JUDGMENT Arijit Banerjee, J. - This contempt application has been filed alleging wilful violation of the order dated December 21, 2020, passed by a Coordinate Bench in A.P.O No. 29 of 2020, C.S No. 174 of 2019. G.A. No. 1 of 2020 (Md. Sarfaraz Alam v. Md. Mofazzular Rahman & Ors.). 2. A brief factual background in which the order dated December 21, 2020, was passed may be helpful. 3. The petitioner and the alleged Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 are all related to each other and are members of a larger family. They carried on business in co-partnership under the name and style of M/S. Serajuddin & Co. The business is of mining related activities. The alleged Contemnor No. 7 is the Chief Accountant of the partnership firm. 4. Disputes arose between the petitioners and the other partners of the firm. The alleged Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 filed a suit being C.S. No. 174 of 2019 against the petitioner herein, claiming inter alia, a declaration that the petitioner herein stands removed as partner of the said firm. In the said suit the petitioner herein has filed a counter claim praying for various reliefs including a declaration that the partnership firm stands dissolved pursuant to a notice of dissolution dated July 13, 2019, issued by him. In connection with such counter claim, the petitioner herein moved an interlocutory application in the suit praying for, inter alia, appointment of Receiver over and in respect of the business and assets of the said firm. The prayer for Receiver was not granted. Being aggrieved by such refusal, the petitioner herein preferred an appeal being A.P.O No. 29 of 2020, wherein the order dated December 21, 2020 came to be passed. The order reads as follows: 'The Court: An appeal is made on behalf of Md. Sarfaraz Alam for some money to be released for his immediate treatment for which Mr. Alam needs to travel to Singapore and incur considerable expenses. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have agreed to immediately release a sum of Rs. 50 lakh in favour of Mr. Alam to facilitate his travel to Singapore for treatment. The respondent nos. Sarfaraz Alam for some money to be released for his immediate treatment for which Mr. Alam needs to travel to Singapore and incur considerable expenses. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have agreed to immediately release a sum of Rs. 50 lakh in favour of Mr. Alam to facilitate his travel to Singapore for treatment. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have also agreed that in addition to the same being released immediately which will meet the expenses for travel and the like, money will be directly paid to the hospital upon the hospital raising bills and without any delay. However, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 say that the bills must be only pertaining to the treatment of Mr. Alam, his stay in hospital and elsewhere in Singapore and the incidental expenses pertaining to his wife who will accompany him. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have also agreed that Mr. Alam's travel by air-ambulance to Singapore and expenses in such regard would be borne from out of the common funds. It is hoped that in view of this gesture, the parties see reason and upon Mr. Alam's treatment in Singapore being successful, the parties would try to resolve the issues before the matter appears next on the second Monday of February, 2021. It is made clear that the payment to be released immediately and for the medical expenses of Mr. Alam will be completely without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and will create no equity in favour of Mr. Alam. It is also agreed that upon final accounts being done, the expenses incurred for Mr. Alam's treatment will be debited from the entitlement, if any, of Mr. Alam. The payment to be made to Mr. Alam for the purpose of his medical treatment will be treated as an interest-free loan till the accounts are finalised.' 5. The acts of contempt alleged by the petitioner are as follows:- '(i) In spite of the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 warding off an order by agreeing to release a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs in favour of the petitioner to facilitate his travel to Singapore for treatment, the contemnors have thereafter resiled, whereupon, this sum had to be deposited with the Registrar of this Hon'ble Court; (ii) In spite of the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 agreeing that in addition to Rs. 50 lakhs in favour of the petitioner to facilitate his travel to Singapore for treatment, the contemnors have thereafter resiled, whereupon, this sum had to be deposited with the Registrar of this Hon'ble Court; (ii) In spite of the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 agreeing that in addition to Rs. 50 lakhs being released immediately, money will be paid directly to the hospital upon the hospital raising bills and without any delay, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have refused to pay money to the hospital and have even delayed the insignificant payments made by them: (iii) In spite of the order dated December 21, 2020 directing the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 to make payment pertaining to the treatment of the petitioner, his stay in hospital and elsewhere in Singapore and incidental expenditures pertaining to his wife, who is accompanying him and inspite of the bills for the same being made over, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have refused to make payment in wilful, deliberate and contumacious violation of the said order; (iv) Even though the petitioner has made over bills raised by the hospital at Singapore for a sum of SGD 663005.10 relating to his treatment and inspite of making over bills for a sum of SGD 74170.79 pertaining to the incidental expenditures for him and his wife at Singapore for his treatment, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have refused to make payment in excess of sum of SGD 127498.50 in wilful, deliberate and contumacious violation of the said order; (v) Even though the order dated December 21, 2020 requires the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 to make payment without delay upon bills being issued by the hospital and for other incidental expenditures, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have delayed making payment; (vi) Despite the petitioner, requesting the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 to make payment without delay upon bills being issued by the hospital and for other incidental expenditures, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have delayed making payment; (vi) Despite the petitioner, requesting the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 to make payment to the hospital authorities for his treatment and diagnosis, in terms of the order dated December 21, 2020, the contemnors have refused to make payment to the hospital authorities towards the expenses on account of treatment and/or diagnosis incurred by the petitioner; (vii) The contemnors have wilfully, deliberately and contumaciously failed and/or neglected to meet the medical expenses including hospital bills in connection with the petitioner's treatment in Singapore; (viii) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately failed and/or neglected to pay for the expenses incurred by the petitioner and his wife in Singapore arising out of his treatment and his boarding and lodging in Singapore as well as that of his wife, Sabana Alam who have been in Singapore continuously since March 2, 2021; (ix) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately not met the petitioner's expenses and that of his wife for travel to Singapore and incidental expenses in connection with his travel; (x) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately not paid to the hospital where the petitioner had been admitted, namely, Mount Elizabeth Hospital, Singapore, where he is being treated from March 2, 2021. (xi) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately refused to bear the expenses for the petitioner's return travel from Singapore by air ambulance; (xii) The contemnors with the object of wilfully and deliberately violating the said order December 21, 2021 issued an email on January 26, 2022 refusing to bear the expenses on account of the petitioner's medical treatment in Singapore; (xiii) The Contemnor No. 7 has aided and abetted the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 in committing contempt of Court which is borne out, inter alia, from the email dated January 26, 2022 issued by Contemnor No. 7;' 6. Mr. Jisnu Chowdhury, learned Advocate representing the petitioner argued that the alleged contemnors assured the Court that they would bear the medical expenses of the petitioner and acting on the basis of such assurance, the Court refrained from passing any mandatory order. It was as good as an undertaking given by the respondents to Court. Mr. Jisnu Chowdhury, learned Advocate representing the petitioner argued that the alleged contemnors assured the Court that they would bear the medical expenses of the petitioner and acting on the basis of such assurance, the Court refrained from passing any mandatory order. It was as good as an undertaking given by the respondents to Court. The respondents having wilfully acted in breach of such undertaking, they are liable to be punished for contempt of Court. 7. Mr. Chowdhury relied on the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 12 of its judgment in the case of Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora, reported at (1996) 6 SCC 14 , which reads as follows:- '12. Law is well settled that if any party gives an undertaking to the Court to vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted under the orders of the Court and there is a clear and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt but since, in the present case, the respondent did not file any undertaking as envisaged in the order of this Court the question of his being punished for breach thereof does not arise. However, in our considered view even in a case where no such undertaking is given, a party to a litigation may be held liable for such contempt if the Court is induced to sanction a particular course of action or inaction on the basis of the representation of such a party and the Court ultimately finds that the party never intended to act on such representation or such representation was false. In other words, if on the representation of the respondent herein the Court was persuaded to pass the order dated 5.10.1995 extending the time for vacation of the suit premises, he may be held guilty of contempt of Court, notwithstanding non-furnishing of the undertaking, if it is found that the representation was false and the respondent never intended to act upon it.' 8. Mr. Chowdhury referred to various correspondence and hospital bills and submitted that in spite of repeated requests, the respondents failed, neglected and refused to honour their obligation under the order dated December 21, 2020, which amounts to contumacious violation of the said order. Mr. Chowdhury referred to various correspondence and hospital bills and submitted that in spite of repeated requests, the respondents failed, neglected and refused to honour their obligation under the order dated December 21, 2020, which amounts to contumacious violation of the said order. He submitted that due to the refusal of the respondents to clear the hospital bills in Singapore, the hospital in question stopped medical treatment of the petitioner thereby causing life threat to him. 9. Appearing for different respondents, Mr. S. K. Kapur, Senior Advocate and Mr. Ranjan Bachawat, Senior Advocate, argued that for a person to be held guilty of contempt of Court, first there has to be an order of Court which contains a mandatory direction on that person. It is wilful violation of such direction that will amount to contempt of Court. However, in the present case, the order dated of December 21, 2020, is not such an order. No direction or mandate to the respondents has emanated from that order. At the highest, the said order records an agreement between the parties and a good 'gesture' on the part of the respondents. 