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2022 DIGILAW 1375 (ALL)

Rajesh Dayal v. State Of U. P.

2022-08-30

SAMEER JAIN

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Radhey Shyam Yadav, learned counsel for the applicant and Dr. S.B. Maurya, learned AGA-I for the State. 2. The instant application has been moved on behalf of the applicant with following prayers:- “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed the this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this application and quash the order dated 24.06.2022 passed by Special Judge, SC/ST (P.A.) Act, Etah in Criminal Misc. Case No. 239 of 2022, Rajesh Dayal versus Rajpal and others, Police station-Marhara, District-Etah, pending in the court of Special Judge, SC/ST (P.A) Act, Etah. It is further prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct to court below to pass a fresh, reason and speaking order in accordance with law in Criminal Misc. Case No. 239 of 2022, Rajesh Dayal versus Rajpal and others, Police station-Marhara, District-Etah under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and/or pass such other and further order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case, otherwise the applicant shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.” 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that applicant moved an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. with a prayer to direct the police station concerned to register the case and investigate the matter but instead of doing so, the court below treated the said application as complaint. He next submitted that as Special Judge SC/ST Act is not empowered to take cognizance on private complaint, therefore, order dated 24.06.2022 is illegal. He further submitted that if an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is moved before Special Judge SC/ST Act then he is having no authority to treat the said application as criminal complaint and only option before the Special Judge is that either he dismiss the application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or direct the local police to register the case and investigate the matter. Learned counsel for the applicant confined his argument only to the extent that the court below is not having any authority to treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a criminal complaint. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance in the case of Soni Devi Vs. Learned counsel for the applicant confined his argument only to the extent that the court below is not having any authority to treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a criminal complaint. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance in the case of Soni Devi Vs. State of U.P. and others 2022 (5) ADJ 64 and submitted that the issue as to whether an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C can be treated as complaint or not by Special Judge SC/ST Act is no more res-integra but it has been authoritatively decided by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in above noted case of Soni Devi (supra) and according to the law laid down in Soni Devi case (supra) an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as criminal complaint by Special Judge SC/ST Act and only option before the court is to direct for registration of the case and to investigate the matter. Learned counsel for the applicant next submitted that as the impugned order dated 24.06.2022 is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in case of Soni Devi (supra), therefore, it is liable to be quashed as Special Judge SC/ST Act was not having any authority to treat the application moved by applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint and he had to pass a direction to register the FIR and to investigate the matter as application moved by the applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. prima facie disclosed cognizable offences against opposite party nos. 2 to 6. 5. Per contra, learned AGA submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 24.06.2022 as Special Judge SC/ST Act is having jurisdiction either to direct for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or to treat the application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a criminal complaint. 2 to 6. 5. Per contra, learned AGA submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 24.06.2022 as Special Judge SC/ST Act is having jurisdiction either to direct for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or to treat the application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a criminal complaint. Learned AGA next submitted that by virtue of amendment of 2016 as per Section 14 of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ in short), Special Judge SC/ST Act is having power to directly take cognizance of the offence under the provisions of the Act, therefore, Special Judge, SC/ST Act being court of original jurisdiction is having all the powers and law is settled that if any application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is moved then court is not bound to pass a direction to register the FIR and investigate the matter. Learned AGA next submitted that if the court is of the view that there is no necessity to pass such direction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. then it can treat the application moved under Section 156(3) as a criminal complaint, therefore, by treating the application moved by applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint, court below did not commit any illegality. 6. I have heard both the parties and perused the record of the case. 7. I have gone through the judgment passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Soni Devi (supra). 8. In the case of Soni Devi (supra) two questions were framed. The first question is not being referred as the same does not relate to the present dispute. The second question as framed therein in paragraph no. 15 is as follows:- “15. The second question for consideration before this Court is as to whether Special Judge can treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case or not.” 9. The answer is given to the second question in paragraph no.18 in Soni Devi case (supra) as follows:- “18. .... Therefore answer to the second question that Special Judge can treat the application under Section 156 (3)Cr.P.C. as a complaint case or not ? Answer is "No" in view of Rule 5(1) of the Amended Act.” 10. As per section 14 of the Act Special court established under the Act for the purpose to provide speedy trial. .... Therefore answer to the second question that Special Judge can treat the application under Section 156 (3)Cr.P.C. as a complaint case or not ? Answer is "No" in view of Rule 5(1) of the Amended Act.” 10. As per section 14 of the Act Special court established under the Act for the purpose to provide speedy trial. Section 14 of the Act runs as follows:- “14. Special Court and Exclusive Special Court.