ORDER : The petitioner prays for a writ of certiorari directing to quash the proceedings dated 07.09.2004 of the 2nd respondent / Deputy Chairman, Visakhapatnam Dock Labour Board (VDLB) dismissing the petitioner from the service and also to set aside the proceedings of the 1st respondent dated 15.12.2003 whereby the appeal of the petitioner was rejected and to issue consequential direction to respondent to continue the petitioner in service as a peon with all consequential benefits. 2. The factual matrix of the case is thus: (a) Basing on instructions of the Government of India, Ministry of Surface Transport, New Delhi to implement liberalized pension benefits to the widows of deceased employees of the Major Port Trust and Dock Labour Boards including the existing pensioners w.e.f. 01.01.1986, the then Deputy Chairman of the respondent, VDLB constituted a Committee of Officers to scrutinize the claims received for the said purpose. The said Committee was assisted by the writ petitioner who was working as Peon / Messenger and A.Ramalingeswara Rao, Junior Assistant and G.Narsing Rao, Head Assistant of VDLB. After final scrutiny, pension and arrears were paid in April / May 1992 w.e.f. 01.01.1986. Subsequently complaints were received in 1994 that certain bogus widows made false claims and drew widow pension by impersonating themselves as the surviving wives of the deceased workers of the VDLB. An investigation was conducted wherein it was revealed that several candidates submitted claims for payment of widow exgratia pension by producing false death certificates. The Chief Medical Officer, Municipal Corporation, Visakhapatnam on request of VDLB, verified the genuineness of death certificates and informed that 138 out of 200 death certificates were not genuine. Thereafter, a compliant dated 09.02.1995 was lodged with the police of Harbour Law & Order, Port Circle, Visakhapatnam and the police after investigation filed charge sheet against 99 accused including petitioner as A2. After full-fledged trial in the related CC No.197/1998, learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam acquitted all the accused of the charges under Section 120B, 420, 427, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 419 IPC. (b) Be that as it may, the 1st respondent ordered departmental enquiry by appointing an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer having conducted detailed enquiry submitted his enquiry report dated 15.03.1999, wherein he came to conclusion that charges were proved against the charged employee (CE) / petitioner. (b) Be that as it may, the 1st respondent ordered departmental enquiry by appointing an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer having conducted detailed enquiry submitted his enquiry report dated 15.03.1999, wherein he came to conclusion that charges were proved against the charged employee (CE) / petitioner. Pursuant to the enquiry report, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and he submitted his explanation. However, agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and not agreeing with the explanation of the petitioner, the 2nd respondent found petitioner guilty of charges and awarded punishment of dismissal from service with immediate effect. (c) Aggrieved, the petitioner filed appeal and the 1st respondent dismissed the appeal on 15.12.2003 without considering the grounds submitted by the petitioner in right perspective. Hence, the writ petition. 3. Heard arguments of the learned counsel for petitioner Sri Lakshmi Priyanvita, on behalf of Sri Vedula Srinivas, counsel for petitioner, and Sri Pathanjali Pamidigantam for P.Raghuram, counsel for respondent. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner while vehemently opposing the proceedings dated 08.09.2003 dismissing the petitioner from service on the basis of enquiry report dated 15.03.1999 and also the appellate order dated 15.12.2003, firstly argued that the enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty of the charges, even though there was absolutely no evidence against the petitioner establishing his complicity in conspiring with other employees and in creation of bogus / false death certificates of the employees and also in arranging false persons as Gedela Suri and his wife and making undue claim for the pension benefits with arrears. Learned counsel would strenuously argue that none of the witnesses examined before the Enquiry Officer has categorically stated about the involvement of the petitioner in fabrication of the death certificates or engaging false persons for claiming benefits. The Enquiry Officer strangely and perversely held as if the petitioner entertained the bogus / false claims of impersonated women and arranged payments knowing fully that those women were having forged certificates. Learned counsel lamented that there is no iota of evidence to establish that the petitioner has directly conspired with other employees and impersonated some persons as Gedela Suri and his wife. Despite, the enquiry officer wrongly concluded that charges were proved against the petitioner and submitted his report, basing on which the petitioner was dismissed from service which is untenable under law. Despite, the enquiry officer wrongly concluded that charges were proved against the petitioner and submitted his report, basing on which the petitioner was dismissed from service which is untenable under law. (a) Secondly, learned counsel argued that in CC No.197/1998 learned Magistrate has acquitted all the accused including the petitioner holding that none of the charges was proved against them. The subject matter in the criminal case as well as the domestic enquiry is one and the same and the charges are also similar. Since the petitioner was acquitted, the domestic enquiry for the same charges is unsustainable. Learned counsel thus prayed to allow the writ petition. 