JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. A.C. Borbora, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Roy, learned senior counsel for the respondents in the FCI. 2. The petitioner who was appointed as a Manager (Accounts) as per the order of appointment dated 13.02.2012 in the respondent FCI was transferred as Manager (Accounts) to the FCI District Office at Banderdewa where he joined on 03.02.2015 and continued up to 31.03.2016. By the order dated 05.10.2016 of the Executive Director (NE) of the respondent FCI, the petitioner was placed under suspension with reference to a memorandum for major penalty dated 27.09.2016 for the acts of commission and omission as provided in the memorandum. The petitioner was also served a memorandum (UR-58) dated 27.09.2016 wherein he was at Sl. No. 2 of the list of charged officials provided in the memorandum. The memorandum provided that the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour for the purpose of the enquiry to be held was set out in the statement of charge which was enclosed as Annexure I to the memorandum. The memorandum also refers to a statement of imputation of misconduct in support of each of the articles of charge which was enclosed as Annexure II and further a list of documents and witnesses were also enclosed as Annexures III and IV. 3. The Annexure I statement of articles of charges contained thirteen articles. Article I was in respect of payment of advance by providing that during the course of a special audit investigation, it was found that advance payments were made by signing a cash voucher for the year 2014-15 without mentioning any date and also without any supporting documents. Article II pertained to non-compliance of ED (NE) advisory note and ignoring CAG observations wherein it was provided that there was a CAG observation that such advances be not paid under any circumstance to the handling and transport contractors in future. Article III pertained to the passing of bills based on fictitious work slips/work done certificates by referring to an investigation report which indicated that advance payments were released to the contractors without any bill and after that fictitious bills were sanctioned based on false work and while the bills were passed, the guidelines/SOP provided for the purpose were violated. Article III pertained to the passing of bills based on fictitious work slips/work done certificates by referring to an investigation report which indicated that advance payments were released to the contractors without any bill and after that fictitious bills were sanctioned based on false work and while the bills were passed, the guidelines/SOP provided for the purpose were violated. The Article further provided that it was the duty of the accounts section to verify the quantity of the bills with the stock accounts for the particular month. Article IV pertained to payment of higher claim of handling bills without verification of facts as no approval was recorded for re-stacking or re-filing of books wherein it is provided that no approval was given for restacking in the depots namely Anini, Roing, Kharsang, Deomali, Daporijo and Tezu. Article V pertained to adopting of different methodology for bill payment and provided that the officers/officials at FCI District Office at Banderdewa were well aware of the normal SOP and guidelines for processing and passing handling bills of contractors but while processing the bills of M/s Seyee Doyni Enterprises, there was a deviation from the normal procedure. Article VI pertained to payment of disproportionate handling claims with that of EPF deposit slips which provided that a test check of few EPF challans enclosed with some of the bills clearly contradicts the claim of the contractor of higher volume of operation. Article VII pertained to the late entries in the FAP and miscalculation of advance payment in FAP i.e. Books Of Accounts and provides that the accounts division of District Office at Banderdewa took the advance payments made to M/s Seyee Doyni Enterprises under the advance head instead of putting it under the handling expense head. Article VIII pertained to non-proportion of reconciliation statement and non-maintenance of essential accounts with division records wherein it was provided that the officials at FCI District Office at Banderdewa did not prepare any Bank Reconciliation Statement manually or through FAP and were not available for the special audit team. It also provided that some basic documents like bill passing registers, Depot wise MSA, cash book for the year 2014-15 and 2015-16 were not maintained in the District Office at Banderdewa. It also provided that some basic documents like bill passing registers, Depot wise MSA, cash book for the year 2014-15 and 2015-16 were not maintained in the District Office at Banderdewa. Article IX pertained to non-deduction of TDS from the payment of bill that the District Office at Banderdewa did not show the income paid to the contractor M/s Seyee Doyni Enterprise in the TDS return. Article X pertained to CC limit enhancement wherein it is provided that the FCI in the District Office at Banderdewa got its cash credit limits enhanced from 20 lakhs to 70 lakhs in a phased manner stating operational exigency on account of commissioning of Harmutti Railhead but no files or records were placed before the investigating team wherein the actual requirement to meet the expenditure of the newly operational Railhead at Harmutti was estimated or calculated. Article XI pertained to an excess payment of Rs. 34.13 lakhs to the transport contractors wherein it is provided that the District Office at Banderdewa and the Regional Office at Itanagar engaged transport contractors to carry stocks from Railhead Harmutti to FSD-Ziro, FSD-Daporijo, FSD-Pasighat during October, 2014 to April, 2015 and May 2015, but as no weighbridge was available in the Harmutti Railhead, the contractors were allowed to transport food grains via FSD-Banderdewa for weightment and the extra distances involved in transportation was 18 kilometres, and the Area Manager in the District Office at Banderdewa, in order to