ORDER : Aravind Kumar, J. 1. Draft amendment allowed. The same is taken on record. 2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs; “(A) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ or orders or directions be issued to the State of Gujarat-the Respondent No.2 to issue a notification u/s 1(3) of the Gujarat Lokayukta Aayog Act, 2013 to implement the Gujarat Lokayukta Aayog Act, 2013 forthwith; (B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare that the rule 41 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Rules, 1989 ultra vires the Articles 21, 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India and/or the Gujarat Lokayukta Act, 1986 or in alternate be pleased to interpret the rule 41 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Rules, 1989 and declare that rule 41 is not applicable to a person who is a party in the proceedings before the Lokayukta and seeks a certified copy of the document of his own matter or in alternate be pleased to hold and declare that the Lokayukta is not prohibited to provide simple copies of the documents to the parties in its respective matters before the Lokayukta. (C) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ or orders or directions be issued to quash and set aside impugned communication dated 15.09.2022 at Annexure-A (Pg. No.00) issued by the Office of the Lokayukta-the Respondent No.1 denying to provide certified or simple copies of the documents to the petitioner from his own Complaint No.4 of 2020 before the Lokayukta and further be pleased to direct Respondent No.1 to provide certified or simple copies of the documents sought by the petitioner vide application dated 12.9.2022; (D) Cost of this petition to be provided to the petitioner; (E) Pending admission, hearing and/or final disposal of this petition, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the office of the Lokayukta-the Respondent No.1 to not proceed further in the petitioner’s Complaint Inquiry No.4 of 2020 and 1 of 2021; (F) Ad interim ex-parte relief in terms of paragraph (E) above; (G) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant such other and further relief(s) as deemed fit in the interest of justice and equity.” 3. The facts, in brief, leading to filing of the present petition can be crystallized as under; 3.1 Petitioner, who claims to be a public spirited person, is said to have filed a complaint before first respondent under Section 9 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Act, 1986 (for short “Old Act”) against the Vice-Chancellor of a University of the State highlighting seventeen irregularities/illegalities on the premise that said office is a public office or the Vice-Chancellor is discharging the functions of public office. The said complaint came to be registered on 01.10.2020 in Complaint No.4 of 2020. Similar complaint was said to have been made before the Agricultural Minister of the State which resulted in same being forwarded to the authorities for its examination and scrutiny and copy of the said application having also been forwarded to the Governor of Gujarat also is said to have been referred to the Lokayukta which came to be registered as Complaint/Inquiry No.01 of 2021. The said complaints were said to be pending before the first respondent-Lokayukta for consideration. 3.2 Petitioner appeared before the Lokayukta and apprehending that his meritorious case may be construed as weak because of his inadequate knowledge qua the procedural aspects and also on account of facing hearing problem due to purported old age. Hence, petitioner is said to have decided to engage the advocates to appear before the Lokayukta, i.e. the first respondent herein and, accordingly, petitioner is said to have engaged advocates. On applications being filed by the petitioner, seeking permission of the Lokayukta to engage the counsel, he was permitted and, accordingly, the proceedings were taken up. 3.3 Claiming that on account of he (petitioner) having been appearing as a party-in-person has pleaded that he could not maintain the complete records of the matters which were pending before the first respondent, and as such, in order to put the records straight, he intended to obtain certain records/documents/records & proceedings of the Lokayukta, and as such, is said to have made an application on 09.09.2022 seeking inspection of the records, and by way of abundant caution, on the designated day, the learned advocates is said to have appeared before first respondent and petitioner is said to have submitted separate applications on the said date and sought permission for inspection to avoid any technical plea being put up against the petitioner. On carrying out the inspection of the records, it was found by petitioner that it consisted of 7570 plus pages and despite the learned advocates being able to peruse the papers and on account of pressure being exerted by the first respondent to tender his examination-in-chief during the midst of the inspection of the records, it became just and necessary for the petitioner to obtain the copies of the said documents, and as such, application is said to have been submitted seeking certified simple copies of the documents since first respondent which according to the learned advocates representing him, had insisted on production of these documents and also on the ground that they were in grave need of said documents, application seeking copies was filed. The said application was considered by first respondent and by endorsement dated 15.09.2022, Annexure-A, was rejected on the ground that as per the provisions of Sections 10(2), 10(7) and 16(1) of the Old Act, 1986 read with Rule 41 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Rules, 1989, the same cannot be provided. Hence this petition. 