JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Chetan Chatarjee, learned counsel for the respondent nos.8 and 9 through video conferencing. 2. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the defendants against the order dated 23.04.2019 passed in Original Suit No.48 of 1992 (Zile Singh Vs. Sanmukh and others) whereby the Court of Additional Civil Judge-I (Senior Division), Saharanpur has rejected the application of petitioners (Paper No. 26Ga), praying for rejection of written statement filed by respondent no.8 and 9 and the order dated 24.11.2021 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Saharanpur passed in Civil Revision No.60 of 2019 (Gordhan and others Vs. Zile Singh) confirming the order of trial Court dated 23.04.2019. 3. The suit has been instituted by the respondent nos.1 to 6 for specific performance of contract on the ground that one Sanmukh had entered into a registered agreement to sale dated 27.11.1991 with the respondent nos. 1 to 6 in respect of property in dispute. 4. In the Original Suit No. 48 of 1992, Sanmukh filed written statement denying execution of agreement to sale. 1 to 6 in respect of property in dispute. 4. In the Original Suit No. 48 of 1992, Sanmukh filed written statement denying execution of agreement to sale. The relevant paragraph nos.23, 24, 26, 27 of written statement are extracted herein below: ^^23& ;g fd oknh dk ;g dguk xyr gS fd izfroknh uaŒ1 us lEifr eUnztk okn i= en ¼?k½ dk oknh ds lkFk foØ; djus dk vuqca/k vadu 16]000@& :i;s es fd;k gks ;k bl lEca/k esa izfroknh uaŒ1 us oknh ds fgr es fnŒ27&11&91 dks dksbZ vuqca/k i= rgjhj o fu"ikfnr djkdj lc jftLVŒ dk;kZy; nsocan ftyk lgkjuiqj esa iathd`r djk;k gks ;k vadu 55]000@& :Œ mDr vuca/k i= ds iathdj.k ds le; izfroknh uaŒ&1 us oknh ls vfxze /kujkf'k ds :i es udn izkIr fd;s gksA 24& ;g fd oknh dk ;g dguk xyr gS fd oknh o izfrokn ua&1 ds chp vuqcaf/kr i= dh eq[; 'krsZ fuEu r; ikbZ gks cfYd oknh izfroknh uaŒ&1 dh chp es dksbZ egk;nk lEifŸk eUnztk okn i= en v dks cspus dh ckor ugha gqvk blfy, mlh 'krZ ds rS; gksus ;k ;g rS; gksus dk dksbZ iz'u gh iSnk ugh gksrk fd izfroknh uaŒ1 lEifŸk en¼v½ eUnztk okn i= dk cSukek fnukad 21&1&93 rd oknh ;k ml ukfer O;fDr ds fgr es fu"ikfnr djkdj iathd`r djk;sxk vkSj 'ks"k /kujkf'k vadu ,d yk[k ikap gtkj :i;s cSuke d iathdj.k ds le; oknh ls izkIr djsxkA vkSj uk gh ;g Lohdkj gS fd oknh ds fgr esa cSukek djus ds le; rd dfFkr ys[ki= dks izfroknh uaŒ1 fdlh vU; O;fDr ds fgr esa gLrkUrfjr ugha djsxk vkSj lEifŸk dks gj izdkj ds Hkkj ls eqDr j[ksxkA 26- ;g fd oknh dk ;g dguk Hkh xyr gS fd oknh o izfroknh uaŒ1 ds chp dfFkr bdjkjukes ds le; ;g 'krsZ r; ikbZ gks fd ;fn izfroknh uaŒ1 ds chp dfFkr bdjkjukes ds le; ;g 'krsZ r; ikbZ gks fd ;fn izfroknh uaŒ1 lEifr ij tokc izkIr dj ysA ;k ,slh lwjr es izfroknh lŒ1 oknh ds leLr gtsZ o [kpsZ dks vnk djus dk ftEesnkj gksxkA 27& ;g fd oknh o izfroknh uaŒ1 ds chp dksbZ eqgk;nk ckor cspus vkjkth eUnztk okn i= e; ugh gqvk gSA vkSj u gh izfroknh uaŒ1 ds dfFkr nLrkost ftldks oknh bdjkjukek tkfgj djrk gSA oknh ds gd es cRkkSj bdjkjukek tkfgj djrk gS oknh ds gd es crkSj bdjkjukek ekgnk c; ekurs gq, rgjhj o rdehy dh vlfy;r ;g gS fd izfroknh uaŒ1 ls eqLrfdy rksj ij xzke dkyje ftyk djuky gfj;k.kk es jgus yxk gS izfroknh eqthc ds iq= Hkh ogha jgrs gS izfroknh laŒ1 ds iq= jkts'k dks dqN tehu xzke dky:e es [kjhnuh FkhA ftlds fy, 40000@& :i;s dh vko';drk FkhA ftudk ftØ izfroknh uaŒ1 us oknh ds lkFk fd;kA tks fd oknh o izfroknh uaŒ1 dks vkil esa dkQh mBuk cSBuk Fkk rFkk izfroknh uaŒ1 dk oknh ij iwjk fo'okl Fkk uoEcj lu 1991 es izfroknh uaŒ1 us oknh ls 40]000@& : m/kkj nsus ds fy, dgk oknh izfroknh uaŒ&1 dks 40]000@& :Œ crkSj dtZ rhu :i;k lSdMk ekgokj ln ij nsus dks rS;kj gqvk vkSj oknh us izfroknh uaŒ1 lkFk ;g Hkh 'krZ j[kh fd lEifŸk en v eUnztk okn ij izfroknh uaŒ1 ds ;gk jgu djuh iMs+xh vkilh ckrphr ds ckn izfroknh uaŒ1 ls dtZ dh jde ij nks :i;s 75 iSls lSdM+k izfrekg ij dtZ nsus dks jkth gks x;k exj mlesa ;g 'krZ j[kh fd 14 eghus dh ctk; e; vly dtZ nLrkost jgukek es izfroknh laŒ1 }kjk ysuk rgjhj djk;k tk;sxkA ;kfu dtZ dh vkn;xh 55]000@& :Œ fy[kkbZ tk;sxh rkfd izfroknh uaŒ1 ij dtZ dh okilh dk ncko jg ldsA^^ 5. During the pendency of suit, Sanmukh had died on 30.03.2018. After the death of Sanmukh, respondent nos. 8 and 9, who are the legal heirs of late Sanmukh have been impleaded in the suit as defendant no.1/1 and 