JUDGMENT : OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J. 1. Heard Sri Vishwajeet Rai, Advocate holding brief of Sri Kripa Shankar Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the State authorities and Sri Kumar Ayush, learned counsel representing the Lucknow Development Authority. 2. By instituting these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-Kripa Shanker Singh has prayed that the opposite party nos. 1 to 4 may be directed for registry of House No. M/213/G, L.D.A. Colony, Kanpur Road Yojna, Lucknow in his favour. Further, the petitioner has also prayed that the registry of the said house may not be done in favour of opposite party no. 7. Although the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow and the Station House Officer, Police Station Ashiyana, District Lucknow have been arrayed as opposite party nos. 5 and 6 respectively, however, no prayer has been made by the petitioner against them. 3. The case set up by the petitioner in the writ petition is that one Smt. Kavita Singh was issued a letter dated 22nd January, 1992 informing her that her application dated 03.01.1992 was accepted by the Lucknow Development Authority for allotment of Plot No. A/863/I, L.D.A. Colony, Kanpur Road Yojna, Lucknow. It seems thereafter the said Smt. Kavita Singh has applied for alternate plot to the Lucknow Development Authority, which was allowed vide an order dated 13.09.1996 and as such an alternate property being M/213/G, was allotted to said Smt. Kavita Singh for and in place of the earlier plot in the same locality. The petitioner has relied on a document dated 23.09.1996 issued by L.D.A. informing the said Kavita Singh that the petitioner’s request and affidavit have been accepted by them and as such the plot allotted was allowed to be transferred to the petitioner on the same terms and conditions. It is the further case of the petitioner that subsequently a “Hire purchase agreement” was executed in his favour by L.D.A. on 25.09.1996 for the said property number M/213/G for a consideration of Rs. 2,63,900/- on hire purchase basis and pursuant to which he was also issued a possession letter dated 25.09.1996 for the said property. The tenure for the said hire purchase agreement was 20 years and it was expected that L.D.A. would execute the sale deed for the said plot after the completion of the said tenure of hire purchase agreement. 4. 2,63,900/- on hire purchase basis and pursuant to which he was also issued a possession letter dated 25.09.1996 for the said property. The tenure for the said hire purchase agreement was 20 years and it was expected that L.D.A. would execute the sale deed for the said plot after the completion of the said tenure of hire purchase agreement. 4. It is the further case of the petitioner that the actual possession was given to him by the L.D.A. on 27.09.1996 by the Engineer concerned. The petitioner relied on an unverified computer sheet purported to be a report dated 15.10.2005, estimated for registry by the L.D.A. depicting a payment of Rs. 51,700/- made against the property in question and narrating the installment information relating to the said property. The learned counsel also relied on an internal register/document purported to be of L.D.A. wherein name of the petitioner is reflected at serial no. 61 and various payments to have been made, although dates of payments are mentioned in the said extract of register but no dates have been mentioned therein. The learned counsel referring to the said documents has argued that since the name of the petitioner finds mentions in the records of the L.D.A. he should be construed as the only rightful owner of the property M/213/G, L.D.A. Colony, Kanpur Road Yojna, Lucknow. 5. The learned counsel continuing with his arguments vociferously went on to submit and rely on several documents relating to the raising and payment of house tax, water tax and electricity bills raised by the concerned Department and paid by the petitioner over a passage of time to further his argument relating to the petitioner being the rightful allottee of the property in question. Further, an internal document of the L.D.A. relating to a list of plot/building numbers and the allotees name, for which it was proposed to open a duplicate application for registration purpose as on 23.12.2008 has also been relied upon by the petitioner. However, the next document brought to the notice of this Court shows that although the petitioner’s name is registered in the computer sheet printed and annexed as Annexure-18 to the writ petition, but there is no explanation as to why the registration and issue date of the said registration is 17.01.1984, when actually the plot was not even in existence. 6. 6. The petitioner has vehemently relied on the form for registration for one time settlement (O.T.S.) filled by the petitioner on 02.12.2008, wherein the date of allotment has been mentioned as 13.09.1996 to explain that there was some discrepancy in the registration and the issue date, however, again we are not able to find any document on record, which would show that any objection had been filed by the petitioner with the L.D.A. for correcting the said error. In fact, it is the other way around, wherein the petitioner vide letter dated 10.12.2009 although has represented the L.D.A. for considering the O.T.S. by mentioning the opening of the duplicate application for registration purpose, however any mention of the correction in the computer record was conspicuously absent. It is seen that the petitioner had been giving series of representations in similar manner as is apparent from the letter dated 25.04.2010, 