4. We have heard the arguments of Shri S.H. Munjyasara, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also perused the case papers. We are not inclined to issue notice to the respondent and petition is being dismissed at the threshold for the reasons indicated herein below. 5. It is the contention of Shri Munjyasara, learned counsel appearing for petitioner that Old Act, 1986 has been repealed by Act No. 20 of 2014 which has been passed by the State Assembly and received the assent of the President and awaiting the issuance of notification, and as such, the first respondent could not have rejected the application of the petitioner under the Old Act; it is his further contention that Act having received the assent of the President of India, the only other option left to the State was to issue the notification, and as such, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar vs. M. Venkatachalam Potti, Authorized Official & Income Tax Officer, reported in AIR 1956 SC 246 , he has prayed for the reliefs sought for in the petition being granted. He would further elaborate his submission by contending that when the new Act itself provides for repealing of the Old Act vide Section 28, the impugned endorsement could have no legs to stand. He would contend that Act having been amended, the rules which were in force as on the date of the New Act coming into force, by operation of law had stood repealed, and as such, the said endorsement issued to the petitioner which is impugned in the present special civil application is liable to be quashed. He would also contend that Rule 41 of the Gujarat Lokayukta Rules is oppressive and ultra vires of Articles 14, 21 and 19 of the Constitution of India. He would contend that Rule 41 is in excess of the power conferred by Act 31 of 1986. He would submit that by virtue of Section 10(2), 10(7) and 16(1) of the Old Act, the intention of the Legislature is to permit conduct of investigation in private and it would indicate not to disclose the information to the public or press which does not mean that the information/documents sought for by the parties to the proceedings has to be denied. The documents sought for by petitioner being in aid of the investigation and to unearth the truth and as such the same could not have been denied as right to a fair trial being fundamental right and contending if the documents produced by respondent which is available on record which is an offshoot of the complaint lodged by the petitioner, furnishing of same should not be deprived as it would be violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right. Hence, he seeks for grant of the prayer. 6. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that Shri Munjyasara, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon Section 63 of the Lokayukta Act, 2013 to contend that it was incumbent upon the State Legislature to pass the Lokayukta Act and it is in furtherance of the same, Act 20 of 2014 was enacted and same requires to be implemented in the State of Gujarat. In this background, it would be necessary to extract Section 63 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 and it reads thus; “63. In this background, it would be necessary to extract Section 63 of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 and it reads thus; “63. Establishment of Lokayukta.—Every State shall establish a body to be known as the Lokayukta for the State, if not so established, constituted or appointed, by a law made by the State Legislature, to deal with complaints relating to corruption against certain public functionaries, within a period of one year from the date of commencement of this Act.” 7. A plain reading of the above provision of Lokpal Act, 2013 would clearly indicate that every State should establish a body to be known as the Lokayukta for the State. The expression “if not so established” requires emphasis in the teeth of the contention raised by Mr. Munjyasara, learned counsel for the petitioner. The intention of the Parliament being clear and unambiguous, namely, it is only in those States which did not have the Lokayukta Act which was required to be enacted as contemplated under Section 63. Undisputedly, as on the date, the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 came into force, namely, on 16.01.2014, the Act 31 of 1986, namely, the Gujarat Lokayukta Act, 1986 was already in force, vogue and in operation in the State of Gujarat. Subsequent to the Lokapal Act coming into force, no doubt the Act 20 of 2014 was passed by the State Assembly and it has received the assent of the President and notification came to be published for having received the assent of the President in the Gujarat Government Gazette on 25.09.2014. However, the same is not said to have been notified as required under sub-section (3) of Section 1 as stated by the learned Advocate General who is present in the Court. In the light of the said statement being made, we have no hesitation to hold that the New Act having not come into force and the Act, 1986 being in operation, the provisions of the said Act is being applied. In the light of the said statement being made, we have no hesitation to hold that the New Act having not come into force and the Act, 1986 being in operation, the provisions of the said Act is being applied. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, namely, A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar (supra), no doubt a similar contention was raised, namely, that no notification had been issued by the then Travancore Government upto 01.07.1949 to implement the Travancore Act 14 of 1124 passed by the Travancore Legislature on 07.03.1949 when the Travancore State and the Cochin State integrated into the United State of Travancore and Cochin. In the very same judgment, there is a reference at Paragraph-36 that on 26.07.1949 a notification was issued under Section 1(3) by the United State of Travancore and Cochin bringing the Act 14 of 1124 into force, that too, retrospectively from 22.07.1949. In that view of the matter, said judgment would not come to the rescue of the petitioner inasmuch as in the instant case, Act 20 of 2014, i.e., sub-section (3) of Section 1 clearly indicates that it would come into force on such date after the State Government in the notification of the Official Gazette appoint for the Act to be in operation and same having not been issued. 8. Now coming to the second issue with regard to Rule 41 being ultra vires of the Constitution, when examined in the teeth of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act, 1986, it would clearly emerge therefrom that such information which is received by the Lokayukta during the course of investigation would be a confidential information and the non-obstante clause found in subsection (1) of Section 16 reinforces this fact. Hence, it would be of benefit to extract section 16(1) and it reads thus; “16(1) "Any information obtained by the Lokayukta or members of his staff in the course of, or for the purposes of, any investigation under this Act, and any evidence recorded in connection with such information, shall, subject to the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 10, be treated as confidential and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no Court shall be entitled to compel the Lokayukta, or any public servant to give evidence relating to such information or produce the evidence so recorded." 9. For the purposes of fair investigation, the embargo placed in sub-section (1) of section 16 is a complete answer. Hence, we deem it proper to extract sub-section (2) of Section 16 also and it reads thus; “16(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to the disclosure of any information or particular:- (a) in any report to be made on an investigation under this Act or for any action or proceeding to be taken on such report, or (b) for purposes of any proceedings for an offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, or an offence of giving or fabricating false evidence under the Indian Penal Code or for purposes of any proceedings under section 17; or (c) for such other purposes as may be prescribed.” 10. A plain reading of the above provision would make it explicitly clear that the embargo placed in sub-section (1) would not apply to the disclosure of any information or particulars in a report to be made on an investigation under this Act or for any action or proceedings being taken based on such report. In that view of the matter, on the mere assertion of the petitioner that it is violative of Articles 14,19 and 21, the rule cannot be struck down. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sathappan vs. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors., reported in AIR 2004 SC 5152 has held as under; “As such an appeal is expressly saved by Section 104(1). Sub-clause 2 cannot apply to such an appeal. Section 104 has to be read as a whole. Merely reading sub-clause (2) by ignoring the saving clause in sub-section (1) would lead to a conflict between the two sub-clauses. Sub-clause 2 cannot apply to such an appeal. Section 104 has to be read as a whole. Merely reading sub-clause (2) by ignoring the saving clause in sub-section (1) would lead to a conflict between the two sub-clauses. Read as a whole and on well established principles of interpretation it is clear that sub-clause (2) can only apply to appeals not saved by sub-clause (1) of Section 104. The finality provided by sub-clause (2) only attaches to Orders passed in Appeal under Section 104, i.e., those Orders against which an Appeal under "any other law for the time being in force" is not permitted. Section 104(2) would not thus bar a Letters Patent Appeal. Effect must also be given to Legislative intent of introducing Section 4 C.P.C. and the words "by any law for the time being in force" in Section 104(1). This was done to give effect to the Calcutta, Madras and Bombay views that Section 104 did not bar a Letters Patent. As Appeals under "any other law for the time being in force" undeniably include a Letters Patent Appeal, such appeals are now specifically saved. Section 104 must be read as a whole and harmoniously. If the intention was to exclude what is specifically saved in sub-clause (1), then there had to be a specific exclusion. A general exclusion of this nature would not be sufficient. We are not saying that a general exclusion would never oust a Letters Patent Appeal. However when Section 104(1) specifically saves a Letters Patent Appeal then the only way such an appeal could be excluded is by express mention in 104(2) that a Letters Patent Appeal is also prohibited. It is for this reason that Section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as follows: "4. Savings.