JUDGMENT : This is a defendant’s second appeal, arising out of a suit for specific performance, which has been decreed by both the Courts below. 2. Heard Mr. Mridul Kumar, learned Counsel for the appellant in support of the motion under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[for short “the Code] and Mr. Jitendra Kumar Ravat, learned Counsel, who appears on caveat, on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. 3. The plaintiff-respondent, Ramawatar, who shall hereinafter be referred to as “the plaintiff” instituted Original Suit No. 210 of 2002, Ramawatar v. Chabila, before the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jalaun at Orai claiming specific performance of a registered agreement to sell dated 13.11.1998, executed in the plaintiff’s favour by Chabila, the sole defendant-appellant. The defendant-appellant aforesaid shall hereinafter be referred to as “the defendant”. 4. It is the plaintiff’s case that the defendant is the recorded bhumidhar-in-possession of an agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 194 ad-measuring 1.165 hectares, situate in Mauja Dharguva, Pargana Orai, Jalaun. It was asserted by the plaintiff that the defendant was in need of money and decided to sell-off his land aforesaid to the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs.70,000/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a Rs.70,000/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a registered agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff on 13.11.1998. At the time of execution of the agreement, the plaintiff paid, out of the agreed consideration, a sum of 65,000/-. It was agreed between parties that the Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a plaintiff shall pay the remainder of 5,000/- within a period of one year Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a and thereupon, the defendant shall execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, transferring the land subject matter of the suit agreement. The land aforesaid shall hereinafter be called as “the suit property”. 5. It is the plaintiff’s case that the suit agreement was executed in the Sub-Registrar’s Office and the earnest was also paid there. The plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is also the plaintiff’s case that the defendant is bound under the suit agreement to receive the remainder of the sale consideration i.e. the sum of Rs. 5,000/- and execute a sale deed in his favour. It is the plaintiff’s Rs.70,000/-. The plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is also the plaintiff’s case that the defendant is bound under the suit agreement to receive the remainder of the sale consideration i.e. the sum of Rs. 5,000/- and execute a sale deed in his favour. It is the plaintiff’s Rs.70,000/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a further case that he requested the defendant to execute the sale deed in his favour, but the defendant did no more than assure the plaintiff that he would abide by his covenant. In fact, he did not. The plaintiff, accordingly, caused a notice dated 01.03.2022 to be served upon the defendant, asking him to receive the remainder of the consideration and execute the requisite sale deed in his favour. The said notice was never replied by the defendant. The plaintiff then caused a notice to be sent to the defendant’s correct address, asking the latter to remain present in the Sub-Registrar’s Office on 17.10.2002, for the purpose of executing the covenanted sale deed upon receipt of the balance sale consideration, in terms of the suit agreement. He was present at the Sub-Registrar’s Office on 17.10.2002, but the defendant did not turn up. Broadly on this cause of action, the suit was instituted. 6. The defendant put in his written statement, also carrying his counterclaim. He admitted his ownership of the suit property, but denied the plaintiff’s case almost about everything else. Most of the defendant’s case is carried in the additional pleas, where it is averred that he was ailing and needed a sum of 3,10,000/-. The defendant approached one Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a Ram Prakash, an attesting witness of the suit agreement, requesting a loan. Ram Prakash is alleged to have assured the defendant that he would secure him a loan of 30,000/-, which would carry interest at the usual Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a bank rate. It is pleaded that the defendant being in need of money, received a sum of 30,000/- from Ram Prakash at his home, in the Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a presence of witnesses, on 13.01.1998. Ram Prakash said that the defendant would have to execute some papers to serve as security for the loan. It is pleaded that the defendant being in need of money, received a sum of 30,000/- from Ram Prakash at his home, in the Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a presence of witnesses, on 13.01.1998. Ram Prakash said that the defendant would have to execute some papers to serve as security for the loan. It is averred that Ram Prakash never disclosed what property he would have to encumber as security. He is said to have made the defendant thumb-mark blank stamp papers and also supply his photographs. Ram Prakash was alleged by the defendant to have assured the latter that he would take care of the paperwork. The defendant was assured that as soon as he repays the loan, the document would be