1/2 who file their written statement (paper no. 248-A2) on 14.01.2019 wherein they admitted in paragraph no.4 of their additional written statement about sale of property in dispute. Paragraph 4 of the additional statement is extracted herein below: ^^4- ;g fd izfroknhx.k eqthc ds firk dk ewy fuokl okyk xzke dkyjksa mQZ dkyje okn gktk es fyIr lEifŸk okys ekSts cM+xkWo ls vR;f/kd nwjh ij fLFkr FkkA rFkk nksuks xkaoks dh nwjh vR;f/kd gksus ds dkj.k nksuks xkoksa es dk'r dh tkuh lEHko ugh jg x;h FkhA vr% o"kZ 1991 es izfroknhx.k eqthc ds firk us viuh lEifŸk of.kZr okn i= dks ftys flag dks foØ; djuk r; dj fy;k FkkA rFkk oknh ftys flag ls iz'uxr lEifŸk dks 1]60]000@& :i;s es foØ; djuk r; djds ,d nLrkost ftys flag ds fgr es C;kus ds :i es 55000@& :i;s izkIr djds fu"ikfnr djk;k FkkA^^ 6. The petitioner, who claims to be the purchaser of the property in dispute by sale deed dated 08.05.1992, filed objection (paper no. 26Ka) praying therein that the additional written statement filed by respondent nos.8 and 9 may not be taken on record for the reason that the stand taken by them in their written statement is contrary to the stand taken by their father in his written statement. It is pleaded that the father of the respondent nos.8 and 9 has denied the execution of agreement to sale dated 27.11.1991 and thus, the stand of respondent nos.8 and 9 in their written statement admitting the sale of property by their father is contrary to the stand taken by their father and, therefore, the additional written statement of respondent nos.8 and 9 cannot be taken on record in view of Order 22 Rule IV Sub-rule 2 of CPC. 7. The respondent nos.8 and 9 filed their objection to the petitioners' application 26-Ga2 on 23.04.2019 praying that application 26-Ga2 of petitioners may be rejected. 8. 7. The respondent nos.8 and 9 filed their objection to the petitioners' application 26-Ga2 on 23.04.2019 praying that application 26-Ga2 of petitioners may be rejected. 8. The trial Court by order dated 23.04.2019 rejected the objection of petitioners holding that the objection which has been taken by the petitioners in their application (paper 26Ga) cannot be looked into at this stage as only written statements have been filed and evidence in the suit has yet to be led by the parties. Accordingly, it concluded that it is not appropriate at this stage to correct the averments of respondent nos.8 and 9 in the additional written statement. 9. The petitioners preferred revision against the order dated 23.04.2019. The revisional Court also by order dated 24.11.2021 rejected the revision affirming the order passed by the trial Court. 10. Challenging the aforesaid impugned orders, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that both the courts below have committed manifest error in rejecting the application of petitioners 26Ga inasmuch as both the courts below has failed to appreciate that it is established on record that the additional written statement of respondent nos.8 and 9 contains pleading contrary to the pleading by their father in his written statement which is not permissible under Order 21 Rule IV Sub-rule 2. Thus, he submits that as the issue of jurisdiction is involved, therefore, the orders of court below are not sustainable. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon judgment Vidyawati Vs. Man Mohan & Ors., 1995 SCC (5) 431. 11. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioners are defendant and have no locus to challenge the additional written statement filed by the respondent nos.8 and 9. He submits that both the courts below have not committed any jurisdictional error in rejecting the application of petitioners and as such the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. He further submits that each defendant has to stand on his own legs and has to prove his case and therefore, for this reason also the application of petitioner 26Ga was misconceived and has been rightly rejected. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel. 13. The suit has been instituted by respondent no. 1 to 6 stating that a registered agreement to sale has been entered into between them and Sanmukh (defendant no. 2) i.e. father of respondent no. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel. 13. The suit has been instituted by respondent no. 1 to 6 stating that a registered agreement to sale has been entered into between them and Sanmukh (defendant no. 2) i.e. father of respondent no. 8 and 9. In additional statement, Sanmukh had denied the execution of any agreement to sale dated 27.11.1991. After the death of Sanmukh, respondent no. 8 and 9, substituted as heirs of Sanmukh, filed their additional written statement admitting that their father had entered into agreement to sale dated 27.11.1991. 14. Undisputedly, the petitioners claim to be the owner of the property by virtue of sale deed dated 08.05.1992 executed by Sanmukh in their favour with respect to property in dispute. Petitioners are impleaded as defendant in the suit and they have to stand on their own legs to succeed in the suit. 15. The petitioners at this stage cannot be said to be aggrieved by filing of additional written statement by respondent no. 8 and 9. The petitioners have filed written statement and have to stand on their own legs. It is also settled in law that the petitioners cannot have better title than the Sanmukh and once the respondent no. 1 to 6 proves that agreement to sale was executed by late Sanmukh, the law will take its own course. 16. The matter can be viewed from another angle. Admittedly, the petitioners are alien to agreement to sale, therefore, in view of judgment of Apex Court in Gurmit Singh (Supra), they are neither necessary nor proper party in the suit and by abundance precaution they have been impleaded as party in the suit. Paragraph 5.1 and 5.2 of said judgment are reproduced herein below: "5.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiffs filed the suit against the original owner - vendor - original defendant no.1 for specific performance of the agreement to sell with respect to suit property dated 3.5.2005. It is an admitted position that so far as agreement to sell dated 3.5.2005 of which the specific performance is sought, the appellant is not a party to the said agreement to sell. It is an admitted position that so far as agreement to sell dated 3.5.2005 of which the specific performance is sought, the appellant is not a party to the said agreement to sell. It appears that during the pendency of the aforesaid suit and though there was an injunction against the original owner - vendor restraining him from transferring and alienating the suit property, the vendor executed the sale deed in favour of the appellant by sale deed dated 10.07.2008. After a period of approximately four years, the appellant filed an application before the learned trial Court under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC for his impleadment as a defendant. The appellant claimed the right on the basis of the said sale deed as well as the agreement to sell dated 31.3.2003 alleged to have been executed by the original vendor. The said application was opposed by the original plaintiffs. The learned trial Court despite the opposition by the original plaintiffs allowed the said application which has been set aside by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order. Thus, it was an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC by a third party to the agreement to sell between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no.1 (vendor) and the said application for impleadment is/was opposed by the original plaintiffs. Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration before this Court is, whether the plaintiffs can be compelled to implead a person in the suit for specific performance, against his wish and more particularly with respect to a person against whom no relief has been claimed by him? 5.2 An identical question came to be considered before this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) and applying the principle that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court observed and held that the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. The tests are - (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. It is further observed and held that in a suit for specific performance the first test can be formulated is, to determine whether a party is a necessary party there must be a right to the same relief against the party claiming to be a necessary party, relating to the same subject matter involved in the proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell. It is further observed and held by this Court that in a suit for specific performance of the contract, a proper party is a party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held that the parties claiming an independent title and possession adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of the contract, are not proper parties and if such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance shall be enlarged to a suit for title and possession, which is impermissible. It is further observed and held that a third party or a stranger cannot be added in a suit for specific performance, merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property or to avoid multiplicity of the suits. It is further observed and held by this Court that a third party or a stranger to a contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. In paragraph 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under:" 17. For the aforesaid reason, this Court finds that the petitioners are not aggrieved by the filing of written statement by respondent no. 8 and 9 and thus, their objection was not maintainable. 18. Now coming to the merit of the case, this Court finds that the Court below has recorded finding that the parties have filed their written statement and evidences are yet to be filed by the parties. 8 and 9 and thus, their objection was not maintainable. 18. Now coming to the merit of the case, this Court finds that the Court below has recorded finding that the parties have filed their written statement and evidences are yet to be filed by the parties. Now, the question that arises whether the stand taken by the respondent no. 8 and 9 is contrary to the stand taken by the late Sanmukh in his written statement at this stage or at the stage of trial. This Court believes that the question as to whether the stand of respondent no. 8 and 9 in written statement is contrary to the stand taken by late Sanmukh, can be looked into at the stage of trial for which an issue has got to be framed and necessary evidence is to be led by the parties, on the basis of which the adjudication of the said issue is possible. This Court finds no illegality in the view taken by the Court below that the stage to consider as to whether the stand of respondent no. 8 and 9 in their written statement is contrary to the stand taken by late Sanmukh in his written statement. As only the pleadings have been exchanged in the suit and evidence is yet to be led by the parties. 19. This Court may also take note of the fact that the agreement to sale is a registered document and therefore, the Court below has rightly rejected the application of the petitioners for rejecting additional statement of respondent no. 8 and 9 on the ground stated above. 20. Now coming to the judgment relied upon counsel for the opposite party in the case of Vidyawati (supra) the Apex Court has dismissed the appeal of Vidyawati who was impleaded as legal heir in a suit instituted by respondent-plaintiff, in which the petitioner had filed additional written statement claiming title and interest in the property on the basis of Will said to have been executed by Smt. Champawati, which was dismissed by the trial Court by order dated 06.08.1994 holding that it is not open to the present applicant to assert her own right or hostile title to the suit. It was held that if legal representatives wants to raise any individual point, which deceased party could not raise, he must get himself impleaded in his personal capacity or must challenge the decree in separate suit. The facts of the case of Vidyawati are different from the present case inasmuch as in the said case the objection against filing of additional written statement filed by legal representatives of deceased-defendant which was contrary to the written statement of deceased defendant, was taken by plaintiff in the suit and in such view of the fact the Apex Court held as above, but in the present case the petitioners are defendant and as they have to stand on their own legs they cannot file any objection, therefore, the objection by the petitioner against additional written statement is not maintainable. Thus, the judgment of Apex Court passed in the case of Vidyawati is not applicable in the present case. 21. For the reasons given above, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to cost.