JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh along with Mr. Krishna Kant Vishwakarma, counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ram Sajiwan Mishra, counsel for Respondent Nos. 4 to 7. Mr. Praveen Chandra Mishra has put in appearance for Respondents No. 8 to 18. 2. Briefs facts of the case are that dispute relates to plots of Khata No. 81 situated in Village-Dewapur, Pergana-Nawabganj, District-Allahabad. Particulars of plots of Khata No.81, its area and Basic Year entry are as follows:- S. No. Khata No. Plots Nos. Area Name of the tenure holder recorded in Basic Year 1. 81 52 (Bhumidhari) 5-4-12 Hira Lal adopted 2. 81 23 (sirdari) 0-5-0 son of Ram Charan 3. 81 24 (Sirdari) 2-10-11 4. 81 55 (Sirdari) 0-5-0 Status of revenue entry in C.H. Form 45 in respect to 1st consolidation operation, are as follows:- S. No. Khata No. Plots Nos. Area Name of the tenure holder recorded in Basic Year (Class-1 ka Bhumidhar) 1. 1 52 5-4-12 Ram Charan son of Sheetal, Ram Lakhan (major), Hira Lal, (16 year minor) guardian Ram Lakhan real brother, sons of Mahavir S. No. Khata No. Plots Nos. Area Name of the tenure holder recorded in Basic Year (Class-2 Sirdar) 1. 68 23 0.5.0 Ram Charan son of Sheetal 24 2.10.11 3. Against the Basic Year Entry, an objection under section-9A(2) of U.P.C.H. Act was filed by petitioner’s father Ram Lakhan with the prayer that he should be recorded alongwith Hira Lal over plot No. 52 and their share should be recorded as ½ each. A further prayer was made that sale deed executed by Hira Lal in favour of the Mata Prasad in respect to plot no. 52 be cancelled. In respect to plot Nos. 23, 24 and 25, petitioner’s father prayed to record his name exclusively after expunging the name of Hira Lal, Father of respondent No.4. 4. Hira Lal son of Ram Charan filed his written statement and opposed the objection filed by Ram Lakhan. Hira Lal claimed the right on the basis of the adoption deed executed by Ram Charan in his favour on 23.3.1948. 5. Mata Prasad claimed the right on the basis of registered sale deed executed by the Hira Lal in his favour on 5.7.1983 in respect to 1.0.0 area of plot no. 52 so his name be recorded in place of Hira Lal. 5. Mata Prasad claimed the right on the basis of registered sale deed executed by the Hira Lal in his favour on 5.7.1983 in respect to 1.0.0 area of plot no. 52 so his name be recorded in place of Hira Lal. Ayodhya Prasad and Nanhe Lal claimed the right on the basis of the registered sale deed executed on 3.7.1973 by Ram Lakhan in their favour in respect to 2-12-6 area of plot no.52. Accordingly, Ayodhya Prasad, Nanhe Lal (ancestor of respondent nos. 8 to 18) prayed for recording their names after expunging the name of vendor Ram Lakhan. 6. Nine issues were framed before the Consolidation Officer and parties adduced oral and documentary evidences in support of their cases. Consolidation Officer while deciding the issues nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 & 9 recorded finding of fact that adoption deed as claimed by Hira Lal is void and ineffective as ceremony of adoption has not been proved by Hira Lal. Consolidation Officer further recorded finding that even after adoption, Hira Lal executed a registered sale deed in 1974, showing his age as 32 years and his father’s name as Mahavir (natural father) which demonstrate that adoption deed is void. Accordingly, Consolidation Officer ordered to record the name of Ram Lakhan (deceased), substituted by Ram Murat for ½ share along with Hira Lal, son of Mahavir in the place of Hira Lal, adopted son of Ram Charan. 7. While deciding the Issue Nos. 5 & 6, Consolidation Officer ordered to record the name of Ayodhya and Nanhe Lal, being vendees of Ram Lakhan, son of Mahavir as claim for ½ share of Ram Lakhan was accepted. 8. While deciding Issue Nos. 7 & 8, plot nos.23, 24 & 55 were ordered to be vested in state after expunging the name of recorded tenure holder by order of Consolidation Officer dated 7.10.2008. 9. Against the order of Consolidation Officer dated 7.10.2008, three appeals were filed under Section 11(1) of U.P. C.H. Act, one appeal by Hira Lal (father of respondent no.4), one appeal by petitioner Ram Murat and one appeal by Mata Prasad (respondent no.1). All the three appeals were consolidated and heard together by Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and by order dated 10.9.2014, Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dismissed all the three appeals. 10. All the three appeals were consolidated and heard together by Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and by order dated 10.9.2014, Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dismissed all the three appeals. 10. Against the appellate order dated 10.9.2014, three revisions under Section 48 of the U.P. C.H. Act were filed, one by petitioner Ram Murat, one by Raja Ram and others (respondent nos. 4 to 6) and one by Mata Prasad (respondent no.7). All the three revisions were heard together by Deputy Director of Consolidation. Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 8.3.2008, allowed the revisions of respondent nos. 4 to 7 and dismissed the revision filed by petitioner, setting aside the orders passed by Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 7.10.2008 & 10.9.2014 and maintained the basic year entry of khata no.81 as well as ordered to record the names of Mata Prasad, vendees of Hira Lal in place of Hira Lal in respect of plot no. 52, area 1-0.0. Hence this writ petition on behalf of the petitioner. 11. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) have recorded finding of fact that adoption deed is void and ineffective but Deputy Director of Consolidation has illegally held in exercise of revisional jurisdiction that civil court in Suit No.12 of 1979 has recorded finding that Ram Charan has adopted Hira Lal while the fact is the Suit No.12 of 1979 filed by Hira Lal for cancellation of sale deed dated 3.6.1973 executed by Ram Lakhan in favour of Ayodhya Prasad and Nanhe Lal was dismissed by judgment dated 8.12.1982 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, as such, finding on any other point which were not in issue in the suit will be irrelevant. He further submitted that certified copy of adoption deed dated 23.3.1948 was filed before Consolidation Officer but original adoption deed was not filed nor there was any explanation for the same, as such, in view of the provisions contained under Sections 64, 65, 74 & 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, certified copy of adoption deed will not be admissible. He further submitted that Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) after considering the orders and entries of earlier consolidation operation, have rightly held that petitioner and his vendees are entitled to be recorded over plot no.52 but revisional court has illegally interfered with findings of act, as such, revisional order is liable to be set aside. He further submitted that court of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) have illegally vested the plot nos. 23, 24 & 55 in the state in spite of the fact that the petitioner’s father was recorded in the 1st consolidation operation over the plot nos. 23, 24 & 55. He also submitted that provisions of Section 175 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was not taken into consideration, as such, impugned orders are illegal. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shri Jagdamba Prasad (dead) thr. L.R.’s and Others vs. Kripa Shankar (Dead) thr. L.R. and Others, 2014 (124) R.D. 1 in which it is held that Section 48 of the U.P. C.H. Act is pari materia to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Power of revisional authority only extends to ascertaining whether the subordinate courts have exceeded their jurisdiction in coming to the conclusion, if not, revisional authority cannot come to a contrary conclusion by admitting new fats either in form of documents or otherwise. He further placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Udit vs. D.D.C. and Others, 2014 (125) R.D. 627 in which judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Shri Jagdamba Prasad (supra) has been followed. 12. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent nos. 4 to 7 submitted that revisional court has rightly exercised the jurisdiction as vested in him under Section 48 as well as explanation nos. 1, 2 & 3 of Section 48 of the U.P. C.H. Act, as such, no interference is required against the impugned revisional order. He further submitted that adoption deed executed on 23.3.1948 is more than 20 year old, as such, respondent nos. 4 to 6 are entitled to benefit of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 1, 2 & 3 of Section 48 of the U.P. C.H. Act, as such, no interference is required against the impugned revisional order. He further submitted that adoption deed executed on 23.3.1948 is more than 20 year old, as such, respondent nos. 4 to 6 are entitled to benefit of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. He further submitted that entries made in the first consolidation operation were manipulated as Hiralal, father of respondent no.4 was minor during that period, as such, no reliance can be placed upon the entries of first consolidation operation. He further submitted that sale deed executed by Hiralal on 20.5.1974, although, contain the name of natural father but it was the creation of his elder brother Ram Lakhan (father of petitioner) being guardian of Ram Lakhan. Counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon paragraph no.21 of the written statement filed by Ram Lakhan in Civil Suit No.12 of 1979 by which, according to him, Ram Lakhan admitted adoption deed preferred by Hira Lal. He further placed portion of the judgment of civil court dated 8.2.1982 where civil court on the basis of averment of paragraph no.21 of the written statement found that Hira Lal is adopted son of Ram Charan, accordingly, counsel for the respondent nos. 4 to 7 submitted that no interference is required against the impugned revisional order. 13. In reply, counsel for the petitioner submitted that at the time of execution of sale deed by Hira Lal in the year 1974, Hira Lal was very much major and was aged about 32 years. He further submitted that father’s name of Hira Lal as Mahavir is also mentioned in Voter List, kutumb register as well as in C.H. Form 45 of earlier consolidation operation which cannot be ignored while considering the case of adoption set up by Hira Lal (father of respondent no.4). He further placed reliance upon paragraph no.16 of the written statement where it was specifically stated that there was no adoption of plaintiff (Hira Lal) according to Hindu religion. He further placed reliance upon paragraph no.16 of the written statement where it was specifically stated that there was no adoption of plaintiff (Hira Lal) according to Hindu religion. He further submitted that there was no issue framed in Suit No.12 of 1979 regarding adoption deed dated 23.3.1998 nor there was any adjudication of Civil Suit No.12 of 1979 on merit rather the suit was dismissed for the lack of jurisdiction of the court, as such, no reliance can be placed upon the judgment of Suit No.12 of 1979. 