JUDGMENT : Order on Civil Misc. Delay Condonation Application No.426225 of 2015 1. This is a delay condonation application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking to condone the delay in preferring the present Civil Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The office has reported a delay of 15 years and 244 days, and by the present application, the applicant-revisionist asks this Court to condone the said delay. 3. The facts leading to this delay condonation application are required to be briefly recounted in order to appreciate whether a sufficient cause is made out to condone the long delay of 15 years and 244 days in preferring the Revision. The defendant is the judgment debtor of Original Suit No. 11 of 1982, which was decreed in favour of the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 on 19.05.1983. The suit was one for specific performance of contract relating to sale of land. The applicant-revisionist and the opposite party no.2 preferred a First Appeal to this Court being First Appeal No. 274 of 1983. The First Appeal aforesaid was partly allowed on 19.12.1997 and this Court directed the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 to deposit Rs.25,000/- within a period of four months. The plaintiff-opposite party no.1 was held entitled to adjustment of Rs.5,000/- while making the deposit, in case he had already made good that amount before the Execution Court. 4. Defendant no.2 to the suit i.e. the applicant-revisionist was ordered to join Dharampal, the defendant-proforma opposite party here, in execution of the sale deed in respect of whatever interest he acquired under the sale deed executed in his favour by Dharampal, subsequent to the suit agreement. It was further provided that in case the plaintiff fails to make good the deposit within the period of four months, it will be deemed that he is not ready and willing to perform his part of the suit agreement and the suit shall stand dismissed. 5. The plaintiff-opposite party no.1 moved Civil Misc. Time Extension No. 15351 of 1998 before this Court in First Appeal No. 274 of 1983 and prayed for extension of time by two months to deposit the sum of Rs.25,000/-, as directed by this Court. It appears that on 09.10.2003, Civil Misc. Time Extension Application No. 15351 of 1998 was rejected. On 01.07.1998, when Civil Misc. Time Extension No. 15351 of 1998 before this Court in First Appeal No. 274 of 1983 and prayed for extension of time by two months to deposit the sum of Rs.25,000/-, as directed by this Court. It appears that on 09.10.2003, Civil Misc. Time Extension Application No. 15351 of 1998 was rejected. On 01.07.1998, when Civil Misc. Time Extension Application aforesaid was pending before this Court, the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 moved Execution Case No. 5 of 1998 without depositing the balance consideration of Rs.20,000/-, the sum of Rs.5,000/- having already been deposited. 6. It is the judgment debtor's case that the opposite party did not comply with the judgment dated 19.12.1997 passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 274 of 1983, in consequence whereof his suit stands dismissed, in terms of the judgment and decree passed. It is averred in Paragraph No.10 of the affidavit that all these proceedings taken in appeal before this Court and the Execution Court were not within the applicant-revisionist's knowledge for reason that at the relevant time, the revisionist was a minor aged about six years. However, in the next Paragraph, it is averred that the time extension application was pending before this Court and for the said reason, the applicant-revisionist had no occasion to imagine that the the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 would go to the Execution Court and levy execution. It is also averred that no notice of execution was served upon the applicant-revisionist. There is an averment further that concealing all facts about the pendency of the time extension application and disobeying the orders of this Court dated 19.12.1997, by not depositing the additional sum of money towards consideration, as directed by this Court, the plaintiff-opposite party succeeded in his fraud to secure the impugned order dated 12.01.2000. It is submitted that when the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 came to take possession in the year 2006, the revisionist-judgment debtor became aware for the first time about the order dated 12.01.2000 passed in Execution Case No. 5 of 1998. 7. It is further pleaded that the applicant-revisionist came to know about the order dated 12.01.2000 in the month of December, 2006 and thereupon approached Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate, High Court, who assured the revisionist that the order dated 12.01.2000 being one obtained by playing fraud upon the Execution Court, is liable to be set aside. It is also asserted that Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate, High Court, who assured the revisionist that the order dated 12.01.2000 being one obtained by playing fraud upon the Execution Court, is liable to be set aside. It is also asserted that Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate was ill at that time, when the revisionist met him, and he assured the revisionist that once he regains health, he would take appropriate action to get the order dated 12.01.2000 set aside. It is then asserted in Paragraph No.16 that the revisionist lost his son, Prince and himself developed some eye ailment. There are some medical reports annexed in support of the aforesaid averments. It is the revisionist's further case that when no status about the proceedings taken by Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate against the order under challenge were intimated to him, he inquired about the current status of the case. The revisionist was informed by the learned Counsel that he had not been able to attend Court in all this while and, therefore, nothing has happened so far. It is asserted further that Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate assured the revisionist that he would take necessary steps in the case at the earliest. 