JUDGMENT : M.G. Sewlikar, J. 1 . The matter is referred by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for deciding the following issue:- "What is the court fee payable in regard to a suit for declaration that the sale deed, to which the Plaintiffs are not privy/party is void and not binding on the Plaintiffs, and for consequential relief of injunction?" 2. Few facts for deciding this reference can be stated as below:- 3. The Petitioners herein are the Original Plaintiffs in Regular Civil Suit No. 267 of 2014 filed in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.), Shrirampur, District - Ahmednagar. 4. The Petitioners filed a suit for declaration that the sale deed executed by Defendant Nos. 1 to 6 is not binding on the Plaintiffs and for cancellation of mutation entry on the basis of the sale deed and for perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from creating encumbrance and interfering in the possession of the Plaintiffs over the disputed property Gat No. 56/1 admeasuring 4 H 94 R. 5. Summonses were issued to the Defendants (Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 herein) by the learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Shrirampur. The Defendants caused their appearance at Exhibit 25 in the record of the Trial Court, Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 filed an application stating therein that the consideration mentioned in the sale deed is Rs. 12,05,000/-.Therefore, the Civil Judge (J.D.), Shrirampur has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6 . Plaintiffs filed say to this application and contended that the sale deed has been executed by the persons who are not the owners of the disputed property. Relief claimed is that the sale deed is not binding on the Plaintiffs as they are not parties to the sale deed. Therefore, court fee is correctly computed. 7. Learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Shrirampur allowed the application at Exhibit 25. The learned Civil Judge (J.D.) held that the valuation ought to be in accordance with Section 6(iv)(ha) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act. It held that Section 6(iv)(j) can be pressed into service only when monetary evaluation of the subject matter is not possible and where there is no other provision for the valuation of the subject matter in dispute. It further held that by Maharashtra Amendment Act, 1970, a new provision 6(iv)(ha) has been inserted and the court fee will have to be calculated in terms of Section 6(iv)(ha). 8 . It further held that by Maharashtra Amendment Act, 1970, a new provision 6(iv)(ha) has been inserted and the court fee will have to be calculated in terms of Section 6(iv)(ha). 8 . Aggrieved by this decision, the Plaintiffs preferred Writ Petition before this Court. During the hearing of the Writ Petition, the learned Single Judge of this Court noticed that there are divergent views on this point. He found that in a case of Prism Reality vs. Mr. Govind Yashwant Khalade & Ors. in Writ Petition (Stamp) No. 24111 of 2014 of this Court the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh Alias Sardool Singh vs. Randhir Singh and Ors. - AIR 2010 SC 2807 was held by a Single Judge of this Court not applicable in view of specific provision in terms of Section 6(iv)(ha). He found that there are judgments of this Court in which reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) and held that Section 6(iv)(ha) will not be applicable but Section 6(iv)(j) will be applicable in cases where the Plaintiff is not a party to the sale deed. Therefore, the learned Single Judge formulated the above referred issued. 9 . Heard Mr. Subodh P. Shah, learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Plaintiff, Mr. D.S. Bagul, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1, Mr. R.N. Chavan, learned Counsel holding for Mr. V.A. Bagadia, learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 3 to 6. 10. Learned Counsel Mr. Shah, submitted that the Petitioners are not parties to the sale deed. He submitted that when the Plaintiff is a party to the sale deed, he has to file a suit for cancellation of the sale deed. When the Plaintiff is not a party to the sale deed, he has to file a suit for declaration that the sale deed is void/non-est/invalid. The Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) held that when party to a suit files a suit for declaration of the sale deed being void, such a Plaintiff has to seek cancellation of sale deed. Whereas the Plaintiff who is not a party to the sale deed will have to seek a declaration that the sale deed is invalid/void/non-est. He submitted that such a suit is not susceptible to monetary evaluation and would fall under a residuary Section that is 6(iv)(j). Whereas the Plaintiff who is not a party to the sale deed will have to seek a declaration that the sale deed is invalid/void/non-est. He submitted that such a suit is not susceptible to monetary evaluation and would fall under a residuary Section that is 6(iv)(j). Section 6(iv)(ha) simply introduced a new category of suits wherein declaration is sought that the sale deed is void and provides for the court fees payable on such suits. He submitted that the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh has been followed by this Court in the case of Common Piru Caudhari vs. Berubai Chendu Redhiwale and Ors. - (2017) 5 MhLJ 388 and other judgments. In the case of Prism Reality vs. Mr. Govind Yashwant Khalade & Ors. in Writ Petition (Stamp) No. 24111 of 2014, this Court held that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) is not applicable to the State of Maharashtra as Maharashtra Court Fees Act contains a provision enumerated in Section 6(iv)(ha). He, therefore, submitted that Section 6(iv)(ha) cannot be made applicable to the suits filed by the Plaintiff who is not a party to the sale deed. Provisions of Section 6(iv)(ha) can be pressed into service only when the declaration is sought by a Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed. 11. Learned Counsel Mr. Chavan submitted that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) has not been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Agra Diocesan Trust Association vs. Anil David and Ors. and Shailendra Bharadwaj and Ors. vs. Chandra Pal and Anr. - (2013) 1 SCC 579 . He submitted that in terms of Section 6(iv) (ha), the relief sought is susceptible to monetary evaluation. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) is not applicable in view of the specific provision of Section 6(iv)(ha). In Prism Reality vs. Mr. Govind Yashwant Khalade & Ors. reported in 2015(4) MhLJ 472 this Court has put its own gloss thereon and therefore that gloss is binding. The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) is not applicable in view of the specific provision of Section 6(iv)(ha). In Prism Reality vs. Mr. Govind Yashwant Khalade & Ors. reported in 2015(4) MhLJ 472 this Court has put its own gloss thereon and therefore that gloss is binding. He submitted that in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was calculation of court fee under Court Fees Act, 1870 as applicable to the State of Punjab. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Prism Reality (supra) held that there was no analogous provision in Court Fees Act, 1870 akin to Section 6(iv)(ha) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act. He submitted that whenever a sale deed is challenged on the ground of it being void, by default Section 6(iv)(ha) has to be pressed into service. According to him, Section 6(iv)(ha) makes no distinction between the Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed and the Plaintiff who is not party to the sale deed. Therefore, such type of distinction is impermissible to be drawn. He submitted that in the case of Niraj Narendra Walle vs. Vijaya Narendra Walle & Ors. - 2017 (4) MhLJ 402 , judgment of the Prism Reality was not brought to notice of the learned Single Judge and therefore, the learned Single Judge placed reliance in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra). He therefore submitted that irrespective of other Plaintiff is a party to the sale deed or not, when sale deed is challenged on the ground of it being void, the Plaintiff will have to pay court fees on the entire consideration of the sale deed. He therefore prayed for answering the reference accordingly. 12. We have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions of all the learned Counsel. Before adverting to the submissions of the learned Counsel, certain provisions will have to be looked into. Section 6(iv)(ha) of Maharashtra Court Fees Act reads as under:- " Section 6 of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act 6 . The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:- (i) .... (ii) .... (iii) .... (iv)(a) .... Section 6(iv)(ha) of Maharashtra Court Fees Act reads as under:- " Section 6 of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act 6 . The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:- (i) .... (ii) .... (iii) .... (iv)(a) .... (ha) In suits for declaration that any sale, or contract for sale or termination of contract for sale, of any moveable or immoveable property is void [one-half] of ad valorem fee leviable on the value of the property." Section 6(iv)(ha) contemplates that in a Suit for declaration that any sale or contract for sale or termination of contract for sale of any movable or immovable property is void, one-half of ad valorem fee shall be leviable on the value of the property. Section 6(iv)(j) reads thus:- "(j) In suits where declaration is sought, with or without injunction or other consequential relief and the subject-matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and which are not otherwise provided for by this Act [ad valorem fee payable, as if the amount or value of the subject matter was [one thousand rupees]." 13. Section 6(iv)(j) thus, contemplates that in suits where declaration is sought with or without injunction or other consequential relief and the subject matter is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and which are not provided elsewhere in this Act, court fee shall be payable as if the amount or value of the subject matter was Rs. 1,000/-. 14. Before adverting to the issue involved in this reference, law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) and the judgments of this Courts on Section 6(iv)(ha) will have to be considered. 15. In the case of Suhrid Singh (supra), it is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Court Fees Act and the amendment made in the State of Punjab. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suhrid Singh's case made following observations:- "7. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B, two brothers. A executes a sale deed in favour of C. Subsequently A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as nonbinding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. 8 . Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7." 16. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made three categories viz. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7." 16. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made three categories viz. - (1) when the executant of a sale deed seeks annulment, he has to seek cancellation of the sale deed; (2) If a non-executant wants sale deed to be annulled, a declaration that the deed is invalid/non est/illegal or not binding on him will have to be sought. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also given illustration to differentiate between a prayer for cancellation and a declaration that the deed of transfer/conveyance is non-est/illegal or void or not binding on him; and (3) If the executant seeks cancellation of the deed, and seeks possession. If a non-executant is in possession and sues for the declaration is null and void and does not bind him on his share. 17. Both of them i.e. Plaintiff in category 1 and 2 seek the same relief, but form is different. A Single Judge of this Court in the case of M/s. Prism Reality vs. Mr. Govind Yashwant Khalade and Ors. has distinguished the case of Suhrid Singh (supra) and held thus:- "9. In so far as Section 6(iv)(j) is concerned, the same applies to suits which have been filed for declaration other than those sought in the earlier sections with or without injunctions or other consequential relief and the subject-matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and which are not otherwise provided for by this Act. In so far as Section 6(iv)(ha) is concerned, the same applies to suits for declaration that any sale, contract for sale or termination of contract for sale, of any moveable or immoveable property is void. The said provision therefore, encompasses within itself suits that have been filed for avoidance of sale, contract for sale, etc.. In the light of the reliefs which have been sought in the instant suit vide prayer clauses (a) and (b), the suit as filed is undoubtedly for declaration in respect of the Development Agreement and the Sale Deed and by seeking the reliefs sought, what the Plaintiffs in fact are seeking to do is the avoidance of the said sale or contract. Hence, in so far as the said reliefs are sought, the provisions of Section 6(iv) (ha) can be said to be applicable. The fact that according to the Plaintiffs the said documents are sham and bogus cannot be considered for computing or determining the valuation of the suit and the payment of the Court Fees in respect thereof. The Sale Deed which has been executed by the Defendants No. 2 and 3 in favour of the Defendants No. 4 and 5 is undisputedly a registered document and clause (4) thereof the consideration has been mentioned and also the fact that the vendors have accepted that payment of the said consideration has been made to them so also is the Development Agreement. Hence, merely because the Plaintiffs questioned the Sale Deed as being sham and bogus, the Plaintiffs cannot be exempted from the rigours of Section 6(iv) (ha) of the Court Fees Act in the matter of valuation of the suit and payment of the Court Fees. 10. In so far as the judgment of the Apex Court in Surhid Singh @ Sardool Singh (Supra) is concerned, the Apex Court was concerned with a case under the Punjab Court Fees Act and especially Section 7(iv)(c) thereof which was in respect of suits seeking various declarations. Since the Plaintiff in the said suit was not the executant of the document and was seeking a declaration that the Apex Court observed that Court Fees would have to be paid in terms of Clause (c) of the said Section 7 and not in terms of the consideration mentioned in the document. It would have to be borne in mind that the Apex Court was not concerned with provision akin to Section 6(iv)(ha) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, as probably such a provision does not find a place in the Punjab Court Fees Act. However, as indicated above, in so far as the Bombay Court Fees Act is concerned, there is a specific provision governing the suits, where a declaration is sought in respect of a sale or contract for sale or termination of contract is void. However, as indicated above, in so far as the Bombay Court Fees Act is concerned, there is a specific provision governing the suits, where a declaration is sought in respect of a sale or contract for sale or termination of contract is void. Hence, the statutory regime prevailing in the Punjab Court Fees Act being different than the statutory regime prevailing in the Bombay Court Fees Act, the judgment of the Apex Court in Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh's case (Supra) would have no application and would not aid the Plaintiffs in the instant case to contend that they are liable to pay Court Fees as per Section 6(iv)(j). The learned counsel appearing for the Respondents also sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court reported in 2006 DGLS (AHS) 16555 in the matter of Siddha Construction (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Shanmugan and Ors. The said judgment was rendered in the context of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1965, wherein also it appears that there is no provision akin to Section 6(iv) (ha)." In the case of Common Piru Caudhari vs. Berubai Chendu Redhiwale & Ors., 2017 (5) Mh.L.J. 388 , the learned Single Judge of this Court held thus:- "Obviously, clause (ha) of Section 6(iv) of the Act applies only when the suit seeks declaration that any sale or contract for sale or termination of contract for sale of any moveable or immoveable property is void and as such, it would have no application to declarations sought in this case which do not seek any sale or contract for sale or termination of contract for sale of any immovable or movable property to be void. One must understand that there is a sea difference between a declaration that any sale or contract for sale is null and void and the declaration that the sale or contract for sale