JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel for the petitioner alongwith Mr. K. Paul, learned senior counsel for the opposite party respondent. 2. This is a petition submitted under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the impugned Judgment& Order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in connection with Complaint Case No. 105/2013. 3. Brief facts of the case leading to the instant Criminal Petition is that the petitioner had instituted a complainant case before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for bouncing of cheque under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner’s case is that he had constructed a retaining wall at Zokhawsang Zemabawk, Assam Rifles, Aizawl for the respondent by spending a huge amount of money and the respondent gave him a cheque amounting to Rs. 27,23,739/-, but the same was bounced as the bank informed the petitioner that the account of the respondent was closed. The petitioner then served notice upon the respondent but since the respondent did not pay the amount, he had filed the complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. That when the case came up for orders on 26.08.2019, the complainant/petitioner’s lawyer had gone to Lunglei for another case. Since he could not attend the case on 26.08.2019, the case was dismissed for non-prosecution. Aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 26.08.2019, hence the instant petition. 4. Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that from the perusal of the case records and order sheet, it can be seen that summons was issued to the opposite party several times and had even gone to the extent of issuing non bail-able warrant against the opposite party. However, the opposite party had failed to appear before this Court, in spite of all steps taken by the CJM Court. 5. The complainant on the other hand was present on all the Court dates, except on the court date preceding the date of the impugned order i.e. on 26.07.2019 and it can be seen from the order sheet that summons were not issued to the complainant and thus he was absent on the next date when the impugned Order dated 26.08.2019 was passed. 6. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on reading the impugned order dated 26.08.2019, the learned court while passing the impugned Order dated 26.08.2019 had simply dismissed the criminal complaint for non appearance and that there is no order for acquittal. For the above reason, he cannot approach this Court by way of review or by way of an appeal. He mentions that the Order dated 26.08.2019 is not a dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 or 204 Cr.P.C nor is it an acquittal order under Section 256 Cr.P.C and therefore, he cannot approach this Court either under Section 397 or 398 Cr.P.C, it is seen that he has no other option but to approach this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C, which is mainly for the advancement of justice and securing the ends of justice. He submits that though it is known that if there is a specific provision, section 482 should not be invoked, however, in this present case, there is no other provision of law under which the petitioner can approach the court for setting aside the order of dismissal of the case. He submits that there is no specific prohibition under the Cr.P.C from him approaching this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. He thus prays that this is not an acquittal nor dismissal order, he has no other option but to approach this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 7. In support of his submission, he has cited the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Gorige Pentaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others reported in 2008 12 SCC 531 , State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others reported in 2011 14 SCC 770 and 1998 Criminal Law Journal 267. 8. Mr. K. Paul, learned senior counsel for the respondent on the other hand mentions that in the instant case, the learned Court had taken cognizance of the matter and thereafter, had dismissed the matter for non appearance of both the parties on 26.08.2019. The learned Sr. counsel submits that a dismissal automatically amounts to acquittal under Section 256 Cr.P.C and the appropriate remedy for the petitioner would be to approach this Court under Section 378 Cr.P.C is by way of an appeal. He further submits that under Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C, a special leave to appeal is first required to be granted by this court. The learned Sr. He further submits that under Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C, a special leave to appeal is first required to be granted by this court. The learned Sr. counsel thus submits that when this remedy under section 378(4) Cr.P.C is available, the petitioner cannot invoke the powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 9. In support of his submission, he has cited the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand reported in (1998) 1 SCC 687 , Madhu Limaye vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551 , V.K. Bhat v. G. Ravi Kishore reported in 2016 13 SCC 243 . The decision of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in H.P Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. vs. M.P.S. Chawla in Crl.M.P (M) No. 5 of 1994 dated 18.09.1996, Sri. K.B Vedamurthy vs. M/S Laxven Chits Pvt. Ltd.in Criminal petition No.100177/2017 dated 27.01.2020. 10. Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel for the petitioner has made his counter claim that the Apex Court in V.K. Bhat v. G. Ravi Kishore (supra) has in paragraph No. 10 only mentioned that the dismissal of the complaint for non appearance amounts to acquittal as contemplated under Section 256 of the Cr.P.C. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not, in this case, mentioned that they should approach the Court under Section 378 Cr.P.C and the Supreme Court observed that they do not intend to give any further comments in the matter since this observation appears to be only with regards to the facts of the particular case mentioned. The learned counsel has reiterated that Section 482 Cr.P.C has given wide powers to the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of justice. 11. Having heard the submissions of the counsels for both the rival parties and on perusal of the documents on record the impugned order dated 26.08.2019 is reproduced as under:- “Both the parties are absent without steps. Today is fixed for further proceedings and in the previous court date both sides are absent without steps and the court issued summons to the complainant with a condition that if the complainant fails to appear on the next court date (i.e. today) without steps case may be dismissed. Today is fixed for further proceedings and in the previous court date both sides are absent without steps and the court issued summons to the complainant with a condition that if the complainant fails to appear on the next court date (i.e. today) without steps case may be dismissed. Further, this instant case was instituted on 09.07.2013 but till date charge cannot frame against accused and several warrant of arrest (bailable and non bailable) were issued against the opposite party/accused by the predecessor CJM but cannot executed. Again considering the case record it is learned that the complaint also did not appear on many court dates. Therefore, the court feels that the complainant and even the opposite party are not interested in the case as such the court decided to dismiss this instant case due to non-prosecution of the case, and the case cannot proceed further in any manner due to nonappearance of any of the party. Considering the above, this instant case is hereby dismissed due to non-prosecution of the case and non-appearance of the parties.” 12. The Apex court in V.K. Bhat v. G. Ravi Kishore (supra) held that: “After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we find that there is some force in the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and we hold, in the facts of the case, that dismissal of the complaint for non-appearance of the complainant amounts to acquittal as contemplated in Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 13. In State Through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu Alias Afshan Guru and Others [ (2003) 6 SCC 641 ], the Apex court held that: “The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.” 14. In Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., (supra) the court held that : “Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.” 15. I do not find substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Apex Court in V.K. Bhat’s (supra) case made its observation only with regards to the facts of the particular case, where they should approach the court under section 378 Cr.P.C. It is seen that section 256 Cr.P.C. provides that : “(1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day.” The same view was taken in H.P. Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. V. M.P.S. Chawla, (1997) 2 Crimes 591 (H&P) where it was held that : “there is no denying that the dismissal of the complaint in default under section 256 entails the acquittal of the accused. Ltd. V. M.P.S. Chawla, (1997) 2 Crimes 591 (H&P) where it was held that : “there is no denying that the dismissal of the complaint in default under section 256 entails the acquittal of the accused. Once an accused has been acquitted of the offence, the law provides a remedy by way of an appeal against the order of acquittal under section 378 (4) of the Code. 16. In view of the above judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court and on perusal of section 256 Cr.P.C, I find that this court is constrained to hold that the order of dismissal for non appearance of the complainant comes under the ambit of section 256 Cr.P.C and such an order ought to be challenged before this court in an appeal under section 378(4) Cr.P.C. 17. For the above said reasons the Criminal Petition under section 482 Cr.P.C is dismissed with a liberty to the petitioner to approach this court under section 378(4) of Cr.P.C by way of appeal, if so advised. 18. Accordingly Criminal Pet. No. 5 of 2019 stands disposed with the above observation.