JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Mahima Pahwa, learned counsel for the respondents no. 1. 2. At the very outset, Shri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate, contends that he does not intend to file any counter affidavit and the matter may finally be decided. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to hear and decide the matter. 3. The instant petition has been filed praying for following main reliefs : "(i) Set aside/quash the judgment dated 21.07.2022 passed in Execution Application no. EA/43/2018 in complaint Case no. C/2011/136 (Ganesh Shankar Tripathi vs. Lucknow Development Authority), a certified copy of which is contained as annexure no. 1 to this petition. (ii) Direct the opposite party no.2 to consign the proceedings to records of Execution Application no. EA/43/2018 in complaint Case no. C/2011/136 (Ganesh Shankar Tripathi vs. Lucknow Development Authority) pending before it after declaring that the judgment and decree dated 21.08.2015 has been fully complied and satisfied." 4. The facts of the case have already been set forth by this Court in order dated 23.08.2022, which for the sake of convenience is reproduced below : "Heard. Under challenge is the order dated 21.07.2022 passed by the learned State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in an execution case, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the petition, whereby the learned Commission has directed that till the next date no plot in Gomti Nagar or Gomti Nagar Extension shall be allotted, registered, transferred or auctioned. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that respondent no.1, the complainant, had filed a complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1986'), which was decided vide order dated 21.08.2015, a copy of which is Annexure-5 to the writ petition, whereby the learned Commission directed the petitioner herein (Lucknow Development Authority) to deliver the possession of plot measuring 200 sq. meters in Gomti Nagar or in any other scheme in terms of the allotment letter dated 25.10.1993 along with cost. Subsequent thereto, the Lucknow Development Authority issued an allotment letter dated 18.04.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-8 to the petition, allotting the complainant a plot in Sharda Nagar Extension Scheme. Being aggrieved, the execution case was filed by the complainant before the learned Commission. Subsequent thereto, the Lucknow Development Authority issued an allotment letter dated 18.04.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-8 to the petition, allotting the complainant a plot in Sharda Nagar Extension Scheme. Being aggrieved, the execution case was filed by the complainant before the learned Commission. Learned Commission had perused the allotment letter offered by the petitioner in Sharda Nagar scheme and being not satisfied with the same has passed the impugned order, as indicated above. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the judgment passed by the learned Commission dated 21.08.2015 stood complied with the issuance of the allotment letter inasmuch the learned Commission had directed for delivering the possession of a plot in Gomti Nagar Lucknow or in any other scheme and as now through the allotment letter which has been issued to the complainant a plot has been offered in the Sharda Nagar Extension scheme, as such, the judgment passed by the learned Commission has been complied with. He also contends that even if for the sake of arguments it is accepted that the order has not been complied with then too the learned Commission could not have passed the order in the execution proceedings whereby restraining the Lucknow Development Authority from allotting or registering or transferring or auctioning any plot in Gomti Nagar Scheme inasmuch as the orders in execution cases under the provisions of the Act, 1986 can only be passed in terms of Sections 25 and 27 of the Act, 1986 which do not contemplate passing of the order impugned. Ms. Mahima Pahwa, learned counsel for the respondent no.1, prays for some time to address the Court on the aforesaid issue. As such, on her request, list this case in the next week as fresh indicating her name in the cause list from the side of the respondents." 5. Shri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Mahima Pahwa, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has contended that the instant petition is not maintainable on the following grounds: (a) the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing of a revision under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 1986) before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi. Mahima Pahwa, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has contended that the instant petition is not maintainable on the following grounds: (a) the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing of a revision under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 1986) before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi. In this regard Shri Prashant Chandra has placed reliance on the judgements of Madras High Court in the case of A. Gurunathan vs. K. Natarajan reported in 2012 (4) L.W. 470 as well as in the case of R. Jaivel vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2006 (2) CTC 709 . (b) the impugned order has correctly been passed by the U.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as learned Commission) under the provisions of Section 25(1) of the Act 1986 in as much as an attachment order can be passed and impugned order is sort of an attachment order, (c) this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot correct the error, if any, which may have been committed by the court below, (d) the petition has been filed by making false averments, as stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the petition, that the judgement passed by the learned Commission had attained finality while the facts are otherwise in as much as, in the revision filed by the respondent no. 1 herein, the order of learned Commission had been modified as would be apparent from a perusal of the order dated 12.01.2016, a copy of which annexure 6 to the petition, which has been passed by the learned National Commission. (e) Act, 1986 being a special enactment, as such, keeping in view the law laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 , this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct the error that may have been committed by the State Commission. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. So far as the objection (a) is concerned i.e. the petitioner having an alternative remedy of filing of a revision under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi against the order impugned under Section 21(b) of the Act 1986, the Court will have to consider the relevant provisions of the Act, 1986. 8. Section 21 of the Act, 1986 reads as under : "21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission.-Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction- (a) to entertain- (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds [rupees one crore]; and (ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission; and (b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." 9. Sections 2(c) and 2(e) of the Act, 1986 read as under : "2(c) "complaint" means any allegation in writing made by a complainant that- [(i) an unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice has been adopted by (any trader or service provider ;] (ii) [the goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him] suffer from one or more defects; (iii) [the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him] suffer from deficiency in any respect; (iv) a trader or the service provider, as the case may be, has charged for the goods or for the services mentioned in the complaint, a price in excess of the price- (a) Fixed by or under any law for the time being in force; (b) displayed on the goods or any package containing such goods; (c) displayed on the price list exhibited by him by or under any law for the time being in force; (d) agreed between the parties;) [(V) goods which will be hazardous to life and safety when used, are being-offered for sale to the public- (a) in contravention of any standard relating to safety of such goods as required to be complied with, by or under any law for the time being in force; (b) if the trader could have known with due diligence that the goods so offered are unsafe to the public;) (vi) services which are hazardous or likely to be hazardous to life and safety of the public when used, are being offered by the service provider which such person could have known with due diligence to be injurious to life and safety;) with a view to obtaining any relief provided by or under this Act;" 2(e) "consumer dispute" means a dispute where the person against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint; 10. From the perusal of the aforesaid it is apparent that the learned National Commission has got jurisdiction under Section 21(b) of the Act 1986 to call for records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is either pending or has been decided by the said Commission. From the perusal of the aforesaid it is apparent that the learned National Commission has got jurisdiction under Section 21(b) of the Act 1986 to call for records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is either pending or has been decided by the said Commission. "Consumer dispute" has been defined in Section 2(e) to mean a dispute where the person against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, while "complaint" has been defined under Section 2(c) of the Act 1986 to mean any allegation in writing made by a complainant alleging of an unfair trade practice, defect in the goods bought by him or where the service suffers from deficiency in any respect or a higher price has been charged. 11. In the instant case the order impugned has been passed by the learned Commission in an execution case and not in a consumer dispute and consequently, considering the provisions of Section 21(b) of the Act read with definitions as given in Section 2(c) and 2(e) of the Act 1986, it is apparent that the petitioner does not have a remedy of filing of a revision before the learned National Commission. 12. As regards the judgement of Madras High Court in the case of A. Gurunathan and R. Jaivel (Supra) suffice to say that in both the cases the words "consumer dispute" as used in Section 21(b) of the Act 1986 have not been considered and as such the said judgments will have no applicability in the instant case. 13. Before proceeding further with the case and considering the discussion on objection (a) as has been raised by learned Senior Advocate and this Court having held that the petitioner does not have a remedy of filing of a revision before the learned National Commission, another question, which though has not been argued by learned Senior Advocate, is also to be considered which is as to whether this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, has the power of superintendence over the learned Commission? 14. In this regard the jurisdiction of learned Commission, as provided under Section 17 of the Act 1986 has to be seen, which for the sake of convenience is reproduced below : "17. 14. In this regard the jurisdiction of learned Commission, as provided under Section 17 of the Act 1986 has to be seen, which for the sake of convenience is reproduced below : "17. Jurisdiction of the State Commission.-- [(1)] Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction-- (a) to entertain-- (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed [exceeds rupees twenty lakhs but does not exceed rupees one crore]; and (ii) appeals against the orders of any District Forum within the State; and (b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any District Forum within the State, where it appears to the State Commission that such District Forum has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (2) A complaint shall be instituted in a State Commission within the limits of whose jurisdiction,-- (a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the State Commission is given or the opposite parties who do not reside or carry on business or have a branch office or personally works for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises." 15. From perusal of Section 17 of the Act 1986, it emerges that learned Commission has got original jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the fault of goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceed Rs 20 lakhs but does not exceed Rs 1 crore and to hear appeals against the orders of any district forum within the State. From perusal of Section 17 of the Act 1986, it emerges that learned Commission has got original jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the fault of goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceed Rs 20 lakhs but does not exceed Rs 1 crore and to hear appeals against the orders of any district forum within the State. It also has jurisdiction, as per Section 17(1)(b), to call for records and pass appropriate orders on any consumer dispute which is pending or has been decided by the district forum within the state. 16. Undisputedly in this case, the complaint had been filed by the respondent no. 1 before the learned Commission under Section 17 of the Act 1986 which resulted in the judgement dated 25.08.2015 which in turn has been affirmed in both the appeals that have been filed by the respondent no. 1 herein as well as by the petitioner (with some modification). When the judgement of learned Commission has not been complied, the execution case has been filed and during the pendency of the said case, the impugned order has been passed. 18. Whether the learned Commission can be considered to be a ''Tribunal' for the purpose of exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by this Court? This question as to when an authority is a ''Tribunal' has been considered by a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Associate Cement Companies Limited vs. P.N. Sharma reported in AIR 1965 SC 1595 wherein the Apex Court has held as under : "44. An authority other than a court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the authority can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on the materials before it and by application of the relevant law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article 136. It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals." 19. From the aforesaid judgement it emerges that in order to ascertain as to whether learned Commission is a tribunal and as to whether power being exercised by learned Commission can be described as judicial power, suffice to say that once the learned Commission has been given power to decide the controversy between two or more contesting parties with regard to any matter, then the same would satisfy the test of the learned Commission being vested with judicial powers and as such the learned Commission can clearly be regarded as a "Tribunal" and consequently this Court would have the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India over the learned Commission. 20. Likewise reference may also be given of another Constitution Bench judgement of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 wherein, with regard to jurisdiction of the high courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in the respective powers of judicial review, it was held as under : "90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter." 21. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the cases of Associate Cement Companies Limited (supra) and L. Chandra Kumar (supra) this Court holds that the High Court has got jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to entertain petitions against learned State Commission. 22. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the cases of Associate Cement Companies Limited (supra) and L. Chandra Kumar (supra) this Court holds that the High Court has got jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to entertain petitions against learned State Commission. 22. So far as the objection (b) is concerned i.e. the impugned order has correctly been passed by the State Commission under the provisions of Section 25(1) of the Act 1986 in as much as an attachment order can be passed and impugned order is sort of an attachment order this Court will have to consider the provisions of Section 25 of the Act 1986. 23. Section 25 of the Act 1986 reads as under : "25. Enforcement of orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission.-- (1) Where an interim order made under this Act is not complied with, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, may order the property of the person, not complying with such order to be attached. (2) No attachment made under sub-section (1) shall remain in force for more than three months at the end of which, if the non-compliance continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds thereof, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission may award such damages as it thinks fit to the complainant and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto. (3) Where any amount is due from any person under an order made by a District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, the person entitled to the amount may make an application to the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, and such District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission may issue a certificate for the said amount to the Collector of the district (by whatever name called) and the Collector shall proceed to recover the amount in the same manner as arrears of land revenue." 24. From perusal of the Section 25 it is apparent that when an interim order made under the Act 1986 is not complied with, the learned Commission may order the attachment of the property of the person not complying with the order. From perusal of the Section 25 it is apparent that when an interim order made under the Act 1986 is not complied with, the learned Commission may order the attachment of the property of the person not complying with the order. 25. A perusal of the impugned order would indicate that it is not an attachment order rather it restrains the petitioner authority from carrying out the aforesaid acts of allotting, registering, transferring or auctioning any plot in Gomti Nagar Scheme and as such by no stretch of imagination, can the impugned order fall within the ambit of being an attachment order. As such, the said objection is also rejected. 26. So far as the objections (c) and (e) are concerned i.e. this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot correct the error which has been committed by the court below particularly when Act, 1986 is a special enactment, suffice to say that once the State Commission has passed an order which is patently beyond its jurisdiction and the petitioner does not have any alternative remedy of raising a challenge to the said order, accordingly this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and exercising the power of superintendence over the learned Commission can very well see the validity of the impugned order. This would be amply clear from perusal of the judgement of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani (Supra) wherein the Apex Court has held as under : "Before parting with this judgment we would like to say that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The Act is a special legislation governing landlord-tenant relationship and disputes. The legislature has, in its wisdom, not provided second appeal or revision to the High Court. The object is to give finality to the decision of the appellate authority. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. (emphasis by the Court)" The said objection is also rejected. 27. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. (emphasis by the Court)" The said objection is also rejected. 27. So far as the objection (d) is concerned i.e. the petition has been filed by making false averments as contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the petition, suffice to say that the order dated 12.01.2016 has been annexed by the petitioner as annexure 6 to the petition. The National Commission has modified the order passed by the State Commission by enhancing the compensation and imposing penalty. Rest of the order has not been interfered with. Hence, it cannot be said that there has been material concealment of facts in as much as the execution case has been filed being aggrieved for non allotment of the plot in Gomti Nagar Scheme. The said objection is also rejected. 28. Keeping the view the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the order impugned dated 21.07.2022 has been passed by the learned State Commission without any jurisdiction. Accordingly the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 21.07.2022, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the petition, is set aside. 29. It is provided that learned State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission shall proceed with the execution proceedings pending before it in accordance with law considering all the objections as have been raised by the authority before it.