ORDER : 1. The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P. No. 17 of 2017 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Sulthan Bathery, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlady seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule shop room, under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(3) and 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The tenant entered appearance and filed counter statement opposing the order of eviction sought for. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court, by the order dated 15.02.2020 in R.C.P. No. 17 of 2017, ordered eviction of the tenant under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(3) and 11(8) of the Act, and the tenant was directed to give vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the landlady, within the time limit specified in that order. In the said order, it was made clear that the order of eviction granted under Section 11(2)(b) will be vacated, under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act, if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost within a period of one month. 2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court, the tenant filed R.C.A. No. 19 of 2020 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-I), Kalpetta, invoking the provisions under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal was allowed in part, by the judgment dated 31.08.2021. The Appellate Authority confirmed the order of eviction granted under Section 11(8) of the Act. However, the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act was set aside. Challenging the judgment dated 31.08.2021 of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 19 of 2020, to the extent of confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(8) of the Act, the tenant is before this Court in this revision, invoking the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. 3. On 28.09.2021, when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, the respondent-landlady entered appearance through counsel. On 01.12.2021, this Court has made it clear that pendency of this Rent Control Revision will not stand in the way of the execution court proceeding with the matter, in accordance with law. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlady. 5. On 01.12.2021, this Court has made it clear that pendency of this Rent Control Revision will not stand in the way of the execution court proceeding with the matter, in accordance with law. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlady. 5. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the order of eviction granted under Section 11(8) of the Act. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would contend that, while confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(8) of the Act, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has not properly appreciated the contention raised by the tenant as to comparative hardship, as contemplated under the first proviso to Section 11(10) of the Act. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlady would contend that the Appellate Authority, while confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(8) of the Act, dealt with properly the contention raised by the tenant as to comparative hardship, as contemplated under the first proviso to Section 11(10) of the Act. Therefore, the order of eviction granted under Section 11(8) of the Act warrants no interference, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 8. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(8), a landlord who is occupying only a part of a building may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use. Section 11(10) of the Act provides that, claim under sub-section (3), (4), (7) or (8) should be bona fide. As per Section 11(10), the Rent Control Court shall, if it is satisfied that the claim of the landlord under sub-section (3), (4), (7) or sub-section (8) is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent control Court, and if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application. As per the first proviso to Section 11(10), in the case of an application made under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. As per the second proviso to Section 11(10), the Rent control Court may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate. 9. In Hassan Koya K. vs. James George and Others, 2019 (4) KLJ 74 , a Division Bench of this Court held that, under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the distinction maintained by the legislature between Section 11(3) and Section 11(8) is clear. The test to be applied in a proceeding for eviction under Section 11(8) or Section 11(3), as the case may be, for distinguishing these two grounds of eviction is to ascertain whether landlord and tenant are stated to be occupying different portions of the same building owned by the landlord or whether the tenant is stated to be occupying the whole building of the landlord. If the landlord is in occupation of a portion of his building and asks for eviction of the portion let to his tenant urging need for additional accommodation for personal use, it would then be a case of eviction falling under Section 11(8). On the other hand, if the tenant is put in occupation of a building owned by the landlord who has no part of the structure in his custody, it is then a case brought for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act alone, provided other conditions for eviction are also present. Legally, the grounds of eviction under Section 11(3) and Section 11(8) are fundamentally different and considered therefore as mutually exclusive. The distinction emerging between these two grounds has been discussed in S.R. Sabu vs. T.K. Vasudevan, (2001) 8 SCC 110 and Indian Saree House and Others vs. Radhalakshmy and Others, 2006 (3) KLT 129 . 