reduce the expense of transportation of extra 18 kilometres, engaged a private weighbridge operator and accordingly two of the contractors namely, M/s Seyee Doyni Enterprises and M/s T.K. Agencies were allowed extra 9 kilometres in addition to the actual distance. It further provided that the officers in the District Accounts Division at Banderdewa were responsible for suppressing the fact regarding excess distance claimed by the transport contractor and that the extra distance for engaging a private weighbridge at Harmutti ought to have been denied for payment. Article XII pertained to two fraudulent payments of Rs. 14.73 lakhs by allowing a higher rate to the transport contractors and that M/s Seyee Doyni Enterprises was allowed @ Rs. 14.8 per MT per KM rather than a new rate of Rs. 9.86 per MT per KM. Article XII pertained to two fraudulent payments of Rs. 14.73 lakhs by allowing a higher rate to the transport contractors and that M/s Seyee Doyni Enterprises was allowed @ Rs. 14.8 per MT per KM rather than a new rate of Rs. 9.86 per MT per KM. Article XIII pertained to non-reporting of gross irregularities to higher offices of FCI and provided that the charged officials had failed to serve the respondent FCI in an honest and faithful manner so as to safeguard its interest. The Annexure I statement of charges was also accompanied by the Annexure II statement of imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour in respect of the individual three charges. 4. Against the statement of charges and the statement of imputations/allegations the petitioner submitted his reply dated 29.01.2018. In his reply to Article I, the petitioner in his defence stated that during his tenure as a Manager (Accounts) at District Office at Banderdewa, he signed only one payment voucher in March 2015 and the voucher that was signed was a bill payment and not an advance payment 5. As regards, Article II, the petitioner took the stand that the ED(NE) Advisory and the CAG observations were not served to the accounts division and as Bandardewa did not have a proper internet connection, it was not possible for him to view such advisories through the internet. 6. With regards to Article III of passing of bills based on fictitious workslips and work done certificates, the petitioner took the stand that neither in the accounts manual nor in any circular there is a requirement of tallying of handling bills with monthly stock accounts and as the bills were coming to the accounts division after necessary checking by the operating division, the accounts division only checks for any arithmetical accuracy and other applicable statutory deductions and not on the correctness of such bill. 7. With regard to Article IV, the stand of the petitioner is that the restacking of the depots was done by the contract division and the accounts division has no role in such acts. 8. With regard to Article V, the petitioner took the stand that the charges made therein may be applicable to the operating division, inasmuchas, in the accounts division, the same methodology was followed in respect of all the contractors. 9. 8. With regard to Article V, the petitioner took the stand that the charges made therein may be applicable to the operating division, inasmuchas, in the accounts division, the same methodology was followed in respect of all the contractors. 9. With regard to Article VI, the petitioner took the stand that the handling and transporting contractors may employ labourers on monthly or daily fixed payment basis and it was not for the accounts division at the time of approving the bills of payment to verify the factual aspect as to how many labourers were employed by a contractor on a given day. 10. With regard to Article VII, the petitioner took the stand that there may have been some bill entries made but such entries were not fictitious and such discrepancies may have occurred due to low internet connectivity at Banderdewa. 11. Regarding Article VIII as regards non-production of Bank Reconciliation statement and non maintenance of essential divisional accounts records, the petitioner took the stand that on the relevant dates when the committee had visited the District Office at Banderdewa, the up-to-date document could not be shown because the internet was not responding for the purpose. 12. With regard to Article IX, the petitioner took the stand that as per Section 10 (26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, that for a tribal person working in a tribal State, there was no requirement of any deduction of TDS. 13. In respect of Article X on the allegation of enhancement of cash credit limit, the petitioner took the stand that the cash credit limit was increased in the months of December 2014 and January 2015 and he had joined the office subsequently and, therefore, not responsible. 14. As regards Article XI on excess payment of Rs. 34.13 lakhs to transport contractors, the petitioner took the stand that the actual distance covered by the transport contractors are required to be re-verified by the higher authorities as because most of the distances are calculated on the basis of google map rather than the actual verification specially in a hilly place like Arunachal Pradesh. 15. 34.13 lakhs to transport contractors, the petitioner took the stand that the actual distance covered by the transport contractors are required to be re-verified by the higher authorities as because most of the distances are calculated on the basis of google map rather than the actual verification specially in a hilly place like Arunachal Pradesh. 15. As regards Article XII fraudulent payment of Rs.14.73 lakhs it is the stand of the petitioner that the bills at the rate of 14.78 per KM was cleared through the operating division which also may be a clerical mistake in the said division, but the accounts division has nothing to do on the matter. 16. As regards Article XIII, regarding non-reporting of gross irregularities it is the stand of the petitioner that in respect of the annual accounts, under different heads of account, there was a correct reflection of the amounts under each head of expenditure and the same was duly forwarded to the higher authorities and was also certified by the CAG. 17. Be that as it may, in the resultant proceeding by the order dated 04.02.2019 of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner was dismissed from service on 04.02.2019. 