—(1) For the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an Exclusive Special Court for one or more Districts: Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under this Act is recorded, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for such Districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act: Provided further that the Courts so established or specified shall have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act. (2) It shall be the duty of the State Government to establish adequate number of Courts to ensure that cases under this Act are disposed of within a period of two months, as far as possible. (3) In every trial in the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, the proceedings shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing: Provided that when the trial relates to an offence under this Act, the trial shall, as far as possible, be completed within a period of two months from the date of filing of the charge sheet.” 11. According to the proviso clause of Section 14(1) of the Act, the special court so established shall have power to directly take cognizance of the offences under the Act. 12. Therefore, from the perusal of the proviso clause of Section 14(1) of the Act, it appears that Special Judge so established under the Act is having jurisdiction to directly take the cognizance. 13. 12. Therefore, from the perusal of the proviso clause of Section 14(1) of the Act, it appears that Special Judge so established under the Act is having jurisdiction to directly take the cognizance. 13. The law is settled that if an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is moved then the Magistrate is having two option; (a) either give a direction to register the case and investigate the matter; or (b) to treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint (See Mona Panwar Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (2011) 3 SCC 496 ). 14. Therefore, the question arises whether Special Judge SC/ST Act so established under the Act is having the same power as enjoyed by the Magistrate under the provisions of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 15. In view of the Soni Devi case (supra) the Special Judge so established under the Act is not having any authority to treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as criminal complaint. From the perusal of the judgment of Soni Devi (supra) it reflect that the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in view of the Rule 5(1) of the amended Act held that Special Judge cannot treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint. 16. Rule 5 of The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1995 reads as under:- "5. (1) Every information relating to the commission of an offence under the Act, if given orally to an officer in-charge of a police station shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant, and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the persons giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be maintained by that police station. (2) A copy of the information as so recorded under sub-rule (1) above shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (2) A copy of the information as so recorded under sub-rule (1) above shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in-charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-rule (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who after investigation either by himself or by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, shall make an order in writing to the officer in-charge of the concerned police station to enter the substance of that information to be entered in the book to be maintained by the police station." 17. Therefore, from the perusal of Rule 5(1) of the amended Act it reflects that it is duty of an officer incharge of police station that he shall lodge the FIR on the basis of every information relating to the commission of offence under the Act even if it given orally. 18. Therefore, the Rule 5(1) of the amended Act is almost similar to Section 154 Cr.P.C., which runs as follows:- "154. 18. Therefore, the Rule 5(1) of the amended Act is almost similar to Section 154 Cr.P.C., which runs as follows:- "154. (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf : Provided that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under section 326A, section 326 B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376, section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB, section 376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or any woman officer: Provided further that - (a) in the event that the person against whom an offence under section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376, section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB, section 376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, then such information shall be recorded by a police officer, at the residence of the person seeking to report such offence or at a convenient place of such person's choice, in the presence of an interpreter or a special educator, as the case may be; (b) the recording of such information shall be videographed; (c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-section (5A) of section 164 as soon as possible. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person, aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence." 19. It is settled law that if any information given to police officer discloses cognizable offences then it is the duty of the police officer to register the case and investigate the matter. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in case of Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others (2014) 2 SCC 1 held that the registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation (See para 120.1). 20. Therefore, in my considered view, the Rule 5(1) of the amended Act does not ousted the jurisdiction of Special Judge to treat the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint. 21. The issue with regard to the power of Special Judge has come before Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in case of A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another (1984) 2 SCC 500 in respect of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. 22. Section 6, 7 and 8 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 runs as follows:- “6. Power to appoint special judges. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another (1984) 2 SCC 500 in respect of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. 22. Section 6, 7 and 8 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 runs as follows:- “6. Power to appoint special judges. (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many special judges as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences, namely:- (a) an offence punishable under section 161, section 165 or section 165A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) or sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (11 of 1947); (b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a). (2) A person shall not be for qualified for appointment as a special judge under this Act unless he is, or has been, a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge or an assistant sessions judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898). 7. Cases triable by special judges.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) or in, any other law the offences specified in sub-section (1) of section 6 shall be triable by special judges only. (2) Every offence specified in sub-section (1) of section 6 shall be tried by the special judge or the area within which it was committed, or where there are more special judges than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government. (3) When trying any case, a special judge may also try any offence other than an offence specified in section 6 with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1898, be charged at the same trial. 