ORDER : 1. In wake of instant surge in COVID-19 cases and spread of its highly infectious Omicron variant, abundant caution is being maintained, while hearing the matters in Court, for the safety of all concerned. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant points out from the impugned order that the learned trial court has accepted the compromise to the extent of Sections 341 & 323 of IPC, but has convicted under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act for six months with fine. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that looking into the sentence period as well as the fact that the parties have already entered into a compromise and the main witnesses i.e. PW-1 Parvindra Singh & PW-2 Vishnu Giri were declared hostile, thus, the present petitioner be acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor opposes the appeal. 5. This Court is conscious of the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in:- 5.1 Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and Ors. (2012) 9 SCC 460 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, with regard to the exercise of a High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C, observed asunder :- “The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression 'prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice', the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. The legality, proprietary or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, non-compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, Section 482 is based upon the maxim quando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder videtur id quo res ipsa esse non protest, i.e., when the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the thing itself would be unavoidable. The Section confers very wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the process of the Court is not permitted to be abused. The Section confers very wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the process of the Court is not permitted to be abused. It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative examination of the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard to matters which are specifically provided for under other provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a party could have availed of the remedy available under Section 397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj Kapoor and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. MANU/SC/0210/1979 : AIR 1980 SC 258 : (1980) 1 SCC 43 ]}. In this very case, this Court has observed that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This itself shows the fine distinction between the powers exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In this very case, the Court also considered as to whether the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other extraordinary situation invites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time, are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of restriction.” 5.2 Ramawatar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2021 SC 5 228 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, while giving its imprimatur to an earlier decision rendered in Ramgopal and Anr. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 (4) Crimes 17 (SC), and made the following observations:- “it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, wherein, a two-Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI & Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court Under Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extra-ordinary powers Under Article 142 or Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, would be to do complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through brute force, threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck post-conviction, the Courts should, inter-alia, carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the Accused before and after the incident in question. While concluding, the Court also formulated certain guidelines and held: 19... Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the Accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the Accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevnat considerations. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court Under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the Accused. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers Under Article 142 or Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, are exercisable in post-conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant-victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker Sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level of protection. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the Accused party. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the Accused party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 6. There is nothing on the record, nor have the learned counsel for the private respondent or the public prosecutor brought to the attention of this Court that the compromise entered into the parties is the result of force or compulsion, and therefore may be safely assumed that the compromise is a result of exercise of the free will of the concerned parties. 6.1 Furthermore, the appellant and the complainant are residents of the same village, and live in proximity to each other and therefore, it would be in the interest of fostering peace in the village to accept the compromise entered into by the concerned parties. 7. Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, while taking strength from the aforementioned precedent laws coupled with the compromise arrived at between the parties and the aforementioned negative final report, this Court is inclined to allow the present appeal in exercise of its inherent powers, in light of Amit Kapoor (supra), in particular. 8. This Court, looking into the fact that the compromise has been recorded in the impugned order by the learned trial court and also the fact that principal witnesses PW-1 Parvindra Singh & PW-2 Vishnu Giri have turned hostile, is inclined to quashed the impugned order. 9. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 02.07.2001, passed by the learned Special Judge SC/ST Cases, Sri Ganganagar is quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. The appellant is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. 10. All pending applications stand disposed of.