ORDER 1. Regard being had to the similitude of controversy, these petitions are heard analogously and decided by this common order. For convenience's sake, facts as narrated in MCRC No.36348/2022 are taken into consideration. 2. A tabular representation of different petitions with alleged violation by petitioner and their brief particulars is given for ready reference :-- Sr. No. Case Number Violation alleged by respondent Relevant Year Brief particular about offence 1. MCRC No.36752/2022 Allegation of violation section166 readwith 159 of Companies Act which is punishable under section 162 of Companies Act, 1956 2008-2009 2009-2010 Allegation is non-submission of annual return and holding of annual general meeting in the relevant year. 2. MCRC Allegation of violation section129 readwith 137 of Companies Act, 2013 which is punishable under section 129 (7) and 137(3) of Companies Act, 2013 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 Allegation is non-submission of financial statement within the stipulated time with Registrar of Companies. 3 MCRC No.36754/2022 Allegation of violation section12(1) of Companies Act, 2013 which is punishable under section 12(8) of Companies Act, 2013 2014 Allegation is of not having registered office capable of receiving and acknowledging the communication. 4 MCRC No.36756/2022 Allegation of violation section 96 read with 129 of Companies Act, 2013 which is punishable under section 99 of Companies Act, 2013 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 The AGM has not been held proceedings has not been forwarded to Registrar. 3. Perusal of table indicates violation of different provisions of Act, 1956 as well as Act 2013 and the relevant years. 4. The present petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the petitioner taking challenge to the complaint filed / prosecution lodged at the instance of the Registrar of the Companies for alleged violation of different provisions of the Companies Act, 1956/Companies Act, 2013. 5. Precisely stated facts of the case as represented in MCRC No.36348/2022 are that the petitioner was earlier one of the Directors of M/s. Sterling Kalks Sand Bricks Limited (hereinafter referred as Company) between the period 30th September, 1992 to 13th March, 1995. On 13th March, 1995, petitioner resigned and no longer continued to remain as Director of the Company thereafter. 6. On 13th March, 1995, petitioner resigned and no longer continued to remain as Director of the Company thereafter. 6. In the year 2011, complaint was filed by respondent with the allegations that the Company and its Directors including the present petitioner were guilty of offence as contained in section 162 of the Companies Act, 1956 because of non-compliance of section 220 of the Act, 1956 for period in year 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. It was the allegation that Company has not submitted a balance sheet and profit and loss account of that period. Therefore, company and its Directors were guilty of such non-compliance. 7. Since the petitioner resigned as Director of the Company w.e.f. 13.3.1995, thereafter, when petitioner as accused (in summon's case) appeared before the Trial Court then moved an application under section 239 of Cr.P.C. for discharge. It was the contention of petitioner in the said application that he resigned in the year 1995 as referred above and in support of submissions, he filed certified copy of acceptance of resignation by the Registrar of the Companies. Therefore, on the strength of such documents, it was his submission that he may be discharged because at the relevant point of time, he was not at the helm of affairs in any capacity in the Company. He also referred the proceedings of Securities and Exchange Board of India (hereinafter referred as S.E.B.I.) vide proceedings dated 9.9.2004 in which concerned authority considered this aspect and came to the conclusion that since petitioner is no longer Director of the Company, therefore, no action was proposed against him. He also referred the proceedings dated 21.10.2016 of S.E.B.I. to submit that S.E.B.I. exonerated the petitioner and other similarly placed persons on account of resignation wherein S.E.B.I. referred the fact that it already exonerated them vide order dated 9th September, 2004, therefore, show cause notice was disposed of. 8. Along with the said application under section 239 of Cr.P.C., another application under section 91 of Cr.P.C. was also preferred in which prayer was made that Trial Court may call the relevant proceedings of S.E.B.I. from the concerned authority so that the submissions may be verified from the original record. 9. Vide impugned order dated 28.5.2022, Trial Court rejected both the applications, therefore, petitioner preferred this petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C. taking exception to the institution of complaint and proceedings in toto. 10. 9. Vide impugned order dated 28.5.2022, Trial Court rejected both the applications, therefore, petitioner preferred this petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C. taking exception to the institution of complaint and proceedings in toto. 10. It is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner resigned from the Company w.e.f. 13.3.1995 and thereafter, he had no role to play in the affairs of the Company. Notice in question referred the year 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 where certain noncompliances under section 162 of the Act, 1956 were noticed. Therefore, proceedings under section 220 of the Act, 1956 were initiated. Since petitioner resigned much earlier and S.E.B.I. recognized this fact earlier in their different proceedings, therefore, no case is made out at all. Counsel relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Rajeev Thapar and others v. Madal Lal Kapoor reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330 to submit that this is a case where no dispute regarding facts exist and date of resignation and its effect is not being disputed even by the respondent i.e. Registrar of the Companies. Therefore, no offense is prima facie made out and petitioner cannot be made to suffer such frivolous litigation. 