JUDGMENT 1. This is an Appeal under Sec. 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 ('the Act') by the appellant-Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. questioning the legality of the judgment rendered in FWCA No. 02 of 2004 on 19/07/2006 by Commissioner, under the Act, Bhandara directing the appellant and others jointly and severally liable to pay compensation of Rs.2,43,300.00 with interest @ 12% per annum from the date till due payment. 2. The applicant No.1 is widow of late Yogesh Gadhave, who was working with the non-applicant No.3 on the post of 'Tipper driver' on monthly salary of Rs.2500.00. Applicant No.2 is the son of applicant No.1. 3. According to applicant-wife, deceased workman was on duty on 15/09/2003 and at about 3-00 a.m. he expired in the premises of Sunflag factory. The work of deceased was to drive the Tipper to collect raw and finished material and to reach it to the different concerning department. On the day of incident due to stress and strain of work he suffered mental, physical and bodily strain and after vomiting blood from his mouth he died. This clearly was because of personal injury in incident arising out of and in course of employment and thus there is a casual connection between the employment and the death. 4. According to applicants, since they are dependent on the deceased-workman, therefore, they are entitled for the compensation amount of Rs.3,69,487.00 by way of compensation. 5. Non applicant Nos. 1 and 2 resisted the application by filing reply (Exh. 7-B) and denied that the death of the workman occurred due to bodily injury during the course of his employment. According to them, the postmortem report does not show any injury on the person of the deceased and no definite opinion has been given by the doctor, who conducted the postmortem. Therefore, the application filed by the applicants deserves to be dismissed with costs, concluded nonapplicants. 6. Non applicant No.4-Insurance Company also contested the application by filing its written statement (Exh. 23) and denied all the contentions raised in the application including the employment of the workman. 7. After hearing both the parties, the Commissioner directed nonapplicant Nos. 2 to 4 to pay the applicants jointly and severally in the sum of Rs.2,43,300.00. Therefore, the present Appeal. 8. Mr. 23) and denied all the contentions raised in the application including the employment of the workman. 7. After hearing both the parties, the Commissioner directed nonapplicant Nos. 2 to 4 to pay the applicants jointly and severally in the sum of Rs.2,43,300.00. Therefore, the present Appeal. 8. Mr. Mirza, learned Counsel for the appellant, submits that there is no evidence on record to show that the death occurred because of the injury sustained in and during the course of employment. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the postmortem report to substantiate his submission. According to learned Counsel, there is no evidence on record to show that the deceased-workman died due to heart attack and this being so the learned Commissioner was wrong in allowing the application. Learned Counsel placed reliance in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v/s. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Anr. AIR 2007 SC 248 , Jyothi Ademma v/s. Plant Engineer, Nellore and Anr. AIR 2006 SC 2830 and Smt. Ashabai Bhimrao Bomborde and Ors. v/s. The Divisional Controller First Appeal No. 497 of 2017 dtd. 22/01/2019 (Bombay High Court) . 9. Mr. Choudhari, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment and order and also placed reliance in Mst. Param Pal Singh through father v/s M/s. National Insurance Co. and Anr. AIR 2013 Supreme Court 974 . 10. Sec. 3 of the Act carves out the circumstances under which the employer is liable for employees compensation. 1 and 2, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment and order and also placed reliance in Mst. Param Pal Singh through father v/s M/s. National Insurance Co. and Anr. AIR 2013 Supreme Court 974 . 10. Sec. 3 of the Act carves out the circumstances under which the employer is liable for employees compensation. Sec. 3(1) reads thus:- "Employer's liability for compensation (1) If personal injury is caused to a employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable- (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the employee for a period exceeding [three] days; (b) in respect of any [injury, not resulting in death [or permanent total disablement] caused by] an accident which is directly attributable to- (I) the employee having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the wilful disobedience of the employee to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of employee, or (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the employee of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of employee. " Following expressions used in the Ss. are noteworthy.:- (1) personal injury, (2) accident and (3) arising out of and in the course of employment. One cannot dispute that death is a personal injury and if it has occurred by heart attack then it is an accident is now well established by series of judicial pronouncements. 11. In the instant case, there is no dispute to the fact that the death in the instance case had taken place in the course of employment only. What needs to be determined is that whether the death in question arose during the course of employment or not. 12. Applicant No.1 i.e. widow of the deceased-workman stated in her evidence (Exh. 32) that her husband was driver with respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and used to transport raw and finished material from one place to another on a Tipper. Since the Tipper was always used to be loaded he was required to change gears frequently. 12. Applicant No.1 i.e. widow of the deceased-workman stated in her evidence (Exh. 32) that her husband was driver with respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and used to transport raw and finished material from one place to another on a Tipper. Since the Tipper was always used to be loaded he was required to change gears frequently. Having regard to the nature of work, he was always on the mental and physical stress and accordingly he used to tell her. On the day of incident because of the heavy work load and also because of physical and mental stress he started vomiting blood and died. I may note here that it was her second affidavit (Exh.32) and there is noting in her cross-examination. However, during the course of arguments learned counsel for appellant invited my attention to her first affidavit (Exh. 15) and more particularly, crossexamination wherein she admitted that her husband died of natural death. In my considered opinion, this being a stray statement much could not be read from the said statement inasmuch as admittedly the wife was not at the place of employment. There is no dispute from the side of respondents and more particularly, in the pleadings and as also cross-examination that, on the day of incident the deceased-workman had vomited blood at the place of employment. 13. The applicants have also examined the witness in support of their case. The witness is Laxmichand Ramdas Padole (Exh.33), who at the relevant time, was working with the deceased-workman. He also supports the version of applicant-wife in respect of physical and mental stress in view of the nature of job undertaken by the deceased-workman. He also stated in his substantive evidence that because of vomiting of blood the deceased-workman died. Except general denials in the crossexamination there is nothing to impeach his testimony. 14. As against above, the non-applicant Nos. 1 to 3 examined Mr. Narendrasingh s/o Ramghulamsingh Bhuwal (Exh. 36). He stated in his evidence that the deceased-workman died on 15/09/2003 at about 3-00 a.m. and the death was natural. According to him, as per postmortem report no bodily injury was seen on the body of deceased-workman. 15. I have gone through the postmortem report (Exh. 19). Admittedly, the column No. 17 of the said postmortem report shows that no external injuries were seen on the body of the deceased-workman. According to him, as per postmortem report no bodily injury was seen on the body of deceased-workman. 15. I have gone through the postmortem report (Exh. 19). Admittedly, the column No. 17 of the said postmortem report shows that no external injuries were seen on the body of the deceased-workman. The opinion as to the probable cause of death was also reserved till the report of chemical analysis. Surprisingly, the findings of the chemical analysis were not produced before the Commissioner. This being so, it cannot be said, as is claimed by the non-applicant's witness in his evidence, that the deceased-workman died natural death. There is no evidence to that effect. One must not lost sight of the fact that the deceased-workman had suffered vomiting of blood followed by death. This has certainly to do with his nature of employment. In this regard the observations of learned Commissioner in para 19 of the impugned judgment and order appear to be quite probable and cannot be termed as perverse or against the material on record. 16. Merely because the postmortem report does not show the cause of death, does not in any manner relieve the non-applicants from proving that there was no proximate nexus between the death and nature of employment of the deceased-workman. 17. In Shakuntala Chandrakant Shresthi (supra) it has been held that the factors to be established to prove that an accident has taken place must have been culled out and stated as under ( para 26): 1. stress and strain arising during the course of employment 2. nature of employment. 3. injury aggravated due to stress and strain. 18. I have already gone through the evidence and pointed out the nature of job performed by deceased-workman which certainly included stress and strain and inasmuch as he was required to transport raw and finished loaded material in his Tipper from one destination to another. What should engage attention, at the cost of repetition, is that during and in the course of employment he vomited blood which was directly connected with the stress and strain suffered by him during the course of employment and this could fairly be inferred by preponderance of probability particularly when there is nothing coming against the said probability. 19. What should engage attention, at the cost of repetition, is that during and in the course of employment he vomited blood which was directly connected with the stress and strain suffered by him during the course of employment and this could fairly be inferred by preponderance of probability particularly when there is nothing coming against the said probability. 19. In Param Pal Singh (Supra) it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that the deceased being a professional heavy vehicle driver when undertakes the job of such driving as his regular avocation it can be safely held that such constant driving of heavy vehicle, being dependent solely upon his physical and mental resources and endurance, there was every reason to assume that the vocation of driving was a material contributory factor if not the sole cause that accelerated his unexpected death to occur which in all fairness should be held to be an untoward mishap in his life span. Such an 'untoward mishap' can therefore be reasonably described as an 'accident' as having been caused solely attributable to the nature of employment indulged in with his employer which was in the course of such employer's trade or business. 20. In the case in hand, I have already pointed out the nature of employment undertaken by the deceased-workman. I have also pointed out about the untoward incident attributable to the nature of employment indulged in with his employer leading to vomiting of blood immediately before his death. This being so, the incident certainly and can therefore, reasonably be described as an incident as having been caused solely attributable to the nature of employment indulged in with his employer which was in the course of such employer's trade or business. 21. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the judgment of learned Commissioner in the FWCA No. 02 of 2004 which is required to be confirmed. Hence, the following order: ORDER 22. First Appeal No. 1070 of 2008 stands dismissed with no order as to costs.