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2022 DIGILAW 1349 (ALL)

Ajai Kumar Verma v. State Of U. P.

2022-08-26

IRSHAD ALI

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Sudeep Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner is challenging an order dated 11.10.2000, passed by the respondent No.2 (Annexures-1 and 2 to the writ petition) with a further prayer for issuance of necessary direction to the respondent No.3 to accept the resignation letter dated 30.11.1996 by a formal order w.e.f. 30.11.1996. It is also prayed for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the alternative, in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to treat the petitioner's service terminated in pursuance of order dated 14.1.1998, passed by the respondent No.3. 3. Brief fact of the case is that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Senior Scientific Assistant in temporary capacity on 27.10.1990. The petitioner submitted an application to his appointing authority i.e. Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur for issuance of No Objection Certificate. The said application was forwarded by the Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur on 16.7.1996. 4. The petitioner came to know of his appointment in Consolidation Department, where he was posted as Senior Scientific Assistant, Field Unit, Shahjahanpur on 30.11.1996. The petitioner handed over his entire charge to one of his subordinates on the same day. The petitioner submitted his resignation letter to the Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur on 30.11.1996. 5. The respondent No.3 again required the petitioner to resume his duties on 20.6.1998. The petitioner expressed his reluctance to join in Forensic Science Laboratory. The respondent No.2 vide order dated 23.9.1999 required the petitioner to justify his resignation from service. Thereafter, on 14.1.2000, the respondent No.3 terminated the petitioner from service. On 2.3.2000, the Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur intimated the Director, Forensic Science Laboratory, U.P. at Lucknow that there was no dues lying against the petitioner, in his office. 6. The respondent No.2 advised the petitioner by letter to resign from consolidation department and to continue under their subordination on 23.9.2000. On 9.8.2000, an order was passed by the High Court, disposing of the writ petition of the petitioner. The petitioner submitted a representation to the respondent No.2 on 16.8.2000. Thereafter, on 24.8.2000, the petitioner submitted a supplementary representation to the respondent No.2. The respondent No.4 submitted his alleged report (enquiry report) on 28.8.2000. 7. On 9.8.2000, an order was passed by the High Court, disposing of the writ petition of the petitioner. The petitioner submitted a representation to the respondent No.2 on 16.8.2000. Thereafter, on 24.8.2000, the petitioner submitted a supplementary representation to the respondent No.2. The respondent No.4 submitted his alleged report (enquiry report) on 28.8.2000. 7. The respondent No.2 issued his order dated 11.10.2000, dispensing with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner and dismissed him from service, under the provisions of U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. The representation filed by the petitioner was rejected by the respondent No.3 on 11.10.2000. 8. Assailing the impugned orders, submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is gross violation of principles of natural justice as Rule 6 (2) of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 provides that in case there are serious charges against the employee then enquiry by issuing charge sheet is to be initiated. Due to non issuance of charge sheet and non holding of regular enquiry, the impugned order vitiates in law and is liable to be set aside. 9. Second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that relying on the preliminary enquiry report, the impugned order has been passed. He submits that law is very much settled that in case the order has been passed on the basis of preliminary enquiry, the order cannot be sustained. 10. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon the following judgments : (i) Union of India and another Vs. Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 Supreme Court Cases 398] (ii) Hari Niwas Gupta Vs. State of Bihar and another [(2020) 3 Supreme Court Cases 153] (iii) Sudesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others [(2005) 11 Supreme Court Cases 525] (iv) Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others [(1991) 1 Supreme Court Cases 362] (v) Wing Commander Rajesh Kumar Nagar Vs. State of U.P. [2021 SCC OnLine All 477] (vi) M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others [(2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 88] (vii) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. Vs. Mahesh Dahiya [(2017) 1 Supreme Court Cases 768] 11. Next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that once vide Annexure-6, it was directed that in case of non joining within the stipulated period, service will be dispensed with, there was no occasion to passed the impugned order. 12. Mahesh Dahiya [(2017) 1 Supreme Court Cases 768] 11. Next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that once vide Annexure-6, it was directed that in case of non joining within the stipulated period, service will be dispensed with, there was no occasion to passed the impugned order. 12. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel submits that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and is a just and valid order. He further requested to adjourn the case for production of record. 13. In the opinion of the Court, there is no requirement of producing of record and there is controversy or dispute in regard to the documentary evidence, placed by the petitioner. 14. After having heard the rival contention of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record. 15. To resolve the controversy, Rule 7(ii) of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 is being quoted below :- "7. Procedure for imposing major penalties. -- (ii) The facts constituting the misconduct on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of definite charge or charges to be called charge-sheet. The charge-sheet shall be approved by the Disciplinary Authority : Provided that where the Appointing Authority is Governor, the charge-sheet may be approved by the Principal Secretary or the Secretary, as the case may be, of the concerned department." 16. On bare perusal of the record, it is well established that the provision of Rule 7(ii) was not followed while initiating disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner, therefore, there is no hesitation to hold that the impugned order has been passed in utter disregard of the provision referred hereinabove. 17. On perusal of the impugned order, it is also established that the impugned order has been passed on the basis of preliminary enquiry conducted against the petitioner, without supplying the copy of the enquiry report and charge sheet to him. 18. Relevant portion of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is being reproduced hereunder :- (i) Union of India and another Vs. Tulsiram Patel (Supra), paragraph 130 "130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. Tulsiram Patel (Supra), paragraph 130 "130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are "not reasonably practicable" and not "impracticable". According to the Oxford English Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter alia as meaning "possible to practice or perform : capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished : feasible". Further, the words used are not "not practicable" but "not" reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner : to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate witnesses who are going to given evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the government servant by himself or together with or through other threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or member of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause(3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India and others, [1984] 3 S.C.R. 302, is an instance in point. In that case, the appellant was working as a senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The Senior Commercial Officer wrote a letter to the appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation with regard to twelve charges of gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted his explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing and that another chance was being given to him to offer his explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant submitted his further explanation but on the very next day the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an order dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be retained in service. The appellant submitted his further explanation but on the very next day the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an order dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be retained in service. This Court struck down the order holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent who was the disciplinary authority and that if an inquiry were to be held, the principal witness for the Department would have been the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent himself, resulting in the same person being the main accuser, the chief witness and also the judge of the matter." (ii) Hari Niwas Gupta (Supra), paragraphs- 10, 11, 18 and 19 "10. Clause (1) states that persons employed in civil services or posts under the Union or the States or members of the all-India service shall not be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by an authority subordinate to that by which he/she was appointed. Clause (2) provides that such a person could be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank only after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and after being afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The second proviso incorporates exceptions when the need for holding an inquiry under clause (2) can be dispensed with. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked to impose a punishment of dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank on the satisfaction, to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to conduct an inquiry before imposing the punishment. This Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, relying on an earlier decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, has affirmatively held that the obligation of the competent authority to record reasons when passing an order under clause (b) to the second proviso to Article 311(2) is mandatory, and it was inter alia observed: "5. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent 3 in the impugned order. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram case: (SCC p. 504, para 130) A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the departments case against the government servant is weak and must fail." 11. In the present matter, the Division Bench vide the impugned judgment has as a fact found that the High Court had failed to record satisfaction in writing for dispensing with an inquiry before arriving at its decision to dismiss the judicial officers. For this reason, the order of dismissal dated 12th February 2014 passed by the Governor of the State of Bihar under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) was quashed and set aside. Consequently, the judicial officers were to be reinstated in service. This is what has been observed in the quoted portion of the final directions by the Division Bench, which refers to the fact that two (sic-one) judicial officers had attained the age of superannuation during the pendency of the writ petitions and, therefore, they would be deemed to be continuing in service for the limited purpose of enabling the disciplinary proceedings to continue. The other officer(s) would be deemed to be under suspension. The High Court was required to take a decision within two months and if no decision was taken, the proceedings would lapse and the judicial officers would be entitled to all consequential benefits as if the proceedings had been set aside in entirety. It was directed that the judicial officer(s) who continued to be in service, would be paid subsistence allowance, and the retired would be paid provisional pension to the extent of 25% forthwith. 18. The observations in our opinion are being misread as the aforequoted portion refers to the legal position that normally departmental inquiry should be held. It was directed that the judicial officer(s) who continued to be in service, would be paid subsistence allowance, and the retired would be paid provisional pension to the extent of 25% forthwith. 18. The observations in our opinion are being misread as the aforequoted portion refers to the legal position that normally departmental inquiry should be held. It also refers to the scenario where a departmental inquiry cannot be conducted that is, when conducting of departmental enquiry was turning out to be a difficult task, in which case a decision could have been taken to dispense with the enquiry; by recording specific reasons. It is observed that the principles laid down in Tulsiram Patel (supra) and Tarsem Singh (supra) have to be kept in mind. Appropriate in this regard, would be a reference to the following observations in Tulsiram Patel (supra), which read: "130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are not reasonably practicable and not impracticable. According to the Oxford English Dictionary practicable means Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible. Websters Third New International Dictionary defines the word practicable inter alia as meaning possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible. Further, the words used are not not practicable but not reasonably practicable. Websters Third New International Dictionary defines the word reasonably as in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation." 19. Thus, the authorities to invoke the power under clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2) to dispense with a departmental inquiry must record a finding that such an inquiry cannot be conducted and record specific reasons for the same. Thus, the authorities to invoke the power under clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2) to dispense with a departmental inquiry must record a finding that such an inquiry cannot be conducted and record specific reasons for the same. In this case, the Division Bench had recorded the contention of the respondent-High Court as the disciplinary authority that it would be impossible to assimilate, collect and produce direct evidence and material as the acts and misdeeds were in another country. The Division Bench having found that reasons had not been recorded for dispensing with the inquiry, has neither accepted nor rejected this contention of the High Court. It will not be appropriate and correct to interpret the decision of the Division Bench by reading one or more sentences of a paragraph in isolation. The entire judgment has to be read to understand the ratio and finding and the observations must be read in the context in which they have been made." (iii) Sudesh Kumar (Supra), paragraphs- 5, 6 and 7 "5. It is now established principle of law that an inquiry under Article 311(2) is a rule and dispensing with the inquiry is an exception. The authority dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2) (b) must satisfy for reasons to be recorded that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. A reading of the termination order by invoking Article 311(2)(b), as extracted above, would clearly show that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned as to why it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. The reasons disclosed in the termination order are that the complainant refused to name the accused out of fear of harassment; the complainant, being a foreign national, is likely to leave the country and once he left the country, it may not be reasonably practicable to bring him to the inquiry. This is no ground for dispensing with the inquiry. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, by order dated 23-12-1999, the visa of the complainant was extended up to 22-12-2000. Therefore, there was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr. Kenichi Tanaka in the inquiry. 6. A reasonable opportunity of hearing in Article 311(2) of the Constitution would include an opportunity to defend himself and establish his innocence by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses produced against him and by examining the defence witnesses in his favour, if any. Therefore, there was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr. Kenichi Tanaka in the inquiry. 6. A reasonable opportunity of hearing in Article 311(2) of the Constitution would include an opportunity to defend himself and establish his innocence by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses produced against him and by examining the defence witnesses in his favour, if any. This he can do only if inquiry is held where he has been informed of the charges levelled against him. In the instant case, the mandate of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has been violated depriving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant. 7. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the order terminating the services of the appellant is not sustainable in law. It is, accordingly, quashed and set aside. However, the respondents are at liberty, if so advised, to hold an inquiry against the appellant by affording him a reasonable opportunity of hearing and thereafter pass any order as it may deem fit and proper in accordance with law." (iv) Jaswant Singh (Supra), paragraph-5 "5. "The impugned order of April 7, 1981 itself contains the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of the said order, which we have extracted earlier, gives two reasons in support of the satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the appellant. These are (i) the appellant has thrown threats that he with the help of other police employees will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and (ii) he and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer. Now as stated earlier after the two Revision Applications were allowed on October 13, 1980. the appellant had re-joined service as Head Constable on March 5, 1981 but he was immediately placed under suspension. Thereafter, two show cause notices dated April 4, 1981 were issued against him calling upon him to reply thereto within 10 days after the receipt thereof. Before the service of these notices the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. Before the service of these notices the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. He was, therefore, hospitalised and while he was in hospital the two show cause notices were served on him at (5 of 8) about 10.00 p.m. on April 6, 1981. Before the appellant could reply to the said show cause notices the third respondent passed the impugned order on the very next day i.e. April 7, 1981. Now the earlier departmental enquiries were duly conducted against the appellant and there is no allegation that the department had found any difficulty in examining witnesses in the said inquiries. After the Revision Applications were allowed the show cause notices were (4 of 6) [CW-1737/2008] issued and 10 days time was given to the appellant to put in his replies thereto. We, therefore, enquired from the learned Counsel for the respondents to point out what impelled