11. Counsel also relied upon judgment rendered by the apex Court in the case of Bhushan Kumar and another v. State (NCT Of Delhi) and others reported in (2012) 5 SCC 424 and submits that application under section 239 of Cr.P.C. can be considered in the matter of summons cases also. He referred para 20 of the said judgment of apex Court in this regard where it has been observed that inherent power under section 251 of the Code mandates that when the accused appears before the trial Court pursuant to summons issued under section 204 of the Code in a summons trial case, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to carefully go through the allegations made in the charge-sheet or complaint and consider the evidence to come to a conclusion whether or not, commission of any offence is disclosed and if the answer is in the affirmative, the Magistrate shall explain the substance of the accusation to the accused and ask him whether he pleads guilty otherwise, he is bound to discharge the accused as per section 239 of the Code. 12. 12. Counsel further relied upon the judgment rendered this Court in the case of Shivendra Dhakre v. Narendera Sharma reported in 2017 (3) JLJ 325 to submit that once the trial starts, then power under section 91 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the Trial Court in the interest of justice, so that at the time of evidence of complainant, accused can bring some documents from the custody of the complainant or otherwise to verify the very existence of those documents and/or to refer to the complainant or witnesses during cross-examination. 13. Per contra, learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing on behalf of respondent/Registrar of Companies opposed the prayer and submitted that record of respondent appeared online at some later point of time, therefore, when the complaint was instituted, it was not known to the respondent that petitioner already resigned and S.E.B.I. had already taken note of this fact. However, he prayed for dismissal of this petition. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents appended thereto. 15. This is a case where admittedly petitioner worked as Director of the Company between the period 30th September, 1992 till 13th March, 1995 and then resigned. In 2011, under the mistaken belief, complaint was filed against present petitioner also for alleged non-compliance of section 220 of Act, 1956 for which penalty is provided under section 162 of the Act, 1956. This is a case where admittedly petitioner worked as Director of the Company between the period 30th September, 1992 till 13th March, 1995 and then resigned. In 2011, under the mistaken belief, complaint was filed against present petitioner also for alleged non-compliance of section 220 of Act, 1956 for which penalty is provided under section 162 of the Act, 1956. For ready reference, section 220 of the Act is reproduced as under :-- “(1) After the balance sheet and the profit and loss account have been laid before a company at an annual general meeting as aforesaid, there shall be filed with the Registrar [within thirty days from the date on which the balance sheet and the profit and loss account were so laid, [or where the annual general meeting of a company for any year has not been held, there shall be filed with the Registrar within thirty days from the latest day on or before which that meeting should have been held in accordance with the provisions of this Act], (a) [***][a copy] of the balance sheet and the profit and loss account, signed by the managing director, [***] manager or secretary of the company, or if there be none of these, by a director of the company, together with [a copy] of all documents which are required by this Act to be annexed or attached to such balance sheet or profit and loss account : [Provided that in the case of a private company, [copy] of the balance sheet and [copy] of the profit and loss account shall be filed with the Registrar separately:] [***] [Provided further that, - (i) in the case of a private company which is not a subsidiary of a public company, or (ii) in the case of a private company of which the entire paid-up share capital is held by one or more bodies corporate incorporated outside India, or (iii) in the case of a company which becomes a public company by virtue of section 43A, if the Central Government directs that it is not in the public interest that any person other than a member of the company shall be entitled to inspect, or obtain copies of, the profit and loss account of the company, no person other than a member of the company concerned shall be entitled to inspect, or obtain copies of, the profit and loss account of that company under section 610.] (2) If the annual general meeting of a [***] company before which a balance sheet is laid as aforesaid does not adopt the balance sheet, [or is adjourned without adopting the balance sheet], [or, if the annual general meeting of a company for any year has not been held], a statement of that fact and of the reasons therefor shall be annexed to the balance sheet [***] required to be filed with the Registrar. (3) If default is made in complying with the requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2), the company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be liable to the like punishment as is provided by section 162 for a default in complying with the provisions of section 159, 160 or 161.” 