JUDGMENT : A.S. Supehia, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed inter alia seeking following reliefs: "8.(B) be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment/order/award dated 19-6-2013 passed by the Industrial Tribunal No.1, Rajkot in Reference (I.T.) No. 84 of 2009." 2. At the outset, learned advocate Mr. Hardik Rawal appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned award is required to be quashed and set aside since the industrial dispute is raised after 15 years and that too after retirement of the petitioner on 31.07.2008. It is submitted that after holding the departmental inquiry, on 31.03.1992, the order of punishment of stoppage of increments for two years with permanent effect was passed and the dispute has been raised on 12.06.2009 and hence, the Industrial Tribunal should not have entertained the reference. 2.1. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vadodara Mahanagar Corporation Kamdar Karmachari Union v. Municipal Commissioner, 2018 (4) GLR 3531 . 2.2. Learned advocate has further submitted that against the impugned order of punishment, the respondent-workman had preferred the first appeal, which was dismissed on 09.03.1994 and the same has neither been challenged before the Industrial Tribunal nor any dispute has been raised in this regard. Thus, he has submitted that the writ petition may be allowed by setting aside the impugned award. 3. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Ms. Tejal Shah appearing for the respondent-workman has submitted that the impugned award does not require any interference since the respondent-workman was not paid the retirement benefits and hence, he was constrained to raise the industrial dispute. Thus, she has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal, after appreciating the documentary as well as oral evidence, has set aside the punishment order. Thus, she has submitted that the writ petition may be rejected. 4. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and also perused the documents as pointed out by them. 5. The established facts from the record are that by the order dated 31.03.1992, the petitioner imposed the punishment upon the respondent-workman of stoppage of increments for two years with permanent effect. 4. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and also perused the documents as pointed out by them. 5. The established facts from the record are that by the order dated 31.03.1992, the petitioner imposed the punishment upon the respondent-workman of stoppage of increments for two years with permanent effect. The respondent-workman retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation on 31.07.2008 and the industrial dispute has been raised in the year 2009, which culminated into the reference being Reference (IT) No. 84 of 2009. Thus, the reference has been registered for dispute, which had occurred in the year 1992, when the order of punishment was passed. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner, after having retired and after having undergone the punishment of stoppage of increments for two years with permanent effect, has raised the industrial dispute. 7. This Court has perused the impugned award. It does not reflect that the respondent-workman had kept the dispute alive for all these years. The Industrial Tribunal has misdirected itself in allowing the reference since the aspect with regard to delay was not appreciated in its true perspective. The Industrial Tribunal should have considered that the dispute has been raised after retirement of the respondent-workman that too after undergoing the punishment. 8. It is also not in dispute that though the first appeal filed by the respondent-workman was rejected by the order dated 09.03.1994, the same has not been referred at all before the Industrial Tribunal nor any reference in this regard has been made. 9. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Division Bench in case of Vadodara Mahanagar Corporation Kamdar Karmachari Union (supra), wherein the Division Bench, after considering the decision of the Apex Court in case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department, AIR 2016 SC 2984 has held thus: "9. The entire controversy raised in the present appeal as well as the issue before the Industrial Tribunal and the learned single Judge rests only on one issue - whether the Industrial Tribunal as well as the learned single Judge were justified in rejecting the demand raised by the workman only on the ground of delay. The secondary issue is that even if there was a delay in raising the dispute, whether the relief prayed for by the workman could have been granted by moulding the reliefs. 10. The secondary issue is that even if there was a delay in raising the dispute, whether the relief prayed for by the workman could have been granted by moulding the reliefs. 10. In the recent decision rendered in the case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another, reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2016 SC 2984 , paras 19, 34, 38, 40 and 42), the Supreme Court after a detailed scrutiny and examination of various judgments on the aspect of delay and limitation in making reference, as well as moulding the reliefs in such cases, has observed thus: "21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive the matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 01.04.1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 01.04.1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination and therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a "dispute" what had otherwise become a buried issue. 40. Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case the party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong. 42.2 Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3 Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. 42.3 Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are latches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, it the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry." 11. The Apex Court, in paragraph-44 of the above decision, has summarized the entire case law and has observed that the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is a satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry. 12. The observations made by the Apex Court in the preceding paragraphs spells out that the dispute arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects it and if he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists and the workman has to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the dispute is still alive and on the other hand, if because of such delay, dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the workman was appointed on the Class-IV post of Sepoy vide order dated 22.06.1999 after due verification of his educational qualifications. He was appointed on compassionate ground on the post of his father, who was also serving as a Sepoy at the time of his death. It is not disputed that the post of Sepoy was a Class-IV post. After 14 years of his appointment on the post of Sepoy, the workman raised a dispute seeking appointment on the Class-III post of Junior Clerk with retrospective effect. It is to be noted that at the relevant time i.e. in the year 1999, the workman had accepted his appointment on the post of Sepoy without any demur and he continued to work as such till the year 2014. It is to be noted that at the relevant time i.e. in the year 1999, the workman had accepted his appointment on the post of Sepoy without any demur and he continued to work as such till the year 2014. Even if it is considered that the workman was working on the post of Junior Clerk, after being regularly appointed in the year 2015, as averred in the Letters Patent Appeal, then it would be a worst case for him since it appears that he raised the dispute on a misconceived notion that he is eligible for the said post right from his inception in service in 2014 before he was regularly selected in 2015. Thus, after 14 years, without raising any demand or making any application before the respondent authorities requesting to consider his case for appointment to the post of Junior Clerk, he has raised an industrial dispute. No explanation for such long delay has been given by the workman either before the Labour Court or before the learned single Judge. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the dispute raised by the workman can be treated as dead. It is also not disputed that the post of Junior Clerk is a Class-III post. The said post is required to be filled-in through direct recruitment. However, we are not entering into the merits of the case since the issue before us is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar ( AIR 2016 SC 2984 ) (supra). However, the fact remains that the dispute has been raised after a delay of 14 years and hence, as per the law enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, no relief can be granted to the respondent-workman. 13. Another aspect which necessitates response is that whether the workman is entitled to any of the reliefs by moulding the same on the ground of delay. As observed by the Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar ( AIR 2016 SC 2984 ) (supra), if there is no agitation by the workman and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced the same and the same cannot be termed as an "existing dispute". In such a situation, the "appropriate Government" can refuse to make reference. In such a situation, the "appropriate Government" can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and therefore, no relief can be granted. It is also further observed that in those cases where the Court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. As observed by us, in the present case, no dispute can be said to be in existence since the appellant had acquiesced his rights of being appointed to the post of Junior Clerk, as he had accepted his compassionate appointment to the Class-IV post without any protest and had continued on the same for 14 years." 10. Thus, in view of the law enunciated by the Apex Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court, the respondent-workman said to have waived his right or acquiesced since for all these years, he did not raise any grievance with regard to the punishment order and only after his retirement such dispute has been raised. 11. The writ petition succeeds. The impugned award dated 19.06.2013 passed by the Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Rajkot in Reference (IT) No. 84 of 2009 is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. 12. As a sequel, the connected Civil Application for vacating interim relief also stands disposed of.