has no binding effect. In the former case, the very existence of the sale transaction or contract for sale is sought to be razed whereas in the latter case, such existence is not sought to be denied but its effect is only sought to be not applicable to the person seeking declaration. In the former case, the very existence of the sale transaction or contract for sale is sought to be razed whereas in the latter case, such existence is not sought to be denied but its effect is only sought to be not applicable to the person seeking declaration. This would mean that when the declaration that a sale or contract for sale insofar its effect is concerned, does not affect in any manner the claimant or is not binding upon the claimant, its existence is not sought to be denied and it may still be binding upon all others but the claimant. It would then follow that the declarations as sought by the applicant in this case were such as were not covered by clause (ha) of Section 6(iv) of the Act and that would be covered by some different clause." Same view as laid down in Common Piru Caudhari (supra) has been propounded by this Court in the cases of Govind Ramchandra Patil through his Legal Heirs Vina Jitendra Cinchu and Anr. Vs. Liyakat Ali and Ors. and in the case of Niraj s/o. Narendra Walle vs. Vijaya w/o. Narendra Walle and Ors. - 2017 (4) Mh.L.J. 402 . 18. As indicated earlier, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made a distinction between a Plaintiff who is not a party to the sale deed and the Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed. A Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed, as held by the Supreme Court, the Plaintiff will have to seek cancellation of sale deed whereas a Plaintiff who is not a party to the sale deed will have to seek declaration that the sale deed is not binding on him/it is illegal/its invalid/non-est. 19. Agreement which is not enforceable at law is void. An agreement is void when it is without consideration, it is executed by a person not competent to enter into a contract and by a person who is not of the age of majority, is not of sound mind and is not disqualified by any law to which he is subject. The contract is voidable if it is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation or by undue influence. In case of void agreement, the agreement has no legal existence. Therefore, when a Plaintiff seeks declaration that the agreement, instrument/deed is void, he wants the entire agreement to be cancelled. The contract is voidable if it is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation or by undue influence. In case of void agreement, the agreement has no legal existence. Therefore, when a Plaintiff seeks declaration that the agreement, instrument/deed is void, he wants the entire agreement to be cancelled. Void agreement has no sanctity in law. But this is not the case with the Plaintiffs who seek declaration that the instrument/deed is not binding on him. The instrument deed may be otherwise valid, but since the Plaintiff is not a party to the instrument/deed wants the declaration that the said instrument/deed is not binding on him. Therefore, in such cases, the Plaintiff need not seek declaration that the instrument or deed is void. Therefore, 6(iv)(ha) applies only to the persons who seek declaration that the agreement is void i.e. they challenge the very legality of the agreement and that it is void. But in case of the Plaintiffs who seek declaration that the instrument/deed is not binding on them, they do not question the execution of the agreement. Their only contention is that the instrument/deed is not binding on them. The deed or instrument may be otherwise valid inter parties. In such cases, the Plaintiffs are not required to seek declaration that the instrument/deed is void. 20. As held in the case of Common Piru Caudhari (supra) there is a vast difference between a declaration that any sale or contract for sale is null and void and the declaration that sale or contract for sale has no binding effect. In the former case the very existence of the transaction is challenged whereas in the latter case existence of the contract or the instrument is not denied but its effect is sought to be made not applicable to the person who is not a party to the instrument or contract. This would mean that in the latter case, existence of contract is not denied but declaration is sought by the claimant that the instrument or contract is not binding on him but it binds the other executants. In the former case the existence of the contract itself is under cloud. In such a case the entire contract is sought to be cancelled whereas in the latter case only the contract to the extent of the claimant is sought to be not binding. In the former case the existence of the contract itself is under cloud. In such a case the entire contract is sought to be cancelled whereas in the latter case only the contract to the extent of the claimant is sought to be not binding. Therefore, the Plaintiff in both the categories cannot be placed on the same pedestal. They have to be treated differently. For the reasons given above, it would be apposite to make distinction between the Plaintiff who seeks declaration of cancellation of sale deed and the Plaintiff who seeks avoidance of sale deed on the ground that he is not a party to the sale deed. 21. This distinction, if not made, will lead to anomalous results rather absurd results. A Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed seeks avoidance of sale deed on the ground of fraud or mistake of fact, coercion, misrepresentation, etc. In such a case it would be prudent to compute the court fee on the