JUDGMENT : I.A. No. 4899 of 2020: 1. This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 186 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 2. No counter affidavit to the delay condonation application has been filed. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and considering the statements made in this application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in preferring this appeal within time. 5. Accordingly, this interlocutory application is allowed and the delay of 186 days in preferring this appeal, is hereby condoned. 6. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard at this stage for final disposal. L.P.A. No. 918 of 2019: 7. This intra court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent are directed against the order/judgment dated 18.05.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No. 6127 of 2012, whereby and whereunder, the award dated 09.08.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No.10 of 2007 by which the reference has been decided against the appellant-writ petitioner, has been refused to be interfered with. 8. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petitions required to be enumerated, read as under: The case of the concerned workman/writ petitioner as per the written statement is that he was appointed as a casual labour in Indian Tube Company in the year 1975 and he was made permanent on 01.11.1981. At the time of employment, the workman could not produce any document/certificate regarding his date of birth. As per the procedure, his age was assessed by the Medical Officer of Indian Tube Company as 31 years on 10.11.1980, accordingly, his date of birth was recorded as 10.11.1949. The workman had also put his thumb impression on the age declaration document by declaring that he will not challenge his recorded age in future. Subsequently, after the lapse of some years, the workman requested the management for change of his date of birth which was turned down by the management. The workman had also put his thumb impression on the age declaration document by declaring that he will not challenge his recorded age in future. Subsequently, after the lapse of some years, the workman requested the management for change of his date of birth which was turned down by the management. It is the case of the workman that, after the merger of the respondent company with Tisco Ltd. used to work in Public Health Department and after formation of JUSCO Ltd., the said department got transferred under JUSCO Ltd. and the said workman worked under the JUSCO Ltd. It is the case of the writ petitioner that the he is an illiterate person and therefore, could not produce any certificate about his date of birth, i.e., 10.11.1956 at the time of employment but had given verbal information and one affidavit was sworn by his mother to the management but the management did not record his correct date of birth in the company. After coming to know that his date of birth has incorrectly been recorded in the records of the company, the writ petitioner approached the respondent by making representation but the respondent has paid no heed to such representation. Thereafter, the writ petitioner has himself got examined by the Chief Medical Officer, Jamshedpur who after carrying out physical, dental and Radiological examination has assessed the age of the workman as 45 years on 06.06.2002 and he has also got birth certificate issued by the NAC, Jamshedpur dated 12.05.2001. 9. Thus, it is evident from the fact enumerated in the pleading as referred above that the writ petitioner-workman has raised the dispute about his date of birth and the matter travelled to the Conciliating Officer for conciliation but the conciliation having been failed, the matter was referred for adjudication by making reference by the Government in exercise of power conferred under Section 10(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1947. 10. The tribunal has considered the rival submissions/documents produced before it and thereafter has answered the reference against the writ petitioner holding his date of birth to be 10.11.1949. The said award was challenged before the High Court by filing a writ petition being W.P.(L) No.6127 of 2012 but the writ petition has been dismissed, against which the instant intra-court appeal has been preferred. 11. The said award was challenged before the High Court by filing a writ petition being W.P.(L) No.6127 of 2012 but the writ petition has been dismissed, against which the instant intra-court appeal has been preferred. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has submitted that there is no proper appreciation of the fact by the Tribunal rather the Tribunal has only considered the entry made in the service book in which the writ petitioner has put his Left Thumb Impression (LTI). It has been contended by the writ petitioner that merely putting the LTI in the service book cannot be considered to be a valid evidence to disprove the claim of the writ petitioner regarding the date of birth which he claims to be 10.11.1956. 12. The learned counsel in the backdrop of the aforesaid fact, has submitted that the writ petitioner is an illiterate person and these aspects of the matter has not been considered by the learned Single Judge, therefore, the order impugned requires interference. 13. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 14. The dispute pertains to the date of birth for which the reference was made to the effect that “Whether it is justified not to correct the date of birth of Sri Suraj Mukhi, Public Health Department by the Management of M/s Jusco Ltd. Jamshedpur is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to?.” 15. The Tribunal has proceeded by calling upon the management. The documents have been placed for its appreciation. 16. It is evident from the award appended as Annexure-2 to the writ petition that the various documents have been produced for its scrutiny as also various witnesses have deposed their statement. The writ petitioner/workman has filed the gate pass marked as Ext. W/1, letter of the workman dated 21.06.2002 marked as Ext. W/2, letter of the company dated 31.10.2002 marked as Ext. W/3, reminder dated 18.11.2002 marked as Ext. W/4, postal receipt marked as Ext. W/5 series, letter of workman dated 01.04.2005 marked as Ext. W/6, medical certificate granted by C.M.O. Office, Jamshedpur marked as Ext. W/7, certificate of N.C. Jamshedpur marked as Ext. W/8, medical service book marked as Ext. W/9 and works standing order marked as Ext. W/10. 17. W/3, reminder dated 18.11.2002 marked as Ext. W/4, postal receipt marked as Ext. W/5 series, letter of workman dated 01.04.2005 marked as Ext. W/6, medical certificate granted by C.M.O. Office, Jamshedpur marked as Ext. W/7, certificate of N.C. Jamshedpur marked as Ext. W/8, medical service book marked as Ext. W/9 and works standing order marked as Ext. W/10. 