JUDGMENT : Veerappa, J. Though the present Cross Objection along with Writ Appeal are posted for final hearing, Sri M.B.Nargund, Learned Additional Solicitor General of India along with Sri Jayakara Shetty, Learned Counsel for respondent No.1/Union of India raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of cross objection in the writ appeal filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. I. BRIEF FACTS OFTHE CASE: 2. The State Government issued preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dated 09.06.2005 proposing to acquire various extents of lands situated at Benniganahalli, K.R.Puram, Bengaluru, for the benefit of Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). On 22.08.2008, one of the land owner viz., Smt.Krishnamma filed W.P.No.21948/2005, which came to be allowed in part, quashing the invocation of urgency clause and directed the Land Acquisition Officer to give an opportunity of hearing under Section 5(A) of the Land Acquisition Act. Considering the objections filed by the cross- objector, the Land Acquisition Officer by the Order dated 19.01.2010 opined that the land in question is not required for the purpose of acquisition. On 07.10.2010, the State Government, issued final notification under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. When the cross-objector filed W.P.No.912/2011 questioning the legality and correctness of the preliminary and final notifications, the Learned Single Judge, by the Order dated 30.04.2014, allowed the writ petition and quashed the notifications. The said order was challenged by the Union of India in W.A.No.2122/2015. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court, by the Order dated 20.04.2016 directed the parties to maintain status quo. The cross objector filed the present Cross Objection on 30.07.2022 and also entered appearance in W.A.No.2122/2015, on 09.08.2017. 3. When the matter was posted for hearing, Learned Counsel ASG for the respondent No.1/appellant raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of Writ Appeal Cross Objection No.2/2022 in W.A.No.2122/2015. 4. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties to the lis. II. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY LEARNED ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA 5. Sri M.B.Nargund, Learned Additional Solicitor General of India for the respondent No.1/appellant contended that filing of an Appeal and Revision is the substantive right of a party and filing of the Cross Objection in Writ Appeal is not the substantive right. II. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY LEARNED ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA 5. Sri M.B.Nargund, Learned Additional Solicitor General of India for the respondent No.1/appellant contended that filing of an Appeal and Revision is the substantive right of a party and filing of the Cross Objection in Writ Appeal is not the substantive right. He would further contend that the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure envisages that, ‘the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suit shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction’. Therefore, it shall not include a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thereby, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code are applicable per se to the writ proceedings. 6. Learned ASG further contended that, Rule 6 of Chapter VI-A of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, depicts that, subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A, the rules applicable to Regular First Appeals and the provisions of Orders XLI and XLI-A of Code of Civil Procedure, shall as far as may be, apply to Original Side Appeals. Thereby, the cross-objection filed by the respondents in the Writ Appeal No.2122/2015 is not maintainable. He further contended that, if the respondents are aggrieved by the order or finding of the Learned Single Judge, there is no impediment for them to file separate Appeal under the provision of Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. 7. Learned ASG further contended that, the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Puran Singh And Others vs. State Of Punjab And Others, AIR 1996 SC 1092 was with regard to question as to whether the provisions made under Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, an explanation was added to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by way of amendment, to the effect that, ‘In this section, the expression “proceedings” includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the present Cross Objection No.2/2022 filed in W.A.No.2122/2015, as not maintainable. 8. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the present Cross Objection No.2/2022 filed in W.A.No.2122/2015, as not maintainable. 8. In support of his contentions, Learned ASG relied upon the following judgments. (i) Jabalpur Development Authority vs. Y.S.sachan, Laws(MPH)-2004-2-25 (ii) Principal Chief Conservator Of Forests vs. Suresh Mathew, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 420, paragraph-3. (iii) Villupuram Market Committee, Rep. By Its Special Officer, Villupuram And Others vs. K.Sekar, 2007-2-L.W.919, paragraphs 23 and 26. (iv) C.N.Byrappa vs. State Of Karnataka, ILR 1994 KAR 1906, paragraph 8. III. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS OBJECTOR 9. Per contra, Sri C.M.Nagabhushana, Learned Counsel for the cross objector contended that the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, was enacted by virtue of the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 envisages that, the provisions of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the rules made by the High Court of Karnataka under the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply, as far as may be, to proceedings under Article 226 (and/or Article 227) and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made in the said rules. Thereby, the cross objection filed under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Writ Appeal is maintainable. 