JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Petitioner has challenged the order dated 08.03.2015 as contained in memo No.883/Go, passed by the Superintendent of Police, Godda, whereby, on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, petitioner has been punished with stoppage of one increment for six months, which is equivalent to one black mark. It was further ordered that during the period of suspension, petitioner will not be paid any amount except the subsistence allowance. Further the petitioner has also challenged the appellate order dated 4th January, 2017 as contained in memo No.57/Go passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority has been dismissed. 3. Petitioner is a police constable. He was chargesheeted vide memo No.934 dated 27.06.2014, alleging therein that one Dula Munda, Sub Inspector of Police, had to prepare a report in respect of a non-FIR registered under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 31.05.2014, based on a complaint made by Pratima Devi. The said Dular Munda prepared a report to be sent, but the allegation is that the petitioner removed the report and prepared another report in his own handwriting, without containing any signature in the said report. Thus, there is an allegation against this petitioner of tampering with the documents and report. A Departmental Proceeding was initiated, wherein, based on the evidence adduced during the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the offence. After issuance of second show cause notice and furnishing the Enquiry Report to the petitioner, petitioner was inflicted with a punishment of stoppage of one increment for six months, which is equivalent to one black mark. It was also ordered that during the period of suspension, he will only be paid the subsistence allowance. A departmental appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the said order of punishment, which was also dismissed. 4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that Dular Munda was never produced as witness before the Enquiry Officer. He submits that only on the basis of conjunctures and surmises, petitioner was found guilty of the misconduct. 5. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondents, submits that in the Departmental Proceeding, opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself, which he failed. He submits that only on the basis of conjunctures and surmises, petitioner was found guilty of the misconduct. 5. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondents, submits that in the Departmental Proceeding, opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself, which he failed. In the Departmental Proceeding, standard of proof is “preponderance of probability”. In this case there is highest degree of probability that the petitioner has committed the misconduct. Admittedly, it is not the case of the petitioner that the report was not prepared by him. Responsibility of preparing the report was given to Dular Munda, Sub Inspector of Police and admittedly, the said report was removed and the report, which was there in the record is in the writing of this petitioner. This fact cannot be denied. Thus, probability is against the petitioner. Petitioner has also accepted that the report is in his pen. That being so, there is no necessity of examining Dular Munda and the misconduct against the petitioner stands proved. 6. In exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in judicial review, scope of interference by this Court in the departmental proceeding is very limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 954 at paragraph 37 thereof has held that it is well settled that High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and re-appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry officer. By referring to judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh versus S. Sree Rama Rao [1963 AIR SC 1723], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the function of the High Court to review on the findings and arrive at a different finding. In a departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can interfere. In a departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can interfere. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:- (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 7. Further, in the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others versus Ajay Kumar Srivastava reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 24 thereof has held as under:- 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 8. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 8. In paragraph 25 of the aforesaid judgment (Ajay Kumar Srivastava) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has narrated the scope, which reads as follows:- 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public service, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 9. In paragraph 28 of the aforesaid judgment (Ajay Kumar Srivastava) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution, the Court will not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceeding except in a case of mala fides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. 10. Considering the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I have gone through the entire records of the case. In this case, I find that opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself. He availed the opportunity and had participated in the Departmental Proceeding. Show cause notice was also issued to the petitioner to which he replied. The fact that the petitioner has prepared the report, which was not supposed to be prepared by him, stood proved in the Departmental Proceeding. Even the petitioner has accepted the same. Petitioner never denied the preparation of the said report by him. Admittedly, it was Dular Munda, Sub Inspector of Police, who was supposed to prepare the report and in fact had prepared the report, but the same was not found in the record, rather the report, which was prepared by this petitioner, was found in the file. It is admitted case that the petitioner was not supposed to prepare the report. Admittedly, it was Dular Munda, Sub Inspector of Police, who was supposed to prepare the report and in fact had prepared the report, but the same was not found in the record, rather the report, which was prepared by this petitioner, was found in the file. It is admitted case that the petitioner was not supposed to prepare the report. Thus, there is high probability that it is the petitioner, who has committed the misconduct by removing the report and to have replaced it with the report prepared by him. 11. When the misconduct stood proved and there is no violation of any provisions of law or any irregularities in the Departmental Proceeding, scope of interference remains limited only to the quantum of punishment. In this case, the punishment is only of stoppage of one increment for six months, which is equivalent to one black mark. This punishment, considering the gravity of the proved misconduct, which the petitioner has committed, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be disproportionate to the proved charge. Since the punishment is also not disproportionate to the proved charge, there is no ground for interference with the punishment. 12. I find no ground to interfere with the impugned orders, i.e, order dated 08.03.2015 as contained in memo No.883, passed by the Superintendent of Police, Godda and the appellate order dated 4th January, 2017 as contained in memo No.57/Go passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka. This writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.