JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner is assailing the interlocutory order dtd. 21/1/2014, rendered by the Maharashtra Land Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur ("MRT" for short), in Revenue Revision 18/TNC/2003-04, whereby the revisionist Mr. Datta Gaikwad respondent 1 was permitted to amend the memo of revision and raise additional grounds and the final order dtd. 24/3/2014, whereby the MRT set aside the order dtd. 31/7/2003, passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Pusad ("SDO") in Revenue Case 2/59/98-99 of mouza Umarkhed, District Yavatmal and remitted the matter to the SDO for fresh enquiry and decision. The order of the SDO which is set aside by the MRT allows the application preferred by the petitioner under sec. 120 (c) of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agriculture Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act ("MTAL Act" for short) and directs respondent 1 Mr. Datta Gaikwad to deliver possession of the subject agricultural land to the petitioner. 2. The factual matrix lies in an extremely narrow compass. The petitioner is a Public Trust initially registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act and then under the Bombay Public Trust Act ("Trust Act" for short). 3. The petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the "Trust" for short) owns various agricultural lands including agricultural field survey 209, admeasuring 35 acres, situated at mouza - Umarkhed, District Yavatmal ("subject agricultural land" for short). 4. Father of respondent 1 (respondent 1 expired during the pendency of the petition and is represented by legal heirs respondents 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3) Mr. Mahipati Gaikwad was in possession of the subject agricultural land and in view of the provisions of the MTAL Act acquired the status of tenant. Mr. Mahipati Gaikwad expired, and while the exact date of death is not discernible from record, the application under sec. 120(c) of the MTAL Act, which was allowed by the SDO, is preferred after the death of Mr. Mahipati Gaikwad, on the premise, that in view of the exemption certificate obtained by the Trust under sec. 129 of the said enactment, the tenancy of Mr. Mahipati Gaikwad is not heritable under sec. 54 of the said enactment, and the possession of the legal heir Mr. Datta Gaikwad is illegal. 5. The SDO, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Shriram Mandir Sansthan alias Shri Ram Sansthan Pusda vs. Vatsalabai and Others, (1999) 1 SCC 657 , held that in view of the exclusion of sec. 54 of the said enactment, and the possession of the legal heir Mr. Datta Gaikwad is illegal. 5. The SDO, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Shriram Mandir Sansthan alias Shri Ram Sansthan Pusda vs. Vatsalabai and Others, (1999) 1 SCC 657 , held that in view of the exclusion of sec. 54 of the MTAL Act by sec. 129 thereof, the tenancy of deceased Mr. Mahipati Gaikwad is not heritable. 6. Mr. Datta Gaikwad approached the Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati, challenging the order of eviction passed by the SDO. Perusal of the memo of appeal reveals that the order of the SDO was challenged on the ground of denial of opportunity to adduce evidence and that the status as trustees of the persons representing the Trust is not verified. 7. The appeal preferred by Mr. Datta Gaikwad came to be transferred to the MRT and registered as Revenue Revision 18/TNC/2003-04 of Mouza Umarkhed. 8. Mr. Datta Gaikwad preferred an application dtd. 2/9/2013 for production of documents, which application was opposed by the Trust. Mr. Datta Gaikwad further preferred an application seeking permission to amend the memo of revision and raise additional grounds. Mr. Datta Gaikwad further preferred another application dtd. 29/10/2013 seeking production of documents. 9. The MRT passed an interlocutory order dtd. 21/1/2014 allowing the application seeking permission to amend the memo of revision and raise additional grounds. The MRT observed that the documents ought to have been filed before the SDO. However, the MRT laconically observed that the submission of Mr. Datta Gaikwad that the documents were then not available, is acceptable. 10. The additional grounds which Mr. Datta Gaikwad was permitted to raise may be briefly noted. Mr. Datta Gaikwad contended that the Trust ceased to be the owner of the subject agricultural land in view of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Proprietary Rights Act. In the alternate, Mr. Datta Gaikwad contended that in view of the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ceiling and Holdings Act"), the SDO could not have directed delivery of possession of the subject agricultural land to the Trust. The other ground which is raised is that the trustees are not competent to represent the Trust and the proceedings before the SDO suffer from the defect of non-joinder of the necessary parties. 11. The other ground which is raised is that the trustees are not competent to represent the Trust and the proceedings before the SDO suffer from the defect of non-joinder of the necessary parties. 