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2022 DIGILAW 1398 (GUJ)

Chetan Krishnakant Shah HUF Its General Manager and Karta Chetan Krishnakant Shah v. Chhotalal Bhaichandbhai Panchal Since Decd. Through His Legal Heirs

2022-10-14

ARAVIND KUMAR, ASHUTOSH J.SHASTRI

body2022
ORDER : Aravind Kumar, J. 1. In this intra-court appeal challenge is laid to the order dated 23.6.2022 passed in Special Civil Application No.10611 of 2022. 2. We have heard Mr. Amrish V. Jani, learned advocate appearing for the appellant who submits that he has been instructed to appear on behalf of Mr. Jigar A. Pandya. 3. In Special Civil Application No.10611 of 2022 filed before the learned Single Judge, challenge was laid to the orders dated 17.3.2022 and 22.4.2022 whereunder the interlocutory applications filed in Special Civil Suit No.15 of 2017 for appointment of handwriting expert and review application filed by the respondents at Exh.144 and Exh.152 seeking review of the order dated 17.3.2022 passed on Exh.144 came to be dismissed. Said petition was though filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, learned Single Judge has rightly observed that impugned orders which led to filing of Special Civil Application has to be construed as one filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Respondents in Special Civil Suit No.15 of 2017 filed an application at Exh.144 (without specifying the provision of law) sought for appointment of a Government handwriting expert to verify the handwriting in the documents which had been produced and marked as Exh.104 to Exh.106. This application came to be dismissed by order dated 17.3.2022. Seeking review of this order, an application under Order 47 Rule 1 as per Exh.152 came to be filed which was heard and dismissed by order dated 22.4.2022. These two orders passed by the jurisdictional Civil Court viz. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand were challenged before the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.10611 of 2022, who by order dated 23.6.2022 allowed the Special Civil Application and set aside the orders passed by the learned trial Court. In other words, the interlocutory application filed under Exh.144 had stood allowed. Being aggrieved by the same, present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed. 5. The order which was under challenge before the learned Single Judge was an order passed by the Civil Court. In other words, the interlocutory application filed under Exh.144 had stood allowed. Being aggrieved by the same, present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed. 5. The order which was under challenge before the learned Single Judge was an order passed by the Civil Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Kishan Fauji vs. State of Haryana [ (2017) 5 SCC 533 ] at paragraph 42.3 has held as under : “42.3 A writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article and, hence, no intra-court appeal is entertainable.” 6. This judgment has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Nandini J. Shah [ (2018) 15 SCC 356 ]. Hence, we are of the view that facts of the present will have to be examined in this background. Before embarking upon such an exercise, it would also be useful to refer to the judgment of the Full Court Judgment of this Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. Firoze M. Mogal and Anr. [2014 (1) GLH (FB) 1] whereunder it came to be held that by entertaining a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not seek to exercise jurisdiction to issue any prerogative writs. In the instant case, while examining the order passed by the Trial Court, the learned Single Judge has exercised the power of superintendence. The powers contemplated by the Constitution under Articles 226 and 227 appear to be different. The former is described as the power to issue certain writs, orders or directions. The latter is described as the power of superintendence. The power under Article 227 is a power that can be exercised by the High Court over the Courts and Tribunals over which it has power of superintendence. In the instant case, the order of the Trial Court which is sought to be interfered by the learned Single Judge is and was in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction and not the original jurisdiction and as such by no stretch of imagination, the petition, though termed as filed under, could be or could have been construed as one filed under both the articles viz. Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. As such, the learned Single Judge has rightly construed, treated and adjudicated the petition or Special Civil Application though filed under Articles 226 and 227 as one filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as the learned Single Judge was exercising only power of superintendence over the Trial Court’s order. As such, we are of the considered view that present appeal would not be maintainable. A writ petition which questions the order of the Civil Court before the High Court will have to be necessarily construed as one challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and its determination thereof by the High Court would be construed as an order passed under supervisory jurisdiction vested under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Against such orders, intra-court appeal would not be maintainable. It would be of benefit to note the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India referred to supra : “59. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the respondents had resorted to remedy of writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of our conclusion that the order passed by the District Judge (in this case, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court at Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the Subordinate Court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. Moreover, on a close scrutiny of the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court dated 14.08.2012 we have no hesitation in taking the view that the true nature and substance of the order of the learned Single Judge was to exercise power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and there is no indication of Court having exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as such. Indeed, the learned Single Judge has opened the judgment by fairly noting the fact that the writ petition filed by the respondents was under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Indeed, the learned Single Judge has opened the judgment by fairly noting the fact that the writ petition filed by the respondents was under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. However, keeping in mind the exposition of this Court in the case of Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) wherein it has been explicated that in determining whether an order of learned Single Judge is in exercise of powers under Article 226 or 227 the vital factor is the nature of jurisdiction invoked by a party and the true nature and character of the order passed and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge. In paragraph 40 of the reported decision, the Court adverting to its earlier decision observed thus: “40. xxx xxx xxx Whether the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction Under Article 226 or Under Article 227 or both, would depend upon various aspects. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. It was reiterated that it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The two-Judge Bench further clarified that the Division Bench would also be required to scrutinise whether the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on that foundation. The delineation with regard to necessary party not being relevant in the present case, the said aspect need not be adverted to. Again in paragraphs 41 and 42, which may be useful for answering the matter in issue, the Court observed thus: “41. We have referred to these decisions only to highlight that it is beyond any shadow of doubt that the order of civil court can only be challenged Under Article 227 of the Constitution and from such challenge, no intra-court appeal would lie and in other cases, it will depend upon the other factors as have been enumerated therein. 42. We have referred to these decisions only to highlight that it is beyond any shadow of doubt that the order of civil court can only be challenged Under Article 227 of the Constitution and from such challenge, no intra-court appeal would lie and in other cases, it will depend upon the other factors as have been enumerated therein. 42. At this stage, it is extremely necessary to cull out the conclusions which are deducible from the aforesaid pronouncements. They are: 42.1 An appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench of the High Court if it is so permitted within the ambit and sweep of the Letters Patent. 42.2 The power conferred on the High Court by the Letters Patent can be abolished or curtailed by the competent legislature by bringing appropriate legislation. 42.3 A writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge Under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article and, hence, no intra-court appeal is entertainable. 42.4 The tenability of intra-court appeal will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis as to how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same.” (emphasis supplied) 7. The Full Bench of this Court under similar circumstances in the background of amendment having been carried out under Section 115 of CPC vis-a-vis Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has opined thus : “247. However, we may only say that when a remedy for filing the revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code has been expressly barred, then in such a case, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may lie and not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, we may only say that when a remedy for filing the revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code has been expressly barred, then in such a case, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may lie and not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When the Parliament has though fit to restrict the powers under Section 115 of the Code with a definite object, then, in such circumstances, an order which is not revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be challenged by way of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, and that too, an interlocutory order passed by civil courts in a regular suit proceeding. 254. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusion in seriatim. (i) A power to issue the writ is original and the jurisdiction exercised is original jurisdiction. (ii) Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are in exercise of original jurisdiction of the High Court whereas the proceedings initiated under Article 227 of the Constitution are supervisory in nature. (iii) When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is issued in exercise of its original jurisdiction whether against the Tribunal or inferior Court or administrative authority. (iv) The power exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution is in exercise of original jurisdiction and not supervisory jurisdiction. (v) Exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence is not to be equated with the original or supervisory jurisdiction. (vi) The learned Single Judge must have exercised original writ jurisdiction as distinguished from appellate jurisdiction, revisional jurisdiction or power of superintendence in order to maintain an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. (vii) A writ of certiorari lies in appropriate cases against the order of Tribunal or Court subordinate to the High Court where such a Court, or Tribunal acts not only as an authority of first instance but even if such a Court or Tribunal acts as an appellate or revisional authority provided a case for a writ of certiorari is made out to the satisfaction of the Court concerned. Thus, if an appellate or revisional order of the Court or Tribunal, subordinate to a High Court, suffers from a patent error of law or jurisdiction, the same could be challenged before the High Court with the aid of Article 226 of the Constitution and it could not be said that such an appellate or revisional order of the Court or Tribunal could be challenged with the aid of Article 227 alone. (viii) The High Court, when exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari does not act either as a Court of Appeal or that of Revision and it has no power to correct either findings of fact or even errors of law except where the error of law is patent on the face of the record. The sole function of the Court is to correct the persons or Tribunals exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when they assume jurisdiction which they do not possess, or when they refuse to exercise jurisdiction which is vested in them by law, or when in the exercise of their jurisdiction they violate principles of natural justice. (ix) The term “original jurisdiction” as contained in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent should be understood in context with the power of the High Court to issue a high prerogative writ like a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is that original power to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which makes the proceedings original and the exercise of such power will always be original jurisdiction. (x) If the Special Civil Application is described as one not only under Article 226 of the Constitution, but also under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the Court or the Tribunal whose order is sought to be quashed, is not made a party, the application is not maintainable as one for the relief of certiorari in the absence of the concerned Tribunal or Court as party, but the same may be treated as one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. If the Court or Tribunal is not impleaded as a party respondent in the main petition, then by merely impleading such court or tribunal for the first time in the Letters Patent Appeal will not change the nature and character of the proceedings before the learned Single Judge. If the