JUDGMENT 1. In W.P.No.28236/2018, this is a legal battle for land of the temple waged by & between a devotee & the Managing Committee of the Temple on the one hand and the persons claiming to be it's archaks cum cultivators on the other. The application in Form 1 claiming regrant in respect of land in question was made by the private respondents on 13/1/1993 u/s 5 of the Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977. The Land Tribunal vide order dtd. 3/3/2018 having regranted the land in favour of private respondents, aggrieved thereby, petitioners are knocking at the doors of Writ Court. 2. After service of notice, the private respondents having entered appearance through their advocates, vehemently oppose the petition making submission in justification of the impugned order and the reasons on which it has been constructed. Learned AGA also supports the order of the Tribunal contending that the private respondents have been in the cultivation of subject temple land and therefore, regrant cannot be faltered. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the Petition Papers, this Court is inclined to grant indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (a) The application in Form 1 seeking regrant of land was filed u/s 5 of the 1977 Act on 13/1/1993, the Karnataka Act No.3 of 1991 having prescribed 31/3/1991 as the last date for making the application. That being the position, the application made beyond the statutory limit is no application in the eye of law and therefore, could not have been favourably treated by the respondent-Land Tribunal. Added, there is no provision for the condonation of delay and that prescription of limitation period is by the legislature itself. The vehement contention of learned counsel appearing for the Archak and his sister that a Division Bench of this Court in SRIPATHY GOVIND BHAT VS STATE OF KARNATAKA ILR 2003 KAR 4196, has held that the time limit is directory in nature and therefore, merely because the application was made beyond the statutory limitation, regrant of land cannot faltered, is difficult to agree with. (b) The Division Bench in the said decision was considering mainly as to who could lay a challenge to the order of the kind and thus incidentally treated the question of limitation by making some passing observations. Therefore, the same cannot be treated as a Thumb Rule.
(b) The Division Bench in the said decision was considering mainly as to who could lay a challenge to the order of the kind and thus incidentally treated the question of limitation by making some passing observations. Therefore, the same cannot be treated as a Thumb Rule. It has been a settled position of law since the days of LORD HALSBURY vide QUINN VS. LEATHAM, (1901) A.C. 495, 506 that a case is an authority for the proposition that it actually lays down in a given fact matrix and not for all that which logically follows from what has been so laid down. (c) The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that it has been the villagers who have been cultivating the land in question and using the usufructs thereof for the maintenance of temple in question and also for periodic jaatra, gains support from the long and uninterrupted entries standing in the revenue records which enjoy presumptive value u/s 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. There is of course a sporadic entry for the year 1975-76 wherein along with a member of the Temple Managing Committee, name of one Mr.Veeraiah under whom private respondents claim also figures, is true. How all of a sudden, his name gained entry to the revenue records is not forthcoming from the records. It is a mystery wrapped in enigma. Nothing is stated by the Tribunal either, about this. A sporadic adverse entry of the kind does not enjoy presumptive value qua regular and long standing other entries and therefore, it is bereft of rebuttal force, as rightly submitted by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. (d) The vehement contention of learned counsel appearing for the private respondents that their father was poojary of the temple in question and after his demise, the 3rd respondent and his sister's husband have been performing pooja cannot be accepted for more than one reason: Admittedly, they are ordinary residents of another village. Added, there is absolutely no evidence substantiating that respondent No.3 and husband of respondent No.5 were performing pooja of the temple as archaks on regular basis. Their counsel's reliance on the earlier decision of the Land Tribunal dtd. 7/9/1976 vide Annexure-N which mentions about archakship also does not come to his rescue inasmuch as the occupancy claim was rejected. This order is not set at naught by any court, admittedly.
Their counsel's reliance on the earlier decision of the Land Tribunal dtd. 7/9/1976 vide Annexure-N which mentions about archakship also does not come to his rescue inasmuch as the occupancy claim was rejected. This order is not set at naught by any court, admittedly. The Apex Court in STATE OF PUNJAB VS. GURDEV SINGH AIR 1992 SC 111 , at paras 5, 6 and 7 has held that an order howsoever illegal it may be, would continue to have existence for all ostensible purposes unless set aside in appropriate proceedings taken against it. (e) The last contention of learned counsel for the respondents that petitioners lack locum and locus standii for maintaining the Writ Petition, is bit difficult to countenance. The observations of the Division Bench in SRIPATHY GOVIND BHAT, supra giving such an impression were made in a different fact matrix. Added, the contra contention of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in BISHWANATH VS. SHRI THAKUR RADHABALLABHJI, AIR 1967 SC 1044 . It also draws support from another Division Bench decision in W.P.No.9623/1988 between M.PUNDALIKAPRABHU VS. ADDITIONAL LAND TRIBUNAL, disposed off on 22/2/1994 (LANS(KAR)-1994-2-17). In W.P.No.8766/2021, petitioners lay a challenge to the orders of Civil Courts dtd. 22/10/2020 and 27/1/2020, which in effect have granted injunctive relief in favour of private respondents on the basis of order of the Land Tribunal whereby regrant of land was made in their favour. Even direction for police protection is also structured on the basis of Land Tribunal order. Now, the said Land Tribunal order itself is being set at naught in the accompanying W.P.No.28236/2018, the impugned orders in this petition do lose the substratum, to stand on and therefore, are liable to be voided. In the above circumstances, both the Writ Petitions succeed; a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the order of the Land Tribunal; similarly, a writ of certiorari also issues quashing the order of temporary injunction, the order in M.A.No.9/2019 affirming the grant of temporary injunction and also the order directing police aid. Entries in Revenue Records shall be restored as before, forthwith. Costs made easy.