11. The MRT allowed the revision vide final order dtd. 21/1/2014, and as noted supra, directed the SDO to conduct fresh enquiry. 12. Perusal of the final order rendered by the MRT reveals that paragraphs 1 to 5 reproduce the contentions of the parties and paragraphs 6 and 7 purport to record the findings and the reasons. However, in my considered view, the final order is virtually unreasoned in as much as the only question which arose for determination was the entitlement or otherwise of Mr. Datta Gaikwad to remain in possession of the subject agricultural land in view of the exemption under sec. 129(b) secured by the Trust, which the MRT did not address. The MRT was swayed by certain documents placed on record pertaining to the proceedings under the Ceiling on Holdings Act and the additional grounds raised by Mr. Datta Gaikwad. Unfortunately, the MRT made no effort to delve deeper in the objection raised by Mr. Datta Gaikwad on the basis of the provisions of the Ceiling on Holdings Act and to ascertain the locus of Mr. Datta Gaikwad to raise such objections. This aspect shall be considered more elaborately while dealing with the submissions advanced on behalf of Mr. Datta Gaikwad, at a later stage. 13. I have heard the learned senior counsel Mr. R.L. Khapre on behalf of the Trust and the learned senior counsel Mr. C.S. Kaptan on behalf of the legal heirs of Mr. Datta Gaikwad at considerable length, and with the able assistance of the learned senior counsel, the material on record is analyzed. 14. Mr. R.L. Khapre invites my attention to order dtd. 10/4/1974 (which is a part of record of connected Writ Petition 3119/2014), whereby certificate under sec. 129 of the MTAL Act is issued in favour of the Trust. Mr. R.L. Khapre would highlight two aspects. Mr. R.L. Khapre would submit that the exemption under sec. 129(b) of the MTAL Act does not operate prospectively and merely statutorily recognizes the existing entitlement of the Trust to exemption from certain provisions of MTAL. Mr. R.L. Khapre would emphasize that while the certificate which is issued under sec. Mr. R.L. Khapre would highlight two aspects. Mr. R.L. Khapre would submit that the exemption under sec. 129(b) of the MTAL Act does not operate prospectively and merely statutorily recognizes the existing entitlement of the Trust to exemption from certain provisions of MTAL. Mr. R.L. Khapre would emphasize that while the certificate which is issued under sec. 129(b) after holding an enquiry, is conclusive evidence that the Trust satisfies the conditions of exemption, the statutory scheme is that a Trust which satisfies the conditions prescribed in sec. 129(b) is deemed to be exempted from the relevant provisions from the appointed date. Mr. R.L. Khapre would further submit that the date of the registration of the Trust is irrelevant since the registration merely recognizes that the Public Trust exists. The other aspect highlighted by Mr. R.L. Khapre is that in view of the well entrenched position of law, if the Public Trust is exempted from the relevant provisions, applicability of sec. 54 of the MTAL Act is excluded, and the tenancy is not heritable, and axiomatically, Mr. Datta Gaikwad is liable to be evicted from the subject agricultural land, as was rightly ordered by the SDO. 15. Mr. R.L. Khapre has invited my attention to the provisions of sec. 54 and 129 of the MTAL Act, and certain decisions explaining the interplay between the said provisions. My attention is invited to the Division Bench decision in Digambar s/o. Pandhari Bhise dead through LRs. Kamala wd/o. Pandhari Bhise vs. Shri Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan Shegaon, 2016(5) Mh.L.J. 163 , Vidarbha Maharogi Seva Mandal Tapovan, Amravati vs. Member Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal Nagpur, 2016(4) Mh.L.J. 645 , Shri Digambar Jain Dharma and Samaj Vikas Trust vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Malkapur, 2016(4) Mh.L.J. 441 , Gajanan Maharaj Santhan, Shegaon Vs. Digambar Pandhari Bhise, 2005(4) Bom. C.R. 376, Sarda Education Trust Vs. Nandulal Vishwanath and Ors, (1999) 7 SCC 497 and Shriram Mandir Sansthan vs. Vatsalabai and Others, (1999) 1 SCC 657 (supra). 16. It would not be necessary to burden the judgment with elaborate reference to the enunciation in the decisions pressed in service by Mr. R.L. Khapre, particularly, since the learned senior counsel Mr. C.S. Kaptan with his usual fairness has not canvased any submission contrary to the well entrenched position of law. The the submissions canvased by Mr. 16. It would not be necessary to burden the judgment with elaborate reference to the enunciation in the decisions pressed in service by Mr. R.L. Khapre, particularly, since the learned senior counsel Mr. C.S. Kaptan with his usual fairness has not canvased any submission contrary to the well entrenched position of law. The the submissions canvased by Mr. C.S. Kaptan focus on the import and implication of the provisions of the Ceiling on Holdings Act in the context and backdrop of certain proceedings and orders under the said enactment. 