16. Non-compliance of section 220 of the Act attracts the penalty under section 162 of the Act, 1956. For ready reference, section 162 of the Act is reproduced as under :- - “(1) If a company fails to comply with any of the provisions contained in section 159, 160 or 161. The company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to [five hundred] rupees for every day during which the default continues. (2) For the purposes of this section and sections 159, 160 and 161, the expressions "officer" and "director" shall include any person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the Board of directors of the company is accustomed to act.” 17. Admittedly, alleged non-compliance is for the period 2008-2009 and year 2009-2010 where some defaults on the part of the Company are made. Admittedly, petitioner resigned w.e.f. 13th March, 1995. Much thereafter, alleged defaults have been committed. 18. In year 2004, in the matter of directions under section 11 readwith section 11(B) of the S.E.B.I. Act, 1992 to Sterling Kalks Sand Bricks Limited and its Directors, and in respect of some companies which were identified as vanishing companies, therefore, task force was set up in this regard. After detail inquiry by the task force in its report dated 9.9.2004 in para 5.1, a specific finding has been given in favour of petitioner. The said para 5.1 is reproduced as under :-- “5.1- I find that in respect of the erstwhile directors viz. P.S. Santhankrishnan, Vijay Kumar Verma, Avtar Singh Narang, Sachidanand Chitalre, Neinz George Sibehlds, Paramjeet Singh Saluja and Ramnik Shah Saluja, I find that while they were directors of SKBL, the company had filed balance sheets and otherwise complied with requirements of the listing agreement. Since they are no longer directors of the company, I find that no action needs to be taken against them.” 19. Since they are no longer directors of the company, I find that no action needs to be taken against them.” 19. Later on, in the year 2016, also vide order dated 21.10.2016, S.E.B.I. again looked into and the report dated 9.9.2004 and affirmed the fact that petitioner has already been exonerated vide order dated 9th September, 2004, therefore, show cause notice issued earlier was disposed of in respect of the petitioner and others similarly placed persons. The said conclusion is in Para 14 of report dated 21.10.2016. Same is reproduced as under for ready reference :-- “It has also been confirmed that names of Mr. P.S. Santhanankrishnan, Vijay Kumar Verma, Avtar Singh Narang, Sachidanand Chitalre, Neinz George Sibehlds, Paramjeet Singh Saluja and Ramnik Shah Saluja have been removed from the list of directors of Sterling Kalks Sand Bricks Ltd. and they have been exonerated vide order dated 9.9.2004. I accordingly, dispose of the SCNs in respect of them.” 20. From the facts, it appears that S.E.B.I. has already considered this aspect twice and exonerated the petitioner from the teeth of section 162 of the Act and other related provisions. This stands true for all other cases also, particulars of which are given in table above. All provisions and respective penalty, if looked into, then it is clear that no case is made out against the petitioner. 21. Therefore, if on such allegations, trial Court is allowed to continue, then it would nothing but harassment to be meted out to the petitioner because long drawn proceedings itself tantamount to punishment, when prima facie no case is made out and case of the petitioner already considered by the concerned authority i.e. S.E.B.I. and given findings in favour of the petitioner twice. 22. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, seven parameters were prescribed under which Court can interfere for resorting to extraordinary jurisdiction. Here contingency No.5 is attracted and same is reproduced as under :-- “Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” 23. Here contingency No.5 is attracted and same is reproduced as under :-- “Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” 23. In the case of Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330 , the apex Court reiterated the scope of power vested under section 482 of Cr.P.C. in following words :-- 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. :-- (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the Court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under section 482 of the Cr.P.C.. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious Court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 24. Considering the submission and going through the documents appended thereto as well as the reply filed by the respondent, it appears that petitioner made out his case for interference. Considering the submission and going through the documents appended thereto as well as the reply filed by the respondent, it appears that petitioner made out his case for interference. Once, he resigned in the year 1995, then he cannot be fastened with any liability for a period of 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. 25. Resultantly, petition is hereby allowed and impugned order dated 28th of May, 2022 (Annexure P-1) as well as the proceedings pending before the Trial Court (Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior) in Criminal Cases No.3634/2011, No.1481/2015, No.2048/2015, No.3633/2011, and No.1482/2015, so far as it relates to petitioner only, namely Sachitanand Chitala (Chitale) (Accused No.5 before the Trial Court) have been quashed. For rest of the accused, trial may proceed in accordance with the law.