Court or Tribunal is not impleaded as a party respondent in the main petition, then by merely impleading such court or tribunal for the first time in the Letters Patent Appeal will not change the nature and character of the proceedings before the learned Single Judge. By merely impleading such a Court or Tribunal for the first time in the LPA, the appeal could not be said to be maintainable, if the proceedings before the learned Single Judge remained in the nature of supervisory proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution. (xi) If the learned Single Judge, in exercise of a purported power under Article 227 of the Constitution sets aside the order of Tribunal or Court below and at the same time, the essential conditions for issue of writ of certiorari are absent, no appeal will be maintainable against such order in view of the specific bar created under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent itself and such an order can be challenged only by way of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. To put it very explicitly, take a case where a petition is only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, invoking superintending powers of the High Court and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. After examining the matter, if the court finds substance in the petition and sets aside the order of an authority, court or a tribunal, then against such an order, an LPA would not lie on the argument that since the court has set aside the order it has decided the matter on merits having found substance in the same. To put it in other words, once a petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and while entertaining such a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, if the court allows a petition by setting aside the order impugned, then against such an order no LPA would lie. To put it in other words, once a petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and while entertaining such a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, if the court allows a petition by setting aside the order impugned, then against such an order no LPA would lie. (xii) If a learned Single Judge, in exercise of a purported power under Article 227 of the Constitution modifies the order of Tribunal/Authority or Court below and thereby partly allows a petition to a certain extent, then in such circumstances, it could not be said that the Court exercised its certiorari jurisdiction and no appeal will be maintainable against such order in view of the specific bar created under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent itself. However, if a learned Single Judge, in purported exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, issues a writ of certiorari, although the same is not maintainable, an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would nevertheless be maintainable against such order. To put it in other words, take a case where a party on his own invokes supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and in such a petition, the Court issues a writ of certiorari, then against such an order an LPA would be maintainable. To put it explicitly clear, take a case where in a petition neither there is a prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari nor the Tribunal/Authority or Court whose order is impugned is impleaded as a party respondent, and despite such being the position, if the Court proceeds to issue a writ of certiorari, then against such an order an LPA would be maintainable. (xiii) A combined application under both Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be entertainable only when the court fees payable for invoking both the provisions have been paid in aggregate. If court fees payable for invoking only one of the Articles 226 and 227 have been affixed, the Court before dismissing the application on that ground may give option to the petitioner to choose only one of such provisions, if he does not pay the balance amount of court fees and the application should be treated accordingly. If court fees payable for invoking only one of the Articles 226 and 227 have been affixed, the Court before dismissing the application on that ground may give option to the petitioner to choose only one of such provisions, if he does not pay the balance amount of court fees and the application should be treated accordingly. It is, however, for the Court to decide whether the facts of the case justify invocation of original jurisdiction or it is a fit case for exercising supervisory jurisdiction. (xiv) The facts would justify invocation of the original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution only if all the requisite conditions for issue of a writ of certiorari are made out by the petitioner and the Court concerned is convinced that the petitioner has been able to point out a serious or a palpable error in the order impugned going to the root of the jurisdiction. In the absence of such a glaring infirmity or an error patent on the face of the record, the party would not be justified in invoking original jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of certiorari. (xv) When a remedy for filing the Revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code has been expressly barred, then in such a case, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would lie and not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When the Parliament has thought fit to restrict the powers under Section 115 of the Code with a definite object, then, under such circumstances an order which is not revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be challenged by way of filing a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and that too an interlocutory order passed by the Civil Court in a Regular Suit proceedings.” 8. As could be seen from the impugned order and the case papers, at the cost of repetition, would disclose that interlocutory application which came to be filed before the Trial Court was invoking the jurisdiction for appointment of a Commissioner viz. As could be seen from the impugned order and the case papers, at the cost of repetition, would disclose that interlocutory application which came to be filed before the Trial Court was invoking the jurisdiction for appointment of a Commissioner viz. handwriting expert i.e. to verify the handwriting document produced at Exh.104 to 106 and same having been dismissed by the Civil Court, the appellant herein cannot be heard to contend that said order which was challenged by the respondents before the learned Single Judge of this Court was by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is for this precise reason, learned Single Judge while examining the Special Civil Application has clearly held after examining the correctness and legality of the impugned order as an order challenged before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India viz. and order passed thereon would be under supervisory jurisdiction. 9. For myriad reasons abovesaid, we are of the considered view this intra-court appeal is not maintainable and it stands dismissed. All pending applications stand consigned to records.