consideration mentioned in the sale deed. But a person who is not a party to the sale deed is completely unaware of the sale deed having been executed. These transactions are executed behind his back. He comes to know of such a transaction only after the deed/instrument is executed. Because of subsequent events he gets the knowledge of the sale deed having been executed by a person who is not the owner of the property or by a person selling his own share and share of other co-owners as well. In such cases, the Plaintiff has not received consideration of the sale deed. It would be unreasonable for the plaintiff who has not received a single farthing or even a penny towards the consideration mentioned in the sale deed to pay the court fee on the entire consideration mentioned in the sale deed. In such cases, he would be penalized twice for no fault of his. First he has lost his property and second he has to pay court fee on the entire consideration. Legislature must not be having such an intention in mind. In the case of the Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed stands on a different pedestal. In such cases, he would be penalized twice for no fault of his. First he has lost his property and second he has to pay court fee on the entire consideration. Legislature must not be having such an intention in mind. In the case of the Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed stands on a different pedestal. He has received the entire consideration in the sale deed but for the reasons enumerated above he seeks avoidance of sale deed or cancellation of sale deed and seeking declaration that the instrument/deed is void. 22. It is true that in the cases of Agra Diocesan Trust Association (supra) and Shailendra Bharadwaj (supra), the authority reported in Suhrid Singh (supra) has not been followed on the ground that the issue involved in Agra Diocesan (supra) and Shailendra Bharadwaj (supra) was not involved in Suhrid Singh (supra). Ratio laid down in Agra Diocesan (supra) and Shailendra Bharadwaj (supra) is not applicable for the reasons that in U.P. Amendment Act a distinction is made between the Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed seeking declaration of avoidance of sale deed and the Plaintiff who is not a party to the sale deed seeking declaration of avoidance of sale deed. This distinction is not made in the Maharashtra Court Fees Act. As indicated earlier, both the categories of the Plaintiffs cannot be treated at par. Section 7 of the U.P. Court Fees Act, 1870 reads thus:- "7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits-The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows: - XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees. Section 7 of the U.P. Court Fees Act, 1870 reads thus:- "7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits-The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows: - XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees. (iv-A) In suit for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable decree for money or other property having a market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value: (1) where the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was a party to the decree or the instrument, according to the value of the subject-matter, and (2) where he or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the decree or instrument, according to one-fifth of the value of the subject matter, and such value shall be deemed to be - if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree is passed or the instrument executed, and if only a part of the decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount or value of the property to which such part relates." This shows that U.P. Amendment Act has created distinction between the Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed and Plaintiff who is not a party to the sale deed. 23. Thus, these two categories of the Plaintiffs need to be treated differently. No doubt, there would be some unscrupulous Plaintiffs falsely claiming that the instrument does not bear their signatures. In such cases such Plaintiffs would be governed by Section 6(iv)(ha) as they would be required to seek cancellation of the instrument. 24. From the above discussion in our judgment, Section 6(iv)(ha) would be applicable only to the Plaintiff who is a party to the sale deed seeking declaration of avoidance of sale deed. It would not be applicable to the Plaintiffs who are not party to the instrument seeking declaration of avoidance of sale deed. Such Plaintiff would be governed by Section 6(iv)(j) as it is not susceptible to monetary evaluation. 25. In the light of above, law is correctly laid down in the cases of Common Piru Caudhari vs. Berubai Chendu Redhiwale & Ors., Govind Ramchandra Patil through his Legal Heirs Vina Jitendra Cinchu and Anr. Vs. Liyakat Ali and Ors. Such Plaintiff would be governed by Section 6(iv)(j) as it is not susceptible to monetary evaluation. 25. In the light of above, law is correctly laid down in the cases of Common Piru Caudhari vs. Berubai Chendu Redhiwale & Ors., Govind Ramchandra Patil through his Legal Heirs Vina Jitendra Cinchu and Anr. Vs. Liyakat Ali and Ors. and Niraj s/o. Narendra Walle vs. Vijaya w/o. Narendra Walle and Ors. 26. In view of the above, answer to the reference is that the court fee payable in regard to a suit for declaration of the sale deed to which the Plaintiff is not a party to the sale deed binding on him and for consequential injunction would be governed by Section 6(iv)(j) of Maharashtra Court Fees Act. 27. This judgment be circulated to all the subordinate Courts in the State of Maharashtra.