14. I have considered the argument advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 15. There is no dispute about the fact that in the basic year of the consolidation operation, Hiralal, adopted son of Ram Charan was recorded in the basic year of the consolidation operation. Against the basic year entry, an objection under Section 9-A(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act was filed by petitioner’s father Ram Lakhan that he should be recorded along with Hira Lal over plot no.52 and share should be ½ each. He further prayed that in respect to plot nos. 23 to 25, petitioner’s father be recorded exclusively after expunging the name of Hira Lal. On the other hand, Hiralal contested the objection on the basis of adoption deed alleged to be executed in his favour on 23.3.1948 by Ram Charan. Respondent no.7 claimed the right on 1.0.0 area of plot no.52 on the basis of sale deed executed in his favour by Hira Lal and Ayodhya Prasad and Nanhe Lal claimed the right on the basis of registered sale deed executed in their favour by Ram Lakhan in respect to 2.12.6 area of plot no.52. Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) have given right to petitioner’s father to be recorded over plot no.52 having ½ share, accordingly, right of vendees of petitioner’s father was also accepted but the claim of Hiralal on the basis of adoption deed alleged to be executed on 23.3.1948 was rejected, accordingly, the claim of vendees of Hiralal was also rejected. Consolidation Officer has further ordered to vest the plot nos. 23 to 25 in the state as nobody was found heir of Ram Charan. Deputy Director of Consolidation has allowed the revisions of respondent nos. Consolidation Officer has further ordered to vest the plot nos. 23 to 25 in the state as nobody was found heir of Ram Charan. Deputy Director of Consolidation has allowed the revisions of respondent nos. 4 to 7 and dismissed the revision of petitioner, accordingly, basic year entry was maintained and the case of adoption was found proved by Deputy Director of Consolidation. 16. Since in the 1st consolidation operation Ram Charan, son of Sheetal, Ram Lakhan, son of Mahavir and Hiralal, minor son of Mahavir under guardianship of Ram Lakhan were recorded over plot no.52 in C.H. Form No.45, as such, that entry cannot be ignored where the name of natural father Mahavir is mentioned against the name of Hira Lal. It is further relevant that first consolidation operation were completed in the year 1960 but no steps were taken by Hiralal to correct the entry on the basis of adoption deed nor Ram Charan has taken any steps being father of Hiralal. So far as adoption deed of 23.3.1948 is concerned, there is no signature of the person who is giving his child for adoption. It is further relevant that original adoption deed has not been filed before Consolidation Officer rather certified copy of adoption deed was filed and there is no explanation regarding original adoption deed. It is further relevant that name of natural father of Hiralal has been mentioned in Voter List, Kutumb Register even in the registered sale deed executed in the year 1974 when the Hiralal was 32 years of age, as such, this fact is also relevant which was considered by Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (consolidation). So far as the judgment of civil court passed in civil suit no.12/1979 filed by Hiralal for cancellation of sale deed executed by Ram Lakhan infavour of Ayodhya Prasad and Nanhe Lal are concerned, since that suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and there was no issue in the suit with respect to adoption deed dated 23.3.1948, as such, any observation in that suit regarding adoption deed will not be conclusive proof of adoption deed. Revisional court has illegally held that civil court has found the adoption deed dated 23.3.1948 as genuine. On the question of admissibility of adoption deed. Revisional court has illegally held that civil court has found the adoption deed dated 23.3.1948 as genuine. On the question of admissibility of adoption deed. It will be relevant to mention here that adoption deed is of 23.3.1948 that is before the enforcement of the Hindu Adoption & Maintenance act, 1956. In 1948, one could not claim validity of his adoption merely because registered document was executed and no presumption in law about the validity of adoption arose, according to the then prevalent law. The registered document regarding adoption has assumed significance after the enforcement of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. 17. On the question of admissibility of certified copy of adoption deed, the perusal of Section 64, 65, 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act, shall be relevant, which are as follows: “64. Proof of documents by primary evidence.—Documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned. 65. 17. On the question of admissibility of certified copy of adoption deed, the perusal of Section 64, 65, 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act, shall be relevant, which are as follows: “64. Proof of documents by primary evidence.—Documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned. 65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.—Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases:— (a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power— of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it; (b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest; (c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time; (d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable; (e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74; (f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in [India] to be given in evidence; [India] to be given in evidence;" (g) when the originals consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection. In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible. In case (b), the written admission is admissible. In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents. 74. In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents. 74. Public documents.—The following documents are public documents :— (1) Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts— (i) of the sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country; (2) Public records kept in any State of private documents. 76. Certified copies of public documents.—Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefore, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies. Explanation.—Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty, is authorized to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section. 18. On the point of presumption of document, more than 20 years old Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 shall be relevant which is as follows:- 90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.—Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.—Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. This Explanation applies also to section 81. STATE AMENDMENTS Uttar Pradesh. (a) Renumber section 90 as sub-section (1) thereof; (b) in sub-section (1) as so renumbered, for the words “thirty years”, substitute the words “twenty years”; (c) after sub-section (1) as so renumbered, insert the following sub-section, namely:— “(2) Where any such document as is referred to in sub-section (1) was registered in accordance with the law relating to registration of documents and a duly certified copy thereof is produced, the court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, it is that person's handwriting, and in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to have been executed or attested”. (d) After section 90, insert the following section, namely:— “90A. (1) Where any registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of the record of a Court of Justice, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the original was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed. (2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement.” The Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 90 will also apply to this section; [Vide Uttar Pradesh Act 24 of 1954, sec. 2 and Sch. (w.e.f. 30-11-1954).]” 19. On the point of Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act as well as on the point of proof of adoption deed this Court in a case of Harihar Vs. 2 and Sch. (w.e.f. 30-11-1954).]” 19. On the point of Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act as well as on the point of proof of adoption deed this Court in a case of Harihar Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Mau and Others 2015 (127) RD 144 has held that so far as admissibility of the document being 20 year old under Section 90 of Evidence Act, 1872 it has nothing to do with the ceremonies of the adoption which has to be proved either by direct evidence or presumption has to be raised according to the provisions of Section 16 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. Paragraph No.7, 8 and 9 of Harihar (supra) is as follows: “7.I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the parties and examined the record. Admittedly, the ceremonies of adoption have not been proved by any witness. Thus the only evidence relating to adoption is adoption deed dated 12.08.1964. The arguments of the counsel for the petitioner that the document, being twenty years old was admissible in evidence without any formal proof under Section 90 of the Act as such the consolidation authorities are bound to raise presumption of the ceremonies of adoption as provided under Section 16 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Section 16 of which is relevant is quoted below:-. 16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.--Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. 8. In order to raise presumption regarding adoption on the basis of adoption deed, the deed must have been signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption both. Admittedly, deed dated 12.08.1964 was not signed by natural father and mother of the petitioner. As such presumption regarding ceremonies of adoption on its basis cannot be raised. In order to be valid adoption, the child must have been adopted according to the rites and custom of Hindu law. Admittedly, deed dated 12.08.1964 was not signed by natural father and mother of the petitioner. As such presumption regarding ceremonies of adoption on its basis cannot be raised. In order to be valid adoption, the child must have been adopted according to the rites and custom of Hindu law. So far as admissibility of the document being 20 years old under Section 90 of Evidence Act, 1872, it has nothing to do with ceremonies of the adoption which has to be proved either by direct evidence or presumption has to be raised according to the provisions of Section 16 above. 9. Findings regarding Udasi being daughter of Soti and Khedani is based upon Pariwar Register as well as oral evidence of Udasi, which is admissible under Section 50 of the Evidence Act, 1872. There is no illegality in respect of findings of fact in this respect and no interference is required by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Similarly, the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to correct the revenue entries of other khatas, even there was no objection by Udasi. In view of aforesaid discussions, orders of respondents-1 and 2 do not suffer from any illegality. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed.” 20. This Court in another judgment in a case of Dr. Jeevan Bahadur Samaddar Vs. Govind Charan Samaddar and Others 2013 (120) RD 717 has held that if certified copy has not been placed on record after satisfying the requirements of Section 64/65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the mere fact that it was a certified copy by itself, would not make it admissible in evidence since it is secondary evidence and can be adduced in evidence only as provided in statute and not otherwise. Paragraph No.39 and 40 of Dr. Jeevan Bahadur Sammaddar (supra) will be relevant to appreciate the present controversy which is as follows: “41.Thus presumption under Section 90(1) is attracted in respect of original document. However, sub-section (2) is applicable in respect of certified copies but it would be attracted only when certified copy has been adduced in evidence in accordance with procedure prescribed in law, or after satisfying the requirement of law, i.e., Sections 64 and 65 of Act, 1872 and not otherwise. Under Act, 1872 certified copy as such is not admissible in evidence being a secondary evidence unless the procedural requirement thereof is satisfied. Under Act, 1872 certified copy as such is not admissible in evidence being a secondary evidence unless the procedural requirement thereof is satisfied. It is only when a certified copy has been adduced in evidence in accordance with requirement of the statute, the question of presumption under Section 90(2) would be attracted and not otherwise. Section 90(2) cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read in harmony with other provisions of the Act, 1872. 42. The above discussion also leads to the inference that, (1) presumption under Section 90 is discretionary, though the discretion is to be exercised judiciously; (2) sub-section (1) of Section 90 (as amended in U.P. or otherwise) is applicable only in respect to original document and not copies or certified copies; (3) the document must be 20/30 years old and must have come from proper custody; (4) the presumption is in respect of execution and attestation of document as also the handwriting of person concerned; (5) sub-section (2) (as available in U.P.) is applicable to certified copies when the same are adduced in evidence in accordance with law, i.e., as per the requirement of Sections 64 and 65 of Act, 1872.” 21. This Court in the case of Ram Vrat Tripathi Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others 2006 (100) R.D. 581 has held that ceremony of giving and taking is essential to validate adoption. Para No.5 of the judgment is as follows: “5. Besides the controversy that whether the adoption deed being twenty year old, no further proof was required and document was to be accepted as it is, this Court has to consider various other facts and circumstances besides voluminous evidence as was available before the Courts below and as has been placed before this Court also. Petitioner has brought on record bulk of documentary evidence in the shape of school record, Khasra extracts and documents relating to proceedings of earlier cases. In all the school record, respondent No. 3 is shown to be the son of Sahadeo. Petitioner has brought on record bulk of documentary evidence in the shape of school record, Khasra extracts and documents relating to proceedings of earlier cases. In all the school record, respondent No. 3 is shown to be the son of Sahadeo. In the Transfer Certificate, School Leaving Certificate, admission documents and in the declaration in the University, respondent No.3 was shown to be recorded as son of Sahadeo.The adoption deed is said to be dated 13.12.1946 but thereafter when for the first time, respondent No. 3 was admitted in school, form was filed by Sahadeo himself and Sahadeo was shown to be father of Ram Chandra. There is a mention in the documents so filed by petitioner that college staff asked the signatory on the form namely Sahadeo about parentage upon which, a declaration was given that Ram Chandra is the son of Sahadeo. In all Khasra extracts, Ram Chandra is shown to be the son of Sahadeo. There are several money order receipts from which, it is clear that the petitioner has been sending money to Sahadeo who happened to be elder brother. In Khasra extracts, petitioner is shown to be in possession as ‘marfat’ to Sahadeo. The adoption deed is not signed by Sahadeo who is said to have given his son in adoption to Ram Cheez. The Consolidation Officer by referring these factors in a precise manner, gave a clear finding that the name of Ram Chandra alone came in the papers without any reference to any amaldaramad in 1354 Fasli. Beeran Tiwari and Thag Tiwari the marginal witnesses of the adoption deed have not been examined. In all the school papers, revenue papers throughout Ram Chandra is shown to be son of Sahadeo. For the first time when Ram Chandra was admitted in School which was after the alleged adoption deed, he was shown to be son of Sahadeo. At no point of time, till the last Ram Chandra ever tried to get his parentage corrected as adopted son of Ram Cheez. In his service book also, he is shown to be son of Sahadeo. Oral evidence is contradictory in respect to the ceremony of giving and taking. It is on all these findings, genuineness of deed was rejected by the Consolidation Officer and the petitioner was accepted to be co-tenant with the respondents along with his legitimate share according to the pedigree. Oral evidence is contradictory in respect to the ceremony of giving and taking. It is on all these findings, genuineness of deed was rejected by the Consolidation Officer and the petitioner was accepted to be co-tenant with the respondents along with his legitimate share according to the pedigree. The appellate authority and the Revisional Court mainly on the ground that deed is twenty year old and it has not been cancelled in any competent Court have negatived the petitioner's claim and have reversed the judgment of the Consolidation Officer. The Deputy Director of Consolidation appears to have made wrong observation by saying that the land was throughout recorded in the name of Bikkan and thereafter Ram Cheez whereas the record placed before this Court states otherwise. A further wrong finding was given that Ram Chandra is entered as adopted son of Ram Cheez in the record which is not so. There is a further wrong finding that in no document, the petitioner has been shown to be in possession whereas Khasra extracts have been filed to show his name in possession as ‘marfat’. The Deputy director of Consolidation has concluded by saying that in any view of the matter, entry of Ram Chandra showing his long possession, confers independent rights on him which appears to be totally misconceived as it was not the case of even respondent and on the other hand, all three were shown to be in possession in the shape of ‘marfat’ entry. The appellate authority in a very cryptic manner only by giving emphasis about the document being twenty year old, allowed the appeal and the Revisional Court by recording varous findings on the question of fact as noticed above, which apparently do not born out from the record has dismissed the revision. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that besides adoption deed, own conduct of the respondent No. 3 and his father throughout as is apparent from voluminous evidence was liable to be taken note of by Appellate Court and the Revisional Court. By adoption, mode of succession stands changed and therefore, that is to be accepted with all care. Even in presence of adoption deed, ceremony of giving and taking as stated in the principle of Hindu Law as has been noticed by the Apex Court in the case of Lakshman Singh(supra) has to be kept in mind. By adoption, mode of succession stands changed and therefore, that is to be accepted with all care. Even in presence of adoption deed, ceremony of giving and taking as stated in the principle of Hindu Law as has been noticed by the Apex Court in the case of Lakshman Singh(supra) has to be kept in mind. Few observations as are contained in the judgment of the Apex Court will be useful to be quoted here; “That a formal ceremony of giving and taking is essential to validate the adoption has been emphasized by the Judicial. Committee again in Krishna Rao v. Sundara Siva Rao.” Further observation as has been made by the Apex Court in paras-9 and 10 will be useful to be referred at this place; Para-9: Strong reliance is placed by learned Counsel for the appellant on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Biradhmal v. Prabhabhati. There a widow executed a deed of adoption whereby she purported to have adopted son to her deceased husband a boy. The Sub-Registrar before whom the document was registered put to the boy's natural father and to the widow questions whether they had executed the deed. The boy was also present at that time. The Judicial Committee held that, under the said circumstances, there was proof of giving and taking. The question posed by the Privy Council was stated thus: “The sole issue discussed before their Lordships was the question of fact whether on 30th June, 1924, at about 6 P.M. when the adoption deed was being registered the boy was present and was given by Bhanwarmal and taken by the widow.” The question so posed was answered thus at p. 155— “……. Their Lordships think that the evidence that the boy was present at the time when the sub-registrar put to his father and to the widow the questions whether they had executed the deed is sufficient to prove a giving and taking.” This sentence is rather laconic and may lend support to the argument that mere putting questions by the sub-registrar would amount to giving and taking of the adoptive boy but the subsequent discussion makes it clear that the Privy Council had not laid down any such wide proposition. Their Lordships proceeded to observe: “Even if the suggestion be accepted that the auspicious day ended at noon on the 30th and that the deed was executed before noon and before the boy arrived at Ajmer, it seems quite probable that the registration proceedings which were arranged for 6 P.M. would be regarded as a suitable occasion for carrying out the very simple ceremony that was necessary.” These observations indicate that on the material placed before the Privy Council-it is not necessary to say that we would come to the same conclusion on the same material it held that there was giving and taking of the boy at about 6 p.m. when the judicial committee, in our view, did not intend to depart from the well recognized doctrine of Hindu Law that there should be a ceremony of giving and taking to validate an adoption. Para-10: The law may be briefly stated thus: Under the Hindu Law, whether among the regenerate caste or among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the corporeal giving and receiving in adoption is obviously to secure due publicity. To achieve this object, it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law required that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of the case. But a ceremony there shall be part of the exigencies of the situation arising out of diverse circumstances necessitated to the introduction of the doctrine of delegation and therefore, the parents, after exercising their volition to give and take the boy in adoption, may both or either of them delegate the physical act of handing over the boy or receiving him, as the case may be, to a third party.” 22. In view of ratio of law laid down by this Court in Harihar (supra), Dr. In view of ratio of law laid down by this Court in Harihar (supra), Dr. Jeevan Bahadur Sammadar (supra) and Ram Vrat Tripathi (supra), the finding recorded by revisional court on the admissibility of adoption deed dated 23.3.1948 cannot be sustained as the adoption deed dated 23.3.1948 has no signature of person giving his child for adoption, as such, presumption regarding ceremonies of adoption on its basis cannot be raised so far as admissibility of document under Section 90 of the Evidence Act is concerned, it has nothing to do with ceremonies of adoption. Non-filing of original adoption deed before Consolidation Officer will also go against the respondent nos. 4 to 7, as such, according to provisions contained under Sections 64, 65, 74 & 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, secondary evidence will not be admissible in evidence. Continuance of name of natural father of Hira Lal in Voter List, Kutumb Register as well as in the registered sale deed executed by Hira Lal himself in 1974 when Hira Lal was about 32 years old, raises presumption of the fact that adoption deed set up by Hira Lal is doubtful. Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) have rightly disbelieved the adoption deed executed on 23.3.1948 which was basis of claim of respondent nos. 4 to 7, accordingly, both parties were given ½ share in the bhumidhari plot no.52 but so far as sirdari plot nos.23,24 & 55 are concerned that were rightly vested in state as claim of Hira Lal on the basis of adoption was disbelieved and Ram Charan was exclusively recorded over plot nos. 23, 24 & 55 and the order dated 24.7.1960 passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer in Case No.26 in respect to recording of the name of Ram Lakhan over plot nos. 23, 24 & 55 in place of Ram Charan was rightly found doubtful as under which provision the order was passed, has not been mentioned in the order. 23. So far as revisional jurisdiction under Section 48 of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act is concerned as argued by respective counsel for the parties, the decision of this Court in a case of Nathu Ram and Others Vs. 23. So far as revisional jurisdiction under Section 48 of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act is concerned as argued by respective counsel for the parties, the decision of this Court in a case of Nathu Ram and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Varanasi and Others 2017(136) RD 480 will be relevant in which this Court after considering the various amendment made in Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act as well as the ratio of law laid down by Apex Court in Ram Dular Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Jaunpur and Others 1994 RD 290 (SC), Sheshmani and Another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation District- Basti U.P. and Others 2001 RD 210 (SC) and Sri Jagdamba Prasad (dead) through LRs and Others Vs. Kripa Shankar (dead) through LRs and Others 2014 (124) RD 1 (SC), ,has held that revisional power is not a power of first or second appellate Court, the finding recorded therein would be possible to be interfered under Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act only on the grounds discussed in Ram Dular (supra), Sheshmani (supra) and Jagdamba Prasad (supra). 24. Revisional court exceeded his jurisdiction in reversing the order of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and upholding the adoption deed as valid and genuine and maintaining the basic year entry, the revisional court has failed to consider the evidences and findings recorded by courts below, as such, impugned revisional order is wholly illegal. No useful purpose will be served by sending the matter back before revisional court for fresh decision as the order passed by Consolidation Officer dated 7.10.2008 and Settlement Officer (Consolidation Officer) dated 10.9.2014 are based upon evidence on record as well as on the principle laid down by this Court in Harihar (supra). Dr. Jeevan Bahadur Samaddar (supra) and Ram Vrat Tripathi (supra), accordingly, the same are hereby maintained. 25. Writ petition is allowed in part. Impugned revisional order dated 8.3.2018 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad in Revision Nos. 759, 431 & 770 is quashed and the order dated 7.10.2008 passed by Consolidation Officer and order dated 10.9.2014 passed by Settlement Officer (Consolidation) are hereby maintained. No order as to costs.