10. In Hassan Koya K. 2019 (4) KLJ 74 the Division Bench noticed that, the bona fide claim understood in terms of Section 11(10) of the Act is no way different from the expression bona-fide used in Section 11(3) of the Act. 10. In Hassan Koya K. 2019 (4) KLJ 74 the Division Bench noticed that, the bona fide claim understood in terms of Section 11(10) of the Act is no way different from the expression bona-fide used in Section 11(3) of the Act. Bona fide need or requirement must be the outcome of the natural, sincere, real and honest desire of the landlord rather than a mere wish or desire. This principle of law has long been settled as is discernible from Mattulal vs. Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365 , Chandukutty vs. George, 1977 KLT 607 and Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by LRs. vs. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust, (2005) 2 SCC 476 . 11. In Hassan Koya K. the Division Bench held that, it is mandatory that a definite finding on the issue of comparative hardship between the parties must be entered in a proceeding for eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act. If the Rent Control authorities find on evidence that hardship to which the tenant would be exposed in the case of eviction will be higher than that of the landlord in the case of refusal of eviction, prayer for eviction could only be declined. If, on the other hand, the evidence fortifies a finding that landlord would occasion to suffer greater than the tenant in case of refusal of eviction, an order of eviction under Section 11(8) in such a case would certainly be justified. 12. In Hassan Koya K. the Division Bench held that, Section 11(3) of the Act has laid down in very clear and specific terms certain conditions to be satisfied by the landlord as well as tenant in prosecution or defence of eviction proceeding, as the case may be, before the Rent Control authorities. A landlord not being in possession of any building of his own in the locality sufficient to satisfy his proved bona fide need, cannot nonetheless recover tenanted premises on the ground of Section 11(3), if the tenant mainly depends on the income derived from his business and further has no alternative suitable accommodation available in the locality for shifting his business. Strictly speaking, none of the conditions appearing in Section 11(3) is relevant in an eviction petition brought under Section 11(8) seeking additional accommodation. Section 11(8) is absolutely silent as to the relevant considerations on which comparative hardship in issue between parties could be decided. Strictly speaking, none of the conditions appearing in Section 11(3) is relevant in an eviction petition brought under Section 11(8) seeking additional accommodation. Section 11(8) is absolutely silent as to the relevant considerations on which comparative hardship in issue between parties could be decided. Nonetheless the preponderance of judicial precedents is in favour of the view that availability of suitable and alternative premises with both the landlord and tenant to satisfy their needs in a proceeding for eviction under Section 11(8) is one of the matters relevant to the decision on the issue of comparative hardship between the parties. Equally relevant is the question as to whether parties mainly depend for their livelihood on the income derived from the business or trade in case tenanted premises have been let out for conducting business. The Division Bench made reference in this connection to Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs. Chandrakant M. Patel, (1974) 1 SCC 661 , Mst. Bega Begum vs. Abdul Ahad Khan (Dead) by LRs. (1979) 1 SCC 273 , Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada vs. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 , Arumugham vs. R. Leena, ILR 2005 (3) Ker. 584, Jose vs. Antony, 2005 (1) KLT 252 and Indian Saree House and Others vs. Radhalakshmy and Others, 2006 (3) KLT 129 . 13. In Hassan Koya K. the Division Bench found that, the considerations relevant for decision on the issue of comparative hardship in terms of Section 11(10) of the Act are unrestricted and wider in scope than the conditions specified in Section 11(3). But only thing that needs to be ensured by the court is that those considerations must be materially relevant and essential to the just decision of the issue. Discretion of the court in this respect should be exercised carefully guided by sound judicial principles and also in conformity with principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Burden of proving such relevant facts within the scope of Section 11(10) is equal to both the parties unlike the burden of proof cast by Section 11(3) of the Act. The landlord seeking eviction under Section 11(8) has not only to prove the bona fides of his claim for additional accommodation but also the comparable degree of hardship which he would suffer than the tenant in the case of refusal of eviction. The landlord seeking eviction under Section 11(8) has not only to prove the bona fides of his claim for additional accommodation but also the comparable degree of hardship which he would suffer than the tenant in the case of refusal of eviction. Burden thereafter shifts to the tenant who would then be liable to show that hardship on him will exceed than that of the landlord in case he fails to secure a decision favourable to his continuance. The Division Bench noticed that the decisions in Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs. Chandrakant M. Patel, (1974) 1 SCC 661 and Arjunan vs. Eranu, 1991 (2) KLT 279 make the legal position clear in this respect. 14. In Marzook K.N. and Others vs. A.J. Simon, 2012 (2) KLT 276 , a Division Bench of this Court noticed that, as per Section 11(10) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the hardship that may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction should outweigh the advantage to the landlords. The Division Bench held that, the fact that the landlords are affluent and that the tenant may have to shell out money for alternative accommodation is no ground to deny eviction. The comparative hardship even if there is any can be mitigated by granting a reasonable time to vacate. The Division Bench placed reliance on the view taken by the Apex Court in Bhimanagouda Basanagouda Patil vs. Mohammed Gudusaheb, 2003 (3) SCC 101 . The Division Bench granted the tenant a period of 18 months to vacate the commercial premises in question and held that, comparative hardship under Section 11(10) of the Act can be mitigated by granting larger time to vacate as above. 15. The respondent-landlady sought for an order of eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the petition schedule shop room, under Section 11(8) of the Act, on the ground that she requires the petition schedule shop room as additional accommodation for starting a Women Health Clinic for care, counselling, treatment for communicable diseases, pregnancy cases, etc., which would be beneficial to the public at large. The landlady is a medical practitioner specialised in Gynaecology, retired from Government service as Civil Surgeon. She is presently engaged as a Part-time Gynaecology Consultant in MES Hospital, Sulthan Bathery. She is having 48 years of practice in Gynaecology, out of which she had worked in Sulthan Bathery for about 33 years. The landlady is a medical practitioner specialised in Gynaecology, retired from Government service as Civil Surgeon. She is presently engaged as a Part-time Gynaecology Consultant in MES Hospital, Sulthan Bathery. She is having 48 years of practice in Gynaecology, out of which she had worked in Sulthan Bathery for about 33 years. She had acquired good reputation as a Gynaecologist in Sulthan Bathery. She is also conducting an outpatient clinic in the first floor of a multistoried building. The petition schedule shop room is in the ground floor of that building. The landlady intends to expand her outpatient clinic as a full-time Women Health Clinic, for which she requires the petition schedule shop room as additional accommodation. The land in which the petition schedule building situates originally belonged to her husband Dr. M.R. Khan. On his death the property devolved upon her and three children. The children are residing abroad. The multistoried building consisting of shop rooms, including the petition schedule shop room, is constructed and managed by her. She is residing in the very same compound. 16. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition, seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act is supported by the oral testimony of the landlady, who was examined as PW-1. She deposed in tune with the averments in the Rent Control Petition. During cross examination of PW-1, nothing could be brought out to discredit her version in support of the claim for eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act. Room No. 18/236 in which the landlady is presently running an outpatient clinic is in the first floor of the building. The said room is not sufficient for the landlady to expand the outpatient clinic as a full-time Women Health Clinic for care, counselling, treatment for communicable diseases, pregnancy cases, etc. Since the landlady is aged, instead of working as part-time Consultant in Private Hospitals, she thought it better to engage herself in the full-time Women Health Clinic proposed in the multi-storied building situated in her residential compound, after expanding the outpatient clinic conducted in the first floor of the building, with the additional accommodation in the ground floor, after evicting the tenant from the petition schedule shop room. 17. 17. In the counter statement filed in R.C.P. No. 17 of 2017 the tenant denied the fact that the landlady is conducting a clinic in the upstairs of the petition schedule shop room. But, this was given a go by when the tenant tendered oral evidence as RW1. In the affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination, the tenant has admitted that, in a portion of the upstairs of the building the landlady is conducting a clinic. The Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Rent Control Court, while inspecting the building found that the landlady is conducting a clinic in the upstairs of the petition schedule shop room. In Ext.C1 report, the Advocate Commissioner found that the upstairs of the building is portioned as consulting room, visiting room, etc. The Advocate Commissioner has also noted certain medical equipment in the upstairs of the building. The oral testimony of PW-1 which stands uncontroverted, and also the facts reported by the Advocate Commissioner lead to an irresistible conclusion that the landlady is occupying the upstairs of the petition schedule shop room, which is not a mere possession, but actual occupation by conducting a n outpatient clinic. 