JUDGMENT Anil Kshetarpal, J. - In A.V.Papayya Sastry vs. Govt of A.P. ( AIR 2007 SC 1546 ), the Apex Court observed that the fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. A judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. It can be challenged in any court at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. The relevant paragraphs 20, 22, and 23 are extracted as under:- '20. Now, it is well settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed; "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal". It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. 22. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. 23. XX XX XX The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. 23. XX XX XX The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, taxevaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation". (emphasis supplied)" 2. The decree holder assails the correctness of the concurrent orders passed by the Executing Court as well as the First Appellate Court. 3. Some peculiar facts are required to be noticed. Late Smt. Karnail Kaur wife of Sh. Bachan Singh was owner of 96.55 ordinary acres of land. As per the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The Collector vide order dated 06.08.1962, declared 50.86 ordinary acres of land (15.86 standard acres) as surplus (beyond ceiling limit) after leaving 60 ordinary acres as the permissible area (that is the area under the petitioner's ownership) as per the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. This order has never been challenged before and it remains final till date. During the consolidation of holdings, late Smt. Karnail Kaur remained in possession of whole of the land including the land which was declared as surplus. Till 1983, the officials of the State of Haryana did not take steps to take over possession of the land which was declared surplus (beyond the ceiling limit). In the meantime, in view of the provisions of the Haryana Sealing of Land Holdings Act, 1972, the land which was declared surplus vested in the State in terms of Section 12(3) from the appointed date i.e. 24.01.1971. After declaration of the surplus area, the authorities are required to separately identify and separate the permissible area and the surplus area. In the meantime, in view of the provisions of the Haryana Sealing of Land Holdings Act, 1972, the land which was declared surplus vested in the State in terms of Section 12(3) from the appointed date i.e. 24.01.1971. After declaration of the surplus area, the authorities are required to separately identify and separate the permissible area and the surplus area. On a notice being given, late Smt. Karnail Kaur, on 29.04.1983, provided the list of khasra numbers which she chose to retain as permissible area to the prescribed authority, which was accepted and the remaining area measuring 50.80 ordinary acres was treated as surplus. Subsequently, as per the Rules and the Scheme, some part of the land was allotted to respondent no.7, 9 and 10 on 15.02.1985. 4. The appeal and the revision petition filed by Late Smt. Karnail Kaur challenging the order of allotment dated 15.02.1985, were dismissed on 29.07.1985 and 13.09.1985, respectively. At that stage, late Smt. Karnail Kaur played a fraud and instead of challenging the order passed in the revision petition before the Financial Commissioner, she filed a civil suit on 06.11.1985, challenging the orders passed by the allotment authority, the Collector as well as the Commissioner, however, she did not implead the allottees as parties to the suit. The Allotment Authority delivered possession to the allottees on 24.09.1985. The officials of the State of Haryana failed to contest the suit properly, resulting in judgment and decree dated 17.11.1985. As per the decree, she was declared to be owner in possession of the property and the officials of the State of Haryana were restrained from dispossessing her from the said property. Neither the State of Haryana nor late Smt. Karnail Kaur disclosed to the Court that possession of the land was delivered to the allottees on 24.09.1985, resulting in her dispossession. As per the decree, the State of Haryana was given liberty to pass a fresh allotment order after separating the surplus land from the permissible area of the big landowner. 5. Another suit was filed by the allottees challenging the judgment and decree dated 17.11.1985, obtained by late Smt. Karnail Kaur by playing fraud. In the aforesaid suit, the allottees sought a decree of declaration. 5. Another suit was filed by the allottees challenging the judgment and decree dated 17.11.1985, obtained by late Smt. Karnail Kaur by playing fraud. In the aforesaid suit, the allottees sought a decree of declaration. The suit was dismissed on two grounds, firstly, that the State of Haryana has not been impleaded as a party-defendant and secondly, that there is no evidence of the fact that the land in question was ever declared surplus. The first appeal filed by the respondents was also dismissed on 06.12.1987 and the aforesaid judgment was upheld in the Regular Second Appeal. 6. The petitioner herein, claiming to be the legal heir of late Smt. Karnail Kaur, applied for the execution of decree dated 17.11.1985. The allottees filed objections which have been allowed resulting in dismissal of the execution petition. The first appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed. 7. This Bench has heard the learned counsels representing the parties at length and with their able assistance perused the paper book as well as the record of the Courts below which was requisitioned. The learned counsels have also filed synopsis along with the gist of their arguments. 8. The learned counsel representing the petitioner contends that the possession of the land has been delivered to the private respondents during the pendency of the suit, that too, in violation of injunction order. He submits that the court is required to restore the possession to him. He further submits that the delivery of possession to the respondents is governed by the doctrine of lis pendens as defined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which provides that any transfer of interest in the immovable property during the pendency of the suit shall be subservient to the result of the suit. He submits that irrespective of fact as to whether there is a decree for possession or not, the Court should restore the possession to the petitioner on the principle of restitution. He relies upon the various judgments passed by the courts including Sohan Singh vs. Gurcharan Singh, 1991(1) RRR 98, Tanusree Basu and others vs. Ishani Prasad Basu and others (2008) 4 SCC 791 and Mrs. Kavita Trehan And Another vs Balsara Hygience Products Ltd., 1994 (3) RRR 361 (equivalent citation (1994) 5 SCC 380 ), while submitting that the Executing Court is bound to implement the decree. 9. Kavita Trehan And Another vs Balsara Hygience Products Ltd., 1994 (3) RRR 361 (equivalent citation (1994) 5 SCC 380 ), while submitting that the Executing Court is bound to implement the decree. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel representing respondent no.7, 9 and 10 submits that late Smt. Karnail Kaur has only been granted the decree of declaration. He submits that late Smt. Karnail Kaur neither brought to the notice of the court that the possession has already been delivered to the allottees nor prayed for the modification of the relief. He further submits that respondent no.7, 9 and 10 are admittedly, not a party to the decree and therefore, it is not binding upon their rights. He further submits that late Smt. Karnail Kaur played fraud with the Court as she never impleaded the allottees of the surplus land in the suit filed by her. He submits that late Smt. Karnail Kaur, after having failed before the authorities, filed a suit by playing fraud with the Court. He further submits that in such circumstances, both the courts have correctly dismissed the execution petition. 10. After having heard the learned counsels representing the parties at length, this Court proceeds to analyze the arguments put forth by the learned counsels. 11. First and foremost, it is important to note that the order declaring the land belonging to late Smt. Karnail Kaur as surplus has never been challenged by her. In other words, the land in question is beyond the permissible limit and falls in the surplus pool. It is also evident that the entire basis of the decree which has been passed in her favour is against the record. On the notice given by the prescribed authority, late Smt. Karnail Kaur selected the permissible area which was accepted by the Collector. In these circumstances, late Smt. Karnail Kaur has obtained the judgment and decree by keeping the court in dark. Further late Smt. Karnail Kaur did not implead the allottees despite having failed before the Collector as well as the Commissioner in the proceedings challenging their allotment. The big landowners do make numerous efforts to remain in possession of the whole land by adopting various dubious means. This is also one such case. Further late Smt. Karnail Kaur did not implead the allottees despite having failed before the Collector as well as the Commissioner in the proceedings challenging their allotment. The big landowners do make numerous efforts to remain in possession of the whole land by adopting various dubious means. This is also one such case. In these circumstances, the question arises as to whether the possession should be restored back to the petitioner particularly when he has no right, title or interest in the same. In the opinion of this Court, the answer to the aforesaid question has to be in the negative. 12. Admittedly, there is no decree of delivery of possession in favour of late Smt. Karnail Kaur or the petitioner. Furthermore, the allottees were not made a party to the suit. The judgment and decree passed on 17.11.1988, granting the decree of declaration is a judgment in personam and not a judgment in rem. Hence, it is not binding on the rights of the allottees. The petitioner and his predecessor late Smt. Karnail Kaur played fraud and deceit with the Court. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to the indulgence of the Court in any manner. 13. This bench now proceeds to analyze the arguments of the learned counsel representing the petitioner. 14. The first argument is with regard to the doctrine of lis pendens. The same is not an absolute doctrine. The doctrine is applicable on the transfers made by the parties to the parties to the suit and can be avoided if the court comes to the conclusion that such doctrine is sought to be misused in order to defeat the ends of justice. In Sohan Singh's case (supra), the decree holder was forcibly dispossessed during the pendency of the suit and the court found that the conduct of the judgment debtors did not entitle them to retain possession particularly when they have tried to overreach the court. In Tanusree Basu and others(supra), the parties were co-sharers and a suit for partition was filed. The parties had also entered into a development agreement. In those facts, the court held that restoration of status-quo ante is necessary because the co-sharers, being in exclusive possession, shall be entitled to an injunction so as to safeguard their possession. In Tanusree Basu and others(supra), the parties were co-sharers and a suit for partition was filed. The parties had also entered into a development agreement. In those facts, the court held that restoration of status-quo ante is necessary because the co-sharers, being in exclusive possession, shall be entitled to an injunction so as to safeguard their possession. It was held that the court has inherent powers to grant injunction under Section 151 CPC even if the case is not covered under Order 39 Rule 1& 2 CPC. It is evident that the aforesaid judgment has no application to the present case. 15. The next argument of the learned counsel representing the petitioner is on the plea of restitution. It may be noted here that the doctrine of restitution means that on reversal of a decree, the party to the suit who has received the benefit of an erroneous decree is liable to restore it to the other party and the parties are restituted to their original position which they would have held had the decree so reversed was not passed in the first place. In Mrs. Kavita Trehan And Another(supra), the Supreme Court while elaborating has held that the jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and must be exercised whenever justice demands. The Court held that the power to restitute is available even beyond the provisions of Section 144 CPC. In the present case, the doctrine of restitution is not applicable particularly when the petitioner or his predecessors were guilty of playing deceit and fraud with the Court. Fraud vitiates even the most solemn transactions. Moreover, the decree is not binding on the allottees as they were not impleaded as a party to the suit. Further, the decree is only for declaration and not for delivery of possession. 16. The next argument of the learned counsel representing the petitioner is that the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree. In the considered opinion of the court, this contention does not require detailed deliberation in the present revision petition particularly when the petitioner has neither been granted the relief of possession nor has been found entitled to such relief in the facts and circumstances of the present case. While exercising the revisional jurisdiction, this court does not find it appropriate to grant indulgence to the petitioner. 17. Consequently, finding no merit, the revision petition is dismissed. 18. While exercising the revisional jurisdiction, this court does not find it appropriate to grant indulgence to the petitioner. 17. Consequently, finding no merit, the revision petition is dismissed. 18. All the pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of.