18. In the concluding paragraph of the order dated 04.02.2019, it was the view formed by the Disciplinary Authority that the petitioner during his tenure as Manager (Accounts) at the District Office at Banderdewa, where bills and vouchers were placed before him for verification with available documents, had failed to perform his duties and responsibilities and accordingly upon such conclusion the Disciplinary Authority was of the view that the petitioner will no longer be required by the Corporation, therefore, the penalty of dismissal was imposed. 19. Being aggrieved this writ petition is instituted on the legal issues being raised that the statement of imputations/allegations as Annexures I and II respectively in the memorandum of charges dated 27.09.2016 are not specific to the petitioner and the factual events narrated therein are applicable in general to the FCI as a whole, rather than it being a specific allegation against the petitioner. 20. 20. A further contention is raised that in the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 04.02.2019, it was held that he was no longer required in service and therefore dismissed as being the Manager (Accounts) in the District Office at Banderdewa where he was required to exercise due diligence and deliberation while passing the bills and further he had failed to perform his duties and responsibilities which resulted in payments being made without any justification. 21. The conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority that the delinquent employee is no longer required is also assailed by the petitioner by raising the contention that such conclusion may at the best could have resulted in a compulsory retirement where the employer employee relationship may be severed and unless there are specific instances of misconduct being proved that the petitioner by taking advantage of his position as a Manager (Accounts) had also indulged upon acts by which he would be personally enriched by the transactions, a punishment of dismissal from service would be disproportionate. 22. A further contention is also raised that the petitioner having duly explained the charges and allegations made against him in his reply dated 29.01.2018 the same was not given its due consideration, either in the enquiry report, or in the order of the Disciplinary Authority resulting in the order of dismissal. 23. To substantiate the contention that the statement of charges and the statement of imputation of allegations were not specific in the instant case and therefore the entire proceeding itself is vitiated, Mr. AC Borbora, learned senior counsel for the petitioner relies upon a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sawai Singh–vs-State of Rajasthan, reported in (1986) 3 SCC 454 , wherein in paragraph 16, it had been provided that charges involving the consequence of termination of service must be specific although a departmental enquiry is not like a criminal trial. Paragraph 16 of Sawai Singh(supra)is extracted below:- 16. Paragraph 16 of Sawai Singh(supra)is extracted below:- 16. It has been observed by this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. [ (1970) 3 SCC 548 : AIR 1971 SC 752 : (1971) 3 SCR 1 ] that charges involving consequences of termination of service must be specific, though a departmental enquiry is not like a criminal trial as was noted by this Court in the case of State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 : (1964) 2 Lab LJ 150] and as such there is no such rule that an offence is not established unless it is proved beyond doubt. But in a departmental enquiry entailing consequences like loss of job which nowadays means loss of livelihood, there must be fair play in action; in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an employee, there must be investigations to the charges consistent with the requirement of the situation in accordance with the principles of natural justice insofar as these are applicable in a particular situation. 24. Further reliance is made on the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anant RKulkarni vs Y.P. Education Society & Ors, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515 , wherein in paragraph 15 taking note of its earlier judgment in Surath Chandra Chakravarty v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 , wherein it had been held that it is not permissible to hold enquiry on vague charges as the same do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an effective defence as he will be unaware of the exact nature of the allegations against him, arrived at its conclusion that the specific content of a charge is the requirement of providing a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly by projecting his own imagination discover all the facts and circumstance that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. 25. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly by projecting his own imagination discover all the facts and circumstance that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. 