returned to him. The defendant has averred that he did not know the plaintiff when the suit agreement was executed. The defendant repaid a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to Ram Prakash and asked him to give back the document, to which Ram Prakash is claimed to have responded, telling the defendant that the document was missing somewhere, and as soon as the same was found, it would be returned to the defendant. The defendant claims that he demanded of Ram Prakash to return the document, but Ram Prakash assured that he would not ask the defendant to repay the loan that he had already received. The defendant came to know later on that the plaintiff had brought a suit for specific performance on the basis of the suit agreement and secured an ex-parte decree behind his back. The defendant moved to set aside the ex-parte decree, which was allowed. It is the defendant’s case that on a perusal of records, he came to know that Ram Prakash had, in fact, caused an agreement to sell to be scribed on those blank stamp papers. It is also the defendant’s case the plaintiff is a moneylender and Ram Prakash would, on his behalf, disburse loans to persons in need. The plaintiff and the defendant never entered into any bargain relating to sale of the suit property that embodies the suit agreement. The defendant never received any notice from the plaintiff. It is the defendant’s case that the suit property is very valuable and the defendant was never in need to sell his land. The plaintiff and the defendant never entered into any bargain relating to sale of the suit property that embodies the suit agreement. The defendant never received any notice from the plaintiff. It is the defendant’s case that the suit property is very valuable and the defendant was never in need to sell his land. The suit property, at the relevant time, had a market value of at least 10 lacs. The defendant is Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a dependent on the suit property for his livelihood. There is no question of selling the said property. If the defendant is made to part with the suit property, he would suffer great hardship. The defendant denied execution of the suit agreement and pleaded that it was the product of a fraud played upon him. In the counterclaim, it was prayed that a decree of declaration be passed, adjudging the suit agreement void. The defendant demanded that the suit be dismissed with special costs. 7. A replication was put in on behalf of the plaintiff, traversing the counterclaim and reiterating the plaint case. 8. On pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed : 1. Whether the defendant executed an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff on 13.11.1998 for Rs. 70,000/-? If yes, its effect? 2. Whether the agreement to sell dated 13.11.1998 was got executed by the plaintiff for the purpose of securing the loan? If yes, its effect? 3. Whether the disputed agreement is based on fraud? 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by Sections 16, 18, 20 and 21 of the Specific Relief Act? 5. Whether the defendant is entitled through the counterclaim in paragraph 21 of written statement to get the disputed document declared void and illegal? 6. Whether the counterclaim of the defendant is time barred? 7. Whether insufficient court fee has been paid on the counterclaim? 8. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 9. The learned Trial Judge has set out a summary of the documentary evidence as well as the description of witnesses examined by both sides in support of their respective cases, and the same need not be listed here again. Of course, reference would be made to so much of the evidence as is necessary to dispose of this motion. 10. The learned Trial Judge has set out a summary of the documentary evidence as well as the description of witnesses examined by both sides in support of their respective cases, and the same need not be listed here again. Of course, reference would be made to so much of the evidence as is necessary to dispose of this motion. 10. The Trial Court found on Issue No. 6 against the defendant, holding the counterclaim to be time-barred. Issues Nos. 5 and 7 followed the result of the answer to Issue No. 6, and were answered against the defendant. Issues Nos. 2 and 3 were taken up together and answered against the defendant. Issue No. 1 has been answered for the plaintiff. Issue No. 4 has been answered against the defendant. Issue No. 8, that relates to the exercise of discretion to grant specific performance of contract under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963[for short “the Act of 1963] has been answered in favour of the plaintiff. The suit has been decreed for the relief of specific performance, though with a direction for the costs to go easy. 11. Upon the defendant’s appeal to the learned District Judge, the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Jalaun at Orai, has reviewed the entire evidence issue-wise, and affirmed the Trial Court, reiterating the Trial Court’s decree in speaking terms. The Lower Appellate Court too, directed costs to go easy. 12. Aggrieved, the defendant has instituted the present appeal. 