JUDGMENT Siddhartha Roy Chowdhury, J. - This appeal assails the judgement and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 3rd Court, Howrah in Title Suit No. 81 of 1996. 2. Briefly stated, Smt. Amala Dutta during her life time on 27th September, 1993, agreed to sell a piece of land more particularly described in the schedule of the plaint, to Smt. Kabyashree Mukherjee and an agreement to that effect was entered into by and between the parties at a consideration of Rs. 4,15,000/- and Amala Dutta on that date received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards earnest money. On the same day Amala Dutta sold part of the property being 220 G.T. Road (South) P.S. Shibpur, Howrah and transferred the same in favour of Smt. Kabyashree Mukherjee by a registered deed of sale executed and registered on 27th September, 1993. 3. However, Smt. Amala Dutta refused to discharge her part of obligation in terms of the agreement by executing a deed of sale despite being requested by the plaintiff, expressing her readiness and willingness to perform her part of contract in terms of the said agreement. Smt. Amala Dutta however, in writing denied to have entered into any agreement for sale as claimed by Smt. Kabyashree Mukherjee. It was specifically stated that Smt. Amala Dutta received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- on the date, when she executed the deed of sale, from the plaintiff towards loan and not towards part of consideration money for selling out of the property in suit. The plaintiff thereafter, filed the suit for specific performance of contract. Smt. Amala Dutta in a bid to contest the suit filed written statement which was subsequently amended. In her written statement, Smt. Amala Dutta denied all material allegations made against her in the plaint. According to defendant she was in need of money and decided to sell a portion of her property to the plaintiff and she also took a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as loan. The defendant depicted herself as an illiterate lady unable to read Bengali script written in long hand and did not know ABC of English language. According to defendant she was in need of money and decided to sell a portion of her property to the plaintiff and she also took a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as loan. The defendant depicted herself as an illiterate lady unable to read Bengali script written in long hand and did not know ABC of English language. She obliged the plaintiff and her husband by putting her signature of some blank papers including one stamp paper on the understanding that those papers would be used for the purpose of documentation of loan transaction, but those blank papers including the stamp paper was converted into an agreement for sale. 4. It is further contended that the suit property is the only residential house of the defendant, she has no place of abode other than the suit property. The alleged agreement is nothing but an unconscionable bargain bereft of equity and good conscience. The defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Learned Trial Court after considering the pleadings of the parties framed following six issues:- 1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and in law? 2. Has the plaintiff any cause of action? 3. Is there any valid and legal agreement for sale entered into by the defendant with the plaintiff on 27.09.1993? 4. Is the plaintiff all along ready and willing to perform her part of the contract dt. 27.09.1993? 5. Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree as prayed for? 6. To what other relief or reliefs, if any, the plaintiff is entitled under law and equity? 6. After considering the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff and other witnesses including the son of the defendant, learned Trial Court was pleased to answer all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and passed the judgement and decree impugned. 7. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with such judgement and decree the defendant Smt. Amala Dutta preferred the appeal. During pendency of the present appeal Smt. Amala Dutta, the original defendant passed away and her legal heirs have stepped into her shoes. 8. Assailing the impugned judgement Mr. Dipak Kr. Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel representing the substituted appellants submits that learned Trial Court did not appreciate the content of Exhibit-4 in its proper perspective. During pendency of the present appeal Smt. Amala Dutta, the original defendant passed away and her legal heirs have stepped into her shoes. 8. Assailing the impugned judgement Mr. Dipak Kr. Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel representing the substituted appellants submits that learned Trial Court did not appreciate the content of Exhibit-4 in its proper perspective. By writing the letter Exhibit-4 the defendant Smt. Amala Dutta apart from indicating the financial capability of the plaintiff also stated that she was incapable of reading or writing English. She was in need of money. 9. The plaintiff taking advantage of her financial strength, compelled Smt. Dutta to sell a part of the suit property. After executing a deed of sale on 27th September, 1993 when Amala Dutta approached her, the plaintiff Kabyashree agreed to give a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards loan, after keeping rest part of her house mortgaged. Smt. Dutta further adverted that upon receipt of letter issued by Kabyashree on 17th January, 1994, she came to know about the agreement for the first time when her son Dilip Dutta read over and explained the content of the letter. Smt. Dutta further stated that the agreement was never read over and explained to her. Had the content of the agreement been known to her, she would not have signed the agreement. 10. Smt. Dutta expressed her willingness to return the money she received. This document Exhibit-4 in our view runs counter to the claim of the defendant made in the written statement to the effect that the husband of the plaintiff obtained signature of the defendant Amala Dutta as well as her son DW-1 Pranoy Kumar Dutta on blank papers including the stamp paper. 11. This document Exhibit-4 does not contain any whisper stating, inter alia, that Smt. Dutta signed on some blank papers at the behest of the husband of the plaintiff. Rather it is an admission that she put her signature on the agreement but she was not aware of the content of the document as it was never read over and explained to her. Contrary claim of the defendant to have signed on blank papers including stamp paper on the one hand and on the other hand being unaware of the content of the document, she signed the same inspire us to hold that Smt. Amala Dutta was veiling the truth. Contrary claim of the defendant to have signed on blank papers including stamp paper on the one hand and on the other hand being unaware of the content of the document, she signed the same inspire us to hold that Smt. Amala Dutta was veiling the truth. She did not sign on blank papers, as claimed. This contrary stand taken by the defendant unerringly indicates towards the fact that an agreement was entered into by and between the parties to the suit. 12. The plaintiff has expressed her readiness and willingness by writing several letters admitted into evidence as Exhibit-3, Exhibit-5, Exhibit-7 and Exhibit-8. But the defendant was never willing to perform her part of obligation in terms of the said agreement. 13. Mr. Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submits that the original defendant Smt. Amala Dutta though had nine children but only the suit house as her place of abode. After her demise his two sons are in occupation of the said house. Both of them are senior citizens having no means or alternative accommodation to stay. Placing his reliance upon the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3049 of 2017 Jayakantham & Ors. Vs. Abaykumar reported in (2017) 5 SCC 178 , Mr. Sengupta with all fairness submits that grant of decree of specific performance of a contract lies in the discretion of the Court and it is not necessary to grant the decree for specific performance simply for the reason that it is legally to do so. 14. The learned Trial Court while exercising such discretion failed to impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing the decree of specific performance. According to Mr. Sengupta the defendants are ready and willing to pay a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- as compensation to the plaintiff- respondent. 15. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Sengupta that while considering a case like this and while exercising the discretion, Court take into consideration two important components in order to balance the equities one of such consideration is, who is the defaulting party and Court should always be vigilant to find out if a party is trying to take undue advantage over the other and also to consider comparative hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing the specific performance. It goes without saying that Section 20(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, preserves judicial discretion to grant decree for specific performance and such discretion should be exercised in accordance with sound and reasonably judicial principle. 16. Refuting such contention of Mr. Sengupta, Mr. Probal Kumar Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel representing the respondent submits that the original appellant Smt. Amala Dutta (since deceased) accepted a sum of Rs. 60,000/- for a property measuring about 13 chittaks 10 sq. ft. of land and on the same day the agreement in question was executed for transfer of property by way of sale standing over the land measuring about 1 cottahs 10 chittaks 3 sq. ft. at a consideration of Rs. 4,15,000/-. Neither the present appellants nor their predecessor in interest made any attempt to return the money received by Amala Dutta as part of consideration money. 17. The money was enjoyed by them since 1993 to the deprivation of the plaintiff/respondent. According to Mr. Mukherjee the appellants are at best entitled to interest over the consideration money of Rs. 4,00,000/- consecutively assessed on an average at 6% per annum which works out to Rs. 21,67,200/- only. According to Mr. Mukherjee, in such situation at least 50% should be deducted from the accrued interest on the balance consideration amount since the property was never parted with possession towards part performance of contract. Relying upon the judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court pronounced in Jayakantham (supra) precisely upon paragraph 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12, Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel submits that there is no scope of unconscionable bargain or undue advantage in the present case. The consideration amount so fixed was fair and according to prevailing market rate. 18. Sri Tarun Kumar Mukherjee, husband of the plaintiff adduced evidence on behalf of his wife and from his testimony we find that on 27th September, 1993, an agreement was entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant which was executed by the parties. Sri Pranoy Kumar Dutta, son of Smt. Amala Dutta and Debasish Banerjee were witnesses to the execution of the said agreement. A sum of Rs. 15,000/- was paid by the plaintiff towards earnest money out of the total consideration of Rs. 4,15,000/-. The agreement was admitted as Exhibit-1. Sri Pranoy Kumar Dutta, son of Smt. Amala Dutta and Debasish Banerjee were witnesses to the execution of the said agreement. A sum of Rs. 15,000/- was paid by the plaintiff towards earnest money out of the total consideration of Rs. 4,15,000/-. The agreement was admitted as Exhibit-1. From the testimony of PW-1 we further find that on the self-same date Smt. Amala Dutta sold and transferred a portion of the said property to the plaintiff by registered deed of sale which was admitted as Exhibit-2. According to PW-1 the plaintiff made her readiness and willingness to perform her part of contract clear and loud; even it was conveyed to the defendant in writing. 19. However, defendant gave a letter dated 21st February, 1994 stating, inter alia, that she received a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards loan and not as earnest money. The said letter was admitted as Exhibit-4. In this manner the parties to the proceeding traded letters even through their lawyers but ultimately the defendant refused to execute the deed of sale in terms of alleged agreement. During cross-examination PW-1 stated that the deed of sale and alleged agreement for sale were executed on the same day both the documents were drafted by Advocate Mr. Rabindra Nath Banerjee. PW-1 admitted that his wife was a tenant in respect of one room prior to alleged agreement for sale and on the date of sale of the property. He denied the suggestion that on the date of execution of the sale deed they obtained signature of Smt. Amala Dutta on some white paper and manufactured the agreement for sale. 20. PW-2 Debasish Banerjee admitted his signature Exhibit-1/1 on the agreement. According to him the agreement was entered into for the purpose of sale of the house. In his presence no monetary transaction took place. He was called by both the parties to the agreement to witness the execution of the documents. He was confronted with copy of the agreement, admitted as Exhibit-A. He expressed his innocence when asked as to whether the plaintiff obtained the signature of defendant on blank papers or not. He could not even remember whether such agreement was read over and explained in Bengali to him and to Smt. Amala Devi. 21. He was confronted with copy of the agreement, admitted as Exhibit-A. He expressed his innocence when asked as to whether the plaintiff obtained the signature of defendant on blank papers or not. He could not even remember whether such agreement was read over and explained in Bengali to him and to Smt. Amala Devi. 21. Pranoy Kumar Dutta the son of the original defendant Smt. Amala Dutta adduced evidence as DW-1 and in his evidence-in-chief he stated that one sale deed was prepared in the chamber of Advocate Rabindra Nath Banerjee; where his mother was requested by the husband of the plaintiff to put her signature on some blank papers including one stamp paper. He was asked to sign on the last page of the sale deed and also on the foot of one of the blank papers. Debasish also signed on the foot of the said paper after him. However, he had no scope to ask as to why signature was required to be put on the blank paper. He further stated that her mother was requested to sign on some blank papers including one stamp paper on the understanding that the same will be used in writing a document for loan transaction. But the plaintiff used all the blank papers including the stamp paper for manufacturing the agreement for sale. According to DW-1 Exhibit- 1 is manufactured document. His mother took a loan of Rs. 15,000/- and on the request of the husband of the plaintiff, she signed on some blank papers including one stamp paper. His mother had no other residential property except the suit property. The suit property according to DW-1 is the only place to abode available to his mother. During cross-examination DW-1 stated that he was adducing evidence for himself and not on behalf of his mother. His mother sold portion of the suit property to the plaintiff by executing deed of sale duly registered. He identified his signature on page 7 of Exhibit-1 and also he identified the signature of his mother on the said document. DW-1 stated that his mother did not file any suit challenging the deed of agreement for sale. His mother sent a letter Exhibit-4 in reply to the letter Exhibit-3. He admitted that till then no step was taken to send back Rs. 15,000/- to the plaintiff by any manner. DW-1 stated that his mother did not file any suit challenging the deed of agreement for sale. His mother sent a letter Exhibit-4 in reply to the letter Exhibit-3. He admitted that till then no step was taken to send back Rs. 15,000/- to the plaintiff by any manner. He stated that he had document to show that his mother took a loan of Rs. 15,000/-. DW-1 further identifies the signatures of Smt. Amala Dutta appearing on the reverse side of page no. 7 of Exhibit-1 and the signatures appearing on page nos. 1 to 7 and on the sitemap annexed to the agreement Exhibit-1. No witness was examined. 22. It goes without saying that plaintiff-respondent discharged the onus to prove that an agreement was entered into by and between the parties on 27th September, 1993. The defendant did not appear before the Court and no step was taken to record her evidence on commission. Son of the original defendant adduced evidence as DW-1 who was present and signed as witness on the sale deed as well as on the agreement. DW-1 admitted the signatures appearing on the document Exhibit-1 to be the signatures of his mother obtained on blank papers. 23. It is gainsaid that when any party wishes the Court to believe certain fact, the onus lies upon him under Section 103 of the Evidence Act to prove the same. Here in this case the agreement has been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff. DW-1 admitted that the document Exhibit-1 contained the signature of his mother. The other witness Debasish Banerjee as PW-2 stated that he was called to witness the signatures of the agreement by both Smt. Dutta and the plaintiff. He put his signature as witness on the agreement. Since the defendant has claimed to have put her signature on some blank papers and stamp paper with the understanding that those papers would be used to prepare a document for loan but the same was converted into an agreement, the onus under Section 103 of the Evidence Act was upon the defendant to prove such averment. The defendant did not appear, as we have already pointed out, to adduce evidence. Her son DW-1 did not adduce evidence on behalf of his mother. 24. The defendant did not appear, as we have already pointed out, to adduce evidence. Her son DW-1 did not adduce evidence on behalf of his mother. 24. Therefore we do not feel any hesitation to hold that the defendant failed to discharge the onus under Section 103 of the Evidence Act. Mr. Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel is underscoring the poor condition of the two sons of Amala Duta as a frame of reference for an objective assessment of comparative hardship, by the Court. Mother decided to sell her property to meet her expenses and her nine sons and daughters maintained stoic silence about the plight of their old mother. Any sympathy towards the sons of Smt. Amala Dutta, in our opinion would be unmerited and misplaced. 25. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie reported in (2013) 8 SCC 131 held:- '39. The long efflux of time (over 40 years) that has occurred and the galloping value of real estate in the meantime are the twin inhibiting factors in this regard. The same, however, have to be balanced with the fact that the plaintiffs are in no way responsible for the delay that has occurred and their keen participation in the proceedings till date show the live interest on the part of the plaintiffs to have the agreement enforced in law. 40. The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles. The parameters for the exercise of discretion vested by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any precise expression of language and the contours thereof will always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness and reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any given case, which features the experienced judicial mind can perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be emphasised that efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. Such a view has been consistently adopted by this Court. It must however be emphasised that efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. Such a view has been consistently adopted by this Court. By way of illustration opinions rendered in P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi [ (2007) 10 SCC 231 ] and more recently in Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Ltd. [ (2012) 5 SCC 712 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 379] may be usefully recapitulated. 41. The twin inhibiting factors identified above if are to be read as a bar to the grant of a decree of specific performance would amount to penalizing the Plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to deny them the real fruits of a protracted litigation wherein the issues arising are being answered in their favour. From another perspective it may also indicate the inadequacies of the law to deal with the long delays that, at times, occur while rendering the final verdict in a given case. The aforesaid two features, at best, may justify award of additional compensation to the vendor by grant of a price higher than what had been stipulated in the agreement which price, in a given case, may even be the market price as on date of the order of the final Court. 42. Having given our anxious consideration to all relevant aspects of the case we are of the view that the ends of justice would require this Court to intervene and set aside the findings and conclusions recorded by the High Court of Delhi in R.F.A. No. 11/1984 and to decree the suit of the Plaintiffs for specific performance of the agreement dated 22.12.1970. We are of the further view that the sale deed that will now have to be executed by the Defendants in favour of the Plaintiffs will be for the market price of the suit property as on the date of the present order. As no material, whatsoever is available to enable us to make a correct assessment of the market value of the suit property as on date we request the learned trial judge of the High Court of Delhi to undertake the said exercise with such expedition as may be possible in the prevailing facts and circumstances.' 26. As no material, whatsoever is available to enable us to make a correct assessment of the market value of the suit property as on date we request the learned trial judge of the High Court of Delhi to undertake the said exercise with such expedition as may be possible in the prevailing facts and circumstances.' 26. Admittedly the agreement was entered into by and between the parties in the year 1996 while adducing evidence on 2nd February, 2007, PW-1 Sri Tarun Kr. Mukherjee, husband of the plaintiff stated that Rs. 4,00,000/- in the year 1996 could come to Rs. 12,00,000/- in 11 years. Therefore the said money would have increased manyfolds over the period of 15 years. In Jayakantham & Ors. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court awarded compensation in lieu of specific performance by directing intended seller who received a sum of Rs. 60,000/- in the month of June, 1999, out of total agreed amount of Rs. 1,60,000/- to pay sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- as compensation. The appellant in that case offered a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- towards compensation, having received a sum of Rs. 60,000/- in the month of June, 1999 from the respondent out of agreed consideration of Rs. 1,60,000/- which comes around 25 times of the amount received, or approximately 9.5 times of the agreed consideration money. Here in this case the consideration money was fixed at Rs. 4,15,000/- and if the appellants are asked to pay 9.5 times of the agreed consideration money as compensation to the respondent it would come to Rs. 39,42,500/-. We cannot expect the appellants to pay the said amount who did not lend support to their mother in distress. 27. In our view learned Trial Court was therefore, absolutely justified in exercising discretion conferred under Section 20 (c) of the Specific Relief Act in granting the decree for specific performance of contract. 28. In the given facts and circumstances of the case and taking lumen from the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court pronounced in the case of Satya Jain (supra) we consider it expedient to maintain the decree for Specific Performance of contract and in the interest of justice upon payment of Rs. 40,00,000/- towards consideration money. 29. At this stage we would like to refer to the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shub Karan Bubna @ Shub Karan Prasad Bubna vs. Sita Saran Bubna & Ors. 40,00,000/- towards consideration money. 29. At this stage we would like to refer to the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shub Karan Bubna @ Shub Karan Prasad Bubna vs. Sita Saran Bubna & Ors. reported in (2009) 9 SCC 689 wherein it is held:- '12. A litigant coming to court seeking relief is not interested in receiving a paper decree, when he succeeds in establishing his case. What he wants is relief. If it is a suit for money, he wants the money. If it is a suit for property, he wants the property. He naturally wonders why when he files a suit for recovery of money, he should first engage a lawyer and obtain a decree and then again engage a lawyer and execute the decree. Similarly, when he files a suit for partition, he wonders why he has to first secure a preliminary decree, then file an application and obtain a final decree and then file an execution to get the actual relief. The common-sensical query is: why not a continuous process? The litigant is perplexed as to why when a money decree is passed, the court does not fix the date for payment and if it is not paid, proceed with the execution; when a preliminary decree is passed in a partition suit, why the court does not forthwith fix a date for appointment of a Commissioner for division and make a final decree and deliver actual possession of his separated share. Why is it necessary for him to remind the court and approach the court at different stages?' 30. Mr. Sengupta, learned Senior Advocate submits that two sons of Smt. Amala Dutta are staying in the suit house. It is obvious that they may require some time to move out. Thus we want to strike a balance while giving the ultimate direction. 31. In fine the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court stands modified to the effect that the plaintiff/respondent shall deposit a sum of Rs. 40,00,000/- to the learned Trial Court within two months from this day with a notice upon the learned Advocate on record for the appellants. 31. In fine the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court stands modified to the effect that the plaintiff/respondent shall deposit a sum of Rs. 40,00,000/- to the learned Trial Court within two months from this day with a notice upon the learned Advocate on record for the appellants. The appellants shall execute and register the deed of sale within two months from the date of receipt of notice regarding deposit of money and deliver the possession of the suit property to the respondent, failing which the plaintiff/respondent will be at liberty to approach the learned Trial Court for execution of decree. Sale deed shall be executed, in that event, by the learned Trial Court according to law, immediately thereafter. 32. If the plaintiff/respondent fails to make such payment within two months as directed, the suit shall stand dismissed. Consequently the appeal is allowed in part, but without costs. Department is directed to send down the Lower Court Records immediately. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, should be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.