10. Learned Counsel further contended that the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, was enacted, in exercise of powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India and Section 54 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 read with Sections 122 and 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 19 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884. Thereby, the Cross Objection is maintainable. 11. Learned Counsel further contended that, though Learned ASG relied upon the judgments rendered by Kerala High Court and Madras High Court, in those High Courts, there is no such provision like Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 which is existing in Karnataka High Court. Thereby the said judgments have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 12. Learned Counsel further contended that, once Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, is applicable to writ petitions, automatically it is applicable to writ appeals as well as cross objections. Thereby the said judgments have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 12. Learned Counsel further contended that, once Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, is applicable to writ petitions, automatically it is applicable to writ appeals as well as cross objections. The cross objection is nothing but an appeal and Court has to deal with it as a separate appeal. Therefore, he sought to allow the cross objection filed in the writ appeal. 13. Learned Counsel further contended that, the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of B.CHANNAPPA GOWDA vs. MANAGEMENT OF M/S CENTRAL ARECANUT AND COCO, W.A. Crob No.1/2019 in W.A.No.2/2019, DD: 23.08.2019, observed that “Chapter VI-A of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1969, in particular, Rule 6 of Chapter VI-A, which lays down that subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A, the rules applicable to Regular First Appeal and the provisions of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, as far as may be, applicable to the original side appeals. That is how Rule 22 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to the present appeal. Hence, the objection regarding maintainability of the cross objections raised by the Learned Counsel for the appellants does not survive.” 14. In support of his contentions, Learned Counsel for the cross objector relied upon the following judgments. (i) PURAN SINGH AND OTHERS vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS (supra). (ii) ROKYAYABI vs. ISMAIL KHAN AND OTHERS, AIR 1984 KAR 234 to contend that Order XLI Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure can be availed in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs 5 and 6. (iii) D.THIMMAPPA SHEIKA AND ANOTHER vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS, 2000 AIHC 979 paragraphs 5 and 8. IV. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 15. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by Learned Counsel for parties, the only point that arises for our consideration in the present cross objection No.2/2022 in WA No.2122/2015, is: “Whether the Cross Objection No.2/2022 filed under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in Writ Appeal No.2122/2015 filed under Section 4 of the High Court Act, is maintainable, in the facts and circumstances of the present case? V. CONSIDERATION 16. V. CONSIDERATION 16. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record, carefully. 17. The acquisition of various extents of land situated at Bennaganahalli, Bengaluru East Taluk, by the State Government for the benefit of DRDO is not in dispute. When the cross-objector filed W.P.No.912/2011 questioning the legality and correct of preliminary and final notifications, the Learned Single Judge, by the Order dated 30.04.2014, allowed the writ petition and quashed the notifications. The said order was challenged by the Union of India in W.A.No.2122/2015. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court, by the Order dated 20.04.2016 directed the parties to maintain status quo. The cross objector filed the present Cross Objection on 30.07.2022 and also entered appearance in W.A.No.2122/2015, on 09.08.2017. 18. Since the Learned Counsel for the appellants raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the cross objection filed under Order XLI rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the said question has to be decided, now. 19. In view of the controversy between the parties, it is relevant to consider the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, which reads as under: “4. Appeals from decisions of a single Judge of the High Court – An appeal from a judgment, decree, order or sentence passed by a single Judge in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court under this Act or under any law for the time being in force, shall lie to and be heard by a Bench consisting of two other Judges of the High Court.” 20. A careful reading of the aforesaid provision make it clear that, any person aggrieved by the judgment, decree, order or sentence passed by the Learned Single Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction, an appeal can be filed and be heard by a Bench consisting of two other judges of the High Court. 21. The Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, was enacted to make provision for regulating the business and the exercise of powers of the High Court of the State of Karnataka in relation to the administration of justice and to provide for its jurisdiction. 22. 21. The Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, was enacted to make provision for regulating the business and the exercise of powers of the High Court of the State of Karnataka in relation to the administration of justice and to provide for its jurisdiction. 22. Rule 1 of Chapter VI-A of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, depicts that “Appeals under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, shall be designated “Original Side Appeals”. 23. Rule 6 of Chapter VI-A of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, reads as under: “6. Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, the rules applicable to Regular First Appeals and the provisions of Orders XLI and XLI-A of the Code of Civil Procedure shall, as far as may be, apply to Original Side Appeals.” 24. A careful reading of the aforesaid provisions make it clear that, any appeal filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 has to be redesignated as Original Side Appeal under chapter VI-A of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, and the rules applicable to Regular First Appeals and provisions of Order XLI and XLI-A of the Code of Civil Procedure shall, as far as may be, apply to the Original Side Appeals. Thus the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, are applicable not only to civil proceedings, but also apply to original side appeals filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, against any order passed by the Learned Single Judge. 25. It is relevant to state that Rule 26 contained in Part III of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, clearly depicts that, ‘every appeal filed from an order passed by a single Judge on a writ petition shall be designated as “Writ Appeal”’. 26. Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, reads as under: 39. Application of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, etc.- “The provisions of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the rules made by the High Court of Karnataka under the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply, as far as may be, to proceedings under Article 226 (and/or Article 227) and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made in these rules.” 27. A careful reading of aforesaid provisions make it clear that, every appeal filed challenging the order passed by Learned Single Judge in a writ petition shall be designated as writ appeal and the provisions of High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the rules made by the High Court of Karnataka under the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation, 1958, and the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply, as far as may be, to the proceedings under Article 226 (and/or Article 227) and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made in the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959. Thereby, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India and writ appeals. Thereby, the cross objection filed by the cross objector (respondent in writ appeal) under the provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable. 28. It is relevant to note that when writ appeal is filed against the order of the Learned Single Judge and cross objection filed against the order or adverse finding recorded by Learned Single Judge, the aggrieved party can file cross objection in the writ appeal and the cross objection has to be dealt independently and the Court fee payable on the writ appeal as well as the cross objections are one and the same. 29. The law on maintainability of a cross objection under Order XLI Rule 22 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been succinctly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER vs. B.SUBBA REDDY, AIR 1999 SC 1747 wherein, it is specifically held as under: “(i) Appeal is a substantive right. It is a creation of the statute. Right to appeal does not exist unless it is specifically conferred. (ii) Cross-objection is like an appeal. It has all the trappings of an appeal. It is filed in the form of memorandum and the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 41 of the Code, so far as these relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal apply to cross-objection as well. (iii) Court fee is payable on cross-objection like that on the memorandum of appeal. Provisions relating to appeals by an indigent person also apply to cross objection. (iii) Court fee is payable on cross-objection like that on the memorandum of appeal. Provisions relating to appeals by an indigent person also apply to cross objection. (iv) Even where the appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, cross-objection may nevertheless be heard and determined. (v) The respondent even though he has not appealed may support the decree on any other ground but if he wants to modify it, he has to file cross-objection to the decree which objections he could have taken earlier by filing an appeal. Time for filing objection which is in the nature of appeal is extended by one month after service of notice on him of the day fixed for hearing the appeal. This time could also be extended by the court like in appeal. (vi) Cross-objection is nothing but an appeal, a cross-appeal at that. It may be that the respondent wanted to give a quietus to the whole litigation by his accepting the judgment and decree or order even if it was partly against his interest. When, however, the other party challenged the same by filing an appeal the statute gave the respondent a second chance to file an appeal by way of cross-objection if he still felt aggrieved by the judgment and decree or order.” Therefore, Can a cross-objection filed by a respondent in a writ appeal filed by the writ petitioner against the dismissal of his writ petition be proceeded with when the writ appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default? Can the respondent be granted any relief in the writ petition which is not pursued at the appellate stage when the writ petitioner does not seek the issue of any writ or direction? The answer can only be in the negative which is sufficient and more to demolish the contention that a cross-objection is maintainable in a writ appeal filed in the High Court. 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PURAN SINGH AND OTHERS vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS (supra), while considering Rule 32 of Writ Rules of Punjab and Haryana High Court, Section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure and Rule 39 of the Karnataka High Court Writ Proceedings Rules, at paragraphs 8 and 9 held as under: 8. 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PURAN SINGH AND OTHERS vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS (supra), while considering Rule 32 of Writ Rules of Punjab and Haryana High Court, Section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure and Rule 39 of the Karnataka High Court Writ Proceedings Rules, at paragraphs 8 and 9 held as under: 8. On a plain reading, Section 141 of the Code provides that the procedure provided in the said Code in regard to suits shall be followed “as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings”. In other words, it is open to make the procedure provided in the said Code in regard to suits applicable to any other proceeding in any court of civil jurisdiction. The explanation which was added is more or less in the nature of proviso, saying that the expression ‘proceedings’ shall not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The necessary corollary thereof shall be that it shall be open to make applicable the procedure provided in the Code to any proceeding in any court of civil jurisdiction except to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Once the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded from the expression ‘proceedings’ occurring in Section 141 of the Code by the explanation, how on basis of Section 141 of the Code any procedure provided in the Code can be made applicable to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution? In this background, how merely on basis of Writ Rule 32 the provisions of the Code shall be applicable to writ proceedings? Apart from that, Section 141 of the Code even in respect of other proceedings contemplates that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed “as far as it can be made applicable”. Rule 32 of Writ Rules does not specifically make provisions of Code applicable to petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It simply says that in matters for which no provision has been made by those rules, the provisions of the Code shall apply mutatis mutandis insofar as they are not inconsistent with those rules. Rule 32 of Writ Rules does not specifically make provisions of Code applicable to petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It simply says that in matters for which no provision has been made by those rules, the provisions of the Code shall apply mutatis mutandis insofar as they are not inconsistent with those rules. In the case of Rokyayabi v. Ismail Khan [AIR 1984 Kant 234 : (1984) 2 Kant LC 114] in view of Rule 39 of the writ proceedings rules as framed by the Karnataka High Court making the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure applicable to writ proceedings and writ appeals, it was held that the provisions of the Code were applicable to writ proceedings and writ appeals. 9. We have not been able to appreciate the anxiety on the part of the different courts in judgments referred to above to apply the provisions of the Code to writ proceedings on the basis of Section 141 of the Code. When the Constitution has vested extraordinary power in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 to issue any order, writ or direction and the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which such High Court is exercising jurisdiction, the procedure for exercising such power and jurisdiction have to be traced and found in Articles 226 and 227 itself. No useful purpose will be served by limiting the power of the High Court by procedural provisions prescribed in the Code. Of course, on many questions, the provisions and procedures prescribed under the Code can be taken up as guide while exercising the power, for granting relief to persons, who have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. It need not be impressed that different provisions and procedures under the Code are based on well-recognised principles for exercise of discretionary power, and they are reasonable and rational. But at the same time, it cannot be disputed that many procedures prescribed in the said Code are responsible for delaying the delivery of justice and causing delay in securing the remedy available to a person who pursues such remedies. The High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons concerned. The High Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious. 31. The High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons concerned. The High Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious. 31. The coordinate Bench of this Court, while considering the provisions of Order XL Rule 1 and Section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure and Article 226 of the Constitution and Sections 48-A and 48-C of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, in the case of ROKYAYABI vs. ISMAIL KHAN AND OTHERS (supra), at paragraph 5, held as under: “5. But Sri Narayana Rao invited our attention to R. 