27.01.2012 but without any results, although the petitioner was made to deposit Rs. 26,000/- with the L.D.A. for processing and administrative fees on 27.02.2012, Rs. 50,000/- on 14.06.2012, Rs. 45,000/- on 21.10.2013. Consequently, it is the case of the petitioner that he has also got sent a complaint to the Director General of Police, Lucknow relating to some named property dealers and some unidentified persons approaching him and intimidating to vacate the property as purportedly these new persons have told him that they have purchased the plot in question from the Lucknow Development Authority. These letters dated 19.10.2013 was alleged followed by another letter dated 21.10.2013 to the L.D.A. and 31.10.2013 to the Secretary, L.D.A. It is the case of the petitioner that since the opposite parties did not heed to his request, he was left with no alternative but to file the present writ petition. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite parties no. 1 to 6 appeared on advance notice and as such notice was issued to the opposite parties no. 7 on 20.11.2013, wherein all the parties were directed to file their counter affidavit and rejoinder thereto and status-quo with regard to possession of plot in question was directed to be maintained. 8. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite parties no. 1 to 6 appeared on advance notice and as such notice was issued to the opposite parties no. 7 on 20.11.2013, wherein all the parties were directed to file their counter affidavit and rejoinder thereto and status-quo with regard to possession of plot in question was directed to be maintained. 8. The assertions made in the writ petition have categorically been denied by the Lucknow Development Authority in the counter affidavit filed by the O.S.D. Lucknow Development Authority, wherein they specifically mention that the petitioner was not the alltotee of House No. M/213/G, Kanpur Road, L.D.A. Colony, Lucknow and he was never allotted the said house. They have denied having given any possession. It was mentioned that the computer generated receipt (Anneuxre-1) is in the name of opposite party no. 7 (Vishwambhar Nath Dubey) is of dated 20.09.2004 and it does not have any bearing to the petition as the opposite party no. 7 has no relation with the petitioner. They further stated on affidavit that the documents filed by the petitioner are forged and no agreement of any nature was executed by them with the petitioner. The authority has stated in its affidavit that no receipt has been filed by the petitioner under the cash sale procedure which could establish registration of the said plot in favour of the petitioner because as per their contention and as per the Rules, without registration, allotment of plot is not possible. They raised doubt on the filing of Anneuxre-4 filed in the writ petition, which according to them was an advance payment of one shop in paper mill and as such verification cannot be done by them. The L.D.A. has also stated that in the cash sale allotment scheme, the registration cost was 10% of the sale consideration and until such registration by depositing 10% of the sale consideration is not made it was not possible for any allotment under the law. The L.D.A. has also raised an issue relating to possession and mutation not being in favour of Smt. Kavita Singh and as such they submit that since Kavita Singh was not given possession or her name was not mutated, how she could have transferred the property in question to the petitioner. 9. The L.D.A. has also raised an issue relating to possession and mutation not being in favour of Smt. Kavita Singh and as such they submit that since Kavita Singh was not given possession or her name was not mutated, how she could have transferred the property in question to the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for L.D.A. has also highlighted the aspect that as per the identity card annexed with the writ petition, the petitioner’s birth year was depicted as 1983 and in case the execution of the document was proposed to be found correct, the same was not legally tenable and void as the petitioner was merely 13 years in the year 1996 and as such any document signed by him does not hold any legal sanctity. The counsel for the L.D.A. has also drawn the attention of the Court to the affidavit filed in support of the present writ petition, which mentions the age of the petitioner as 30 years and as such he reiterates that since the petitioner on the year of filing of the writ petition i.e. 2013 was 30 years, he ought to have been of 13 years in the year 1996 and as such he claims that all the documents filed by the petitioner are forged, even the age claimed by him is forged and as such the petitioner is not entitled for any relief from this Court. 10. Lucknow Development Authority has denied the deposit of Rs. 50,000/- (Annexure-9A) and have claimed that it bears no date and they have further challenged the aspect of procurement and filing of photocopy of disposal register, as it was an internal document of the L.D.A. They have claimed that the documents are self-manufactured and forged and as such has called for serious action against the petitioner. Regarding the procurement of electricity and water connection, L.D.A. has stated that it might have been procured on the basis of forged documents by the petitioner. 