17. Mr. C.S. Kaptan draws my attention to the order dtd. 31/3/1976, rendered by the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal, Pusad ("SLDT" for short), whereby 248.70 acres land owned by the petitioner - Trust was declared surplus. Mr. C.S. Kaptan submits that in an appeal preferred by the Trust challenging the said order, the MRT passed order dtd. 22/12/1983 deleting land admeasuring 60 acres 39 gunthas from the surplus land on the premise that the land in lawful possession of the tenants will have to be excluded from consideration while determining surplus land. Mr. C.S. Kaptan would submit that having taken advantage of the finding rendered by the MRT that the land in possession of the tenants will have to be excluded while determining the surplus land, the petitioner Trust is estopped from contending that Mr. Datta Gaikwad is in unlawful possession of the subject agricultural land. Mr. C.S. Kaptan invites my attention to the provisions of sec. 9 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act and emphasizes that the acquisition of land in excess of ceiling area is prohibited and the expression "transfer" in sec. 9 has the same meaning as in sec. 8. Referring to the explanation to sec. 8 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act, Mr. C.S. Kaptan would submit that the effect of an order under sec. 120(c) of the MTAL Act directing delivery of possession to the petitioner - Trust will be that the petitioner shall hold land in excess of the ceiling area, which is impermissible in law. Mr. C.S. Kaptan would submit that an order of eviction which will violate the mandate of sec. 9 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act will be illegal and contrary to public policy. Mr. C.S. Kaptan would further submit that indubitably the Trust has not obtained exemption under sec. Mr. C.S. Kaptan would submit that an order of eviction which will violate the mandate of sec. 9 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act will be illegal and contrary to public policy. Mr. C.S. Kaptan would further submit that indubitably the Trust has not obtained exemption under sec. 47(2) of the Ceiling on Holdings Act, and that having expressed unwillingness to obtain such exemption in the proceedings decided by the SLDT, the Trust is precluded from applying for exemption on the principle of waiver and estoppal. Mr. C.S. Kaptan would submit that even if the petitioner - Trust secures possession of the subject agricultural land in view of the order under sec. 120(c) of the MTAL Act, the land shall vest with the Government, and therefore, the legal heirs of Mr. Datta Gaikwad cannot be evicted at the behest of the petitioner - Trust. Finally, Mr. C.S. Kaptan would submit that in any event, the issues arising have not been decided by the MRT on merits, and if at all, interference with the order of remand is found necessary, it would be appropriate to direct the MRT to decide the contentious issues on merit. 18. The submission canvased by Mr. C.S. Kaptan that Mr. Datta Gaikwad is held to be lawful tenant by the MRT, and since on such premise, the subject agricultural land is excluded from surplus land, the Trust is precluded from evicting Mr. Datta Gaikwad, must be rejected for reasons more than one. While it is true that Mr. Datta Gaikwad was a party in the proceedings before the MRT and presumably it is he, who is referred to as the lawful tenant, such reference could not have clothed Mr. Datta Gaikwad with the status of tenant. The original tenant Mr. Mahipati Gaikwad having expired, in view of the exemption under sec. 129(c) of the MTAL Act, the provisions of sec. 54 stood excluded. The other aspect is, that during the pendency of the petition, Mr. Datta Gaikwad has also expired. I need not delve deeper in the submission that the petitioner - Trust is estopped from questioning the status of Mr. Datta Gaikwad as lawful tenant and suffice it to note the following observations of the Division Bench in Digambar s/o. Pandhari Bhise (supra). "11. There is an another angle. During the pendency of appeal the original appellant has expired. I need not delve deeper in the submission that the petitioner - Trust is estopped from questioning the status of Mr. Datta Gaikwad as lawful tenant and suffice it to note the following observations of the Division Bench in Digambar s/o. Pandhari Bhise (supra). "11. There is an another angle. During the pendency of appeal the original appellant has expired. The legal heirs are brought on record. In view of the clear pronouncement of law by the Apex Court in the case of Shriram mandir Sansthan (cited supra) in case of the lands belonging to a trust or an educational institution falling within sec. 129(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, the tenancy is not heritable on the death of the tenant. We have made reference to this fact since the said subsequent event has taken place during the pendency of present appeal." 19. While the submissions canvased by Mr. C.S. Kaptan on the touchstone of the provisions of the Ceiling on Holdings Act, appear interesting at the first blush, on slightly deeper examination, it is manifest that the submissions raise certain issues prematurely and are speculative. 