5. In impugnation, learned counsel for the respondent while supporting the impugned proceedings argued that in view of availability of plausible evidence, the enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty of the charges and therefore, there is no legal flaw in the enquiry report. Nextly, he argued that mere acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case does not debar the respondents to hold domestic enquiry as both the proceedings are distinct in nature. On some technicalities, the criminal case was ended in acquittal. However, there was strong evidence in support of the charges and hence, the enquiry officer rightly held the petitioner guilty of the charges. He would thus argue that the acquittal in criminal case is of no consequence. He would submit that preponderance of probabilities and some material on record is essential in departmental enquiry, whereas proof of guilt to the hilt is must in criminal proceedings. In view of such variation, the petitioner cannot claim any advantage out of his acquittal in criminal case. He would also submit that this Court cannot act as an appellate authority over the disciplinary proceedings to judge its correctness. He placed reliance on Lalit Popli v. Cnara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC 583 and Nelson Motis v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711 . He thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. The points for consideration are: 1. Whether the findings in the enquiry report dated 15.03.1999 are perverse and vitiated by lack of evidence and reasons and if so, whether enquiry report is liable to be set aside ? 2. Whether the acquittal of the petitioner in CC No.197/1998 has no consequence in the domestic enquiry? 6. The points for consideration are: 1. Whether the findings in the enquiry report dated 15.03.1999 are perverse and vitiated by lack of evidence and reasons and if so, whether enquiry report is liable to be set aside ? 2. Whether the acquittal of the petitioner in CC No.197/1998 has no consequence in the domestic enquiry? 6. POINT No.1: The petitioner primarily impugns the enquiry report dated 15.03.1999 on the main plank of argument that the findings given by the enquiry officer were perverse and without reason since they were not based on any reason or supported by any evidence. On the other hand, the respondent claims that the findings are backed-up by plausible evidence and sound reasoning. It is also contended that this Court while exercising the power of judicial review under Article-226, cannot sit on appeal to judge correctness of the findings of the enquiry report. 7. The scope and ambit of judicial review over the departmental enquiries is no more res integra. (i) In Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 Hon’ble Apex Court has vividly expounded the circumstances when judicial review can be exercised over the departmental enquiries. It observed thus: “6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority. 7. 7. In Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar [ (1978) 3 SCC 366 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 458 : AIR 1978 SC 1277 : (1978) 3 SCR 708 ] it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer would be perverse. 8. The findings recorded in a domestic enquiry can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such findings are not supported by any evidence on record or are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rama Rao [ (1964) 2 LLJ 150 : AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 ] in which the question was whether the High Court under Article 226 could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [ (1969) 2 LLJ 377 : AIR 1969 SC 983 ] and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel [ (1976) 1 SCC 518 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 92 : 1976 Lab IC 4 : AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280 ] . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR 866 ] it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR 866 ] it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are its mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. 9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.” (ii) In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus: “12. xxx. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.” (iii) In Union of India v. Sitaram Mishra, (2019) 20 SCC 588 Hon’ble Apex Court held thus: “10. xxx. The issue, in the exercise of judicial review against a finding of misconduct in a disciplinary enquiry, is whether the finding is sustainable with reference to some evidence one the record. The High Court can, it is well-settled, interfere only in a situation where the finding is based on no evidence. xxx. The issue, in the exercise of judicial review against a finding of misconduct in a disciplinary enquiry, is whether the finding is sustainable with reference to some evidence one the record. The High Court can, it is well-settled, interfere only in a situation where the finding is based on no evidence. In such a situation, the finding is rendered perverse.” (iv) In Uttarakhand Transport Corporation and others v. Heera Singh Parihar, (2020) 20 SCC 677 = 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1745 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus: “4. At the outset, it may be noted that the High Court applied the wrong test in exercising its power of judicial review with reference to disciplinary proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings are not quasi-criminal in nature. A disciplinary inquiry is conducted by the employer to inquire into a charge or misconduct pertaining to a breach of the rules and regulations governing the service of the employer. The standard of proof is not that governed by a criminal trial. In exercising judicial review the test is whether the findings are based on some evidence. The High Court may interfere with only a case where there is no evidence to sustain the charge of misconduct.” (v) In State of Karnataka v. Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC 563 Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus: “22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct.” (vi) In Lalit Popli’s case (supra) cited by respondent, the Hon’ble Apex Court expressed similar view. Therefore, in the light of above jurisprudence, it has now to be seen whether the findings in the enquiry report are sustainable or not. 8. Therefore, in the light of above jurisprudence, it has now to be seen whether the findings in the enquiry report are sustainable or not. 8. The enquiry report dated 15.03.1999, a copy of which is filed along with material papers, shows that the following 2 charges are framed against the CE/petitioner: (1) Shri K. Masenu Rao, while functioning as Peon, Labour Department made attempts for claiming ex-gratia and pension amounts through fraudulent methods and impersonation in respect of Shri Gedela Suri, Mazdoor No.7108, Registered Scheme. (2) Sri Masenu Rao brought two workers as witnesses and made to believe the officials that the impersonated woman was the wife of Sri G. Suri, Mazdoor No.7108 to draw the ex-gratia amount. The management examined 4 witnesses i.e., (1) Shri P. Sanyasi, No.3627 (MW-1), (2) M. Bangariah, No.3845 (MW-2), (3) G. Gurumurthy, Record Sorter (MW-4) and (4) I. Satyanarayana, Jr. Assistant (MW-5) to establish the above charges. 