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2022 DIGILAW 1389 (JHR)

Dalgobind Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand

2022-12-12

SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 02.09.2013 passed in Land Acquisition Case No.03/2010-11 by the respondent no.3, by which, the claim of the petitioners regarding apportionment of the amount has been rejected with a decision to make payment in favour of respondent no.4 by holding him to be the exclusive title holder of the land discarding the case of the writ petitioners, while according to the writ petitioners, both the writ petitioners and the respondent no.4 are the co-owners of the land in question in the capacity of siblings. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the petition, required to be enumerated which reads as under:- It is the case of the writ petitioners that as per the provision of the National Highway Act, 1956, the Ministry of Road Transport and National Highway, Government of India vide notification dated 27.08.2011 published in the daily High Newspaper on 26.09.2011, by which, the land of Bundu, Tamar were acquired for widening of National Highway No.33 and it has also been mentioned that the land details mentioned in the notification dated 27.08.2011 are being declared the land of the Central Government. The land of the petitioners and respondent no.4 were acquired under the National Highway Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1956). In pursuant to the acquisition, the respondent no.3 determined the amount payable as compensation under Section 3-G of the National Highway Act, 1956 and thereafter, six awards were prepared under Section 3-H of the Act, 1956 vide Panchat No.7, 10, 11, 12 and 19 and intimated vide notice dated 10.12.2011 for payment. All the aforesaid panchat related with the land of the petitioners were issued only in the name of respondent no.4 with the signature of respondent no.3. When the petitioners came to know that the award of compensation has only been prepared in the name of respondent no.4, then they filed their objection before the respondent authorities. It is the further case of the writ petitioners that the writ petitioners are claiming to be owner of the land in question has made an application for apportionment of the land in lieu of acquisition of land by the National Highway Authority, as acquired under the provision of the Act, 1956. It is the further case of the writ petitioners that the writ petitioners are claiming to be owner of the land in question has made an application for apportionment of the land in lieu of acquisition of land by the National Highway Authority, as acquired under the provision of the Act, 1956. The respondent no.4 has entered his appearance before the authority concerned as objector, claiming himself to be the co-owner of the land in question. The concerned authority has passed order on 02.09.2013 (impugned) holding the respondent no.4 to be the exclusive owner of the land in question and has passed an order for making payment of compensation in his favour. The writ petitioners, being aggrieved with the aforesaid decision, have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing the instant writ petition inter-alia for the relief for quashing of the order dated 02.09.2013 on the ground that the administrative authority has got no jurisdiction to decide the title of one or the other in case of any petition to be filed for apportionment of the awarded amount. The said contention has been made on the basis of the provision as contained under Section 3-H(4) of the Act, 1956, wherein, it has been provided that in case of any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. 3. Mr. Sameer Saurabh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners by raising the aforesaid legal issue has questioned the jurisdiction of the competent authority i.e., the respondent no.3, who has passed the impugned order dated 02.09.2013 and has submitted that the authority has assumed the jurisdiction of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction by deciding the dispute by giving a declaration in favour of respondent no.4 to be the absolute owner of the land in question with a decision for making payment of amount of compensation to be paid in lieu of acquisition of land in question. 4. Mrs. 4. Mrs. Sweety Topno, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-NHAI has not disputed the aforesaid legal position and in all fairness has submitted that the competent authority ought to have not held the respondent no.4 to be the exclusive owner of the land in question with a decision to make payment of amount of compensation by denying the claim of the writ petitioners, rather, in view of the expressed provision as contained under Section 3-H(4) of the Act, 1956, the matter ought to have referred before the Principal Judge Civil Court for determination of the claim amongst the parties i.e., the petitioners and the respondent no.4 herein. 5. Mr. Amar Kr. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.4 who has put his appearance on being noticed by this Court vide order dated 10.08.2022, has also not disputed the aforesaid legal position. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the impugned order dated 02.09.2013. 7. The issue which requires consideration by this Court, as to whether the competent authority under the provision of Section 3-H(4) of the Act, 1956 will be said to have any jurisdiction to decide any dispute if arises in between the parties. 8. This Court, in order to answer the aforesaid issue, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Section 3-H(4) which reads as under:- “(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.” The said provision contemplates a situation in case of any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. It is, thus, evident that the competent authority, in case of any dispute is required to refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court having its jurisdiction. It is, thus, evident that the competent authority, in case of any dispute is required to refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court having its jurisdiction. The ‘competent authority’ has been defined as under Section 3(a) of the Act, 1956 which means any person or authority authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to perform the functions of the competent authority for such area as may be specified in the notification. Admittedly, herein, the issue about apportionment of the awarded amount is there in between the petitioners and the respondent no.4. The competent authority while hearing such dispute in a proceeding arising out of L.A. Case No.3/10-11 has decided the issue by discarding the application. It requires to refer herein that the land in question, although, has been acquired by the National Highway Authority and the same is being governed under the same contained Act, i.e., the National Highway Act, 1956 which contains a provision of acquisition and compensation as also the provision to resolve the dispute by making reference by the competent authority before the Principal Judge of the Civil Court having its jurisdiction. The application has been filed by the petitioners not under the provision of Section 3-H(4) of the Act, 1956, rather, it has been filed under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 9. Mr. Sameer Saurabh, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that reference of the aforesaid provision as referred in the application for resolution of dispute regarding apportionment of the amount has wrongly been referred by making it under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 instead of Section 3-H(4) of the National Highway Act, 1956. 10. The position of law is well settled that making reference of the wrong provision of law in an application does not have any repercussion on the issue on merit which requires adjudication, rather, the contents of the application is required to be seen while reaching to the conclusion by the competent authority. 11. This Court, therefore, is treating the aforesaid application filed under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be under Section 3-H(4) of the National Highway Act, 1956. 12. 11. This Court, therefore, is treating the aforesaid application filed under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be under Section 3-H(4) of the National Highway Act, 1956. 12. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi, while adjudicating the aforesaid application which was filed to refer the dispute before the Civil Judge having its jurisdiction but the competent authority has adjudicated the dispute by leading evidence and on appreciation of the documents by holding the respondent no.4 to be exclusive owner of the land in question. 13. The legality and propriety of the said order is under consideration before this Court. 14. The ‘competent authority’ has been defined under Section 3(a) of the Act, 1956, wherein, the authority has been conferred with the power to perform the functions of the competent authority for such area as may be specified in the notification. The provision of Section 3-H(4) is very exclusive, wherein, the competent authority has only been conferred with the power to refer the dispute in case of any dispute arises in between the parties pertaining to apportionment of the amount or any part thereof for its decision before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction having its jurisdiction where the land is situated. But, in the instant case, the competent authority in exceeding his jurisdiction has decided the dispute holding the respondent no.4 to be the exclusive owner of the land in question by negating the claim of the writ petitioners. 15. This Court, is considering the legality and propriety of the said order in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by issuing the Writ of Certiorari. 16. The position of law is well settled regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuing Writ of Certiorari, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477, wherein at paragraph no.7 Their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard also may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, it has been held at Paragraph-21, as hereunder :- “…….as to the character and scope of the writ of ‘certiorari’ and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in ‘Parry and Co. v. Commercial Employees’ Association, Madras,’ AIR 1952 SC 179 (L):-‘Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.’ AIR 1952 SC 192 (M); ‘Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi,’ AIR 1952 SC 319 (N), and quite recently in AIR 1954 SC 440 (C). On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) ‘Certiorari’ will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in “certiorari”…….” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Sawarn Singh and Anr. Vrs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra)……… 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 17. Herein, the issue of jurisdiction is privy consideration of this Court for the purpose of looking into the legality and propriety of the order. 18. Herein, the issue of jurisdiction is privy consideration of this Court for the purpose of looking into the legality and propriety of the order. 18. The jurisdictional issue goes to the root of the issue and the authority is not conferred with any power under the statute if takes any decision, will be said to suffer from jurisdictional error. 19. The application as has been filed on behalf of the petitioners before the District Land Acquisition Officer also refers about the prayer to refer the dispute before the Principal Judge having its jurisdiction. But, the Land Acquisition Officer while exceeding his jurisdiction instead of referring the matter as required to be referred under the provision of Section 3-H(4) of the Act, 1956, has adjudicated the issue in favour of respondent no.4 holding him entitle to get the amount of compensation. 20. Therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, the order dated 02.09.2013 passed in L.A. Case No.3/2010-11 by the District Land Acquisition Officer is not in consonance with the statutory mandate and as such, suffers from jurisdictional error. 21. Accordingly, the order dated 02.09.2013 passed in L.A. Case No.3/2010-11 is hereby quashed and set aside. 22. In the result, the applications to that effect filed by the writ petitioners before the Land Acquisition Officer are restored. 23. Let Land Acquisition Officer is hereby directed to pass necessary order in exercise of power conferred to him under the provision of Section 3-H(4) of the Act, 1956. 24. Let necessary order be passed within the period of six weeks’ from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 25. In view thereof, this writ petition stands allowed with the aforesaid directions. 26. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any stand(s) disposed of.