11. The petitioner filed his rejoinder almost reiterating the stand taken by him in the writ petition. The petitioner repeatedly referred to the computer costing estimate made by the L.D.A. on 05.10.2005 and a list of defaulters allegedly published by L.D.A. in newspaper on 22.02.2011, wherein the petitioner’s name was mentioned, to buttress his argument about the allotment made to the petitioner. The petitioner repeatedly referred to the computer costing estimate made by the L.D.A. on 05.10.2005 and a list of defaulters allegedly published by L.D.A. in newspaper on 22.02.2011, wherein the petitioner’s name was mentioned, to buttress his argument about the allotment made to the petitioner. He referred to various documents filed along with the rejoinder affidavit and claimed that an agreement with a minor was not void but voidable. He contends that the documents filed are genuine and he states that there were no takers of plot under Kanpur Road Yojna at that point of time and in case any person chose and applied for allotment, then L.D.A. was obliged to allot those plots and house and possession used to be given after complying with the legal formalities. 12. The petitioner in rejoinder also stated that the L.D.A. had not disclosed to him the balance amount due as on the present time. As regarding the working of Lucknow Development Authority, the petitioner relies on newspaper clip of Amar Ujala dated 20.03.2016 and 16.07.2015 to further his point that fabrication of registry is rampant in L.D.A. In the news clip 18 plots have been found to be having a forged registry. He states that enquiry relating to 40 plots were initiated by L.D.A. on which 18 were found to be forged and his plot number does not figure in the said list and in any case action has be taken against L.D.A. officials who have been working collusively with people for allotment of plots, which actually were never allotted to this person by preparing forged documents. The petitioner has also filed certain deposit slips relating to Kavita Singh, O.T.S. fees paid by the petitioner etc. He has also filed L.D.A. portal registration details as on 10.09.2017, which shows his name in the said portal and also mentions that Rs. 78,000/- stands paid on various dates. Towards the end, the petitioner has filed electricity bill, water tax and house tax paid by him till date. As regards the variants in the birth date in voter I.D. and PAN, he claims that he belongs to a poor family and the same has been mistakenly printed and immediately after coming to his knowledge has applied for correction. Towards the end, the petitioner has filed electricity bill, water tax and house tax paid by him till date. As regards the variants in the birth date in voter I.D. and PAN, he claims that he belongs to a poor family and the same has been mistakenly printed and immediately after coming to his knowledge has applied for correction. The petitioner has filed his Aadhar card wherein he has declared his date of birth as 01.0.1974, however, the PAN card again shows his date of birth as 01.01.1984. 13. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record of the writ petition available before us, we have considered the rival submissions, but are unable to convince ourselves with the submissions and prayers made by learned counsel for the petitioner for various reasons as would follow hereinafter. 14. As per the petitioner, the plot house in question was allotted to him by L.D.A. vide a Hire purchase agreement dated 25.09.1996 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,63,900/- of which Rs. 46,000/- has been mentioned to be paid as part payment of the sale consideration and the balance money was payable at the rate of Rs. 2539.35 in equal monthly installments payable in advance within first week of each due English calendar month spread over a period of 20 years. Thus, as per the said analogy, the total amount to be paid by the petitioner would be Rs. 6,09,440/- having been paid as equal monthly installments plus Rs. 46,000/- having paid as part payment at the time of Hire purchase agreement, which totals to about Rs. 6,55,440/- provided the petitioner has paid all the equal monthly installments on time, this court painstakingly undertook to understand the said mathematical calculation as the fulcrum of the writ petition is a direction to L.D.A. for getting a property registered in favour of the petitioner, a right which kicks in when the entire sale consideration stands paid to the authority. Paragraph 5 of the Hire purchase agreement in as many word says clearly: “5. that upon payment of all the installments in respect of the demised property by the purchaser the seller will execute the sale deed of the aforesaid house the land in favour of the purchaser.” Similarly, paragraph 12 and 13, which are relevant to the context, inter-alia says: “12. that upon payment of all the installments in respect of the demised property by the purchaser the seller will execute the sale deed of the aforesaid house the land in favour of the purchaser.” Similarly, paragraph 12 and 13, which are relevant to the context, inter-alia says: “12. That in case of default of payment for continuous three regular installments on the part of the purchaser, the seller shall have every right to terminate this agreement or to take any action against the purchaser and the purchaser shall be bound to surrender the property with the seller, as directed in a notice issued by L.D.A. 13. That the seller on re-entry consequent upon the termination of this agreement will be entitled to sell the demised property in favour of any third persons.” 15. A conjoint reading of paragraphs 5, 12 and 13 of the Hire purchase agreement would mean that the L.D.A. can be called upon to execute a sale deed only after all the installments in respect of the subject property is paid, which is the last stage of relationship between purchaser and his seller. In the interregnum, paragraph 12 and 13 has to be pressed for service, in case of default of payment for continuous three regular installments on the part of the purchaser. In default, L.D.A. may terminate the agreement and after termination may reenter the property and sell it to any third party. This Court is bereft of any evidence on record, which could show that the petitioner had defaulted and on his default any action has been taken by L.D.A. or that L.D.A. has reentered the property and sold to some other third party. Neither of the sides have assisted this Court on the said aspect and the only reply which has come from L.D.A. is that they have not made any allotment to the petitioner and as such there was no question of termination or re-entry. Neither of the sides have assisted this Court on the said aspect and the only reply which has come from L.D.A. is that they have not made any allotment to the petitioner and as such there was no question of termination or re-entry. While that question would have been pertinent to adjudicate the matter in its right perspective, especially when the matter had been pending for nearly a decade, however complacency of both the petitioner and L.D.A. in not finally getting the matter adjudicated is quite rife as the petitioner has on the one hand filed huge numbers of documents of which mostly are irrelevant to establish his allotment of the house in question, whereas on the other hand L.D.A. did not choose to file any documents to justify and substantiate its ground as mentioned in the counter affidavit. As regards the Hire purchase agreement, which forms the key to claim the allotment of the house by the petitioner is concerned, the law relating to ownership in such kind of arrangement stands settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The ratio of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Magma Fincorp Ltd. vs. Rajesh Kumar Tiwari, (2020) 10 SCC 399 is relevant to the context, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court relying on its earlier judgments passed in Charanjit Singh Chadha and Others vs. Sudhir Mehra, (2001) 7 SCC 417 , K.L. Johar and Company vs. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1965 SC 1082 , Anup Sarmah vs. Bhola Nath Sharma and Others, (2013) 1 SCC 400 , held that the financier, which in this case is the L.D.A. is the real owner of the house in a Hire purchase agreement. The court in that case, as it was relating to financing of the vehicle in that case, held that the financier being the owner of the vehicle which is a subject of a Hire purchase agreement, there can be no impediment to the financier taking possession of the vehicle when the hirer does not make payment of installments/hire charges in terms of the Hire purchase agreement. However, such repossession cannot be taken by recourse to physical violence, assault and/or criminal intimidation. Nor can such possession be taken by engaging gangsters, goons and muscleman or so called recovery agents. The ratio of the said judgment applies to the present case on all its four corners. However, such repossession cannot be taken by recourse to physical violence, assault and/or criminal intimidation. Nor can such possession be taken by engaging gangsters, goons and muscleman or so called recovery agents. The ratio of the said judgment applies to the present case on all its four corners. Although, L.D.A. might have some right under the hire purchase agreement, but again as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court the same is subject to due process of law and L.D.A. cannot take recourse to violence, assault or intimidation, nor the said dispossession can take place with engaging goons or muscleman. We are conscious of the fact that the petitioner has filed a complaint relating to his forceful dispossession from the house in question, but it seems there is no real threat to his dispossession and as such no relief has been claimed by the petitioner against the police authorities in the writ petition. In any case, the petitioner shall always have the benefit of the settled position of law that any forceful dispossession is illegal and any dispossession has to be as per the due process of law. 16. The next issue raised in the petition is relating to the installment amount paid or the part payments made. The petitioner has heavily relied on numerous documents filed by him in the writ petition, which shows the following payments made by the petitioner: (i) Rs. 46,000/- on 10.09.1996, (ii) Rs. 3000/- paid on 22.08.2005, (iii) Rs. 2500/- paid on 26.08.2005, (iv) Rs. 50,000/- paid on 01.03.2007, (v) Rs. 26,000/- paid on 27.02.2012, (vi) Rs. 50,000/- paid on 14.06.2012 and (vii) Rs. 45,000/- on 21.10.2013. Although, L.D.A. has strongly objected to the receipt and veracity of these payments made by the petitioner, however, even for the sake of argument, if these payments are construed to be correct and paid to the L.D.A. for the plot/house in question, the petitioner as per his own showing has made only payments of Rs. 2,22,500/- against the total amount of Rs. 6,55,440/- or Rs. 15,05,465/- as on 22.02.2011 as notified in the newspaper publication relied by the petitioner. 2,22,500/- against the total amount of Rs. 6,55,440/- or Rs. 15,05,465/- as on 22.02.2011 as notified in the newspaper publication relied by the petitioner. Although, the petitioner has filed an application for O.T.S. in the year 2013, however again the said O.T.S. proposal/application is cryptic and does not mentions as to what demand has been raised by the L.D.A. as in 2013 or what is the offer of the petitioner under said O.T.S. In any case, the pendency of O.T.S. does not take the petitioner anywhere as the L.D.A. has been denying any relationship with the petitioner in their counter affidavit filed to the present writ petition. 17. The petitioner has strenuously relied on the aspect that his name appears in an internal document of the L.D.A. wherein it has been mentioned and proposed to open duplicate files of certain persons including the petitioner. First and foremost, this court was unable to elicit any answer from the parties as to how and in what perspective these duplicate files were to be opened by the L.D.A. Secondly, since it was an internal document of L.D.A. how the petitioner was able to lay his hands on the said document and finally it is no body’s case as to what eventually happened to this document and as to whether it was acted upon by the L.D.A. and as to any duplicate files were actually opened by the petitioner or not as pertinently the said internal communication not only mentions the name of the petitioner, but also 31 other persons. 18. There is another aspect of the matter, as per the own showing of the petitioner a default list was published by the L.D.A. on 22.02.2011, which mentions the name of the petitioner as defaulter for Rs. 15,05,465/- which the petitioner may argue to show that he is a bona fide allottee, however in the same breath it also means that the petitioner had admitted to be defaulting in payment as it is for that reason only that his name might have appeared in the default list published by the L.D.A. Additionally, the petitioner has referred to news clip of Amar Ujala dated 20.03.2016, 16.07.2015 and 24.01.2018, Hindustan dated 18.01.2018 to further his point that fabrication of registry is rampant in L.D.A. and 18 plots have been found to be having a forged registry against the total enquiry of 40 plots. This Court fails to understand as to how this newspaper clipping would further the case of the petitioner. The enquiry relating to 40 plots having been initiated by the L.D.A. and actions being proposed against the delinquent officers of L.D.A. and a having F.I.R. filed against the erring officers of L.D.A. in fact dilutes the case of the petitioner and furthers the case of the opposite party-L.D.A. who has been consistently in the counter affidavit denying any relationship and terming all the documents filed by the petitioner as forged. In any case, the evidentry significance of these newspapers clippings cannot be taken into consideration in this summary proceedings. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Laxmi Raj Shetty and Another vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1988) AIR 1274, held as follows: “Judicial notice cannot be taken of the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspaper is the only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in Section 78 (2) of the Evidence Act, by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as proof of facts reported therein. It is now well-settled that a statement of fact contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the statement appearing in Court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported.” 19. The next point raised by the petitioner is relating to payment of various electricity bills, water bills and the house tax paid to the concerned authorities over a passage of time for the house in question. Although, the respondent/L.D.A. has given an innocuous reply that the same has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, but again neither of the parties have taken pain to prove this document, which could be by way of leading evidence. No doubt the electricity bills, water bills and house tax gives an impression of the possession of the plot/house, but as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several occasions that the title of the property can be proved by documents like sale deed, gift deed, will etc. No doubt the electricity bills, water bills and house tax gives an impression of the possession of the plot/house, but as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several occasions that the title of the property can be proved by documents like sale deed, gift deed, will etc. The courts have been very slow even in recognizing the title of the property by virtue of the mutation in the name of revenue records. The Hon’ble Apex Court has consistently held that mutation of a land in the revenue records does not create or extinguish the title over a land nor it has any presumptive value on the title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. [See: Smt. Sawarni vs. Smt. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223 , Balwant Singh and Another vs. Daulat Singh (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 127 and Narasamma and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 591 ]. Thus, although the payments of electricity bills, water bills and house tax have relevance relating to the possession of the house by the petitioner, but the allotment and the right flowing from the hire purchase agreement has to be adjudicated and proved by leading evidence in a competent court of civil jurisdiction. 20. It is settled law that, when there is an alternative efficacious remedy available, the special and extraordinary remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised. The question as to whether the petitioner is entitled to registry and retain possession of the house in question are all pure questions of facts and could be answered one way or the other only by the Civil Court in a properly instituted civil suit on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties but not in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. 