8. Procedure and powers of special judges-(1) A special judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 18981), for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. 8. Procedure and powers of special judges-(1) A special judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 18981), for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. (2) A special judge may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof; and any pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes of sections 339 and 339A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be deemed to have been tendered under Sections 338 of that Code. 3. Save as provided in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 shall, so far as they are not in consistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a special judge; and for the purposes of the said provisions, the court of the special judge shall be deemed to be a court of session trial cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting a prosecution before a special judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor. (4) A special judge may pass upon any person convicted by him any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of the offence of which such person is convicted.” 23. Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 empowers the State Government to appoint as many Special Judges as are necessary to try the specified categories of offences. Section 7 makes it clear that such offences should be tried only by the Special Judges. Section 8 expressly empowers the Special Judge to take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed or tried and that in trying the accused shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Old Code for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrates. 24. From the perusal of A.R. Antulay case (supra) it appears that a private complaint was filed against A.R. Antulay alleging commission of offence triable by Special Judge under the Act of 1952. 24. From the perusal of A.R. Antulay case (supra) it appears that a private complaint was filed against A.R. Antulay alleging commission of offence triable by Special Judge under the Act of 1952. The Special Judge took cognizance of the offences upon the complaint and adjourned the case for recording evidence of the complainant and on the adjourned day, A.R. Antulay appeared and contended, inter alia, that Special Judge cannot take cognizance upon a private complaint. Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 requires a prior investigation by Police Officer of the designated rank. 25. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court while discussing the matter observed in para 18 as:- “It is a well-established canon of construction that the court should read the section as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any canon of construction permit the court to read the section in such manner as to render it to some extent otiose. Sec. 8 (1) says that the special Judge shall take cognizance of an offence and shall not take it on commitment of the accused. The Legislature provided for both the positive and the negative. It positively conferred power on special Judge to take cognizance of offences and it negatively removed any concept of commitment. It is not possible therefore, to read Sec. 8 (1) as eanvassed on behalf of the appellant that cognizance can only be taken upon a police report and any other view will render the safeguard under Section 5A* illusory.” (*Section 5A Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947) 26. The Apex Court in case of A.R. Antulay (supra) disapproved the contention that a private complaint is not maintainable in absence of unambiguous provision in Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 to that effect. The Apex Court referred the express provision of Section 8 of the Act, 1952 and noticed that these express provisions did not bar initiation of proceedings of a private complaint. 27. The Apex Court at the beginning of paragraph no. 27 stated as:- “It is, however, necessary to decide with precision and accuracy the position of a Special Judge and the Court over which he presides styled as the Court of a Special Judge because unending confusions have arisen by either assimilating him with a Magistrate or with a Sessions Court.” 28. 27 stated as:- “It is, however, necessary to decide with precision and accuracy the position of a Special Judge and the Court over which he presides styled as the Court of a Special Judge because unending confusions have arisen by either assimilating him with a Magistrate or with a Sessions Court.” 28. The Apex Court after referring to Section of the old Code according to which, there are four types of criminal Courts functioning under the High Court, namely, Court of Session, Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class and Executive Magistrate observed as:- “As already pointed out, there were four types of criminal Courts functioning under the High Court. To this list was added the court of a Special Judge.” 29. The Apex Court further observed:- “Now that a new Criminal Court was being set up, the Legislature took the first step of providing its comparative position in hierarchy of Courts under Section 6, Criminal Procedure Code by bringing it to level more or less comparable to the Court of Session, but in order to avoid any confusion arising out of comparison by level, it was made explicit in Section 8(1) itself that it is not a Court of Session because it can take cognizance of offences without commitment as contemplated by Section 193, Criminal Procedure Code. Undoubtedly, in Section 8(3), it was clearly laid down that subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8, the Court of Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors. In contradistinction to the Sessions Court this new Court was to be a Court of original jurisdiction. The legislature then proceeded to specify which out of the various procedures set out in the Code, this new Court, shall follow for trial of offences before it.” 30. Dealing with the question whether Special Judge is a Magistrate or the Court of Session, the Apex Court further observed:- “This is the fallacy of the whole approach. In fact, in order to give full effect to Section 8(1), the only thing to do is to read Special Judge in Sections 238 to 250 wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs. This is what is called legislation by incorporation. In fact, in order to give full effect to Section 8(1), the only thing to do is to read Special Judge in Sections 238 to 250 wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs. This is what is called legislation by incorporation. Similarly, where the question of taking cognizance arises, it is futile to go in search of the fact whether for purposes of Section 190 which conferred power on the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. Special Judge is Magistrate? What is to be done is that one has to read the expression 'Special Judge' in place of Magistrate, and the whole thing becomes crystal clear. The Legislature wherever it found the gray area clarified it by making specific provision such as the