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 framed by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and contended that though the provisions of the C.P.C. are not automatically attracted to a proceeding under Art. 226 the provisions of the C.P.C. have been made applicable by the said Rules. R. 39 of the said Rules reads:- “39. Application of the High Court of Karnataka Rules etc., The provisions of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the rules made by the High Court of Karnataka under the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 shall apply, as far as may be, to proceedings under Art. 226 and/or Art. 227 and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provisions is made in these Rules.” It is, therefore, clear that though the provisions of the C.P.C. are not made automatically applicable having regard to the Explanation to Sec. 141 C.P.C., the provisions of the C.P.C. are made applicable by a specific Rule made by this Court under Art. 226. R. 39 of the said Rules provides that the provisions of the C.P.C. shall apply as far may be to proceedings under Art. 226 and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made under the said Rules. We have therefore no hesitation in agreeing with the contention of Sri Narayana Rao that the provisions of the C.P.C. have been made applicable to proceedings under Art. 226 to the extent indicated in R.39 of the said Rules. Hence it follows that the provisions of O. XL R. 1 C.P.C. can be availed of in a proceeding under Art. 226. 32. Hence it follows that the provisions of O. XL R. 1 C.P.C. can be availed of in a proceeding under Art. 226. 32. The coordinate bench of this Court in the case of D.THIMMAPPA SHEIKA AND ANOTHER vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS (supra), while considering the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 and Order XXII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Rule 39 of the Karnataka High Court Rules, 1959, relying upon dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Puran Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1996 SC 1092 , at paragarphs 5, 6, 7, 8 held as under: 5. Applying this yardstick when we examine the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, in our opinion, this cannot be said to be a case of error apparent on the record. The decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners viz., Puran Singh’s case, supra, is of no assistance to the present applicants/petitioners. The reason is that in that case, their Lordships had considered the question of application of CPC to writ proceedings in the context of Section 141 of the CPC as amended. By amendment of Section 141 of the CPC and adding to Section 141 the Parliament provided that for the purpose of that Section 141 of the CPC the expression “proceedings” includes “proceedings under Order 9 of the CPC, but it does not include any proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution”. That being the position and with reference to Section 141 of the CPC, there cannot be two opinions that by virtue of and on the basis of Section 141, it cannot be said that Code of Civil Procedure will be applicable to the writ proceedings. But if the rules framed under Article 225 by the High Court specifically provide for application of the CPC or for an application of any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to writ proceedings that will stand on a different footing. In those cases, where rules specifically provide that CPC will be made applicable, then on the basis of that rule framed under Article 225 of the Constitution, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure will apply to proceedings under Article 226/227 and not on the basis of Section 141 of the CPC. In those cases, where rules specifically provide that CPC will be made applicable, then on the basis of that rule framed under Article 225 of the Constitution, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure will apply to proceedings under Article 226/227 and not on the basis of Section 141 of the CPC. In the case of Puran Singh, referred to above, their Lordships after having referred to Rule 32 of the Punjab Writ Rules observed that Rule 32 of the Punjab writ rules does not specifically make the provisions of Code applicable to petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The present case is a different case. Here rules framed with reference to the writ petitions and contained in the Karnataka High Court Act and Rules Publication at page 241, particularly Rule 39 specifically provides and reads as under: “Application of the High Court of Karnataka Rules etc. — The provisions of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the rules made by the High Court of Karnataka under the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall apply, as far as may be, to proceedings under Article 226 and/ or 227, and writ rules in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made in these rules”. This rule is very clear. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in view of the specific rule made under the Karnataka Act observed that the High Court of Karnataka in Rokyayabi v. Ismail Khan [AIR 1984 Kant. 234.], had held that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to writ petitions and writ appeals. Their Lordships did not hold that the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the above-mentioned case in Rokyayabi was erroneous or wrong. In view of the above circumstances and in the context of the specific language used in explanation in Section 141 of the CPC in Puran Singh’s case, supra, cannot be said to be of any help to the applicants for the reason that the question of application of CPC in the context of Section 141 had only been considered. Particularly, when Rule 32 of the Punjab Writ Rules, according to their Lordships, did not specifically make the CPC applicable to the proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in that matter. Particularly, when Rule 32 of the Punjab Writ Rules, according to their Lordships, did not specifically make the CPC applicable to the proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in that matter. Thus considered the decision in Puran Singh’s case, supra, is distinguishable and is not applicable to the present case. 6. In Rokyayabi’s case, supra, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon’ble Mr. V.S. Malimath, J. and Hon’ble Mr. N. Venkatachala, J. (as they then were), after referring and quoting to Rule 39 had been pleased to observe as under: “It is therefore clear that though the provisions of the CPC are not made automatically applicable having regard to the explanation to Section 141, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable by a specific rule made by this Court under Article 225. Rule 39 of the said rules provides that the provisions of the CPC shall apply as far as may be to the proceedings under Article 226 and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made under the said rules. It is on the basis of the Division Bench held that the provisions of CPC were applicable”. 7. In a later decision as well namely in the case of C.N. Byrappa, supra, another Division Bench after referring to Rule 39, laid it down as under: “It becomes obvious that the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply not only to writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution but also to writ appeals arising therefrom, provided no specific provision is made in these rules in connection with any such matter”. 8. The Division Bench case of this Court not having been overruled by the Supreme Court or by subsequent decision is yet good and binding. It is by virtue of Rule 39 of High Court Rules (of Karnataka High Court) provision of Code do apply to proceeding under Article 226 and appeals therefrom. No rule to contrary has been shown to be contained in the rules itself dealing with substitution and abatement so provision of Order 22 of the Code do apply to writ proceeding under Article 226 and appeals therefrom. Thus considered, in our opinion, the order impugned does not appear to be one suffering from any error of law apparent on the face of the record. Thus considered, in our opinion, the order impugned does not appear to be one suffering from any error of law apparent on the face of the record. Thus, in our considered opinion, the review petition is misconceived and it is to be and is hereby dismissed. 33. The coordinate Bench of this Court while considering Rule 39 of Writ Proceedings Rules and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the case of C.N.BYRAPPA vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, (supra), at paragraph 8, held as under: 8. Before we consider the aforesaid two contentions, we must note that these are the Review proceedings and we cannot sit in Appeal against the order of the Division Bench. It is well settled that the High Court is not a Court of Appeal while dealing with a Review Petition. These Review proceedings against orders under Article 226 of the Constitution get circumscribed under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. Writ Proceedings Rules 1977 framed by this High Court governing the Writ Proceedings contain Rule 39, which reads as follows: “39. Application of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, etc.- The provisions of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959, the rules made by the High Court of Karnataka under the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply, as far as may be, to proceedings under Art. 226 and/or Art. 227 and writ appeals in respect of matters for which no specific provision is made in these rules.” It becomes therefore obvious that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure will apply not only to original Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, but also to Writ Appeals arising therefrom provided no specific provision is made in these Rules in connection with any such matter. No specific provision is made about reviewing of the Orders passed in Writ Appeals. No specific provision is made about reviewing of the Orders passed in Writ Appeals. Therefore, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will apply as far as may be, to such proceedings and that will naturally attract Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. Even otherwise, as laid down by the Supreme Court in A.T. Sharma v. A.P. Sharma [ (1979) 4 SCC 389 : AIR 1979 SC 1047 .] , the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, if sought to be reviewed, would attract the fetters of Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. It is laid down in the aforesaid Decision that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of Justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the Decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of Court of Appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court. In the aforesaid Decision, the earlier Decision of the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1963 SC 1909 .] , was distinguished. 34. The coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of B.CHANNAPPA GOWDA vs. MANAGEMENT OF M/S CENTRAL ARECANUT AND COCO (supra) while considering the maintainability of cross objection in writ appeal, held as under: “The Registry has raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the cross-objection filed in a writ appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, by relying upon Rule 26 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977. However, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant invites our attention to Chapter VI-A of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1969, in particular, Rule 6 of Chapter VI-A, which lays down that subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A, the rules applicable to Regular First Appeal and the provisions of order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, as far as may be, applicable to the original side appeals. That is how Rule 22 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to the present appeal. Hence, the objection regarding maintainability of the cross objections does not survive.” 