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2022 DIGILAW 1334 (MAD)

Assistant Elementary Educational Officer, Tiruvannamalai, v. Presiding Officer, Additional Labour Court, Vellore

2022-06-10

MUNISHWAR NATH BHANDARI, N.MALA

body2022
JUDGMENT (Prayer: Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 02.11.2018 made in W.P.No.1036 of 2016 on the file of this Court.) Munishwar Nath Bhandari, CJ. 1. The writ appeal has been filed to assail the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 02.11.2018 whereby the writ petition preferred by the writ appellants to challenge the order of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was dismissed. 2. It is a case where the non-appellant employee made an application before the Labour Court invoking Section 33C for computation of benefit pursuant to the G.O. issued by the Government in G.O.No.385, Finance (Salary) Department, dated 01.10.2010. The benefit claimed by the non-appellant employee pursuant to the G.O. for scale of pay of Rs.1300-3000+Rs.300/- was allowed by the Labour Court. The objection regarding the maintainability in reference to the status of the employee and the entitlement of the benefit claimed by the employee was raised in the light of the fact that the employee was only a part-time employee thus is not covered by the G.O. dated 01.10.2010. The Labour Court, however, granted the benefit holding the employee to be entitled to the benefit claimed therein. The challenge to the order of the Labour Court before the High Court failed as the writ petition of the writ appellants was dismissed. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the State submits that ignoring the status of the employee to be a part-time employee and for that reason, the G.O. dated 01.10.2010 was not even applicable, the benefit claimed by the employee was computed. The learned Single Judge ignored the aforesaid and more specifically, the limited jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court under Section 33C of the Act of 1947. An application to seek computation can be made only when it is flown from an award or settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B and entitled to receive the benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The computation aforesaid would be permissible under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. In the instant case, there was no award or settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B, yet the benefit was computed by the Labour Court going beyond the limited jurisdiction vested in it. The computation aforesaid would be permissible under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. In the instant case, there was no award or settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B, yet the benefit was computed by the Labour Court going beyond the limited jurisdiction vested in it. It could not adjudicate the issue of entitlement of the employee rather it can be done only when a dispute is raised invoking Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is also ignoring the fact that the G.O. dated 01.10.2010 was meant for daily-rated employees apart from those who are paid on consolidated basis and not for the part-time employees. Yet, going beyond the G.O. referred to above, the benefit was computed by the Labour Court. 5. The learned Single Judge has ignored all the aspects referred to above while dismissing the writ petition and even to take into consideration the limited jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C of the Act of 1947. The prayer is, accordingly, to set aside the order of the Labour as well as of the learned Single Judge. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent non-appellant employee submits that the application under Section 33C(2) was rightly maintained to seek computation of benefit when the same benefit was extended to similarly placed employees and therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition preferred by the writ appellants. The prayer is not to cause interference in the order because the benefit claimed by the employee was flown from the G.O. dated 01.10.2010 and thus, the prayer is to dismiss the appeal. 7. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the records. 8. It is not in dispute that an application under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was preferred by the nonappellant employee to seek computation of the benefit pursuant to the G.O. dated 01.10.2010 permitting the scale of pay at Rs.1,300- 3000+Rs.300/-. The G.O. aforesaid was applicable to daily-rated employees apart from those who are paid on consolidated basis. The G.O. aforesaid was applicable to daily-rated employees apart from those who are paid on consolidated basis. It was not applicable to the part-time employees, thus, the first issue to be addressed is as to whether the G.O. dated 01.10.2010 could have been applied and apart from that, whether the Labour Court was having jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue aforesaid on an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947. 9. The law on the issue is well settled that computation of the amount can be made when it is arising out of an award or settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B. It is an admitted case that the claim to compute the benefit was not pursuant to any award or settlement, but pursuant to a G.O. In view of the above, the application under Section 33C was not even maintainable. If, for the sake of argument, it is presumed to be maintainable, the issue would further be as to whether the G.O. dated 01.10.2010 makes a reference to the part-time employees. The answer can be easily given in reference to the G.O. which does not make a reference of part-time employees, but only the dailyrated employees and those who are paid on consolidated basis to be extended the benefit of regular pay scale, which cannot be made applicable to a part-time employee working for any duration varying from one hour to few hours but not for the whole day. 10. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge could have caused interference in the order passed by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has failed to take note of the provisions of Section 33C(2) while adjudicating the application. Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 is quoted hereunder for ready reference:- "33C. 10. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge could have caused interference in the order passed by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has failed to take note of the provisions of Section 33C(2) while adjudicating the application. Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 is quoted hereunder for ready reference:- "33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.- (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA or Chapter VB, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; within a period not exceeding three months: Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit. (3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case. (4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in sub-section (1). (5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen. Explanation.--In this section "Labour Court" includes any court constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State.” The provision aforesaid is clear in its terms as to when application can be filed to seek computation of benefits. It cannot be where even rights to claim the benefit is to be determined. 11. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find the order of the Labour Court and also of the learned Single Judge tenable and accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.11.2018 made in W.P.No.1036 of 2016 as also the order dated 23.12.2014 passed in Computation Petition No.255 of 2013 by the Additional Labour Court, Vellore are set aside. It is, however, with the liberty to the non-appellant employee to take the remedy for the claim as made before the Labour Court by raising a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or taking remedy before any other appropriate authority, which according to the non-appellant can be the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. With the aforesaid, the writ appeal is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.6529 of 2022 is closed.