13. Mr. Mridul Kumar,, learned Counsel for the appellant, has argued before this Court that his client is a rustic villager and burden of proof ought to have been reversed, requiring the plaintiff to affirmatively prove that the defendant executed the suit agreement after understanding its contents. This Court must immediately clarify that a plea of non-est factum is different from fraud. Here, a plea of fraud was raised and an issue about it was framed at the defendant’s instance. So far as a rustic villager is concerned, the burden of proof, in case of either plea of fraud or non-est factum, be reversed, but that has not been done in this case. Here, a plea of fraud was raised and an issue about it was framed at the defendant’s instance. So far as a rustic villager is concerned, the burden of proof, in case of either plea of fraud or non-est factum, be reversed, but that has not been done in this case. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the burden of proof should have been reversed in this case, does not appear to be tenable, because for one, it is not in every case of an illiterate man - even a rustic, that the burden of proof has to be reversed, like a pardanasheen woman or a certain class of women, unacquainted with the ways of the world. In the case of a man, it has to be demonstrated that apart from being illiterate and rustic, he is absolutely unacquainted with worldly affairs. The said question does not remotely arise in this case, irrespective of the fact that fraud is pleaded or non-est factum, because there is no pleading to the effect that the defendant is an illiterate and rustic villager, unacquainted with the ways of the world. This submission appears to have been inspired by the stand taken during arguments before the Trial Court, which the Trial Court has rightly rejected in the absence of requisite pleadings. 14. On the other hand, the Trial Court has dealt with the issue of fraud with a remarkably fine understanding of the law and with an equally remarkable marshalling of evidence. The evidence has rightly been appreciated in its finest detail. The Trial Court has held that in case of a plea of fraud, the case has to be established beyond reasonable doubt. He has referred to binding authority on the point. In appreciating the evidence, the learned Trial Judge has referred to the testimony of D.W.-2, about whom it has been very carefully remarked that he is a brother of one of the attesting witnesses, Shiv Narayan. This witness’s testimony has been appreciated to remark that whereas according to his pleading in the written statement, the defendant was made to sign blank stamp papers, the witness under reference has said in his cross-examination that the papers which the defendant signed in his presence were plain and not stamp papers. This witness’s testimony has been appreciated to remark that whereas according to his pleading in the written statement, the defendant was made to sign blank stamp papers, the witness under reference has said in his cross-examination that the papers which the defendant signed in his presence were plain and not stamp papers. It has also been noticed that the witness D.W.-2 has said that Ramawatar (the plaintiff) had not given any loan to Chabila (the defendant). This witness has gone on to say that Ramawatar is into the business of money lending. It is further stated that he has just heard about this fact. From these facts, the Trial Court has remarked that it shows that this witness’s testimony about Ramawatar being into the business of money lending is hearsay and negatived the case on its basis. The evidence of D.W.-3 has also been noticed with the remark that he has not supported the case of the defendant at all in the cross-examination and turned hostile. The Trial Court has remarked that heavy burden lay upon the defendant to prove the plea of fraud and two of his witnesses have not at all supported that case. The finding of the Trial Court on Issues Nos. 2 and 3 is absolutely flawless. The Appellate Court has rightly affirmed the findings. 15. So far as Issue No. 1 goes, the Trial Court has held that the suit agreement is a registered document, wherein, there is a presumption of correctness about the Registrar's endorsement. The presumption is rebuttable, but there is no evidence led to offset the strong presumption that attaches. The said finding has been affirmed by the Lower Appellate Court also. In deciding Issue No. 3, the Trial Court has again held that there is a plea that the suit is barred by Sections 16, 18, 20 and 21 of the Act of 1963, but there is no pleading elucidating how the suit is barred under the said provisions. 16. The Trial Court has dealt with the defendant's case of hardship, thoroughly examining the evidence on record. It has been noticed that the defendant has a total of 30 bighas of agricultural land located in more than one village. It has been remarked that it is not the defendant's case that in the event specific performance being granted, he would become landless, or that his livelihood would be effaced. It has been noticed that the defendant has a total of 30 bighas of agricultural land located in more than one village. It has been remarked that it is not the defendant's case that in the event specific performance being granted, he would become landless, or that his livelihood would be effaced. It has been opined that if a decree of specific performance is passed, the defendant would not face that kind of hardship as envisaged under Section 20(2)(b), read with Explanation II of the Act of 1963. It must be remarked that this position of the law is about the way it stood before its amendment vide The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018[No. 18 of 