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2022 DIGILAW 1379 (MP)

Mukesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2022-11-21

S.A.DHARMADHIKARI, S.A.DHARMADHIKARI

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2) Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 07.11.1998 passed by learned Second ASJ Katni, District Katni in S.T. No. 621/1997 whereby the learned ASJ has convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, 304-B of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred as 'IPC') as well as Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (hereinafter referred as 'Act 1961'). Since, offence under Section 498-A of IPC and 3/4 of the Act 1961 occurred in the course of the same transaction, the trial Court sentenced him under Section 304-B of IPC to undergo R.I. for seven years with fine of Rs. 5000/-. Default stipulation has also been imposed by trial Court. 2. According to prosecution case, on 18.08.1997 information regarding unnatural death of deceased by burn was reported to police by the appellant. Police registered the marg intimation report and inquired the matter. During inquiry, police conducted the post-mortem of the deceased as well as recorded the statements of witnesses whereby it was revealed that marriage of deceased Rupa Gupta was solemnized with appellant on 07.05.1993. During marriage, initially no demand of dowry was made by the appellant and his brother Ramkrishn but after performing Bhanwar rituals, the appellant demanded scooter which could not be fulfilled by the father of deceased i.e. Lallu Lal (PW1). Thereafter, the appellant and his brother started reproaching the deceased for not giving scooter by her father. They were continuously demanding scooter or Rs.20,000/- in lieu of that. The father of deceased Lallu Lal (PW1) had given Rs.8,000/- to the appellant and promised to give rest of the amount after paddy harvest. Being annoyed from non-fulfillment of demand, appellant started torturing the deceased for demand of dowry, resultantly, the deceased died of unnatural death by setting herself ablaze in her matrimonial residential house. Thereafter police registered FIR (Ex.P/24) against present appellant and his brother Ramkrishn Gupta for the offence punishable under Section 304-B, 498-A read with Section 34 IPC as well as 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. 3. After completing the investigation, police filed the charge sheet. The accused persons abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to substantiate the prosecution case, the prosecution has produced 18 prosecution witnesses. 3. After completing the investigation, police filed the charge sheet. The accused persons abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to substantiate the prosecution case, the prosecution has produced 18 prosecution witnesses. The trial Court also recorded the statements of accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned trial Judge, came to conclusion that the appellant is guilty for the offence as mentioned in para -I. However, the learned trial Judge acquitted the co-accused Ramkrishn from the alleged offences as he found that the prosecution has failed to establish its case against co-accused Ramkrishn. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment passed by the learned trial Court is bad-in-law and contrary to facts and evidence of the case. The evidence led by the prosecution witnesses suffers from serious infirmity. The judgment of trial court is based upon the testimony of interested witnesses i.e. Lallu Lal ( PW-1), Krishna Bai Gupta (PW-2), and Bahori Lal (PW-5) whereas they have turned hostile. Jagdish Namdeo (PW-3) and Anil Kumar Gupta (PW-12) are neighbour of the deceased, who deposed that they never saw appellant treating the deceased with cruelty. The appellant was not present during the incident. The prosecution failed to bring any cogent evidence against the appellant with regard to demand of dowry. The learned trial court ought to have seen that there is no independent witness who supported the prosecution case. No such prior report or complaint with regard to making demand of dowry and cruelty with the deceased, has ever been made by the deceased herself or by her relatives. The appellant himself reported the incident to police. Indeed, the deceased died accidentally while using stove. No ingredient is present to constitute the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. In support of his contention, he has relied upon judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this High Court, same are mentioned hereinunder:- (1) Raman Kumar Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2009) 16 SCC 35 . (2) Suresh Kumar & Anr. reported in I.L.R (2017) M.P. 902. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-State opposed the submission made by appellant's counsel submitting that the prosecution succeeded to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. State of Punjab, reported in (2009) 16 SCC 35 . (2) Suresh Kumar & Anr. reported in I.L.R (2017) M.P. 902. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-State opposed the submission made by appellant's counsel submitting that the prosecution succeeded to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. There is specific allegation against the appellant for demand of dowry and cruelty soon before death of deceased. The deceased died of unnatural death within the period of five years from her marriage, thus, presumption of Section 113-B comes into play which is against the appellant. The appellant narrated false story of incident. However, some of the prosecution witnesses have turned hostile but they stated sufficient against the appellant to secure his conviction. They have duly supported the case of prosecution. The learned trial court has rightly considered the evidence of the case. With the aforesaid submissions, he prays for dismissal of the instant appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. While arguing the instant appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following grounds - "(1) That, the possibility of accidental burn could not be ruled out in the present case. (2) That, the prosecution failed to prove that there was a demand of dowry as important witnesses including family members of deceased have turned hostile and also there is material contradictions and omissions in the statements of prosecution witnesses. (3) Lastly, the prosecution also failed to prove that deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death." 8. Before dealing with the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to discuss the legal aspect first. 9. The offence involved in the case under the IPC are Sections 304-B & 498-A of IPC which are reproduced herein-under - "304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-(a)any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 10. The appellant has also been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 3/4 of Act 1961. The said provision is also quoted herein-under - "3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.- (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with the fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. * * * Explanation I omitted by Sec.2 w.e.f 2nd October, 1985 (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to or, in relation to,- presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without nay demand having been made in that behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in list maintained in accordance with rule made under this Act; presents which are given at the time of marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with rules made under this Act; Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given. 4.Penalty for demanding dowry.- (1) If any person demands directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months." 11. Since, the deceased died within seven years of her marriage, under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there is presumption of Section 113-A & 113-B. These provisions are also quoted herein-under - "113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.-When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of1860)" 12. Likewise, under the dowry prohibition Act 1961, there is also presumption prescribed under Section 8-A, which is also reproduced herein-under - "8-A. Burden of proof in certain cases: Where any person is prosecuted for taking or abetting the taking of any dowry under Sec. 3, or the demanding of dowry under Sec.4, the burden of proving that he had not committed an offence under those sections shall be on him." 13. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court has summed up the principle to constitute the offence under Section 304-B IPC. In the case of Kansraj Vs. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court has summed up the principle to constitute the offence under Section 304-B IPC. In the case of Kansraj Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has elucidated the following ingredients to prove dowry death - "(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage; (c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband; (d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and (e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected to soon before her death. " 14. Further, in the case of Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court also has held as under - 27. Importantly, Section 304-B IPC does not categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. This is because death caused by burns can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Finally, any death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304-B IPC are fulfilled, any death (whether homicidal or suicidal or accidental) and whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death". The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of a dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death 28. The evidentiary value of the identification is stated in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (the Act). The key words in this section are "shall presume" leaving no option with a court but to presume an accused brought before it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence. However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable. The key words in this section are "shall presume" leaving no option with a court but to presume an accused brought before it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence. However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable. Section 113-B of the Act enables an accused to prove his innocence and places a reverse onus of proof on him or her." 15. Further, in the case of Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 359 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under - "19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom has used the word "shall" thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. It is unlike the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act where a discretion has been conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided that court may presume abetment of suicide by a married woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only requirements are that death of a woman has been caused by means other than any natural circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred within 7 years of her marriage; and such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand of dowry. 20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death......." 16. 20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death......." 16. On reading of the above mentioned provisions and verdicts given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it appears that when the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within a period of seven years of her marriage and the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband and such cruelty of her husband should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry and such cruelty or harassment, the deceased should have been subjected to soon before her death be called as dowry death and the women's husband or his relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Section 304-B of IPC does not categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Likewise, Section 498-A of IPC provides that any willful conduct of the husband or relatives of the husband of a woman is of such a nature as is likely to drive the women to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman, or harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or her relative to meet any unlawful demand of any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or her relative to meet such demand, is offence under Section 498-A of IPC. 17. Further, two things has to be seen in respect of offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, first to make sure whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out against the accused and if the findings are affirmative then secondly to ascertain that the accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman. 18. 17. Further, two things has to be seen in respect of offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, first to make sure whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out against the accused and if the findings are affirmative then secondly to ascertain that the accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman. 18. Further, when the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage on the instigation of her husband or relative of husband, then presumption of Section 113-A comes into play whereas when a married woman died of unnatural death either suicidal or homicidal due to harassment or cruelty was made in connection to any dowry demands soon before her death, by her husband or relative of husband, presumption of Section 113-B comes into effect and under the said circumstance, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. .Once the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC are fulfilled by the prosecution, the onus shifts to the defence to produce evidence to rebut the statutory presumption and to prove that the death was in the normal course and the accused were not connected. 19. So far as offence relating to Act 1961, i..e. Section 3/4 is concerned, same prohibits for giving, taking and demanding of dowry and provides punishment for that too. The presumption given under Section 8-A of the Act 1961 shifts burden on the accused to prove he had not committed offence. 20. Since, offence under Section 304-B of IPC covers the parameters which are necessary to constitute the offence under Section 498-A and 3/4 of Act, 1961, therefore, there is no need to examine the evidence separately in relation thereof. 21. The learned trial court has given its affirmative finding with regard to dowry death of deceased by the appellant, therefore, this Court has to examine whether the findings of the learned trial court is correct or not? 22. Now I am embarking upon to examine the evidence available on record. 23. On perusal of record, it is undisputed that marriage of deceased Rupa Gupta was solemnized with appellant on 07.05.1993 and she died of unnatural death on 18.07.1997 within seven years from the date of her marriage. 24. 22. Now I am embarking upon to examine the evidence available on record. 23. On perusal of record, it is undisputed that marriage of deceased Rupa Gupta was solemnized with appellant on 07.05.1993 and she died of unnatural death on 18.07.1997 within seven years from the date of her marriage. 24. With respect to cause of death, doctor R.K.Gupta (PW-10) examined before the trial Court and he deposed that he found smell of kerosene oil on the entire body of deceased who had suffered 100% burn injuries. According to him, she died due to asphyxia because of burn. As the deceased succumbed to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it becomes clear that first two ingredients of Section 304-B are satisfied. 25. So far as demand of dowry is concerned, the evidence on record suggests that Lallu Lal (PW-1) father of deceased, Krishna Bai (PW- 2) mother of deceased and Bahori Lal (PW-5) cousin of deceased/mediator of marriage are unanimous on the point of demand of scooter or Rs. 20,000/- in lieu of that by the appellant. They seem to be consistent in their cross examination on the said point. Moreover, PW-1 and PW-2 deposed that the deceased had disclosed that the appellant used to harass her on account of bringing insufficient dowry. On 25.06.1997, the deceased came to her parental house alongwith appellant to attend some family function where appellant demanded sum and on refusal thereof, he quarreled with the deceased and left the house. PW-2 has further stated in para-17 of her cross examination that the appellant restrained the deceased to come to her parental house due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. The police statements of PW-1 and PW-2 indicate demand of dowry by the appellant. Further, Bahori Lal (PW-3) was the mediator through whom the marriage of deceased and appellant was solemnized, has also accepted the fact that the appellant was demanding dowry from the family members of deceased. 26. However, these aforesaid witnesses have been declared hostile and their credibility has also been doubted by the appellant's counsel because of their hostility and interest being close relative of deceased. 27. To the context of admissibility of evidence given by hostile witness, in the case of Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 434 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :- "25. 27. To the context of admissibility of evidence given by hostile witness, in the case of Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 434 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :- "25. It is a settled legal proposition that evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto, merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced, or washed off the record altogether. The same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable, upon a careful scrutiny thereof. 26. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra [ (1996) 10 SCC 360 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1278 : AIR 1996 SC 2766 ] this Court held, that evidence of a hostile witness would not be rejected in entirety, if the same has been given in favour of either the prosecution, or the accused, but is required to be subjected to careful scrutiny, and thereafter, that portion of the evidence which is consistent with either the case of the prosecution, or that of the defence, may be relied upon. 27. Therefore, the law permits the court to take into consideration the deposition of a hostile witness, to the extent that the same is in consonance with the case of the prosecution, and is found to be reliable in careful judicial scrutiny." 28. The principle relating to interested witnesses/close relatives has also been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 129 , relevant para is reproduced as under:- "33. Before closing, the most common place argument must be dealt with. In all cases of bride burning it is submitted that independent witnesses have not been examined. When harassment and cruelty is meted out to a woman within the four walls of the matrimonial home, it is difficult to get independent witnesses to depose about it. Only the inmates of the house and the relatives of the husband, who cause the cruelty, witness it. Their servants, being under their obligation, would never depose against them. Proverbially, neighbours are slippery witnesses. Moreover, witnesses have a tendency to stay away from courts. This is more so with neighbours. Only the inmates of the house and the relatives of the husband, who cause the cruelty, witness it. Their servants, being under their obligation, would never depose against them. Proverbially, neighbours are slippery witnesses. Moreover, witnesses have a tendency to stay away from courts. This is more so with neighbours. In bride burning cases who else will, therefore, depose about the misery of the deceased bride except her parents or her relatives? It is time we accept this reality. We, therefore, reject this submission." 29. Therefore, the evidence of witnesses cannot be discarded merely they have declared hostile on the specific point and they were relatives of the deceased. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. However, close scrutiny is required before accepting their evidence. 30. Now, coming back to merits of the case, Jagdish Namdeo (PW-3) and Anil Kumar Gupta (PW-12) who were the neighbour of appellant deposed before the Court that the deceased wanted to go her parental house on the festival of Rakshabandhan; but, the appellant refused to do so, however, PW-3 stated in his cross examination that on account of business engagement and illness of son, the appellant refused the deceased to go to her parental house and on the date of incident the appellant had gone for medical checkup of his son. But, the appellant failed to produce any documentary proof viz. medical prescription in this regard. Rather, the evidence given by PW-3 and PW-12 supported the evidence given by PW-2 on the point that the appellant used to restrain the deceased to go to her parental house which amounts to mental cruelty. 31. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that there is no evidence to show that any demand of dowry was made soon before the death. In this context, in the case of Kans Raj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has defined the meaning of phrase 'soon after' used in the provision of Section 304-B of IPC, relevant para is quoted as under:- "15.It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband soon before her death. "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term "soon before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately before" and is opposite of the expression "soon after" as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before death" if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough." 32. Therefore, now it becomes clear that the phrase 'soon before her death' in Section 304B IPC does not mean 'immediately prior to death of deceased'. However, the prosecution must establish existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. 33. In the present case, the incident had taken place within two months i.e. on 25.06.1997 when deceased came to her parental house for attending family function where appellant demanded dowry. Therefore, this is not a case where the allegation was leveled after lapse of sufficient time which would prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. 33. In the present case, the incident had taken place within two months i.e. on 25.06.1997 when deceased came to her parental house for attending family function where appellant demanded dowry. Therefore, this is not a case where the allegation was leveled after lapse of sufficient time which would prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. The aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of deceased. 34. From the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was able to successfully prove that the death of deceased occured due to burn injuries within seven years of her marriage under other than normal circumstances. It has further been proved that soon before her death she was subjected to harassment and cruelty pursuant to demand of dowry. Since, the ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC stand satisfied, the presumption under 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the appellant, who is deemed to have committed the offence specified under Section 304-B of IPC, therefore, the burden shifts on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. 35. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the deceased got burnt accidentally while using stove and it is a case of accidental death, and therefore, appellant cannot be fastened with criminal liability. However, the record of the trial Court indicates that the appellant did not produce any witness in support of his case. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C, he explained that during the incident he was not in the house and had gone to the hospital for treatment of his son. But, on perusal of record, it is found that R.K.Gupta (PW-10) deposed before the trial Court that he found smell of kerosene oil on the entire body of deceased who had suffered 100% burn injuries. In the case of Satbir Singh & Another Vs. State of Haryana, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1735-1736 of 2010, passed on 28.05.2021, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with identical issue where the appellant claimed the death of deceased as accidental. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 29 . The burden therefore shifts on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The counsel for the appellants has canvassed before us that it was a case of accidental death, and hence no liability can be fixed upon them. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 29 . The burden therefore shifts on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The counsel for the appellants has canvassed before us that it was a case of accidental death, and hence no liability can be fixed upon them. However, in the present case, the accused persons failed to place any evidence on record to prove that the death was accidental or unconnected with the accused persons. 30.Here, it ought to be noted that, according to the evidence of the doctor, the entire body of the deceased was doused with kerosene oil. Therefore, the possibility of an accident can be safely ruled out. As the Trial Court concluded:- All these circumstances go to prove that either deceased committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body or she was burnt by sprinkling kerosene on her body either by the accused or by somebody else and the plea of accident tried to be made out by the learned counsel for the accused, is not at all proved." 36. In the present case, as mentioned above, it was found that body of the deceased was sprinkled with kerosene oil and therefore, in view of the observation made in Satbir Singh (Supra), the possibility of accident can be safely ruled out herein also. Further, if presumed that deceased committed suicide by setting her ablaze, even then, ingredients of section 304-B are satisfied as death of deceased is subjected to demand of dowry. So far as defence relating to appellant being not present during the incident is concerned, the appellant failed to produce any satisfactory proof in this regard. Moreover, non-presence of appellant does not save him from criminal liability under Section 304-B of IPC as the death of deceased is the result of long harassment by the appellant for demand of dowry and Section 304-B of IPC covers suicidal death too. Judgments relied upon by counsel for the appellant are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 37. Therefore, the presumption given under Section 113-B of Evidence Act goes against the appellant and he failed to rebut the same herein. The finding given by the trial Court regarding conviction under Section 304-B of IPC is hereby affirmed. Judgments relied upon by counsel for the appellant are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 37. Therefore, the presumption given under Section 113-B of Evidence Act goes against the appellant and he failed to rebut the same herein. The finding given by the trial Court regarding conviction under Section 304-B of IPC is hereby affirmed. So far as conviction under Section 498-A of IPC as well as 3/4 of Act 1961 are concerned, it has already been discussed and proved that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and demand of dowry by the appellant, therefore, conviction passed under Section 498-A of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 also deserves to be upheld. 38. So far as sentence is concerned, the trial court has imposed the minimum sentence under section 304-B of the I.P.C. Thus, the sentence imposed by the trial court is affirmed. 39. The appeal sans merit and is hereby dismissed. Impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, as passed by the trial Court is affirmed. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to immediately surrender before the Trial Court for undergoing the remaining jail sentence. 40. let copy of this judgment along with its record be sent to the court below for information and compliance. 41. the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 42. Lastly, this court records its appreciation for valuable assistance provided by learned Amicus Curiae Shri Hitendra Golhani, Advocate.