- (1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. Savings.- (1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in subsection (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land." As stated hereinabove, a specific exclusion may be clear from the words of a statue even though no specific reference is made to Letters Patent. But where there is an express saving in the statute/section itself, then general words to the effect that "an appeal would not lie" or "Order will be final" are not sufficient. In such cases, i.e., where there is an express saving, there must be an express exclusion. Sub-clause (2) of Section 104 does not provide for any express exclusion. In this context reference may be made to Section 100A. The present Section 100A was amended in 2002. The earlier Section 100A, introduced in 1976, reads as follows: "100A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal." It is thus to be seen that when the Legislature wanted to exclude a Letters Patent Appeal it specifically did so. The words used in Section 100A are not by way of abundant caution. By the Amendment Acts of 1976 and 2002 a specific exclusion is provided as the Legislature knew that in the absence of such words a Letters Patent Appeal would not be barred. The words used in Section 100A are not by way of abundant caution. By the Amendment Acts of 1976 and 2002 a specific exclusion is provided as the Legislature knew that in the absence of such words a Letters Patent Appeal would not be barred. The Legislature was aware that it had incorporated the saving clause in Section 104(1) and incorporated Section 4 in the C.P.C. Thus now a specific exclusion was provided. After 2002, Section 100A reads as follows: "100A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge." To be noted that here again the Legislature has provided for a specific exclusion. It must be stated that now by virtue of Section 100A no Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. However, it is an admitted position that the law which would prevail would be the law at the relevant time. At the relevant time neither Section 100A nor Section 104(2) barred a Letters Patent Appeal.” 11. In the matter of Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukkhan, reported in AIR 1957 SC 907 , it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court to the following effect: “if the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act”. An interpretation of which will upset settled transaction should be avoided and if two views are possible, the one which would save the transaction should be upheld or followed and show that such transactions are not disturbed. If one interpretation leads to conflict and another leads to harmonious construction, later should prevail as held by Hon’ble Apex Court. Keeping these authoritative principles of law in mind, when the impugned endorsement is perused in the teeth of subsection (1) of Section 16, it would not detain this Court for too long to brush aside the contentions raised by Mr. Keeping these authoritative principles of law in mind, when the impugned endorsement is perused in the teeth of subsection (1) of Section 16, it would not detain this Court for too long to brush aside the contentions raised by Mr. Munjyasara, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as it is not in consonance with the settled principles of law, howsoever attractive his arguments might be. In that view of the matter, we do not find any good ground to entertain this petition and, accordingly, at the threshold, the petition is being dismissed. However, we make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 12. During the pendency of the present petition, petitioner is said to have filed an application and is said to have sought for time before the first respondent to tender his further examination-in-chief and said request is said to have been declined by the respondent. It is this order dated 23.09.2022 which is alleged to have been passed on the said date by the first respondent declining further examination-in-chief which the petitioner wants to assail by way of amended prayer. We would only hope and trust that first respondent would consider the prayer of the petitioner for permitting him to lead further evidence, if sought for, and subject to all exceptions and without expressing any opinion in that regard, we would only request the first respondent to consider the said request, if any made. However, we also make it clear that under the said guise, petitioner cannot be permitted to take adjournment before the first respondent.