2018 (w.e.f. August 1, 2018)]. The Trial Court has also opined that though according to prevalent circle rate, the price of the suit property for the purposes of stamp duty, would be a sum of 1.68 lacs, the sum of Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a 70,000/- for which the bargain has been struck is apparently the result of Rs.70,00/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a circumstances that made the defendant choose to enter into that bargain. It is opined by the Trial Court that the mere fact that the defendant has made a bad bargain is no ground to refuse specific performance. This finding too has been affirmed by the Lower Appellate Court. In our opinion, there is no perversity about this finding or any illegality besetting it. 17. In deciding Issue No. 8, the Trial Court has gone into every possible detail of relevant evidence that ought to enter consideration before exercising discretion to grant specific performance. He has also considered the issue of directing a higher price to be paid in terms of the decisions of this Court in Om Prakash v. Pooran Chand and another, 2012 (1) CAR 79 (All). It has been opined that the bargain in this case has been settled, because the defendant was in need of money and he decided to do it at a lesser price. 18. There is another reason why the Trial Court has chosen to exercise discretion in favour of the plaintiff, and that is because the defendant apparently came up with a false case of fraud and the transaction being a loan, which he could not prove. 18. There is another reason why the Trial Court has chosen to exercise discretion in favour of the plaintiff, and that is because the defendant apparently came up with a false case of fraud and the transaction being a loan, which he could not prove. In doing that, the Trial Court has relied on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Zarina Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam alias A. Amarnathan, AIR 2015 SC 580 , where it has been held that though the plaintiff has to prove and establish a case that discretion ought to be exercised in his favour, but where the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts, the discretion should not be exercised against specific performance. The defendant's case has been condemned by the Trial Court as false about his defences of fraud and the defendant being a moneylender, who had lent him money, but misused his papers. It is on all these premises that the learned Trial Judge has exercised discretion also to grant specific performance. The Appellate Court has gone through the evidence and affirmed all these findings. 19. On a wholesome consideration of the matter, this Court must remark that there is not the slightest reason in the present case to interfere with the concurrent opinion of the two Courts below on any of the issues involved. To add to it is the fact that the case that the defendant pleaded was that he had taken a loan, which he had returned to the plaintiff's agent Ram Prakash and asked him to give back his papers, which the latter said were misplaced and did not return. This story to the face of it pleaded in defence is enough to tilt the balance of probability against the defendant. The reason, to supplement the reasoning of the Courts below, is that if indeed the defendant had taken a loan from the plaintiff through his agent, Ram Prakash, which he repaid to Ram Prakash, he would have certainly asked for a receipt. Once Ram Prakash had made him execute a registered document that the defendant believed to be a document to secure the loan, in the nature of things, repayment of the loan could not have been without a receipt. 20. Once Ram Prakash had made him execute a registered document that the defendant believed to be a document to secure the loan, in the nature of things, repayment of the loan could not have been without a receipt. 20. In addition, it is also ex-facie a preposterous stand because the loan being a sum of 30,000/-, it is not possible that the sum would have been Rs.70,000/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a refunded without interest.k There is nothing said apparently by the defendant about the interest that he repaid to Ram Prakash on the sum of 30,000/-. The entire story that the defendant had come up with is laced Rs.70,000/-. For the purpose, the defendant executed a with falsehood and the Courts below have rightly disbelieved the defendant's case. 21. On the other hand, the plaintiff's case is well established on the foot of a registered document, that is to say, the suit agreement, which he has proved to the hilt on the strength of evidence that he had led, both oral and documentary. There is absolutely no flaw in the findings returned by the two Courts below concurrently, worth scrutiny under Section 100 of the Code. There is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal, which is concluded by well considered findings of fact. 22. Before parting with the matter, this Court must place on record its profound appreciation for the very well-considered and exceptionally well-structured judgment written by the learned Trial Judge Mr. Palash Ganguly. It shows the finest marshalling of facts and evidence and understanding of the law, considering that the Trial Judge is a very junior Judicial Officer. 23. In this result, this appeal is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code. 24. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.