10. It was further submitted that in any event, the respondents have not violated the said order. The petitioner was unable to furnish proper accounts of the amount of Rs. 50 lakhs that was admittedly released in his favour, as he was called upon to do by a coordinate bench by an order dated March 9, 2021 in A.P.O No. 29 of 2020. The petitioner therefore volunteered to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs with the registrar (Original Side) of this Court. 11. It was further submitted that over the past few years, from time to time, monies have been withdrawn from the till of the partnership firm by the petitioner aggregating a sum which is in the region of Rupees two Hundred Crore. The order in question recorded that the respondents will directly pay the bills of the Singapore hospital upon that hospital raising bills on the respondents. Such bills were not raised. The petitioner at all material times, insisted that the bills will be provided after payment is received by the hospital. 12. In reply, Ms. Debapriya Mukherjee, the new learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the order dated December 21, 2020, was passed upon consent being given by the respondents. Such bills were not raised. The petitioner at all material times, insisted that the bills will be provided after payment is received by the hospital. 12. In reply, Ms. Debapriya Mukherjee, the new learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the order dated December 21, 2020, was passed upon consent being given by the respondents. Even a consent order, if wilfully violated, amounts to contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In this connection she relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Anr., reported at (2006) 11 SCC 114 . 13. Ms. Mukherjee then referred to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Daya Shanker Dubey v. Subhas Kumar, D.M. Allahabad, reported at 1992 Cri LJ 319 in support of her submission that once an order has been passed by the Court, not only the plain meaning of the language used is to be considered but also the spirit and the sense in which the order had been passed has also to be kept in mind. 14. Learned Advocate also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash v. Suresh Kumar, reported at (2020) 13 SCC 188 in support of her submission that a party is bound by the statement made by his counsel before the Court. 15. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Shariff & Ors., reported at (2011) 12 SCC 658 was relied upon by Ms. Mukherjee in support of the proposition that a concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is binding on the client, but if it is on a question of law, it is not binding. 16. Before dealing with the facts of the present case, it may be helpful to briefly recount the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as regards the nature of the Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court and how such jurisdiction should be exercised. 17. 16. Before dealing with the facts of the present case, it may be helpful to briefly recount the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as regards the nature of the Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court and how such jurisdiction should be exercised. 17. It is well settled that the Supreme Court (by reason of Art. 129 of the Constitution) and the High Courts (by reason of Art. 215 of the Constitution) have inherent power to punish for contempt independent of and apart from the Contempt of Court's Act, 1971 or any other law relating to contempt. In R. L. Kapur v. State of Madras, (1972) 1 SCC 651 , the Apex Court observed that such inherent power or jurisdiction is not derived from statutory law relating to contempt. Such power partakes the character of constitutional power and hence no law made by a legislature could take away such jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court and the High Courts. In American Jurisprudence, 17 Am, Jur, 2d 63, it is stated that if a Court derives its powers from the Constitution, the Court's power to punish for contempt cannot be taken away by the legislature. The consensus seems to be that even in the absence of Arts. 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court and the High Courts would necessarily possess the power to punish for contempt. 18. In Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia, (2000) 2 SCC 367 , the Apex Court observed that the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of Law since image of such majesty in the minds of the people cannot be allowed to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by the Courts of Law are the greatest guarantee for an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. 19. In Arundhati Roy, In Re, AIR 2002 SC 1375 , the Hon'ble Apex Court opined that the Rule of Law is the basic scheme of the Constitution and that maintenance of dignity of courts is one of the cardinal principles of the Rule of Law. The object of the law of contempt is to uphold the majesty of law and administration of justice, and not to vindicate the dignity and honour of an individual Judge. The object of the law of contempt is to uphold the majesty of law and administration of justice, and not to vindicate the dignity and honour of an individual Judge. 20. Before a person can be committed for contempt it must be shown that he has wilfully disobeyed the orders of the Court. 'Wilful' means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, JT (2003) 7 SC 581, the Apex Court opined that to establish that a person has wilfully disobeyed the orders of the Court, it must be shown that that person has committed an act of contempt with specific intent to do so i.e. with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. It signifies deliberate action done with full intent or with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore in order to constitute contempt, the order of the Court must be such which is capable of execution by the person charged in normal circumstances. 21. Jurisdiction to punish for contempt exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person who refuses to comply with orders of Court. In T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot, (2006) 5 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that in our democratic polity under the Constitution, the concept of 'Rule of Law' serves as an aorta in the anatomy of our democratic system. The law is supreme. Everyone, whether individually or collectively is unquestionably under the supremacy of law. Whoever he may be, however high he is, he is under the law, no matter how powerful he is and how rich he may be. Disobedience to the Court's order strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our judicial system rests. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. It is the central pillar of the democratic State. If the judiciary is to perform its duty and functions effectively and remains true to the spirit with which the Courts are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the Courts have to be respected and protected at all costs. Otherwise, the very corner stone of our constitutional scheme will give way. That is why it is imperative that Court's orders are to be followed and complied with. 22. Otherwise, the very corner stone of our constitutional scheme will give way. That is why it is imperative that Court's orders are to be followed and complied with. 22. In holding the respondents to be guilty of contempt of Court and in particular civil contempt, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience to the Court's order. Since the notice of contempt and punishment for contempt has far reaching consequences, the power to punish for contempt should be exercised sparingly and only when a clear case of wilful disobedience to the Court's order has been made out. The petitioner complaining of breach of Court's order must allege and establish deliberate or contumacious violation of the order of the Court. In Re Bramblevale (1969) 3 ALL ER 1062, Lord Denning observed that contempt of Court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time honoured phrase it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. In case of doubt the benefit ought to go the person charged. In V. G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1992) 4 SCC 697 , the Apex Court observed that it would be rather hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. 23. In the case of Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai, (2008) 14 SCC 561 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that punishing a person for contempt of Court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and Majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a Court, it is required to take a strict view under the Contempt of Courts Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt. 24. In the case of Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 , at paragraph 11 of the reported judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:- '11. 24. In the case of Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 , at paragraph 11 of the reported judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:- '11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the Courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of Courts is a special power vested under the Constitution in the Courts of record and also under the statute. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the Courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the Court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate Court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the Court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The Court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition be it stated here that the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, who is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. At the cost of repetition be it stated here that the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, who is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the Court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the Courts exercising contempt of Court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of Courts.' [Emphasis is mine] 25. In the more recent case of Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. M. George Ravishekaran, (2014) 3 SCC 373 , at paragraph 19 of the reported judgment it was observed as follows:- '19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty on the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self- determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty on the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self- determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul-vs.- Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 , v. M. Manohar Prasad-vs.- N. Ratnam Raju, (2004) 13 SCC 610 , Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami, (2008) 5 SCC 339 , and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006) 1 SCC 613 .' [Emphasis is mine] 26. What is clear from the above discussion is that the jurisdiction of the Court to punish a person for committing contempt of Court is a special jurisdiction and quasi-criminal in nature. It has to be sparingly exercised. Only in cases where it is absolutely clear that with full knowledge of an order of the Court, a person has acted in wilful violation thereof, will the Court exercise its jurisdiction to punish that person for contempt of Court. It has to be sparingly exercised. Only in cases where it is absolutely clear that with full knowledge of an order of the Court, a person has acted in wilful violation thereof, will the Court exercise its jurisdiction to punish that person for contempt of Court. It is a jurisdiction to be exercised with caution and circumspection, to uphold the majesty of the Court and also to bring to books a person who wilfully defies an order of Court. 27. Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines Contempt of Court as meaning civil contempt or criminal contempt. In the present case, we are concerned with Civil Contempt. Section 2(b) of the Act defines civil contempt as wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. From the definition section, the following ingredients of a civil contempt can be deciphered:- (a) There must be a judgment or decree or direction or order of a Court restraining a party from doing a particular act or directing that party to do a particular act or an undertaking given by that party to a Court. (b) That party must have knowledge of the judgment or decree or direction or order of the Court. (c) That party must have acted in disobedience to the judgment or decree or direction or order or in breach of the undertaking given to the Court. (d) Such disobedience to the judgment or decree or direction or order or breach of undertaking must be wilful. 28. As a starting point therefore, there must be an order whereby the Court has directed a person to do something or has restrained him from doing something or has recorded an undertaking of that person to do or refrain from doing something. If with knowledge of such an order that person wilfully refuses to do the thing that the Court has mandated or wilfully does the thing that the Court has retrained him from doing or acts in breach of his undertaking which the Court has recorded, he would generally be guilty of contempt of Court. 29. In the present case, the order dated December 21, 2020, of which wilfully violation is alleged, does not contain any such injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, on the respondents. 29. In the present case, the order dated December 21, 2020, of which wilfully violation is alleged, does not contain any such injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, on the respondents. The Court did not direct or order the respondents to release the sum of Rs. 50 lakhs for funding the petitioner's treatment in Singapore nor did the Court direct the respondents to foot the bills of the Singapore hospital. The Court merely recorded that the respondents, by way of good gesture had agreed to release the sum of Rs. 50 lakhs immediately and to pay the bills of the hospital in Singapore where the petitioner was to undergo treatment if such bills were raised on them by the hospital. It was further recorded that the respondents had agreed that the expenses pertaining to the petitioner's travel by air- ambulance to Singapore would be paid from the common funds. 30. Indeed, the Court could not have mandated the respondents to pay any money to the petitioner for footing his medical bills and incidental expenses since the Court did not have any application before it with such prayer. There was no occasion for the Court to apply its mind and adjudicate the issue as to whether or not the respondents should bear the expenses relating to the petitioner's medical treatment for the time being. Without coming to a finding that the respondents are under a legal liability or obligation to release funds in favour of the petitioner for his medical treatment, albeit by way of interest free loan, to be adjusted at the time of final settlement of accounts of the concerned partnership firm, the Court could not have directed the respondents to pay any money to the petitioner. A desperate appeal was made by the petitioner in Court but addressed to the respondents. The respondents responded to such appeal in a positive manner and the Court merely recorded the same. There was no mandate from the Court to the respondents to make any payment to the petitioner. Hence, the question of the respondents' disobedience to or violation of any mandate of Court does not arise. 31. We also cannot accept the petitioner's contention that the respondents by their conduct induced the Court not to pass an order in favour of the petitioner. Hence, the question of the respondents' disobedience to or violation of any mandate of Court does not arise. 31. We also cannot accept the petitioner's contention that the respondents by their conduct induced the Court not to pass an order in favour of the petitioner. On December 21, 20220, the Court was not in a position to pass any mandatory order directing the respondents to make payment to any extent to the petitioner. 32. Further, no undertaking of the respondents is recorded in the order in question nor can the order be construed as an undertaking by the respondents to Court. Hence, the question of breach of undertaking does not arise. Submission was made on behalf of the petitioner in reply that violation of a consent order may also amount to contempt of Court. In this connection reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramanarang v. Ramesh Narang & Anr. (Supra). In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it would neither be in consonance with the statute, judicial authority, principle or logic to draw any distinction between the wilful violation of the terms of a consent decree and wilful violation of a decree which is passed on adjudication. With great respect to learned Counsel for the petitioner, that case has no manner of application to the facts of the present case. The order dated December 21, 2020, is no kind of consent order. 33. When the Court passes an order or decree in accordance with the terms of settlement arrived at by and between the litigating parties, it puts its imprimatur on such terms of settlement which is elevated to the status of an order of Court. Therefore, wilful violation of such an order with knowledge thereof would amount to contempt of Court. However, that is not the case here. There is no consent order. 34. The other three decisions cited by learned Advocate for the petitioner as part of her submission in reply, are not germane to the facts of the present case. 35. In view of the aforesaid this contempt application fails and is dismissed, without, however, any order as to costs. 36. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities. I agree.