8. There is then a further averment that the applicant-revisionist has become blind in the left eye and met his Counsel, Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate asking him to return his papers so that he could engage some other Counsel. It is asserted that on all these occasions that the applicant-revisionist contacted his Counsel, Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate, the learned Counsel assured him that on regaining health, he would take the necessary steps. Unfortunately, in the year 2011, Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate passed away after a long ailment. The aforesaid facts came to the revisionist's knowledge through a postcard sent by the office of Mr. Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate, who had taken over Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate's Chamber. He assured the applicant-revisionist that he would contest the case. The revisionist signed a fresh Vakalatnama, furnishing the necessary power to Mr. Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate. 9. It is the applicant-revisionist's further case that in the month of January, 2013, Mr. Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate filed Civil Misc. Application No. 38991 of 2013, under Article 215 of Constitution before this Court in First Appeal No. 274 of 1983, detailing all irregularities and fraud done by the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 before the Execution Court. 9. It is the applicant-revisionist's further case that in the month of January, 2013, Mr. Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate filed Civil Misc. Application No. 38991 of 2013, under Article 215 of Constitution before this Court in First Appeal No. 274 of 1983, detailing all irregularities and fraud done by the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 before the Execution Court. The said application, however, was dismissed by this Court on 25.05.2015 with an observation that the applicant has a remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereupon, the applicant-revisionist was advised to prefer present a Civil Revision against the impugned order dated 12.01.2000 with the assurance that the cause would be pursued as per remedy available under the law. 10. It is stated that the learned Counsel for the applicant-revisionist, Mr. Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate fell seriously ill and medical investigations revealed some serious health problems that prevented him from carrying out his daily routine of life. He underwent treatment at the Tata Memorial Hospital, Mumbai and unfortunately died in the month of September, 2015. The revisionist, hearing of the sad news, went to Mr. Satyendra Mani Tripathi's house in the second week of October, 2015, where his wife met the revisionist and asked him to come over after a week to collect his papers. Thereupon, on 26.12.2015, the applicant-revisionist collected the papers from the late Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate's residence. 11. On 11.11.2015, the applicant-revisionist met Mr. Sanjeet Kumar Yadav, Advocate and left papers with him with a request that he may look into the case. On 16.11.2015, Mr. Sanjeet Kumar Yadav, Advocate advised the revisionist to file a civil revision against the impugned order dated 12.01.2000 before this Court. On 05.12.2015, the applicant-revisionist came over to him with the necessary expenses to institute the present civil revision against the order impugned dated 12.01.2000. Mr. Sanjeet Kumar Yadav, Advocate drafted the revision and upon completion of papers instituted the same on 09.12.2015. 12. It is on the basis of all these facts and events that the applicant-revisionist says that there is sufficient cause to condone the long delay of 15 years and 244 days in preferring the revisionist. 13. Heard Mr. Shrawan Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel for the applicant-revisionist in support of the delay condonation application and Mr. Kunal Ravi, learned Counsel for the respondents. 14. 13. Heard Mr. Shrawan Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel for the applicant-revisionist in support of the delay condonation application and Mr. Kunal Ravi, learned Counsel for the respondents. 14. The delay is indeed very huge and the learned Counsel for plaintiff-opposite party no.2 submits that even without a counter affidavit, there is absolutely no cause to condone this mammoth delay of 15 years and much more in preferring the present civil revision. 15. The question about the principles on which a prayer for condonation of delay, particularly long ones, are to be considered and dealt with, were enumerated by the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 . In Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), it was held : 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 16. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao v. Reddy Srivedi and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, the Supreme Court very recently reversed an order of the High Court, condoning a delay of 1011 days in filing a second appeal, subject to payment of Rs.2000/- in cost. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao (supra), it was held : "20. In the case of Basawaraj (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature. 21. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights". 22. 21. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights". 22. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and considering the averments in the application for condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that as such no explanation much less a sufficient or a satisfactory explanation had been offered by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - appellants before the High Court for condonation of huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal. The High Court is not at all justified in exercising its discretion to condone such a huge delay. The High Court has not exercised the discretion judiciously. The reasoning given by the High Court while condoning huge delay of 1011 days is not germane. Therefore, the High Court has erred in condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - original defendants. Impugned order passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on facts." 17. The sequence of events leading to the impugned order have to be seen in order to ascertain, whether the applicant-revisionist had knowledge of the proceedings and the order impugned order and whether he acted with due diligence, to entitle him to the condonation of delay spanning over a period of more than 15 years. 18. For one, First Appeal No. 274 of 1983 arose out of Original Suit No. 11 of 1982, decided by the District Judge of Fatehpur vide judgment and decree dated 19.05.1983. The applicant-revisionist/ judgment debtor, Sant Kumar was impleaded as a party to the suit as soon as the plaintiff-opposite party no.1, Nanku Singh learnt about execution of the sale deed in favour of Sant Kumar Singh by Dharampal, subsequent to the suit agreement in the plaintiff's favour.. 19. The other relevant fact is that Sant Kumar Singh though a minor of six years when the suit was filed, impleading him through his guardian ad litem, Udaibhan Singh, but he came of age pending proceedings. The First Appeal was admitted to hearing on 19.05.1983, but decided on 19.07.1997. 19. The other relevant fact is that Sant Kumar Singh though a minor of six years when the suit was filed, impleading him through his guardian ad litem, Udaibhan Singh, but he came of age pending proceedings. The First Appeal was admitted to hearing on 19.05.1983, but decided on 19.07.1997. By that time, the revisionist, Sant Kumar Singh, who was a party to the First Appeal, must have turned a young man of 20 years. There is no reason why he would not know of the proceedings, after the appellate decree of this Court, including those of the Execution Case. Besides the aforesaid facts, it is beyond cavil that parties to the lis are relatives. 20. It has been recorded by this Court in the judgment rendered in First Appeal No. 274 of 1983 that the plaintiff, Nanaku Singh is admittedly the father-in-law of the defendant, Dharampal's daughter, Kamla. Sant Kumar Singh is the son of another daughter of Dharampal's, to wit, Natthi. In the conspectus of a close relationship between parties, it is difficult to infer lack of knowledge about proceedings taken before the Execution Court. The impugned order passed by the Execution Court is the result of an attempt by the judgment debtor to frustrate the decree, passed by this Court in First Appeal, on the ground that the enhanced sale consideration directed was not deposited within limitation. 21. For whatever reason assigned, the District Judge held that the sum of Rs.20,000/- required to be deposited under the decree of this Court was deposited within time, in terms of this Court's decree. The merits of this order are not of relevance so far as the present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. It must be remarked that there is nothing so startling or shockingly perverse about the order that may impel this Court, by a certain principle of remote resort, to cast aside the bar of a very long delay. There is indeed no mischief to be undone that may require the delay of 15 years in moving the present revision to be condoned. The explanation given by the applicant-revisionist, though involving the death of his Counsel, both father and son, instructed to appear in the case, yet those events too do not explain the long time period of 15 years and more in moving this Court against the order impugned. 22. The explanation given by the applicant-revisionist, though involving the death of his Counsel, both father and son, instructed to appear in the case, yet those events too do not explain the long time period of 15 years and more in moving this Court against the order impugned. 22. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is no sufficient cause made out to condone the delay on the basis of which this Court may exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant-revisionist. 23. The application is, accordingly, dismissed. Order on CIVIL REVISION DEFECTIVE No. 253 of 2015 24. The delay condonation application filed in aid of the present belated revision having been rejected by my order of date, the memo of revision is rejected as barred by time.