25. In paragraph 16 of Anant R Kulkarni(supra), it is provided that where the statement of charges is accompanied by the statement of facts and allegations, where the statement of charges is not specific, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts and allegations, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the statement of charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. It further provides that even if the delinquent does not take the defence or make the protest that the charges are vague that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for the reasons that there must be fair play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of the accusation and therefore the charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of the charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of Anant R Kulkarni(supra) are extracted below:- “15. In Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. [ (1970) 3 SCC 548 : AIR 1971 SC 752 ] this Court held, that it is not permissible to hold an enquiry on vague charges, as the same do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an effective defence as he will be unaware of the exact nature of the allegations against him, and what kind of defence he should put up for rebuttal thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 553, para 5) “5. … The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the specific contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him.” 16. Where the charge-sheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the charge-sheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a chargesheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The evidence adduced should not be perfunctory; even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. 26. Further reliance is placed on the proposition laid down in paragraph 9 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Transport Commissioner –vs- A. Radha Krishna Moorthy, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 332 , wherein a reading of the charges had shown that they are not specific and clear and it do not clearly point out the precise charge which the delinquent was expected to meet, but the same can still be saved if the charges are being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statements furnishing the particulars of the charges. Paragraph 9 further provides that if the charges are general in nature to the effect that the delinquent along with eight other officials indulged in misappropriation by falsification of account, what part did the delinquent played and which account he had falsified or which amount he had individually or together with other named persons misappropriated are not particularised, the charge would be a general charge and it cannot be the basis for sustaining a charge against the delinquent. Paragraph 9 of Transport Commissioner (supra) is extracted below:- 9. Insofar as the vagueness of the charges is concerned we find that it deserves acceptance. It is asserted by Shri Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for the respondent that except the memo of charges dated 4-6-1989, no other particulars of charges or supporting particulars were supplied. This assertion could not be denied by the learned counsel for the appellant. A reading of charges would show that they are not specific and clear. They do not point out clearly the precise charge against the respondent, which he was expected to meet. One can understand the charges being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statement furnishing the particulars of the aforesaid charges but that was not done. The charges are general in nature to the effect that the respondent along with eight other officials indulged in misappropriation by falsification of accounts. What part did the respondent play, which account did he falsify or help falsify, which amount did he individually or together with other named persons misappropriate, are not particularised. The charge is a general one. It is significant to notice that respondent has been objecting to the charges on the ground of vagueness from the earliest stage and yet he was not furnished with the particulars. It is brought to our notice that respondent's name was not included in the schedule appended to GOMs 928 dated 25-4-1988 mentioning the names of officials responsible for falsification of accounts and misappropriation and that he is also not made an accused in the criminal proceedings initiated in that behalf. 27. Mr. It is brought to our notice that respondent's name was not included in the schedule appended to GOMs 928 dated 25-4-1988 mentioning the names of officials responsible for falsification of accounts and misappropriation and that he is also not made an accused in the criminal proceedings initiated in that behalf. 27. Mr. PK Roy, learned senior counsel for the respondent FCI on the other hand relies upon the proposition in paragraph 10 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anant R Kulkarni (supra), wherein it is provided that where the statement of charges is being accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations where the statement of charges is not specific, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts and allegations, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated and that what is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of the accusation. 28. Mr. PK Roy, learned senior counsel for the respondent FCI also refers to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balbir Chand –vs- Food Corporation of India Ltd and others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 371 , wherein in paragraph 4, it had been provided that in respect of a disciplinary proceeding in the FCI, a common proceeding can also be initiated against two or more of the employees and further by referring to a circular dated 13.05.1980, it would be advisable to issue one common charge-sheet against all the charged officials. Paragraph 4 of Balbir Chand (supra) is extracted below:- 4. It is next contended that a circular was issued by the Department on 13-5-1980 regarding splitting up of an enquiry and while para 2 indicates the procedure to be followed, para 3(ii) indicates as to when the split of the case could be ordered and sub-para (iii) envisages that it would be advisable to issue one common charge-sheet against all the charged officials. It is further envisaged in the Department's Circular thus: “Whenever common proceedings are initiated against two or more than two FCI employees, such common proceedings have to be ordered by the disciplinary authority competent to impose the major penalty of dismissal upon the seniormost FCI employee involved in that case. It is further envisaged in the Department's Circular thus: “Whenever common proceedings are initiated against two or more than two FCI employees, such common proceedings have to be ordered by the disciplinary authority competent to impose