21. It has been consistently held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as in the case of Roshina T. vs. Abdul Azeez K.T. (2018) SCC Online 2654, that “the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law whether civil or criminal are available.” and that the writ jurisdiction of the Court “is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person.” The proposition is emphasized by the subsequent sentence which states that the decision of the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being special and extraordinary, should not be exercised casually or lightly or merely on the asking of the litigant. Paras 13 to 15 of the said judgment relevant to the context read thus: “13. The question as to who is the owner of the flat in question, whether respondent No. 1 was/is in possession of the flat and, if so, from which date, how and in what circumstances, he claimed to be in its possession, whether his possession could be regarded as legal or not qua its real owner etc. were some of the material questions which arose for consideration in the writ petition. 14. These questions, in our view, were pure questions of fact and could be answered one way or the other only by the Civil Court in a properly constituted civil suit and on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties but not in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court. 15. It has been consistently held by this Court that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between the private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. In such cases, the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions to the authority concerned. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. This Court has held that it is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. This Court has held that it is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant.” 22. The facts of the case as discussed above and also as culled out from the pleadings of the respective parties available on the record lead to the only indefeasible conclusion that there exist serious disputed question of facts which cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition. The petitioner claims to be the purchaser of the property in question. However, it appears that the respondents are disputing the said allotment. How, when and under what circumstances, the petitioner was allotted and came into possession of the property in question and as to whether the petitioner is entitled for registry of the said property is to be ascertained as per the subsisting rights between the parties flowing from the hire purchase agreement or any subsequent development. All these facts, according to this court, have to be established by leading evidence in accordance with law. The petitioner has to establish its right under the law to claim the substantial reliefs as claimed in the present writ petition. 23. In view of the facts and the reasoning discussed hereinabove, this court is not inclined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The petitioner is however at liberty to pursue other remedies as available under the law for establishing his rights to claim substantial reliefs as claimed under this writ petition. It is clarified that this Court has examined the matter on the limited issue on its maintainability and no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the petition. 24. Resultantly, the writ petition is dismissed and all interim orders stand vacated. 25. Before parting with the case, we find it appropriate to observe that the manner in which the officers and authorities of the Lucknow Development Authority have conducted themselves in this case, cannot be appreciated. 24. Resultantly, the writ petition is dismissed and all interim orders stand vacated. 25. Before parting with the case, we find it appropriate to observe that the manner in which the officers and authorities of the Lucknow Development Authority have conducted themselves in this case, cannot be appreciated. The stand of the Lucknow Development Authority is that the documents relating to the allotment of House No. M/213/G, Kanpur Road, Lucknow is not available in their records and forged, thus in the background of the above narrated fact, how the money deposited by the petitioner was adjusted as is apparent from the records remains unexplained by the Lucknow Development Authority. In absence of allotment of House No. M/213/G, Kanpur Road, Lucknow, how the L.D.A. could have published the default list and mention the name of the petitioner corresponding to the house in question the internal correspondence and the records of L.D.A. also remains a mystery. The facts of the case compel us to observe that the officers of the Lucknow Development Authority and the administration thereof have been extremely lackadaisical in performing their duties. It is high time that these officers self-introspect and take extraordinary measures which will improve its working so that the development authority is able to discharge its statutory functions entrusted under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. We hope and expect that the top administration of Lucknow Development Authority take notice of the observation of this Court and take appropriate steps not only to put its house in order, but also improve its functioning and administration in the future, keeping in view the solemn discharge of its duty of planning, developing and providing housing solutions effecting the public at large. 26. There shall be no order as to the costs.