one in sub-section (2) of Section 8 and to leave no one in doubt further provided in subsection (3) that all provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge. At the time when the 1952 Act was enacted, what was in operation was the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It did not envisage any Court of a Special Judge and the Legislature never wanted to draw up an exhaustive Code of Procedure for this new Criminal Court which was being set up. The net outcome is that a new Court of original jurisdiction was set up and wherever a question arose as to what are its powers in respect of specific question brought before it as Court of original criminal jurisdiction, it had to refer to the Criminal Procedure Code undaunted by any designation clantrap. When taking cognizance a Court of Special Judge enjoyed powers under Section 190. When trying cases, it is obligatory to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate though as and by way of status it was equated with a Court of Session. The entire argument inviting us to specifically decide whether a Court of a Special Judge for a certain purpose is a Court of Magistrate or a Court of Session revolves round a mistaken belief that a Special Judge has to be one or the other and must fit in the shot of a Magistrate or a Court of Session. Such an approach would strangulate the functioning of the Court and must be eschewed. Such an approach would strangulate the functioning of the Court and must be eschewed. Shorn of all embellishment, the Court of a Special Judge is a Court of original criminal jurisdiction. As a Court of original criminal jurisdiction in order to make it functionally oriented, some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the Court. Except those specifically conferred and specifically denied, it has to function as a Court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hidebound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court of Session. Under the Code, it will enjoy all powers which a Court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys, save and except the ones specifically denied.” (Emphasis supplied) 31. Further, the Apex Court in para 28 observed as:- “Therefore, there is no gainsaying the fact that a new criminal court with a name, designation and qualification of the officer eligible to preside over it with powers specified and the particular procedure which it must follow has been set up under the 1952 Act. The court has to be treated as a court of original criminal jurisdiction and shall have all the powers as any court of original criminal jurisdiction has under the Code of Criminal Procedure, except those specifically excluded.” 32. Therefore, from the perusal of the above observation and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra) it is abundantly clear that Special Judge under the 1952 Act is a Court of original jurisdiction enjoys all the powers except the one specifically denied. 33. The provisions of Section 8 (1) of the 1952 Act is akin to the proviso clause of Section 14(1) of the Act, which clearly states that Special Judge so established under the Act can directly take the cognizance of the offences under the Act and in view of Constitution Bench of the Apex Court special judge so established under the Act can take cognizance even on private complaint as there is no specific denial to that effect under the Act. 34. 34. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Curt in case of A.R. Antulay (supra) a Special Judge so established under the Act being the court of original jurisdiction is having all the powers which a court of original jurisdiction enjoys including the power either to direct for registration of the case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or take cognizance on private complaint. 35. It is pertinent to mention here that the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) in the case of Anand Swaroop Tiwari Vs. Ram Ratan Jatav and others MANU/MP/0285/1995 after discussing the Constitution Bench case of A.R. Antulay (supra) concluded as:- “In the result, we hold as follows : (a) Special Courts under the Act are not to function as Sessions Court, but as Courts 'of original jurisdiction'. (b) Proceedings of Special Court are governed by Section 190, Chapters XV, XVI (other than Section 209) as also Chapters XIX and XX as the case may be and such other provisions of the Code as are not inconsistent with the scheme and provisions of the Act, reading "Special Courts" wherever the expression "Magistrate" occurs. (c) Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the Act and committal orders are not required. (d) Special Court can take cognizance on private complaints after following the procedure provided in the Code in relation to private complaints. (e) Where cognizance has already been taken on the basis of committal orders in Police challan cases, it is not necessary for the Courts to retrace their steps or to take cognizance afresh. (f) Where cognizance has already been taken on the basis of committal orders in private complaint cases, the Special Courts may deal with the cases as if they are dealing with private complaints under Section 200 of the Code.” 36. Therefore, from the above discussion, I am of the view that Special Judge so established under the Act can treat the application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint and thus there is no illegality in impugned order dated 24.06.2022 passed by Special Judge SC/ST (P.A.) Act, Etah. 37. Therefore, from the above discussion, I am of the view that Special Judge so established under the Act can treat the application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint and thus there is no illegality in impugned order dated 24.06.2022 passed by Special Judge SC/ST (P.A.) Act, Etah. 37. Therefore, I am in respectful disagreement with the view taken by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Soni Devi (supra) that Special Judge so established under the Act is having no power or authority to treat the application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as complaint. 38. As this Bench has taken a different view from the view taken in the case of Soni Devi (supra) with regard to the second question, therefore, let the matter be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice for nomination of appropriate Bench to decide following question:- “Whether Special Judge so established under the Act is empowered to treat application moved under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as criminal complaint or not.” 39. Recently, another co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 14443 of 2022 Naresh Kumar Valmiki Vs. State of U.P. and others took a different view from the view taken in the case of Soni Devi (supra) in respect of second question and referred the matter to larger Bench for appropriate decision. 40. As the instant issue has already referred to larger Bench in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 14443 of 2022, therefore, in view of the matter connect the instant application along with Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 14443 of 2022. 41. Since, there is difference of opinion in respect of the view taken in the case of Soni Devi (supra) by co-ordinate Bench of this Court, therefore, prayer for staying the effect and operation of the impugned order is refused.