20. Mr. C.S. Kaptan is right in submitting that sec. 9 restricts acquisition of land in excess of ceiling area and that the expression "transfer" includes transfer by surrender of tenancy or resumption of land by a landlord or any other disposition whether by act of parties or decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or authority. While no positive finding is necessary, it would be safe to observe that the submission that the ceiling limit may be breached if the possession of the legal heirs of Mr. Datta Gaikwad of the subject agricultural land is delivered to the Trust. The seminal issue however is, whether the legal heirs of Mr. Datta Gaikwad are entitled to resist eviction on the premise that the ceiling limit shall be breached if the possession of the subject agricultural land is delivered to the petitioner - Trust, and the answer may be an emphatic no. 21. Sub-Sec. (2) and (3) of sec. 10 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act provides for the consequences of acquisition of land after the commencement date as would breach the ceiling limit. Sub-Sec. (2) and (3) of sec. 21. Sub-Sec. (2) and (3) of sec. 10 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act provides for the consequences of acquisition of land after the commencement date as would breach the ceiling limit. Sub-Sec. (2) and (3) of sec. 10 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act, read thus: (2) If any land is possessed on or after the commencement date by a person, or as the case may be, a family unit in excess of the ceiling area, or if as a result of acquisition (by testamentary disposition or devolution on death or by operation of law) of any land on or after that date, the total area of land held by any person, or as the case may be, a family unit, exceeds the ceiling area, the land so in excess shall be surplus land. (3) Where land is acquired in wilful contravention of sec. 9, then as a penalty therefor, the right, title and interest of the person, or as the case may be, the family unit or any member thereof in the land so acquired or obtained shall, subject to the provisions of Chapter IV, be forfeited, and shall vest without any further assurance in the State Government: Provided that, where such land is burdened with an encumbrance, the Collector may, after holding such inquiry as he thinks fit and after hearing the holder and the person in whose favour the encumbrance is made by him, direct that the right, title and interest of the holder in some other land of the holder equal in extent to the land acquired in wilful contravention of sec. 9, shall be forfeited to Government. 22. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 10 provides that the forfeiture and vesting of the excess land shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Ceiling on Holdings Act. Chapter IV comprises Sec. 12 to 21-A. In the context of the factual matrix, if the ceiling limit is breached, the petitioner-Trust will have to submit return and an enquiry as is envisaged under sec. 14 may be held, and then, the completion of the stages contemplated by Sec. 16,17,18,19 and 20 may result in the declaration regarding surplus land under sec. 21 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act. 23. The petitioner - Trust is also entitled to claim exemption from provisions of Ceiling on Holdings Act under sec. 14 may be held, and then, the completion of the stages contemplated by Sec. 16,17,18,19 and 20 may result in the declaration regarding surplus land under sec. 21 of the Ceiling on Holdings Act. 23. The petitioner - Trust is also entitled to claim exemption from provisions of Ceiling on Holdings Act under sec. 47(2) of the said Act, which provision reads thus: "(2) Subject to any rules made in this behalf, the State Government may, after such inquiry as it deems fit, by an order in the Official Gazette, exempt from the provisions of this Act, any of the following lands on such terms and conditions including the extent of area to be exempted as may be specified in the order, namely :- (a) land held before the 26th day of September 1970 by a public trust 1 [or a wakf] the major portion of the income of such land being appropriated for the purpose of education or medical relief or both or where the major portion of the income is not so appropriated but an undertaking in the prescribed form is given within six months of the commencement date (or within such further period as the State Government may allow in that behalf) to the Collector, that the major portion of the income of such land will, within a period of two years from the date of publication of the order granting exemption be appropriated for those purposes ; (b) and held before the 26th day of September 1970, by any person for stud farm or 2[by any public trust or wakf for] panjarpol or gaushala; [(bb) land held before the 26th day of September 1970, by a public limited company, a public trust or a wakf for the purpose of breeding of cattle or sheep : Provided that, nothing in this clause shall apply to land used for raising of garden produce or crops (other than grass or fodder crop) any time during a continuous period of three years before 26th day of September 1970, or to land which is not being used with the object of improvement of indigenous or local breed of cattle or sheep. The decision of the State Government on the question whether or not any lands falls within this proviso shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any civil court ; (c) land which is held, or to be acquired in any manner, by an industrial undertaking on a public trust or a firm or a company for a bonafide industrial or other non agricultural use, including an integrated township project declared under sec. 18 of 44, as the case may be, of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. In considering whether such land is so held or to be acquired, the State Government shall have regard to the following considerations, that is to say, - (i) the extent and location of the land, if any, already held by the undertaking or a public trust or a firm or a company (including any land, which it may already hold for industrial or nonagricultural use): (ii) the extent of land held by the person from whom it is to be acquired." 24. I am not impressed by the submission that since the petitioner - Trust expressed unwillingness to seek such exemption in the proceedings which were conducted in 1976 or thereabout, the principles of waiver and estoppal shall preclude the petitioner - Trust from seeking an exemption. While the factual foundation for such submission is blurred, even if it is assumed arguendo, that the Trust was not inclined to seek exemption from the provisions of the Ceiling on Holdings Act in 1976, the Trust is not precluded from applying for exemption. The principles of waiver and estoppal invoked by the legal heirs of the tenant do not come into play. The Trust will be entitled to make out a case that the conditions envisaged under subsec. (2) of sec. 47 are satisfied, and if any application is preferred seeking exemption, the same will have to be considered by the appropriate authority on its own merit. 25. In my considered view, the statutory regime of the Ceiling on Holdings Act will be triggered only after the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit. Even if it is assumed arguendo, that the order of the SDO which is set aside by the MRT will in effect result in the petitioner - Trust holding land in excess, the statutory regime will take its own course. Even if it is assumed arguendo, that the order of the SDO which is set aside by the MRT will in effect result in the petitioner - Trust holding land in excess, the statutory regime will take its own course. However, the legal heirs of Mr. Datta Gaikwad, who have no semblance of right to continue in possession are certainly not entitled in law to resist eviction under sec. 120(c) of the MTAL Act. 26. Mr. C.S. Kaptan is right in submission that the MRT has not addressed the issue involved. However, I am not inclined to remit the matter to the MRT as a ritualistic formality particularly, since the application preferred under sec. 120(c) has not reached the logical end despite the passage of 23 years. Remand to the MRT is not necessary particularly since the issue involved can be addressed and decided on the basis of incontrovertible and indeed admitted facts. The only issue which is involved is whether the legal heirs of Mr. Datta Gaikwad have legal right to continue in possession of the subject agricultural land and in view of the discussion supra, the answer must be in the negative. The facts are undisputed and the law is too well settled to warrant further debate. The MRT clearly erred in setting aside the order of the SDO and remanding the matter for fresh enquiry. Remand could not have been ordered at the mere askance of Mr. Datta Gaikwad. I have already held that the statutory regime of the Ceiling on Holdings Act will be triggered only at a later stage, and therefore, there is no occasion for any authority to make an enquiry on the speculative assumption that the ceiling limit will be breached if the legal heirs of the tenant are evicted from the subject agricultural land. In my considered view, the questions raised by the MRT in the order impugned are wholly unnecessary and to that extent, the order impugned suffers from clear misdirection. 27. I am satisfied that the order of the MRT will have to be quashed and that rendered by the SDO directing eviction of Mr. Datta Gaikwad will have to be upheld, and I order accordingly. 28. The petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (1), which reads thus: "Quash and set aside order dtd. 27. I am satisfied that the order of the MRT will have to be quashed and that rendered by the SDO directing eviction of Mr. Datta Gaikwad will have to be upheld, and I order accordingly. 28. The petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (1), which reads thus: "Quash and set aside order dtd. 21/1/2014, passed by Maharashtra Land Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur in Revenue Revision No. 18/TNC/2003-04 of mouza : Umarkhed at Annexure - 27 and final order dtd. 24/3/2014 passed by said Tribunal in Revenue Revision No. 18/TNC/2003-04 of mouza : Umarkhed at Annexure - 28 and further be pleased to restore the order dtd. 31/7/2003 passed by SDO, Pusad in Revenue Case No. 2/59/98-99 Umarkhed at Annexure - 3 with costs throughout."