respondent No. 3 to take a decision that it was necessary to forthwith terminate the services of the appellant without holding an inquiry as required by Article 311(2). The learned Counsel for the respondents could only point out Clause (iv)(a) of sub-para 29(A) of the counter which reads as under: "The order dated 7.4.81 was passed as the petitioner's activities were objectionable. He was instigating his fellow police officials to cause indiscipline, show insubordination and exhibit disloyalty, spreading discontentment and hatred, etc. and his retention in service was adjudged harmful." This is no more than a mere reproduction of paragraph 3 of the impugned order. Our attention was not drawn to any material existing on the date of the impugned order in support of the allegation contained in paragraph 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown threats that he and his companions will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and that they would not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer if any such attempt was made. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed (6 of 8) before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at p. 270 of Tulsi Ram's case: "A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary authority lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in (5 of 6) [CW-1737/2008] order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail." The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the counter filed by the third respondent it is contended that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides it is difficult to understand how he could have given threats, etc., when he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material the third respondent came to the conclusion that the appellant had thrown threats as alleged in paragraph 3 of the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground that he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dissatisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. The third respondent's counter also does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information. To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the (7 of 8) Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground alone the impugned order cannot be sustained." (v) Wing Commander Rajesh Kumar Nagar (Supra), paragraphs 53 to 58 "53. Once the decision is taken by the authorities to institute regular disciplinary proceedings then findings in the preliminary enquiry report ordinarily is not to be relied upon. In case such a report is to be relied upon then the delinquent employees has to be confronted with such materials, and only after hearing their version in the matter that such a report could be relied upon. Any other course followed would clearly be a violation of principles of natural justice. 54. In the facts of the present case, once the decision was taken to institute regular disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and charge-sheet was issued, the enquiry officer was expected to have independently examined the evidence collected during the course of disciplinary proceedings and return its finding as to whether charges against the employees are made out. 55. In the instant case, it appears that the State Government is pre meditated and malafide, which is substantiated by a frequent change of the inquiry officers, who could align with the wishes of the authorities. The petitioner has not been given proper opportunity to submit the reply of the show cause notice as he has not been supplied the relevant documents for the preparation of the reply. 56. A recent decision of the Apex Court in H.P. State Electricity Board Ltd. Vs. Mahesh Dahiya, passed in Civil Appeal No.10913 of 2016, has been pleased to refer to and rely upon a previous decision of the Apex Court in M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 to observe as under:- "24. ...... 56. A recent decision of the Apex Court in H.P. State Electricity Board Ltd. Vs. Mahesh Dahiya, passed in Civil Appeal No.10913 of 2016, has been pleased to refer to and rely upon a previous decision of the Apex Court in M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 to observe as under:- "24. ...... On the scope of judicial review, the Division Bench itself has referred to judgment of this Court reported in M.V. BIJLANI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2006) 5 SCC 88 . This Court, noticing the scope of judicial review in context of disciplinary proceeding made following observations in para 25: "It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." 25. The three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. CHATURVEDI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 1995 (6) SCC 749 had noticed the scope of judicial review with regard to disciplinary proceeding. Following observations have been made in paras 12 and 13: "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case." "13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India V. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could issued." 26. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have heavily relied on the fact that before forwarding the copy of the report by letter dated 02.04.2008 the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already formed an opinion on 25.02.2008 to punish the writ petitioner with major penalty which is a clear violation of principle of natural justice. We are of the view that before making opinion with regard to punishment which is to be imposed on a delinquent, the delinquent has to be given an opportunity to submit the representation/ reply on the inquiry report which finds a charge proved against the delinquent. The opinion formed by the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members on 25.02.2008 was formed without there being benefit of comments of the writ petitioner on the inquiry report. The writ petitioner in his representation to the inquiry report is entitled to point out any defect in the procedure, a defect of substantial nature in appreciation of evidence, any misleading of evidence both oral or documentary. In his representation any inputs and explanation given by the delinquent are also entitled to be considered by the Disciplinary Authority before it embarks with further proceedings as per statutory rules. We are, thus, of the view that there was violation of principle of natural justice at the level of Disciplinary Authority when opinion was formed to punish the writ petitioner with dismissal without forwarding the inquiry report to the delinquent and before obtaining his comments on the inquiry report. We are, thus, of the view that the order of the High Court setting aside the punishment order as well as the Appellate order has to be maintained. 27. We are, thus, of the view that the order of the High Court setting aside the punishment order as well as the Appellate order has to be maintained. 27. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that present is the case where the High Court while quashing the punishment order as well as Appellate order ought to have permitted the Disciplinary Authority to have proceeded with the inquiry from the stage in which fault was noticed i.e. the Stage under Rule 15 of Rules. We are conscious that sufficient time has elapsed during the pendency of the writ petition before learned Single Judge, Division Bench and before this Court, however, in view of the interim order passed by this Court dated 31.08.2015 no further steps have been taken regarding implementation of the order of the High Court. The ends of justice be served in disposing of this appeal by fixing a time frame for completing the proceeding from the stage of Rule 15. 28. We having found that principles of natural justice have been violated after submission of the inquiry report dated 29.12.2007 all proceedings taken by the Disciplinary Authority after 29.12.2007 have to be set aside and the Disciplinary Authority is to be directed to forward the copy of the inquiry report in accordance with Rule 15(2) of Rules 1965 and further proceedings, if any, are to be taken thereafter. " 57. In State of U.P. Vs. Shatrughan Lal and Another, (1998) 6 SCC 651 . The relevant paragraphs of the judgment is reproduced as under:- "It has also been found that during the course of the preliminary enquiry, a number of witnesses were examined against the respondent in his absence, and rightly so, as the delinquents are not associated in the preliminary enquiry, and thereafter the charge sheet was drawn up. The copies of those statements, though asked for by the respondent, were not supplied to him. Since there was a failure on the part of the appellant in this regard too, the principles of natural justice were violated and the respondent was not afforded an effective opportunity of hearing, particularly as the appellant failed to establish that non-supply of the copies of statements recorded during preliminary enquiry had not caused any prejudice to the respondent in defending himself." 58. Reliance is also placed upon a decision of this Court in Chandrika Yadav Vs. Reliance is also placed upon a decision of this Court in Chandrika Yadav Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, passed in Writ Petition No.55836 of 2005, in which following observations have been made:- "From the order of disciplinary authority and the pleadings of the counter affidavit, it is evident that the preliminary enquiry was conducted in the matter and various materials as well as the findings of the preliminary enquiry have been relied upon by the disciplinary authority. It is well settled law that findings and materials of the preliminary enquiry cannot be relied upon in the disciplinary proceeding if the delinquent was not associated with preliminary enquiry. Admittedly, in the present case, petitioner was not given any such opportunity. It is a trite law that object of the preliminary enquiry is to satisfy the employer itself that a disciplinary proceeding can be conducted against an employee. Its purpose is to collect the facts. Once the employer is satisfied on the basis of the materials and report of the preliminary enquiry that disciplinary proceeding may be initiated in terms of the relevant service Rule, the delinquent is placed under suspension, and a copy of the charge-sheet and other documentary evidences relied upon in support of the charges are served upon him. It is noteworthy that if in the disciplinary proceeding the department wants to rely on some materials of preliminary enquiry, it is necessary to supply a copy of said materials to the employee. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Employees of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (Private) Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236 . In a recent judgment in the case of Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and another, (2013) 4 SCC 301 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the scope of preliminary enquiry at length. The observations of the Supreme Court in Nirmala J. Jhala (supra), which are relevant to the present controversy, read as under: "45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice." "47. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice." "47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry." "51. There is nothing on record to show that either the preliminary enquiry report or the statements recorded therein, particularly, by the complainant-accused or Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, had been exhibited in regular inquiry. In the absence of information in the charge-sheet that such report/statements would be relied upon against the appellant, it was not permissible for the enquiry officer or the High Court to rely upon the same. Natural justice is an inbuilt and inseparable ingredient of fairness and reasonableness. Strict adherence to the principle is required, whenever civil consequences follow up, as a result of the order passed. Natural justice is universal justice. In certain factual circumstances even nonobservance of the rule will itself result in prejudice. Thus, this principle is of supreme importance. [Vide S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 ; D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 ; and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 539 )" "52.2 The enquiry officer, the High Court on administrative side as well as on judicial side, committed a grave error in placing reliance on the statement of the complainant as well as of Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, recorded in a preliminary enquiry. The preliminary enquiry and its report loses significance/importance, once the regular enquiry is initiated by issuing charge-sheet to the delinquent. The preliminary enquiry and its report loses significance/importance, once the regular enquiry is initiated by issuing charge-sheet to the delinquent. Thus, it was all in violation of the principles of natural justice." "52.4 The onus lies on the department to prove the charge and it failed to examine any of the employees of the court i.e. stenographer, Bench Secretary or peon attached to the office of the appellant for proving the entry of Shri Gajjar, Advocate in