35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF A.P. vs. B. RANGA REDDY, (2020) 15 SCC 681 at paragraphs, 24, 37 and 38, held as under: 24. It may be noticed that separate decree is required to be preferred in each suit even though the suits are consolidated. The three-Judge Bench in Sri Gangai Vinayagar Temple [Sri Gangai Vinayagar Temple v. Meenakshi Ammal, (2015) 3 SCC 624 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 350] has categorically held that where a common judgment has been delivered in cases in which consolidation orders have been passed, the filing of an appeal leads to the entire dispute becoming sub judice again. The aforesaid judgment arises out of the fact whether tenant has filed a suit to protect its possession during the lease period which was coming to an end on 1-1-1983, claiming injunction not specifically challenging the alienation by the trustees of a public trust. The trustees have filed two separate suits for claiming arrears of rent, one for claiming Rs. 268 and another for Rs. 2600. 37.We find that the High Court has failed to draw the distinction between the decree and a finding on an issue. It is the decree against which an appeal lies in terms of Section 96 of the Code. Decree in terms of Section 2(2) of the Code means formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties. The defendant State could not file an appeal against a decree which was of a dismissal of a suit simpliciter. It is the decree against which an appeal lies in terms of Section 96 of the Code. Decree in terms of Section 2(2) of the Code means formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties. The defendant State could not file an appeal against a decree which was of a dismissal of a suit simpliciter. The findings on Issue 1 against the State could be challenged by way of cross-objections in terms of amended provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code but such filing of cross objections is not necessary to dispute the findings recorded on Issue 1 as the defendants have a right to support the ultimate decree passed by the trial court of dismissal of suit on grounds other than which weighed with the learned trial court. Even in terms of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code, the appellate court has the jurisdiction to pass any order which ought to have been passed or made in proceedings before it. 38. As per the facts on record, Original Suits Nos. 274 of 1983 and 276 of 1983 have been dismissed. The plaintiffs are in appeal in both the suits before the first appellate court. Therefore, such decree including the finding on Issue 1 has not attained finality as the appellate court is seized of the entire controversy including the findings of fact on Issue 1. The defendants have a right to dispute such findings by filing cross- objections under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code as amended in the year 1976 or even in the exercise of the powers conferred on the appellate court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code. 36. The judgment relied upon by the Learned Additional Solicitor General of India in the case of JABALPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. Y.S.SACHAN (supra), was a case where the cross objection as envisaged under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not be maintainable in a letters Patent Appeal that arises from proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, but the same would be maintainable if the Letters Patent Appeal is preferred from an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, held that there is no rule on paramateria with Rule 39 of the Karnataka High Court Writ Proceedings Rules. Thereby, the said judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 37. The other judgment relied upon by the Learned Additional Solicitor General of India in the case of PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS vs. SURESH MATHEW (supra), is a case where, the Kerala High Court was dealing with Order XLI Rule 22, Section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure and Rule 159 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala,1971. Thereby, the said judgment also has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 38. The other judgment relied upon by the Learned ASG reported in Villupuram Market Committee, rep. by its Special Officer, Villupuram and others vs. K.Sekar, reported in 2007-2-L.W.919, has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. VI. CONCLUSION 39. For the reasons stated above and in the light of the principles enunciated in the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court stated supra, we answer the point raised in the present matter in the affirmative holding that Writ Appeal Cross Objection No.2/2022 in W.A. No.2122/2015 is maintainable. VII. RESULT 40. In view of the above, we pass the following: ORDER (i) The Cross Objection No.2/2022 filed in Writ Appeal No.2122/2015, is maintainable, in view of Rule 6 of Chapter VI-A of the High Court of Karnataka Rules 1959 and Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977. (ii) We hereby clarify in general that Cross-Objection is maintainable in a writ appeal filed under Section-4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. (iii) The Registrar (Judicial) is hereby directed to circulate a copy of this order to all the officers and officials working in the Scrutiny Branches of the High Court Principal Bench, Bengaluru and benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi, with a direction not to raise office objection regarding maintainability of a Cross-Objection in Writ Appeal filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, after obtaining prior approval of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. (iv) Office is directed to post the present Cross- objection No.2/2022 along with Writ Appeal Nos.2121/2015, 2122/2015 and 2123/2015, before the appropriate Bench as per the roster.