9. With regard to the depositions of above witnesses, the enquiry officer in his report stated that MW-1 and MW-2 deposed that they could not identify the person who asked them to put their thumb impressions on pension papers of Gedela Suri on 18.01.1994. The enquiry officer further stated that MW-1 and MW-2 have not confirmed in their depositions given before the Vigilance Officer and further pointed out individually that the depositions given by them to Vigilance Officer were not read out to them but their thumb impressions were obtained. (a) Then with regard to the depositions of MW-4 and MW-5, the enquiry officer stated that MW-4 and MW-5 deposed that they did not have any knowledge about the pension papers filed by Smt. G. Asiramma. (b) Then with regard to the Additional Management Witnesses (AMW) i.e., G. Suri, Ex-worker No.7108 (AMW-1) and Smt. G. Asiramma, W/o Sri G. Suri (AMW-2), the enquiry officer mentioned that they were presented by the Presenting Officer against CE-3 in the enquiry dated 16.04.1998 but their witnesses (depositions) was found not relevant to the charges leveled against CE-3. The enquiry officer further stated that above witnesses were cross-examined and during cross-examination MW-1, 2 and 4 confirmed that they gave statement before the Vigilance Officer on 25.02.1994. In the cross-examination of MW-5 he stated that he did not know about the involvement of CE-3 in the widow pension case of Smt. G. Asiramma. AMW-1 was not cross-examined but AMW2 was cross-examined. 10. In the cross-examination of MW-5 he stated that he did not know about the involvement of CE-3 in the widow pension case of Smt. G. Asiramma. AMW-1 was not cross-examined but AMW2 was cross-examined. 10. As can be seen from the above narration of the depositions of witnesses, the enquiry officer has not found any evidence against the CE-3/petitioner. However, having considered the re-examination of MW-1 and MW-2 by Presenting Officer, wherein they stated that they put their thumb impressions on the pension papers of Smt. G. Asiramma on 18.01.1994 at the request and directions of CE-3/petitioner and Sri G. Narasinga Rao, probably the enquiry officer gave his findings that the charges were proved against the CE-3/petitioner. It must be noted that MW-1 and MW-2 in their original evidence have not stated any fact against the CE-3/petitioner but in the re-examination it appears they made allegation against the CE-3/petitioner. Such a wayward/contradictory statements of a witness would only show that the said witness is untrustworthy of credit as per law. The evidence of such witness cannot be taken into consideration for any purpose. Except their changed version there was no other evidence before the enquiry officer to hold CE-3/petitioner is guilty. In other words, there was no acceptable evidence before the enquiry officer to prove the guilt of the CE-3/petitioner. However, strangely the enquiry officer found them guilty. It must be said that such finding is without any evidentiary basis and hence it is a perverted finding. It is trite law that when the enquiry is tainted with perversity and conjunctures for lack of acceptable evidence the same shall be liable to be set aside. Respondent authorities ought not to have accepted the said lopsided report to impose major penalty of dismissal from service. This point is answered accordingly in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent. 11. POINT No. 2: Regarding this point also the law is no more res integra. (i) In Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 9 SCC 94 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus: “7. Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different. (i) In Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 9 SCC 94 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus: “7. Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different. In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental proceedings, the department has to prove only preponderance of probabilities. In the present case, we find that the department has been able to prove the case on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, the submissions of the counsel appearing for the appellant are found to be without any merit.” (ii) In Union of India v. Sitaram Mishra’s case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated as follows: “13. The second ground, which has weighed with the High Court, is equally specious. A disciplinary enquiry is governed by a different standard of proof than that which applies to a criminal case. In a criminal trial, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The purpose of a disciplinary enquiry is to enable the employer to determine as to whether an employee has committed a breach of the service rules.” (iii) In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Dilip Uttam Jayabhay, (2022) 2 SCC 696 the Apex Court held thus: “11.4. xxx. As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standards of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives.” Thus the law is that since the criminal proceedings and departmental enquiry operate in two different spheres and whereas strict proof of guilt is essential in criminal cases whereas preponderance of probabilities is sufficient in departmental proceedings, the acquittal in criminal proceedings cannot be pitted against the departmental proceedings. Hence the acquittal of the petitioner in CC No.197/1998 cannot be taken into consideration in the present matter. In Nelson Motis’s case (supra) cited by the respondent, similar view was expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 12. Thus in the light of the above findings, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. Hence the acquittal of the petitioner in CC No.197/1998 cannot be taken into consideration in the present matter. In Nelson Motis’s case (supra) cited by the respondent, similar view was expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 12. Thus in the light of the above findings, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the findings of the enquiry officer in his enquiry report dated 15.03.1999 are set aside and consequentially the dismissal proceedings No.P1/Dis/2003/ 819, dated 08.09.2003 passed by the 2nd respondent and the appeal order No.P1/Dis/2003/1326, dated 15.12.2003 passed by the 1st respondent are hereby set aside with a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with full back wages and other attending benefits which he is entitled. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.