18. On the requirement of the petition schedule shop room as additional accommodation for expanding the outpatient clinic in the upstairs of the building as a full-time Women Health Clinic, by utilising the petition schedule shop room in the ground floor, the landlady, in her affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination, has explained her requirement for additional accommodation. She is a Gynaecologist, who retired as Civil Surgeon from Government service. She is having 48 years of practice in Gynaecology, out of which she had worked in Sulthan Bathery for about 33 years. She is the senior-most lady doctor in Sulthan Bathery and a well known Gynaecologist having good relations with the people of the locality. She had treated thousands of patients during her service and maintained good relations with them. She is having private practice in a nearby hospital. She is also conducting an outpatient clinic in the upstairs of the petition schedule building. The petition schedule shop room is situated in her residential compound. Her residence is just behind the multistoried building consisting of shop rooms, including the petition schedule shop room and from her residence there is direct entry to the said building. She is also conducting an outpatient clinic in the upstairs of the petition schedule building. The petition schedule shop room is situated in her residential compound. Her residence is just behind the multistoried building consisting of shop rooms, including the petition schedule shop room and from her residence there is direct entry to the said building. She intends to stop her part-time consultancy in the private hospital and to start a Women Health Clinic, by utilising the petition schedule shop room in the ground floor. PW-1 has deposed that, apart from the financial point of view, she is keen to help people with her expertise as a Gynaecologist. The multi-storied building is in the heart of the town. She filed eviction petition against the tenant of other parts and some of the portions have already been surrendered to her. 19. Though the landlady, who was examined as PW-1, was subjected to cross-examination, nothing could be brought out to discredit her version for eviction as sought for under Section 11(8) of the Act. There is nothing on record to show that the landlady has any physical ailments, disabling her to have active practice. Even the tenant, who was examined as RW-1, has admitted that the landlady still has active practice as a Gynaecologist. PW-1 has deposed that, if she is able to start a Women Health Clinic it will be helpful to the people of the locality. The oral testimony of the landlady as PW-1 makes it explicitly clear that, the requirement of additional accommodation projected in the Rent Control Petition, in order to seek an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act is not a fanciful desire or wish of the landlady. The said requirement projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act is the outcome of the natural, sincere, real and honest desire of the landlady rather than a mere wish or desire. 20. The ground floor of the multi-storied building is having three shop rooms. One shop room is already in the possession of the respondent-landlady. The landlady has already obtained vacant possession of another shop room, which was in the possession of a tenant. Now, what remains is the third room in the ground floor, which is in occupation of the petitioner-tenant. The ground floor of the multi-storied building is having three shop rooms. One shop room is already in the possession of the respondent-landlady. The landlady has already obtained vacant possession of another shop room, which was in the possession of a tenant. Now, what remains is the third room in the ground floor, which is in occupation of the petitioner-tenant. Before the Appellate Authority the tenant contended that the petition schedule shop room is having an area of 150 sq. ft. only and the entire remaining part of the multi-storied building is in the possession of the landlady and therefore, she can start the proposed Women Health Clinic utilising that area. As rightly found by the Appellate Authority, when the requirement of the landlady is for the whole building, keeping the tenanted premises in the midst of the entire clinic would not be just and proper. In the above circumstances, conclusion is irresistible that, the requirement of the landlady for additional accommodation, as projected in the Rent Control Petition, seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act is the outcome of the natural, sincere, real and honest desire of the landlord rather than a mere wish or desire. 21. The petitioner-tenant is conducting an agency of the Life Insurance Corporation in the petition schedule building, which is situated near the office of the Life Insurance Corporation. On the question of comparative hardship under the first proviso to Section 11(10) of the Act, the Appellate Authority noticed that, the advantage that the landlady shall get by obtaining eviction of the petition schedule shop room are that (i) she can expand her clinic; (ii) she can avoid private practice in a private hospital and can conduct the clinic conveniently staying in her residential building which is close to the tenanted premises; (iii) she can give service to the local people and (iv) she can lead a content life for rest of her period. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination, the tenant, who was examined as RW-1, has explained the hardships he may suffer due to his eviction from the petition schedule shop room. In the said shop room he is conducting his office as the Chief Insurance Advisor and LIC Agent. Under him, there are 16 Agents. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination, the tenant, who was examined as RW-1, has explained the hardships he may suffer due to his eviction from the petition schedule shop room. In the said shop room he is conducting his office as the Chief Insurance Advisor and LIC Agent. Under him, there are 16 Agents. The only income of the tenant is that derived from the office in the petition schedule shop room. He does not have any other avocation. The Agents under him are also dependent on this income. No suitable alternate building is available in the locality. 22. Before the Rent Control Court, it has come out in evidence that LIC agency of the tenant can be conducted in any building. RW1 has admitted that it can be operated from anywhere, provided internet connectivity is available. RW1 has also admitted that most of the works of LIC agency are being carried out through the internet. It has also come out in evidence that, the wife of the tenant has obtained a room at a place called Chendakuni, where the tenant has fixed his name board, which would indicate that the tenant is carrying out the works of his LIC agency from that premises also. Nature of the works of LIC agency is such that it can be carried out even from his residence. Therefore, the Appellate Authority rightly found that there is no convincing evidence on the side of the tenant to show that no other suitable buildings are available in that locality for him. 23. Before the Appellate Authority, it was contended that, the tenant has been conducting his office in the petition schedule shop room for the last several years and therefore, he cannot shift his office to any other place. The tenant raised such a contention pointing out the goodwill which he had acquired by conducting LIC Agency in the petition schedule shop room. Since the petition schedule shop room is close to LIC office, it may be a convenient place for the tenant to conduct LIC Agency. But that alone is not sufficient to conclude that the hardship that may be caused to the tenant on his eviction from the petition schedule shop room will outweigh the advantages of the landlady who require additional accommodation for expanding her outpatient clinic as a Women Health Clinic. But that alone is not sufficient to conclude that the hardship that may be caused to the tenant on his eviction from the petition schedule shop room will outweigh the advantages of the landlady who require additional accommodation for expanding her outpatient clinic as a Women Health Clinic. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Appellate Authority concluded that, the hardship that the tenant may suffer in case of eviction from the petition schedule shop room is ordered certainly will not outweigh the advantage that the landlady might obtain. When the requirement of the landlady is for the whole building, keeping the tenanted premises in the midst of the entire clinic would not be just and proper. Therefore, the Appellate Authority rightly found that the claim of the landlady for eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act cannot be rejected under the first proviso to Section 11(10) of the Act. 24. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. 25. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499 , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 26. In T. Sivasubramaniam vs. Kasinath Pujari, (1999) 7 SCC 275 the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 27. In Ubaiba vs. Damodaran, (1999) 5 SCC 645 the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 28. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in Rukmini Amma Saradamma that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 29. In Thankamony Amma vs. Omana Amma, AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412 considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Ubaiba and Dilbahar Singh the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 30. Having considered the materials on record and submissions made by the learned counsel on both sides, we find that, the reasoning of the courts below while granting an order of eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act cannot be said to be either perverse or illegal. It cannot also be said that while granting such an order of eviction, the courts below have committed any material irregularity. In the absence of any such grounds made out by the petitioner-tenant, no interference is warranted on the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 11(8) of the Act. 31. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that, considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic the tenant may be granted time 6 months' time for vacating the premises. 32. On the above request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlady would submit that a reasonable period of three months may be granted to the tenant for giving vacant possession of the premises, on condition that the tenant shall clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent and continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default. 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that the tenant is prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court and he shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till he gives vacant possession of the premises to the landlady. 34. 34. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision is dismissed declining interference on the order of eviction granted by the courts below under Section 11(8) of the Act; however by granting six months' time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the respondent-landlady, considering the situation prevailing in the Country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions: (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the petitioner-landlady within six months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop room and further that he will conduct any business in the petition schedule shop room only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities. (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default. (iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner-landlady will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction.