ORDER : The petitioner has challenged his conviction and sentence of RI for 2 years under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, 'IPC') passed in Sessions Trial Case No. 70 of 2009. 2. Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 2011 filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order of his conviction and sentence has been dismissed by the judgment dated 22nd April 2015. 3. On an allegation that the petitioner entered the house of Feku Nayak in the night of 23rd December 2007 in drunken condition, caught his wife and tore her blouse and attempted to sexually assault her, a complaint case was filed by the victim lady. After inquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, CrPC), the learned Magistrate found a prima facie case made out under section 376/511 IPC and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. 4. A charge was framed under section 376/511 IPC against the petitioner and the trial commenced in which the prosecution has examined four witnesses in support of the charge – complainant has examined herself as PW1. 5. The witnesses who were produced by the defence stated that Dashrath Rautia was assaulted by Feku Nayak, Yogender Nayak and one another near the house of Keswar Nayak at about 8:00 pm in the night of 23 rd December 2007. On the basis of such evidence by DW1 and DW2, the defence has set up a case that as a counter-blast to the aforesaid incident the complainant has lodged a false case after seven days. 6. As noticed above, Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 2011 filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. 7. The offence under section 354 IPC involves assault or use of criminal force on a woman to outrage her modesty. Assault has been defined under section 351 IPC to mean any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person. Assault has been defined under section 351 IPC to mean any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person. The offence of “criminal force” means intentional use of force to any person without that person's consent in order to committing of any offence or intending by the use of such force to cause or knowing it to be likely that by use of such force it will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used. 8. The modesty of a woman which is reflected in her conduct and behaviour is a kind of virtue of a woman. It is recognised in all religions and the law also protects modesty of a woman. The acts of the petitioner to catch hold of the victim lady, tearing her clothes and attempting to undress her would undoubtedly attract the offence under section 354 IPC. 9. In “Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana” (2004) 4 SCC 379 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the offence under section 354 IPC, as under: “13. There is no material to show that the accused were determined to have sexual intercourse in all events. In the aforesaid background, the offence cannot be said to be an attempt to commit rape to attract culpability under Sections 376/511 IPC. But the case is certainly one of indecent assault upon a woman. Essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC are that the person assaulted must be a woman, and the accused must have used criminal force on her intending thereby to outrage her modesty. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman’s modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her dress coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman, and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word “modesty” is not defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (3rd Edn.) defines the word “modesty” in relation to a woman as follows: “Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; Shamefast; Scrupulously chaste.” 10. Mr. K.S. Nanda, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that delay of seven days in lodging the complaint creates serious doubts about veracity of the prosecution case against the petitioner. It is further submitted that in the trial the prosecution has examined only the related witnesses who have given parrot-like testimony which in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case does not inspire confidence. 11. PW1 has stated that the police did not register a case and turned her away saying that Dashrath Rautia has already lodged a criminal case against her. However, in the cross-examination of PW1 no question as regards delay in lodging a complaint with the police was put to her. 12. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge-I, Gumla has discussed evidence of the complainant in the following manner: “17. P.W.1 Suman Devi has clearly stated that accused Dashrath Rautia entered in to her house at 8:00 P.M. when she was cooking in her house. No one was present there except this Suman Devi and his two years old boy. P.W.2, 3 and 4 had seen Dashrath Rautia when he was running away from the house of Suman Devi. P.W.4 Feku Nayak has stated that when he reached on P.O. the accused became run away. No one was present there except this Suman Devi and his two years old boy. P.W.2, 3 and 4 had seen Dashrath Rautia when he was running away from the house of Suman Devi. P.W.4 Feku Nayak has stated that when he reached on P.O. the accused became run away. P.W. 3 Yogender Nayak has also stated that when he heard the sound to Suman Devi he reached there fastly and saw that accused Dashrath Rautia has torn the blause of Suman Devi and trying to commit rape and on seeing he run away. This witness has stated in cross-examination that he had caught the accused and assaulted him by slaps. P.W.2 Ramesh Rautia has stated that he saw the accused when he was running away from the P.O.” 13. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge-I, Gumla has further observed as under: “19. According to the evidence of the prosecution it appears that the occurrence took place at 8:00 pm in the house of Suman Devi by accused Dashrath Rautia. Evidence has come that the accused caught Suman Devi and after tearing her blause put her down and ascend on her. This fact has been stated by the complainant but P.W. 2, 3 and 4 have seen the accused when he was running away from the house of Suman Devi. In examination of chief these witnesses have stated that they had seen when accused was assending on Suman Devi but in cross-examination they have stated that they had seen when the accused was running away from the house of complaint.” 14. The plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that evidence of the related witnesses does not inspire confidence is without any substance. It is not the law that evidence of the related witness who may be sometimes interested in prosecution of the accused cannot be accepted. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Raju v. State of T.N.” reported in (2012) 12 SCC 701 , the Courts when faced with such a situation are required to scrutinize the evidence of a related witness with more care and caution. 15. In “Masalti v. State of U.P.” AIR 1965 SC 202 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has indicated such a caution which a criminal Court is required to observe, thus: “14. 15. In “Masalti v. State of U.P.” AIR 1965 SC 202 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has indicated such a caution which a criminal Court is required to observe, thus: “14. … There is no doubt that when a criminal court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence; whether or not evidence strikes the Court as genuine; whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters which must be taken into account. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. …………… The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.” 16. It is by now well-settled that in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 397 read with section 401 CrPC the High Court shall not undertake an exercise to minutely reappreciate the evidence tendered during the trial [refer: “Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar” (1987) 1 SCC 288]. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is very limited and only in cases where injustice is manifest on the face of records the High Court shall interfere with the judgment of conviction. 17. In this regard the judgment in “State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 SCC 452 may usefully be noticed, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under : “5. …. In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. …” 18. Having examined the materials on record and keeping in mind the aforesaid propositions in law, I do not find any ground to entertain the present criminal revision petition and, accordingly, Criminal Revision No. 728 of 2015 is dismissed. 19. Vide order dated 7th September 2015 the petitioner was granted bail. Accordingly, the bail bonds furnished by the petitioner are cancelled. He shall surrender before the Court concerned within 4 weeks to serve the remaining sentence. 20. Let the lower Court records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith. 21. Let a copy of the order be sent to the Court concerned through 'FAX'.