her chamber on 17-8-1993." In the present case, no such procedure has been adopted by the respondents as the disciplinary authority has relied upon the preliminary enquiry but there is nothing on the record to indicate that said materials of the preliminary enquiry were supplied to the petitioner. Along with the counter affidavit the respondents have not filed the alleged statement of petitioner's wife Smt. Genda Devi or Smt. Seema Devi. Learned Standing Counsel also could not point out any material from the records produced by him, from which it can be established that the petitioner has contracted second marriage with Smt. Seema Devi. There is no evidence on the record to the said effect. Merely some letters purportedly written by the petitioner to Smt. Seema Devi cannot establish the relationship of husband and wife. Petitioner has denied that those letters were written by him and the department has not established that those letters were written by the petitioner. Even if those letters are assumed to be correct and written by the petitioner, a perusal thereof do not establish that there was a relationship of husband and wife between them. After careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the disciplinary proceeding conducted against the petitioner is vitiated on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and as such, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority dated 07th May, 1997, 31st August, 2003 and 28th March, 2005 respectively (annexures-1, 5 and 7 respectively to the writ petition), impugned in this writ petition, cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to conduct a fresh enquiry in the matter after serving a copy of the charge-sheet upon the petitioner. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to conduct a fresh enquiry in the matter after serving a copy of the charge-sheet upon the petitioner. The enquiry may be conducted and completed in accordance with the law as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order. Petitioner is directed to cooperate in the enquiry and he will not take unnecessary adjournments." (vi) M.V. Bijlani (Supra), paragraph- 25 "25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." (vii) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30 and 31 "23. The basis of coming to the conclusion by both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that Disciplinary Authority has violated the principle of natural justice is based on the fact that although the inquiry report was sent to the writ petitioner by letter dated 02.04.2008, the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already came to the opinion on 25.2.2008 that writ petitioner be punished with major penalty. The Division Bench of the High Court has placed reliance on Union of India and others v. R. P. Singh. 24. In the above case the issue was, as to whether non-supply of the copy of advise of U.P.S.C. to delinquent officer at pre-decision stage violates the principle of natural justice. This Court placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment in Managing Director, ECIL, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS Versus B. KARUNAKAR AND OTHERS and laid down following in para 21: ""21. 24. In the above case the issue was, as to whether non-supply of the copy of advise of U.P.S.C. to delinquent officer at pre-decision stage violates the principle of natural justice. This Court placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment in Managing Director, ECIL, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS Versus B. KARUNAKAR AND OTHERS and laid down following in para 21: ""21. At this juncture, we would like to give our reasons for our respectful concurrence with S.K. Kapoor (supra). There is no cavil over the proposition that the language engrafted in Article 320(3)(c) does not make the said Article mandatory. As we find, in the T.V.Patel's case, the Court has based its finding on the language employed in Rule 32 of the Rules. It is not in dispute that the said Rule from the very inception is a part of the 1965 Rules. With the efflux of time, there has been a change of perception as regards the applicability of the principles of natural justice. An inquiry report in a disciplinary proceeding is required to be furnished to the delinquent employee so that he can make an adequate representation explaining his own stand/ stance. That is what precisely has been laid down in the B.Karnukara's( AIR 1994 SC 1074 ) case. We may reproduce the relevant passage with profit: - ""29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officers report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employees right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officers report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice."" 25. The Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS Versus B. KARUNAKAR AND OTHERS after elaborately considering the principle of natural justice in the context of the disciplinary inquiry laid down following in para 29, 30 (iv)(v): 29. The Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS Versus B. KARUNAKAR AND OTHERS after elaborately considering the principle of natural justice in the context of the disciplinary inquiry laid down following in para 29, 30 (iv)(v): 29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the Disciplinary Authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the Disciplinary Authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a par t of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the Disciplinary Authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 30. (iv). In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan case should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. (v). The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly. (v). The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an unnatural expansion of natural justice which in itself is antithetical to justice" 26. Present is not a case of not serving the inquiry report before awarding the punishment rather the complaint has been made that before sending the inquiry report to the delinquent officer, Disciplinary Authority has already made up its mind to accept the findings of the inquiry report and decided to award punishment of dismissal. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench on the aforesaid premise came to the conclusion that principle of natural justice have been violated by the Disciplinary Authority. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench on the aforesaid premise came to the conclusion that principle of natural justice have been violated by the Disciplinary Authority. The Division Bench itself was conscious of the issue, as to whether, inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer\Disciplinary Authority has committed fault i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules as non-supply of the report. Following observations have been made in the impugned judgment by Division Bench in para 21: ""Having said so, the core question is whether the inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority has committed fault, i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, i.e. non-supply of inquiry report, findings and other material relied upon by the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority to the writ petitioner-respondent herein to explain the circumstances, which were made basis for making foundation of inquiry report or is it a case for closure of the inquiry in view of the fact that there is not even a single iota of evidence, prima facie, not to speak of proving by preponderance of probabilities, that the writ petitioner has absented himself willfully and he has disobeyed the directions?"" 27. The above observation clearly indicates that Division Bench was well aware that fault has occurred on the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The Division Bench had also relied on the judgment of this Court in KRUSHNAKANT B. PARMAR Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (2012) 3 SCC 178 where this Court had laid down that absence from duty without any application on prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence but it does not always mean willful. Learned counsel for the appellant, as noted above, has confined his submission on the proof of the second part of the charge and he has not invited us to enter into the issue as to whether absence of the writ petitioner was willful or not. 29. On the scope of judicial review, the Division Bench itself has referred to judgment of this Court reported in M.V. BIJLANI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2006) 5 SCC 88 . 29. On the scope of judicial review, the Division Bench itself has referred to judgment of this Court reported in M.V. BIJLANI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2006) 5 SCC 88 . This Court, noticing the scope of judicial review in context of disciplinary proceeding made following observations in para 25: It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 30. The three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. CHATURVEDI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 1995 (6) SCC 749 had noticed the scope of judicial review with regard to disciplinary proceeding. Following observations have been made in paras 12 and 13: 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India V. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could issued. 31. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have heavily relied on the fact that before forwarding the copy of the report by letter dated 02.04.2008 the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already formed an opinion on 25.02.2008 to punish the writ petitioner with major penalty which is a clear violation of principle of natural justice. 31. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have heavily relied on the fact that before forwarding the copy of the report by letter dated 02.04.2008 the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already formed an opinion on 25.02.2008 to punish the writ petitioner with major penalty which is a clear violation of principle of natural justice. We are of the view that before making opinion with regard to punishment which is to be imposed on a delinquent, the delinquent has to be given an opportunity to submit the representation/reply on the inquiry report which finds a charge proved against the delinquent. The opinion formed by the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members on 25.02.2008 was formed without there being benefit of comments of the writ petitioner on the inquiry report. The writ petitioner in his representation to the inquiry report is entitled to point out any defect in the procedure, a defect of substantial nature in appreciation of evidence, any misleading of evidence both oral or documentary. In his representation any inputs and explanation given by the delinquent are also entitled to be considered by the Disciplinary Authority before it embarks with further proceedings as per statutory rules. We are, thus, of the view that there was violation of principle of natural justice at the level of Disciplinary Authority when opinion was formed to punish the writ petitioner with dismissal without forwarding the inquiry report to the delinquent and before obtaining his comments on the inquiry report. We are, thus, of the view that the order of the High Court setting aside the punishment order as well as the Appellate order has to be maintained." 19. On perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that without supplying the preliminary enquiry report to the employee, the impugned order cannot be passed, thus, it is well established that the impugned order has been passed in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice, hence, is not sustainable in law. 20. In regard to the third submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that once there was stipulation in not joining the service, the service will be dispensed with, there was no occasion in not joining the petitioner into service in passing the impugned order. This submission also has merit and there was no occasion to pass the impugned order, relying on the preliminary enquiry report. 21. This submission also has merit and there was no occasion to pass the impugned order, relying on the preliminary enquiry report. 21. Submission of learned Standing Counsel on the point raised hereinabove are not attracted to this Court and being devoid of merit, is rejected. 22. Once the decision is taken by the authorities to institute regular disciplinary proceedings then findings in the preliminary enquiry report ordinarily is not to be relied upon. In case such a report is to be relied upon then the delinquent employees has to be confronted with such materials, and only after hearing their version in the matter that such a report could be relied upon. Any other course followed would clearly be a violation of principles of natural justice. 23. In view of the reasons recorded above, the impugned order dated 11.10.2000 is hereby quashed. 24. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 25. The respondents are directed to follow the consequential action in pursuance thereof.