17. The writ petitioner/workman appeared and has deposed in the cross-examination as would appear from the recital made in the award that he used to put his signature on any paper written in English after knowing the facts mentioned in it and his service record was prepared in Tubes Company and he had filed birth certificate to the company at the time of his employment and when he came to know about the wrong entry about his date of birth in service record has made protest against the entry of his date of birth on the gate pass and he has sign of mole on finger of his right hand and had not given his LTI on Ext. M. It further appears from the award that the doctor has been examined who was a doctor of the medical board and stated that he has examined the workman for assessment of his age and a certificate was issued on 06.06.2002 and X-Ray was done for the aforesaid purpose. 18. The Tribunal, as it appears from the award, has followed the material available on record and taking into consideration the medical certificate furnished by the medical board duly been corroborated by the doctor of the aforesaid medical board, as also considering the fact that the writ petitioner, workman, himself has submitted that he used to put his signature on any paper which contained the content in English. The Tribunal, therefore, has reached to the conclusion that the date of birth which has been mentioned in the service record to be 10.11.1949 has been treated to be conclusive on the basis of the medical examination by the Medical Board and the entry of the date of birth has been made in the service record having been authenticated by the writ petitioner since the LTI has been put in the aforesaid service record, therefore, has answered the reference against the writ petitioner by holding the date of birth of the writ petitioner to be 10.11.1949. 19. 19. The matter has been scrutinized by the learned Single Judge wherein the award has been scrutinized and after taking into consideration the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal basis upon which the assessment of age by the Medical Board and the entry made on the basis of the aforesaid Medical Board examination having been authenticated by the writ petitioner as also considering the LTI, has refused to interfere with the award which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 20. This Court, before proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned order, requires to refer herein the jurisdiction of the High Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to exercise the power of judicial review regarding the fact finding recorded by the Tribunal. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph no.21 as under: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-17 as under: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 the Hon'ble Apex Court has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 21. The law thus is well settled that the scope of the judicial review lies with the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very least, i.e., the interference can only be shown if the finding recorded by the Tribunal or the Labour Court suffers from perversity or there is any jurisdictional error. 22. Herein, the writ petitioner has not agitated the issue of jurisdictional error rather the contention is that the Tribunal has not appreciated the material fact placed before it to the effect putting LTI in the service record wherein there is a reference of his date of birth as per the examination of the Medical Board, and since the writ petitioner is an illiterate person, therefore, the same ought not to have been considered to be a conclusive proof to discard the date of birth which is the writ petitioner is claiming, i.e., to be 10.11.1956. 23. This Court has appreciated the finding recorded by the Tribunal in the award wherefrom it is evident that the document has been placed by both the sides, i.e., from the workman and from the management side. The writ petitioner has been subjected to medical examination by the Medical Officer and the Medical Officer has assessed the date of birth of the writ petitioner to be 31 years on 10.11.1980 on the basis of the due process. It has also come in the award that on the basis of the medical examination, the date of birth of the appellant-writ petitioner has been recorded in the service record of the writ petitioner. It has also come in the award that on the basis of the medical examination, the date of birth of the appellant-writ petitioner has been recorded in the service record of the writ petitioner. It also finds mention in the award that the reference of the aforesaid date of birth contained in the service book has been authenticated by putting the LTI by the writ petitioner. 24. The only point which the writ petitioner is trying to impress upon the Court is that the writ petitioner is an illiterate person which would be evident from the deposition of the writ petitioner wherein he has stated that he can put his signature after going through the content if the content is in English. But, the writ petitioner is arguing against his deposition which has been made by him before the Tribunal by taking the ground of being illiterate but when he himself has deposed before the Tribunal, i.e., he can go through the content of the letter even if written in English, meaning thereby, the ground which is being taken of being illiterate, cannot be said to be sustainable. 25. This Court, after taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the scope of the judicial review in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as quoted and referred above, as also considering the finding recorded by the Tribunal in the award, is of the view that the award is based upon the appreciation of the factual aspect vis-à-vis the deposition recorded in course of adjudication. Therefore, according to the considered view of this Court, there is no perversity rather the finding has been recorded basis upon the appreciation of the material facts, therefore, the same since is not based upon any perversity, there is no error in the award. 26. After having discussed the factual aspect as also the legal position, this Court has scrutinized the legality and propriety of the order impugned and has found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has considered the Ext. W/7 and other part of the deposition as has been recorded in the award basis upon which the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion of absence of any perversity in the award recorded by the Tribunal. 27. W/7 and other part of the deposition as has been recorded in the award basis upon which the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion of absence of any perversity in the award recorded by the Tribunal. 27. This Court is of the view that the learned Single Judge while declining to interfere with the award, has committed no error. 28. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed.