JUDGMENT : This is an appeal by the Insurance Company, challenging an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ the Additional District Judge, Court No.9, Mathura dated 09.01.2014, awarding compensation to the claimant-respondents, on account of a fatal motor accident, where one Heera Singh Chaudhary lost his life. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are thus: According to the claimant-respondents, who are respondent nos.1 to 5 to this appeal and shall hereinafter be called 'the claimants', Heera Singh Chaudhary was a Junior Engineer with the Department of Irrigation, Government of U.P. posted at Etah. On 04.09.2011 for the purpose of tail-feed work, he was supervising the removal of shrubs, garbage etc., blocking water passage under the culvert, situate at the Khitauli Turn on the Amapur-Sahwar Road, Etah. At about 2:30 p.m., a truck bearing Registration No. UP-80F-9381, driven negligently and at a high speed, approached from the Etah side. It hit Heera Singh Chaudhary and ran him over. In consequence, Heera Singh Chaudhary sustained grievous injuries and was conveyed for medical aid to the Sahwar Hospital, but declared dead by the doctors there. His dead body was subjected to autopsy at Etah. Since the accident had occurred within the local limits of Police Station Sahwar, District Kashiram Nagar, Case Crime No. 323 of 2011, under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304A IPC, was registered there. 3. It is the claimants' further case that the deceased Heera Singh Chaudhary was an able bodied and healthy man. He was employed with the Department of Irrigation as a Junior Engineer. He was drawing a monthly salary of Rs.52,041/-, which was the source of livelihood for the family. The entire family, that is to say, the claimants, who are dependents of Heera Singh Chaudhary, have plunged into a financial crisis and their future turned bleak. Accordingly, the claimants have preferred the present claim. 4. It is further pleaded that the accident occurred on account of the offending vehicle being driven at a high speed and negligently by its driver, Kaptan Singh, opposite party no.1 to the claim petition and respondent no.7 here. He shall hereinafter be called 'the driver'. Smt. Mithilesh Kumari, opposite party no.2 to the claim petition, was the registered owner of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. She is respondent no.6 to this appeal. She will hereinafter be called 'the owner'. 5. He shall hereinafter be called 'the driver'. Smt. Mithilesh Kumari, opposite party no.2 to the claim petition, was the registered owner of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. She is respondent no.6 to this appeal. She will hereinafter be called 'the owner'. 5. The offending truck was insured with the New India Assurance Company Limited, Saukh Adda, Mathura through its Branch Manager (hereinafter referred to as ''the insurers') under a policy valid from 22.01.2011 to 21.01.2012. It is the claimants' case that they are entitled to a total compensation of Rs.65 lakhs, together with interest @ 12% per annum on account of the fatal motor accident, payable by the opposite parties to the claim petition, that is to say, the owner, the insurers and the driver, jointly and severally. 6. The claimants, accordingly, instituted the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ District Judge, Mathura as they are residents of Mathura, a fact on account of which the Tribunal at Mathura had territorial jurisdiction. 7. The Insurers put in a written statement, denying the allegations in the claim petition and by way of additional pleas, came up with a case that they are not the insurers of the offending vehicle bearing Registration No. UP-80F-9381, unless the original policy was produced. It was further pleaded that in case the existence of the policy were confirmed, the insurers reserve their rights to file an additional written statement. It was also pleaded that the claim petition was bad on account of copies of the FIR, the Post-mortem Report, the Site-plan, the charge-sheet, the technical report etc. not being presented along with the claim petition. The insurers further denied the fact that the offending vehicle was involved in the accident and put the claimants to strict proof of the fact. It was also pleaded that it was expected of the owner and the driver that they would produce the route-permit, the Driving Licence, the Fitness Certificate, Registration Certificate etc. and prove these, and that in the absence of these documents being produced and proved, the claimants had no right to recover from the insurers. It is the insurers' further case that the owner and the driver have violated the terms of the policy. and prove these, and that in the absence of these documents being produced and proved, the claimants had no right to recover from the insurers. It is the insurers' further case that the owner and the driver have violated the terms of the policy. There is a further plea that the driver of the offending vehicle did not hit the deceased Heera Singh Chaudhary and that the said vehicle has been involved in the accident without basis. The further plea is that the FIR lodged by the deceased's wife is wrong and the insurers deny the accident. It was also the insurers' case that the entire fault/ negligence was that of the deceased, Heera Singh Chaudhary and the insurers are not liable to compensate on that account. Moreover, the compensation demanded was inflated and exaggerated. 8. The owner filed a separate written statement and did a wholesome denial of the claimants' case. In the additional pleas, it was urged that neither the offending vehicle operated by the driver was involved in the accident, that happened on 04.09.2011 at 2:30 p.m. at Khitauli Canal Bridge, P.S. Shahwar, District Kashiram Nagar, nor the deceased Heera Singh Chaudhary sustained injury in consequence of the accident, caused by the offending vehicle. It was pleaded that without prejudice to the owner's case that the accident never happened involving the offending vehicle, there was no rash or negligent operation by the driver. The owner further pleaded that the claimants' case that the deceased was aged 54 years or that he was a Junior Engineer with the Department of Irrigation, earning a sum of Rs.52,041/- per month was wrong, false and concocted. The compensation claimed was not at all due and burden lay entirely upon the claimants to establish the facts. The owner further pleaded that the claimants were not dependents of the deceased nor his legal representatives. The owner was not liable to pay any compensation, as claimed. The petition was not properly drawn up, verified or presented. It was not maintainable. The claimants had not filed the necessary papers, that were mandatory under the Motor Vehicle Rules, entitling them to maintain the claim petition. The further plea was that the owner had, for the offending vehicle on the date of accident, a Registration Certificate, a valid insurance, Fitness Certificate, route-permit, a paid up tax etc. It was not maintainable. The claimants had not filed the necessary papers, that were mandatory under the Motor Vehicle Rules, entitling them to maintain the claim petition. The further plea was that the owner had, for the offending vehicle on the date of accident, a Registration Certificate, a valid insurance, Fitness Certificate, route-permit, a paid up tax etc. The driver had a valid driving licence to operate the offending vehicle bearing Licence No. RT4396/ Aligarh/ 85, valid from 01.12.2008 to 30.11.2011 and 31.03.2012 to 30.03.2015. The licence was further endorsed as LMV (P.E.) + HGV (P.E.) and that it was in force on the date of accident. The offending vehicle on the date of accident, was insured by the insurers vide Policy No. 3213231100200006364, valid from 22.01.2011 to 21.01.2012, offering a comprehensive cover. In substance, therefore, the liability, if any, lay on the shoulders of the insurers. 9. The driver did not appear to contest the claim petition nor did he file a written statement. 10. Upon the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi) : (1) Whether on 04.09.2011 at 2:30 p.m. when Heera Singh Chaudhary for the purpose of tail-feed work, was supervising clearance of shrubs and garbage under the culvert, located at the Khitauli Turn on the Amapur-Shahwar Road, a truck bearing (Registration) No. UP-80F-9381 approaching from the side of Etah, driven negligently at a high speed, hit Heera Singh Chaudhary, the front wheel running him over and causing his death? (2) Whether on the date of accident, the driver of the truck bearing (Registration) No. UP-80F-9381, held a valid and effective driving licence? (3) Whether on the date of accident, truck bearing (Registration) No. UP-80F-9381, was insured with opposite party no.1, the New India Insurance Company (sic) Assurance Company Limited? (4) Whether the petitioners were entitled to any relief from the opposite parties? If yes, how much and from which opposite party? 11. The documentary evidence led on behalf of the claimants has been listed in the judgment of the Tribunal and no useful purpose would be served by a repetition thereof. However, the relevant documents would be referred to wherever appropriate during course of this judgment. The claimants examined Smt. Lajjawati, the deceased's widow as PW-1, one Mausam Ali (an eye-witness) as PW-2 and Pratap Singh Chauhan, a Senior Clerk in the Department of Irrigation, Etah as PW-3. 12. However, the relevant documents would be referred to wherever appropriate during course of this judgment. The claimants examined Smt. Lajjawati, the deceased's widow as PW-1, one Mausam Ali (an eye-witness) as PW-2 and Pratap Singh Chauhan, a Senior Clerk in the Department of Irrigation, Etah as PW-3. 12. The opposite parties put in, by way of documentary evidence, a photostat copy of the insurance policy, the driver's driving licence, a photostat copy of the registration certificate, a photostat copy of the goods permit, a copy of the fitness certificate, Paper No.17 x /5. No oral evidence was produced on behalf of any of the opposite parties before the Tribunal. 13. Heard Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the insurers, Ms. Kamini Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of claimants and perused the record. No one appears on behalf of the owner. 14. Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the insurers has urged that the Tribunal has gone wrong in holding that negligence of the driver was proved. He submits that the Tribunal's finding is primarily based on the testimony of one Mausam Ali, PW-2, who claims to be an eye-witness of the accident. It is urged that the eye-witness was also employed in the same department as the deceased and, therefore, the Tribunal ought not to have accepted his testimony without due caution. It is also urged that at the time of the accident, PW-2 was looking in the opposite direction and, therefore, his testimony is of no significance about the involvement or the negligence of the offending vehicle. It is also said in criticism of the Tribunal's judgment by Mr. Sahai that it is a settled proposition of the law that the factum of negligence is a sine qua non for a claim under Section 166 of the Act to succeed. In a very candid stance on behalf of the insurer, the learned Counsel says that the testimony of PW-2 may have some relevance, so far as the factum of accident and involvement of the offending vehicle is concerned, but his testimony would not be relevant insofar as the issue of negligence goes. It is emphasized that PW-2 was facing the other side and the accident took place with his back to the mishap. As such, negligence cannot be said to be duly proved. 15. It is emphasized that PW-2 was facing the other side and the accident took place with his back to the mishap. As such, negligence cannot be said to be duly proved. 15. It is next submitted that apart from these factors, extrinsic to the testimony of the witness that have bearing upon it, the testimony of PW-2 does not inspire confidence. It is emphasized that the witness has stated that he was standing under the culvert, whereas the deceased was standing over it. The evidence of PW-2, therefore, cannot be relied upon, insofar as the offending vehicle's negligence is concerned. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and others, (2007) 5 SCC 428 . In Meena Variyal (supra), it has been held : 27. We think that the law laid down in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan [ (1977) 2 SCC 441 : (1977) 2 SCR 886 ] was accepted by the legislature while enacting the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by introducing Section 163-A of the Act providing for payment of compensation notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force that the owner of a motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be, and in a claim made under sub-section (1) of Section 163-A of the Act, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned. Therefore, the victim of an accident or his dependants have an option either to proceed under Section 166 of the Act or under Section 163-A of the Act. Once they approach the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. Once they approach the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. But if they proceed under Section 163-A of the Act, the compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule without calling upon the victim or his dependants to establish any negligence or default on the part of the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle. 16. Reliance has further been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Premlata Shukla and others, (2007) 13 SCC 476 and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Gaura Devi and others vs. Shahzad Khan and others, 2013 (1) AWC 914 . 17. Ms. Kamini Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the claimants, on the other hand, submitted that the testimony of PW-2 is a clear, accurate and dependable account by an eye-witness, who was doubtlessly there at the time of the accident. The evidence of PW-2, read as a whole, clearly establishes not only the factum of accident, but the solitary negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. 18. We have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for parties on the issue in hand. So far as the testimony of PW-1 is concerned, it is not of any relevance, insofar as the factum of accident or the negligence of the offending vehicle goes. She is not an eye-witness. In the opinion of this Court, the proof of negligence hinges on the testimony of PW-2, Mausam Ali. It must be said at once that the submission on behalf of the insurers that the testimony of PW-2 ought to be approached with caution, almost suggesting it to be unreliable for the reason that he is an employee of the same department as the deceased, is utterly unacceptable. There is no principle of law or one of prudence by which in a case of tort, like a motor accident, a fellow employee of the victim, serving the same department, is to be doubted for his word, about the circumstances attending the accident. 19. There is no principle of law or one of prudence by which in a case of tort, like a motor accident, a fellow employee of the victim, serving the same department, is to be doubted for his word, about the circumstances attending the accident. 19. So far as PW-2 is concerned, he is a very natural witness since he was a part of the team of employees of the Irrigation Department, detailed to the work of tail-feed being undertaken on the fateful day under the stewardship of the deceased. The said witness was part of his workforce. The witness in his cross-examination has introduced himself as a Seenchpal and has apparently denied a suggestion that he was a Mate. No doubt, he has said that his face and that of Heera Singh was not towards the road and that he did not see the offending vehicle approach, but the evidence is clear on the point that he was working at the site of accident, commanding the labour-force, at a distance of 5 feet from the spot where the deceased was standing at the time when he fell victim to the accident. The witness has clearly specified the registration number of the vehicle. He has consistently remained unwavering in his stand that it was the offending vehicle that caused the accident. In the opinion of this Court, the evidence of the witness has to be read as a whole. Contrary to what the insurers say that the witness could utter falsehood, because of some kind of an ''imagined bias' for a colleague, the witness's account has the assurance of his presence on the date, time and place of accident. He was assuredly detailed to the same duty as the deceased, albeit in a different and subordinate role. His presence on the spot has the credit of Government records from the Irrigation Department. About the witness looking in another direction when the accident happened, is too slender a circumstance to believe that he would not have seen what he has said in his testimony relating to the accident and the tort committed by the offending vehicle. A man standing 5 feet away from the site of a fatal motor accident, even if he were looking the other way, would naturally become cognizant in the split of a second to look in the right direction when the mishap occurred. A man standing 5 feet away from the site of a fatal motor accident, even if he were looking the other way, would naturally become cognizant in the split of a second to look in the right direction when the mishap occurred. Quick shift of attention at a distance, as small as 5 feet, about a happening this big, is good enough to credit the witness with being a truthful witness of whatever he has said in his testimony, relating to the accident. The witness has decidedly reported the offending vehicle to be involved in the accident and said that it was the vehicle's negligence that caused the mishap that day. There is not the slightest reason to take a different view from the Tribunal on this score. In the opinion of this Court by the sound standard of preponderant probability, the negligence of the offending vehicle is well established. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Sahai, all binding for the principle that they lay down, are not attracted to the facts of this case at all for the reasons that we have indicated. It is held, accordingly. 20. The other issue is about the quantum of compensation on which learned Counsel for both parties have vied to sway this Court in favour of their stand. Mr. Sahai has argued that the age of the deceased has been wrongly determined by the Tribunal at 54 years, going by the entry in his service record. He submits that the deceased was aged 57 years at the time of accident. To the above end, learned Counsel for the insurers has drawn this Court's attention to the testimony of PW-1, where it is said that she got married in the year 1974 and at that time, her husband was aged about 20 years. It is argued that the accident happened in the year 2011 and, therefore, the arithmetical calculation would safely place the deceased's age at 57 years. It is urged that in view of the aforesaid testimony of PW-1, the deceased's wife and one of the claimants, the Tribunal ought to have ignored the deceased's date of birth recorded in the service-book. It is also argued by the learned Counsel for the insurers that in no event can this Court enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in the absence of a cross-objection or an appeal preferred by the claimants. It is also argued by the learned Counsel for the insurers that in no event can this Court enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in the absence of a cross-objection or an appeal preferred by the claimants. In aid of the aforesaid submission, Mr. Sahai has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Ranjana Prakash and others v. Divisional Manager and another, (2011) 14 SCC 639 . In Ranjana Prakash (supra), it has been held : 7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation. 21. On the other hand, Ms. Kamini Pandey, learned Counsel for the claimants has argued that the compensation has been rightly assessed, taking the deceased's age as 54 years. The deceased, according to her, was 54 years 2 months and 3 days on the date of accident. It is urged that the best evidence about the deceased's age is the entry in his service-book and there is no reason to doubt the same. It is also the claimants' contention that in the post-mortem report, the age of the deceased has been estimated to be 55 years, approximately. This assessment of age for the deceased supports the record of it in his service-book. It is particularly argued that the deceased is entitled to future prospects as he was a permanent employee in government service. Reliance in support of the grant of future prospects has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 . It is further argued that the claimants have been under-compensated under the conventional heads by the Tribunal. Learned Counsel for the claimants, in this regard, has placed reliance upon the guidance of the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . It is submitted by Ms. Kamini Pandey that each of the claimants is entitled to compensation for loss of consortium in the sum of Rs.40,000/- and the claimants are also entitled to compensation towards loss of estate and funeral expenses in the sum of Rs.15,000/-, respectively. 22. As regards the compensation to be awarded, there is no difficulty in considering the plea for reduction thereof, since the appeal is one by the insurers. There is no dearth of jurisdiction with this Court to reduce the awarded compensation, provided a case is made out by the insurers. 22. As regards the compensation to be awarded, there is no difficulty in considering the plea for reduction thereof, since the appeal is one by the insurers. There is no dearth of jurisdiction with this Court to reduce the awarded compensation, provided a case is made out by the insurers. It, however, requires some consideration whether in the absence of an appeal or a cross-objection by the claimants, it is open to this Court to enhance the compensation awarded, should this Court reach a conclusion in favour of enhancing it. 23. So far as the question of reducing the compensation is concerned, this Court may say at once that the submission of the learned Counsel for the insurers that the age of the deceased is not 54 years, leading to application of a higher multiplier, is not at all acceptable. The deceased was a government servant, who had an authoritative record of his age, maintained by his employers in his service records. There is no reason to disbelieve the record of the deceased's age in his service-book. A copy of his service-book is available on record as Paper No. 29 x /3. The original of the service-book was produced before the Tribunal and the copy thereof filed was proved by PW-3, Vishnu Pratap Singh Chauhan, Senior Clerk in the office of the Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department. The service-book clearly shows the deceased's recorded date of birth as 01.07.1957. This clearly works out to the deceased being aged 54 years 2 months and 3 days on the date he died as a result of the accident. The post-mortem report also estimates the deceased's age at about 55 years. This evidence is indeed enough to hold the deceased's age to be 54 years. The fact that PW-1 in her cross-examination has said that the deceased was aged 20 years at the time the witness and the deceased were married in the year 1974, cannot be relied upon to draw a different conclusion about the deceased's age. The reason is that PW-1 in her cross-examination also says that she does not know her husband's date of birth. She has also said that she also does not know her own date of birth. It is also said that her father-in-law had read up to Class-V and was not gainfully employed. The reason is that PW-1 in her cross-examination also says that she does not know her husband's date of birth. She has also said that she also does not know her own date of birth. It is also said that her father-in-law had read up to Class-V and was not gainfully employed. Though she has said that she has read up to Class-VIII, the overall educational and socio-economic background of parties would not lead this Court to expect a very accurate account from the witness about the deceased's age on the date of the parties' marriage or even the year when the parties were married. On the basis of the estimated dates given out by PW-1, the deceased's recorded date of birth in his service record, much corroborated by the medico-legal evidence, cannot be disbelieved. The contention of the learned Counsel for the insurers on this score is, therefore, not worthy of acceptance. 24. There is no other serious contention apart from the age related variation in the applicable multiplier, urged on behalf of the insurers to reduce the awarded compensation. It is, thus, evident that no case for reducing the awarded compensation is made out. This poses the question before the Court, which Mr. Sahai has argued very vociferously, whether on an appeal by the insurer, compensation to be awarded, can be enhanced unless there be a cross-appeal or objection preferred by the claimant? This Court has already noticed the authority which the learned Counsel for the insurers has pressed in aid of the aforesaid submission with much vehemence. It is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ranjana Prakash. No doubt, the law laid down in Ranjana Prakash specifically holds what the learned Counsel for the insurers canvasses, but the principle there does not appear to be the ruling precedent any longer. The aforesaid change in judicial opinion is evident from the pronouncement of the three Judge Bench of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Surekha and Others v. Santosh and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1312. In Surekha (supra), it has been held : 2. The aforesaid change in judicial opinion is evident from the pronouncement of the three Judge Bench of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Surekha and Others v. Santosh and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1312. In Surekha (supra), it has been held : 2. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated 04.01.2019 passed by the High Court of judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in First Appeal No. 2564 of 2016, whereby the High Court, even though agreed with the stand of the appellants that just compensation amount ought to be Rs.49,85,376/- (Forty-Nine Lakh Eighty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Six Only), however, declined to grant enhancement merely on the ground that the appellants had failed to file cross-appeal. 3. By now, it is well-settled that in the matter of insurance claim compensation in reference to the motor accident, the court should not take hyper technical approach and ensure that just compensation is awarded to the affected person or the claimants. 25. In working out the compensation, what is essential to be reckoned is the monthly income of the deceased. There is a well proven salary certificate from the deceased's employers, who are a department of the State. The certificate is on record as Paper No. 29 - x /9. It shows the gross monthly income of the deceased to be a figure of Rs.52,041/-. The net income has been shown as Rs.44,941/- per mensem. The total deductions include GPF, GIS and GVR, all of which are in the nature of made to funds/ Group Insurance etc. The deduction to be discounted from the income is one towards income tax, which is a figure of Rs.3000/- per month. There is also on record a copy of the deceased's Form-16 submitted by the employer to the Income Tax Authorities for the Assessment Year 2011-12 (corresponding to the Financial Year 2010-11). A perusal of Form-16 relating to the deceased shows that the total income tax deposited is a sum of Rs.45,500/- only. The said form shows that for 11 months, a sum of Rs.3000/- has been deducted at source and in the 12th month, for the Assessment Year 2011-12, a sum of Rs.12,900/- has been deducted. Thus, the Tribunal has determined the income tax deduction from the deceased's annual income at a figure of Rs.45,500/-. The said deduction towards income tax is unexceptionable. 26. Thus, the Tribunal has determined the income tax deduction from the deceased's annual income at a figure of Rs.45,500/-. The said deduction towards income tax is unexceptionable. 26. The Tribunal has worked out the compensation on the basis of a gross month salary of Rs.52,041/-. This figure has been made the foundation to determine the annual income of the deceased at a figure of Rs.6,55,065/-. From the said sum of money, income tax has been deducted. 27. Now, from the said annual income of the deceased, the Tribunal has deducted a sum of Rs.45,500/- towards income tax, which meets our approval, as already said. But, in addition to the deduction from the annual income on account of income tax, the Tribunal has further deducted a sum of Rs.550/- per month, that is to say, a sum of Rs.6,600/- for the year. This deduction has been made on the basis that the deceased was receiving a sum of Rs.200/- per month towards City Compensatory Allowance (CCA) and a sum of Rs.350/- per month towards MCA. The monthly sum of CCA and MCA works out to Rs.550/- and adds up to an annual figure of Rs.6,600/-. The Tribunal has been of opinion that these allowances are payments personally received by the deceased, that he would be utilizing during service. Since these sums would have been utilized by the deceased, the Tribunal has thought it proper to deduct whatever the deceased received towards CCA and MCA, during the year, from his annual income. This deduction ordered by the Tribunal, in our opinion, is not at all justified. Every allowance, that the deceased receives towards his remuneration, would count as his income. All that can be deducted is whatever goes out of the deceased's hands as levies of the State, like income tax or any sum of money, that would not enure to his benefit, if he were alive. For the said reason, deductions made as contributions to funds etc. are not liable to be deducted from the deceased's income and the Tribunal has not done that. 28. The question whether allowances and perquisites received by an employee during service ought to be deducted from his annual income while working out the claimants' dependency, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Sunil Sharma and others v. Bachitar Singh and others, (2011) 11 SCC 425 . 28. The question whether allowances and perquisites received by an employee during service ought to be deducted from his annual income while working out the claimants' dependency, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Sunil Sharma and others v. Bachitar Singh and others, (2011) 11 SCC 425 . In Sunil Sharma (supra), it was observed : (a) Computation of income 6. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava [ (2008) 2 SCC 763 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 550 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 744 : AIR 2008 SC 845 ] S.B. Sinha, J. has observed that: (SCC p. 767, para 9) "9. The term ''income' has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay-packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms." 7. His Lordship also stated that if some facilities were being provided whereby the entire family stood to benefit, the same must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis of which the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants was required to be determined. This Court held that: (Indira Srivastava case [ (2008) 2 SCC 763 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 550 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 744 : AIR 2008 SC 845 ], SCC p. 768, para 12) "12. ... superannuation benefits, contributions towards gratuity, insurance of medical policy for self and family and education scholarship were beneficial to the members of the family." 8. This Court clarified that by opining that: (Indira Srivastava case [ (2008) 2 SCC 763 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 550 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 744 : AIR 2008 SC 845 ], SCC p. 771, para 17) " ''just compensation' must be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The basis for considering the entire pay-packet is what the dependants have lost [in view of] death of the deceased. The basis for considering the entire pay-packet is what the dependants have lost [in view of] death of the deceased. It is in the nature of compensation for future loss towards the family income." and that: (Indira Srivastava case [ (2008) 2 SCC 763 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 550 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 744 : AIR 2008 SC 845 ], SCC p. 772, para 19) "19. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. We may, however, hasten to add that from the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted." 9. In Raghuvir Singh Matolya v. Hari Singh Malviya [ (2009) 15 SCC 363 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 546 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 631] this Court has observed that dearness allowance and house rent allowance should be included for computation of income of the deceased. 10. In the present case, Haryana Women Development Corporation Ltd. certified that the deceased had drawn her salary for the month of July 2006 as under : Basic pay Rs.7100 DP Rs.3550 DA Rs.2556 HRA Rs.885 CCA Rs.200 Medical Allowance Rs.250 Gross Total Rs.14,541 Deduction EPF Rs.780 GIS Rs.30 Computer Advance Rs.500 Total Deduction Rs.1310 Net Payable = Rs.14,541 − Rs.1310 = Rs.13,231 11. Based on the aforementioned judgments, we are of the view that deductions made by the Tribunal on account of HRA, CCA and medical allowance are done on an incorrect basis and should have been taken into consideration in calculation of the income of the deceased. Further, deduction towards EPF and GIS should also not have been made in calculating the income of the deceased. (emphasis by Court) 29. This Court is of opinion that the Tribunal erred in deducting a sum of Rs.6,600/- from the annual income of the deceased. 30. There is no quarrel about the fact that the Tribunal has correctly made a deduction of 1/3rd from the deceased's income on account of personal expenses, bearing in mind the law laid down in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 . 30. There is no quarrel about the fact that the Tribunal has correctly made a deduction of 1/3rd from the deceased's income on account of personal expenses, bearing in mind the law laid down in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 . This proceeds on the basis that the deceased's elder son, Rajesh Singh was not a dependent, as the Tribunal has found. The deceased's dependents were his widow, Smt. Lajjawati, his younger son, Arun Singh and his father Shiv Ram Singh, a senior citizen, aged 78 years. The rule regarding deduction towards personal expenses has been laid down in Sarla Verma (supra) thus : 42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas [ (1994) 2 SCC 176 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 335], Trilok Chandra [ (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and Charlie [ (2005) 10 SCC 720 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1657] ), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years. 31. The dependents of the deceased being found to be three souls, the Tribunal has rightly directed deduction towards personal expenses of a 1/3rd out of the deceased's income. Likewise, the Tribunal has correctly applied the multiplier of 11' in this case, because the deceased was aged 54 years and going by the law laid down in Paragraph No.42 of the report in Sarla Verma, the multiplier of 11' has to be applied in the case of a deceased, where he is in the age group of 51-55 years. Thus, the Tribunal's opinion on the applicable multiplier is also correct. 32. The other issue that is involved is whether the claimants are entitled to add anything towards future prospects of the deceased, and if yes, how much. Thus, the Tribunal's opinion on the applicable multiplier is also correct. 32. The other issue that is involved is whether the claimants are entitled to add anything towards future prospects of the deceased, and if yes, how much. In view of what I have held in F.A.F.O. No. 614 of 2010, Smt. Ganpat Devi v. Istiyaq Ahmad and another, decided on 10.08.2022, the claimants in this case are certainly entitled to add to the dependency what they have lost on account of future prospects of the deceased. Future prospects, as held in Smt. Ganpat Devi (supra) are to be determined in accordance with Rule 220-A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, 'the Rules of 1998'). Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 reads : 220-A. Determination of Compensation- (1) X X X (2) X X X (3) The future prospects of a deceased, shall be added in the actual salary or minimum wages of the deceased as under- (i) Below 40 years of age 50% of the salary (ii) Between 40-50 years of age 30% of the salary (iii) More than 50 years 20% of the salary (iv) When wages no sufficiently proved 50% towards inflation and price index 33. Here, the deceased was aged more than 50 years. He was 54. Therefore, the claimants are entitled to add on account of future prospects 20% of the deceased's salary in reckoning his income and the consequent loss of dependency. The Tribunal has not taken into reckoning future prospects of the deceased in working out the dependency. To this extent, the Tribunal has committed a manifest error. 34. Likewise, the Tribunal has awarded under the conventional heads, a sum of Rs.5000/- to the widow for the loss of consortium and Rs.4000/- towards funeral expenses. This Court is afraid that the award of compensation under the conventional heads does not accord with the law at all. In this regard, there is a very different quantification to be done after the decision of the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi and further elucidated in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra). I had occasion to consider the question of entitlement under the conventional heads in the foreshadow of the guidance in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Co. In this regard, there is a very different quantification to be done after the decision of the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi and further elucidated in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra). I had occasion to consider the question of entitlement under the conventional heads in the foreshadow of the guidance in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd., in F.A.F.O. No. 866 of 2011, Smt. Shanti Devi and others v. Anil Awasthi @ Anil Kumar Awasthi and another, decided on 30.05.2022. In Smt. Shanti Devi (supra), it was held : 28. Again, so far as the conventional heads are concerned, this Court is of opinion that far less than what is to be awarded for the loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses has been directed by the Tribunal. Moreover, loss of consortium is not confined to the widow alone, but the parents too are entitled to be compensated for the loss of filial consortium. The two minor children are entitled to compensation on account of loss of parental consortium. In this regard, the holding of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi is again of much relevance, where it is observed: "48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574 it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) "54. ... we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy." 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: "3. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: "3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above : (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses - actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs.15,000 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs.1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149], is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs.25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads." 29. The principles governing award of compensation under conventional heads, particularly with regard to award for loss of consortium, have been laid down by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), it has been held: "21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), it has been held: "21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation". [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training". 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A few High Courts have awarded compensation on this count [Rajasthan High Court in Jagmala Ram v. Sohi Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3848 : (2017) 4 RLW 3368; Uttarakhand High Court in Rita Rana v. Pradeep Kumar, 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 2435 : (2014) 3 UC 1687; Karnataka High Court in Lakshman v. Susheela Chand Choudhary, 1996 SCC OnLine Kar 74 : (1996) 3 Kant LJ 570]. However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of filial consortium. 24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under "loss of consortium" as laid down inPranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205]. In the present case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and the sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs.40,000 each for loss of filial consortium." 30. It must be noted that under Rule 220-A(4) of the Rules of 1998, compensation or damages under the non pecuniary heads or the conventional heads have been stipulated. But, these are disadvantageous to the claimants and do not confer better or greater benefit upon them in comparison to liquidated figures laid down in Pranay Sethi. The figures under the conventional heads have been arrived at, bearing in mind the price index, falling bank interest, escalation of rates in different cases. There is a provision for 10% upward revision to be done in a span of three years. The figures under the conventional heads have been arrived at, bearing in mind the price index, falling bank interest, escalation of rates in different cases. There is a provision for 10% upward revision to be done in a span of three years. By contrast, the Rules of 1998, that have been amended to bring in Rule 220-A more than ten years ago, in the year 2011, cannot serve as a realistic index to award compensation under the conventional heads. The determination of compensation in Pranay Sethi would, therefore, be applicable. The revised and dynamic determination of compensation payable under the conventional heads stipulated in Pranay Sethi would prevail over that under the Rules of 1998. It is held, accordingly. (emphasis supplied) 35. In view of the guidance in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. and the way entitlement under the conventional heads has been determined in Smt. Shanti Devi, the question would arise as to who, amongst the claimants, would be entitled to compensation on account of loss of consortium. There is no doubt that the widow is entitled to spousal consortium and the deceased's father to filial consortium, going by the principles in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. But, so far as the two sons of the deceased are concerned, this Court is of opinion that they are not entitled to anything on account of loss of consortium. A distinction has to be made between children who are minors on one hand and adults on the other. I had occasion to consider the issue in Jiuti Devi and others v. Manoj Kumar Rai and others, 2022 SCC OnLine All 46, where it was held : 39. Loss of consortium, that includes parental consortium, unlike dependency, is not some tangible economic loss. It is an emotional loss to the next of kin of the deceased-victim of a motor accident. In case of parental loss, it causes a particular deprivation to minors and young children, about whom it is said by the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur, to borrow the words of their Lordships, "Parental Consortium is awarded to the children who lose the care and protection of their parents in motor vehicle accidents". 40. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur, to borrow the words of their Lordships, "Parental Consortium is awarded to the children who lose the care and protection of their parents in motor vehicle accidents". 40. To the understanding of this Court, the impact of loss of parental consortium upon the deceased's children, in the very nature of that loss, is dependent upon the children's age. The loss of parent is a disheartening and emotional event for the child at any age of his maturity, but by the nature of the principle governing award of compensation under the head of parental consortium, the deprivation, that is suffered by a child or a minor, appears to be the determinative and entitling fact. A child, who has advanced into matured adulthood, is married or otherwise in the mainstream of life, would not be entitled to compensation under that head. 36. The two sons of the deceased, Arun Singh and Rajesh are adults. Rajesh Singh is a married man and has two children. He was married 5-6 years ago, reckoned from the time that PW-1 testified before the Tribunal. He was aged 34 years at the relevant time and employed with the B.S.A. College. The younger son, Arun Singh, who was aged 20 years at the relevant time and reading to earn his B.Tech. Degree, is also an adult. In the opinion of this Court, the two adult sons of the deceased are not entitled to any compensation on account of loss of consortium on the principle laid down in Jiuti Devi. 37. It goes without saying that the claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate and a like sum towards funeral expenses. 38. There is no good ground to accept the insurers' appeal, but this Court is of opinion that the award passed by the Tribunal is required to be revised, in accordance with the settled principles, so that the claimants may be awarded just compensation. Accordingly, the award stands revised and redetermined as stipulated below : Sl. 38. There is no good ground to accept the insurers' appeal, but this Court is of opinion that the award passed by the Tribunal is required to be revised, in accordance with the settled principles, so that the claimants may be awarded just compensation. Accordingly, the award stands revised and redetermined as stipulated below : Sl. No. Particulars Amount (i) Monthly Income of the deceased Rs.52,041/- (ii) Monthly Income + Future Prospects (monthly income x 20%) = 52,041+10,408 Rs.62,449/- (iii) Annual Income of the deceased = (62,449 x 12) - Income Tax = 7,49,388 - 45,500 Rs.7,03,888/- (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income - one-third deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 703,888 - 2,34,629 Rs.4,69,259/- (v) Total dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 4,69,259 x 11 Rs.51,61,849/- (vi) Claimant's entitlement under the conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + Dependents' consortium (15,000 + 15,000+ 40,000 x 2) Rs.1,10,000/- (vii) Total Compensation = Total Dependency + Claimant's entitlement under the conventional heads Rs.52,71,849/- 39. Accordingly, the impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to a total sum of Rs.52,71,849/- (Rupees Fifty Two Lac, Seventy One Thousand, Eight Hundred and Forty Nine only). The compensation would carry Simple Interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realisation. However, the sum of money already deposited (paid or invested in terms of the impugned award or interim orders of this Court) shall be adjusted. 40. This appeal is disposed of in terms of the above orders.