the major penalty of dismissal upon the seniormost FCI employee involved in that case. This naturally means that the enquiring authority would submit his report of enquiry in such common proceedings to that particular disciplinary authority, for final orders in the case thereby depriving the junior officials involved of one or more avenues of appeals as also petition for review. In case of such common proceedings, if the enquiry report or a copy thereof is forwarded to the lower disciplinary authorities, competent to impose penalties upon such junior officials, it has in several instances resulted in imposition of varying punishments by different authorities to different individuals on the same charges. This position has been carefully examined with reference to the various instructions issued by the Government of India in this regard and it has been decided to follow the guidelines mentioned hereunder: (i) There has been an apprehension as to the actual meaning of common proceedings and joint proceedings. It is hereby clarified that the terms “common proceedings” and “joint proceedings” are synonymous and in fact there is no difference between the two. (ii) Whenever two or more employees are involved in a particular disciplinary proceedings and when one charged official cites the other as a witness in his case, the proceedings cannot be conducted as common/joint proceedings. In such contingencies, the general principles laid down by the courts is that the charged official in cross-cases should be tried separately and that both the enquiries should he held simultaneously, so as to avoid conflicting findings and different appraisal of the same evidence, by different enquiring authorities. (iii) While initiating common proceedings it would be remembered that such proceedings should be ordered only as a last resort and in case such proceedings are ordered, the charge should be also common against all the charged officials involved. In other words, it would be advisable to issue one common charge-sheet against all the charged officials. The disciplinary authority concerned should examine the desirability of conducting a common enquiry before taking a decision in this regard so that the issue of separate charge-sheets could be avoided. In other words, it would be advisable to issue one common charge-sheet against all the charged officials. The disciplinary authority concerned should examine the desirability of conducting a common enquiry before taking a decision in this regard so that the issue of separate charge-sheets could be avoided. After the enquiry is over in common proceedings, the disciplinary authority concerned should take a decision against the charged employees of considering the gravity of the misconduct by such of the officials concerned. However, cases of all the officials should be disposed of by the authority ordering the common proceedings to ensure that same standards are applied in case of all the officials concerned.” 29. Accordingly, it is the contention of Mr. PK Roy, learned senior counsel for the respondent FCI that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balbir Chand (supra) having upheld the circular of the FCI providing for a common statement of charges, in the instant case also nine delinquents were issued the common statement of charges and therefore the common statement of charges would be permissible in law. 30. From the propositions laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the afore-extracted judgments, what is discernible is that it would not be permissible to hold an enquiry on vague charges as the same do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an effective defence as he would be unaware of the exact nature of the allegations against him and therefore the statement of charges or the statement of facts and allegations have to be specific on the charge. But if the charge itself is specific as per the statement of facts and allegations accompanying the statement of charges and it depicts the specific fact based upon which the charges are made, still the vagueness of the statement of charges may be saved as both the documents are considered to constitute a same document. It is further explained that the requirement of the statement of charges and the statements of facts and allegations to be specific is whether it satisfies the requirement that the delinquent knew about the nature of the accusation so as to give his reply. In the premises of the aforesaid propositions laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we examine the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations involved in the present writ petition. 31. In the premises of the aforesaid propositions laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we examine the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations involved in the present writ petition. 31. A reading of the statement of charges makes it discernible that the charges were divided into 13 articles and it pertains to certain transactions that took place in the year 2014-15, although in the later part of the statement of charges incidents pertaining to 2012 were also referred. One of the facts referred to make out the charge against the petitioner is that certain payments were made as advance by signing a cash voucher by the concerned Dealing Assistant, Manager (A/Cs) and Area Manager during the year 2014-15 without mentioning the date in the voucher. The said Article is supported by the statement of facts and allegations which refers to certain instances of release of advance of various accounts by referring to letters dated 03.04.2012, 11.07.2012 and 07.12.2012 respectively, which were sanctioned by the Area Manager of the District Office at Banderdewa. 32. On one hand the statement of charges refers to advance being paid during the year 2014, where it is supported by the statement of facts and allegations that it refers to some advance being paid to some contractors as per letters of the year 2012 and that too which were sanctioned by the Area Manager of the District Office at Banderdewa. 33. Reading the Article, no specific charge is noticeable against the petitioner about his complicity in doing any of the acts referred in the Article. 34. Article II of the statement of charges is in respect of certain advance payments being made by the accounts division whereas the statement of facts and allegations in respect of Article II refers to certain advisory and CAG observation being made as regards the malpractice of making advance payments to some contractors and that such malpractices continued till a certain Area Manager was released from the District Office at Banderdewa. Article II also does not refer to any specific allegation or imputation against the writ petitioner. 35. Article II also does not refer to any specific allegation or imputation against the writ petitioner. 35. Article III refers to release of advance payment to contractors without any bills and after the release of the amounts, fictitious bills based on false work done certificates were put in place, whereas the statement of facts and allegations against the Article III refers to certain bills, the analysis of which, revealed that the total number of bags shown in the bills exceeded the total number of bags as per the MSA and therefore the bills were understood to be in excess over the actual work done. But the statement of facts and allegations merely provides that had the accounts division been vigilant and dedicated towards their respective duties and made the efforts to verify the bills and the documents, the difference between the total numbers of bags could have been detected. 36. The reply of the petitioner was that there was no circular or any accounts manual that was in circulation at that relevant point of time which required the accounts department to tally the information provided in the bills with that of the other records before any such bill can be passed and that it was the duty of the other departments through which the bills were processed to cross check the contents of the bills. 37. But what is noticeable is that the bills referred in the statement of facts and allegations corresponding to Article III are in respect of the depots at Deomali, Anini, Roing and Tezu and there is nothing on record to indicate that the matters related to such places were also handled by the District Office at Banderdewa. 38. Article IV in the statement of charges refers to certain restacking and refilling of bags in depots in Anini, Roing, Kharsangh, Deomali, Darporijo and Tezu and the statement of facts and allegations provides that the bills that were submitted refers to higher number of bags than in comparison to the total capacity of the depots. The reply of the petitioner to such allegation, is that the accounts department is not related with the restacking and refilling of bags. 39. The reply of the petitioner to such allegation, is that the accounts department is not related with the restacking and refilling of bags. 39. Article V refers to adapting of different methodology for bill payment but a reading of the statement of charges as well as the statement of facts and allegations do not indicate any specific charges being brought against the petitioner. 40. Similarly a reading of the charges in Articles VI to XIII also does not make it discernable that there had been any specific charge or allegation against the petitioner and that any such act on the part of the petitioner can be construed to be a misconduct. 41. From the point of view of the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations in Annexure I and Annexure II to the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.09.2016, a conclusion can be drawn that in respect of the petitioner Mayur Dutta, no specific charge or allegation is discernable, which if accepted in its face value, may lead to a conclusion that there is any misconduct against him. All that the charges and allegations reveal are that certain activities had taken place within the FCI in the district of Banderdewa, amongst others, where excessive bills were passed in respect of certain contractors, where again no specific information as regards the bill date and the nature of the excessive bills are discernable and such bills were also passed through the accounts department and therefore, the Manager (Accounts) would also be liable for not performing his duty in the required manner. 42. As the acts alleged have taken place in a wholesome manner over a period of time, it is the stand of the respondents in the FCI that based upon the Circular dated 13/5/1980 as upheld by the Supreme Court in Balbir Chand (supra), it is permissible on the part of the FCI to have a common disciplinary proceeding against multiple employees inasmuch as all of them may have been involved in the misconduct in such proceeding. 43. Fundamentally, we are in agreement with Mr. P K Roy, learned senior counsel for the FCI that a common disciplinary proceeding can also be held in respect of multiple employees. 43. Fundamentally, we are in agreement with Mr. P K Roy, learned senior counsel for the FCI that a common disciplinary proceeding can also be held in respect of multiple employees. But again it by itself will not enable the respondents in the FCI to give a go by to the requirement of law that the statements of charges and the statement of facts and allegations, either or both, should contain the specific charges or allegations, which are understood by the delinquent concerned i.e. as to what is the exact charges against a given particular delinquent. The said aspect is also discernible from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Balbir Chand (supra) inasmuch as in paragraph 2 of the judgment, the factual background of the matter before the Supreme Court was taken note that the delinquent while working as a Manager in the Food Corporation of India, Chandigarh Office, one Rajinder Singh Rana had impersonated himself as Harjit Singh son of Ajit Singh and succeeded in obtaining a contract with the Corporation for the year 1992-93 for transportation of the food grains and that it was the duty of the delinquent therein to verify the particulars furnished along with the tender bills of the person concerned, more particularly on the fact that Harjit Singh son of Ajit Singh was in fact none other than Rajinder Singh Rana who on a prior occasion misappropriated 1400 MT of superfine rice delivered to him. 44. The said charge in the matter before the Supreme Court was a clear and specific allegation against the delinquent concerned as to what were the charges against him. In the aforesaid circumstance, the Supreme Court approved that if the charges are specific to the delinquent concerned but the event also involved participation of some other employees, a joint disciplinary proceeding can also be held. But merely, because a joint disciplinary proceeding is permissible, it itself does not mean that the requirement of having a specific allegation either in the statement of charges or in the statement of facts and allegations have been given a go by. 45. A further submission is made by Mr. But merely, because a joint disciplinary proceeding is permissible, it itself does not mean that the requirement of having a specific allegation either in the statement of charges or in the statement of facts and allegations have been given a go by. 45. A further submission is made by Mr. P K Roy, learned senior counsel for the FCI that although the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations made have been vague to some extent but a reading of the list of documents included in the Memorandum would have made it discernible to the delinquent employee as to what are the exact charges against him. 46. The said submission would be difficult to accept under the law inasmuch as the list of documents and the list of witnesses are only in support of the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations and are not a part of the charges or allegations requiring the delinquent to go through all the documents and then arrive at his own conclusion as to what may be the specific charges. 47. In the instant case, as a reading of the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations does not make it discernable as to what are the specific charges and allegations against the petitioner, we are of the view that the disciplinary proceeding initiated pursuant to the statement of charges at Annexure I and statement of facts and allegations at Annexure II to the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.09.2016 would be vitiated and not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.09.2016 containing the statement of charges as Annexure I and dated 27.09.2016 as Annexure II in respect of the petitioner Mayur Dutta are set aside and consequence thereof, all such further proceedings that may have taken place, including the enquiry and the impugned order of dismissal dated 04.02.2019 as well as the further appellate order dated 26.07.2019 are also set aside. 48. 48. As the entire proceedings was pursuant to the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.09.2016, containing the statement of charges at Annexure I and statement of facts and allegations at Annexure II, as well as the further consequent orders are set aside, we are not required to go into the contention that the reply given by the petitioner to the Memorandum of Charges were not given its due consideration as well as the contention that order of dismissal from service was disproportionate to the charges that the petitioner had not diligently performed his duty and therefore, required an order of dismissal which is disproportionate to the conclusion is also not gone into. 49. We have also taken note of the provisions in paragraph 13 of the Supreme Court in Anant R. Kulkarni (supra), which is extracted as below: “13. It is a settled legal proposition that once the court sets aside an order of punishment on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the court should not severely preclude the employer from holding the inquiry in accordance with law. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and to conclude the same in accordance with law. However, resorting to such a course depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in view of this that courts/tribunals are not competent to quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings before the same are concluded on the aforementioned grounds. (Vide ECIL v. B. Karunakar [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704 : AIR 1994 SC 1074 ] , Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls [ (2002) 10 SCC 293 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1033] , U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey [ (2005) 8 SCC 264 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 78] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu [ (2008) 12 SCC 30 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 126 : AIR 2009 SC 161 ] .)” 50. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey [ (2005) 8 SCC 264 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 78] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu [ (2008) 12 SCC 30 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 126 : AIR 2009 SC 161 ] .)” 50. A reading of the afore-extracted proposition makes it discernable that when the Court sets aside the order of punishment on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court should not preclude the employer from holding the proceeding in accordance with law and it may remand the matter to be continued from the stage from which it stood vitiated and interfered. 51. We provide that having set aside the disciplinary proceeding as well as the order of punishment, we do not preclude the respondent authorities, if so advised, to proceed against the petitioner but any such proceeding should be strictly as per law. 52. However, the consequence the order of dismissal being set aside would be that the petitioner would now be an employee of the FCI and we leave it open to the authorities in the FCI to decide as to what would be the status and entitlement of the petitioner as an employee of the FCI during the intervening period. The reasoned order thereon be passed by the authorities within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Writ petition stands allowed as indicated above.