JUDGMENT : [Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.] 1. L.P.A. Nos. 434 of 2018; 380 of 2018; 479 of 2018 and 480 of 2018 have been heard together as would appear from the order dated 06.01.2020. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant-State has submitted that since in L.P.A. No. 434 of 2018 and L.P.A. No. 480 of 2018, due appearance has been made on behalf of the respondents by Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel, as such, these two matters may be disposed of by segregating L.P.A. Nos.380 of 2018 and 479 of 2018. 3. Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel for the respondents has no objection to such submission. 4. In view of the submission made on behalf of the parties, L.P.A. Nos.380 of 2018 and 479 of 2018 are being segregated from L.P.A. Nos.434 of 2018 and 480 of 2018. I.A. No. 1718 of 2019 in L.P.A. No. 434 of 2018: 5. This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 171 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 6. No counter to the delay condonation application has been filed. 7. Heard the parties. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considering the statements made in this application, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause in preferring this appeal within time. 9. Accordingly, this interlocutory application is allowed and the delay of 171 days in preferring this appeal, is hereby condoned. 10. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard at this stage for final disposal. I.A. No. 10637 of 2019 in L.P.A. No. 480 of 2018: 11. This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 193 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 12. No counter to the delay condonation application has been filed. 13. Heard the parties. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considering the statements made in this application, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause in preferring this appeal within time. 15. Accordingly, this interlocutory application is allowed and the delay of 193 days in preferring this appeal, is hereby condoned. 16. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard at this stage for final disposal. L.P.A. No. 434 of 2018 and L.P.A. No. 480 of 2018: 17. 15. Accordingly, this interlocutory application is allowed and the delay of 193 days in preferring this appeal, is hereby condoned. 16. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard at this stage for final disposal. L.P.A. No. 434 of 2018 and L.P.A. No. 480 of 2018: 17. Both the appeals are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order with the consent of the parties. 18. These intra court appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent are directed against the orders/judgments dated 19.01.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2008 and in W.P.(S) No. 3566 of 2008 respectively, whereby and whereunder, the orders dated 20.06.2008, 23.08.2003 in W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2008 and orders dated 10.10.2007, 27.12.2007 and 20.07.2005 in W.P.(S) No. 3566 of 2008 have been quashed by treating the writ petitioners entitled for upgradation in pay scale which has been negated on the ground that the writ petitioners have not passed the accounts examination. 19. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petitions required to be enumerated, read as under: L.P.A. No. 434 of 2018: The writ petitioner was appointed as Clerk on 06.04.1984 under the respondent-authority. The writ petitioner, vide order No. 137 dated 12.12.1998, communicated vide Memo No. 3395 dated 21.12.1998, was provided with first time bound promotion w.e.f. 06.04.1994 by the Conservator of Forest, Hazaribagh Anchal, Hazaribagh which was duly approved on 19.12.1998 by the Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh East Forest Division, Hazaribagh. It is the case of the writ petitioner that, all of a sudden, on 23.08.2003 vide office order No. 98 issued by the Conservator of Forest, Hazaribagh Circle, Hazaribagh the promotion given to the writ petitioner was cancelled without any show cause and before cancelling the same, no opportunity to represent his case was provided to the writ petitioner. The promotion given to the writ petitioner was cancelled on the ground that the writ petitioner has not passed the accounts examination which was not necessary for the purpose of time bound promotion. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner made representation on 30.03.2004 stating that passing of the accounts examination was not necessary for time bound promotion and the Establishment Committee at Circle Level after consideration of the same has given the time bound promotion. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner made representation on 30.03.2004 stating that passing of the accounts examination was not necessary for time bound promotion and the Establishment Committee at Circle Level after consideration of the same has given the time bound promotion. Further, it was also stated that the writ petitioner has passed all the three papers of accounts examination. Thereafter, the Conservator of Forest, Bokaro Anchal, Bokaro issued office order No. 43 dated 20.06.2008 regarding recovery of excess payment made to the writ petitioner on account of time bound promotion which has been cancelled which was to the tune of Rs.57,505/- for the period from 06.12.1994 to 30.03.2002 which was to be recovered in 24 installments. The writ petitioner, again on 26.06.2008, made representation before the Conservator of Forest, Bokaro Circle, Bokaro against the office order dated 20.06.2008 for cancellation of the order of recovery and to grant the time bound promotion w.e.f. 06.04.1994. The writ petitioner, having no option, but to approach this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2008 whereby and whereunder the orders impugned have been quashed and set aside against which the instant intra-court appeal has been filed. L.P.A. No. 480 of 2018: The writ petitioner was appointed as Clerk on 23.11.1985 under the respondent-authority. The writ petitioner, vide order No. 27 dated 16.03.1996, communicated vide Memo No. 454 dated 23.03.1996, was provided with first time bound promotion w.e.f. 23.11.1995 by the Conservator of Forest, Departmental Working Circle, Hazaribagh. It is the case of the writ petitioner that, all of a sudden, on 20.07.2005 vide office order No. 54 issued by the Conservator of Forest, Departmental Working Circle, Hazaribagh the promotion given to the writ petitioner was cancelled without any show cause and before cancelling the same, no opportunity to represent his case was provided to the writ petitioner. The promotion given to the writ petitioner was cancelled on the ground that the writ petitioner has not passed the accounts examination which was not necessary for the purpose of time bound promotion. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner made representation stating that passing of the accounts examination was not necessary for time bound promotion. Further, it was also stated that the writ petitioner has passed all the three papers of accounts examination. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner made representation stating that passing of the accounts examination was not necessary for time bound promotion. Further, it was also stated that the writ petitioner has passed all the three papers of accounts examination. Thereafter, the Divisional Forest Officer, State Trading Division, Hazaribagh West issued office order No. 747 dated 10.10.2007 directing the Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh to recover of excess payment made to the writ petitioner on account of time bound promotion which has been cancelled which was to the tune of Rs.69,929 /-. The writ petitioner, against the order dated 10.10.2007, made representation before the Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh West Forest Division, Hazaribgh for cancellation of the order of recovery. The writ petitioner, having no option, but to approach this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3566 of 2008 whereby and whereunder the orders impugned have been quashed and set aside against which the instant intra-court appeal has been filed. 20. The writ petitioners being aggrieved with the order dated 23.08.2003 and 20.07.2005 respectively, the benefits granted in their favour of upgradation in pay-scale has been recalled on the ground that the writ petitioners have not passed the accounts examination, have approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2008 and W.P.(S) No. 3566 of 2008 wherein the learned Single Judge quashed the aforesaid order and allowed the writ petitions against which the instant intra-court appeal have been preferred. 21. The State-appellants has assailed the order passed by the learned Single Judge inter alia on the ground that the order impugned is without appreciating the law laid down by the larger Bench of the Patna High Court rendered in Maheshwar Prasad Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., 2000 SCC OnLine Pat 840, wherein the issue has been decided by taking into consideration the provision as contained under Rule 157(3)(J) of the Rules, 1958 which stipulates passing of the accounts examination for the purpose of grant of upgradation in the pay scale. 22. It is the submission of the State-appellant that since the order passed by the learned Single Judge is in the teeth of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 23. Per contra, Mr. 22. It is the submission of the State-appellant that since the order passed by the learned Single Judge is in the teeth of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 23. Per contra, Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has submitted that the benefit of upgradation has been granted in favour of the writ petitioners as per the circular issued by the Forest Department under the seal and signature of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Bihar as contained in Memo No.3345 dated 14.06.1988, whereby and whereunder, the policy decision was taken that the requirement to pass accounts examination for getting the benefit of time bound promotion is not necessary. The submission, therefore, has been made that since the Forest Department has also taken the policy decision for consideration of the case of one or the other employee for grant of upgradation under time bound promotion as was in existence in course of the operation of the recommendation of 4th Pay Revision Committee, therefore, the benefit of upgrdation by way of granting time bound promotion has been granted in favour of the writ petitioners on the basis of the said policy decision, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error and the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the aforesaid policy decision, if quashed the impugned decision of the authority, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 24. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 25. The issue involved herein is as to whether passing of the accounts examination is necessary for granting of time bound promotion in favour of one or the other employee during the operational period of the 4th Pay Revision Committee under which the benefit of upgradation by way of time bound promotion has been carved out. 26. It is not in dispute that the provision as contained under the Rules, 1947 is applicable regarding consideration of the cases of one or the other employees for promotion from the lower hierarchy to higher hierarchy as per the provision contained therein under Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1958. 26. It is not in dispute that the provision as contained under the Rules, 1947 is applicable regarding consideration of the cases of one or the other employees for promotion from the lower hierarchy to higher hierarchy as per the provision contained therein under Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1958. For ready reference, the said provision reads as under: “157(3)(J) (a) Any clerk, who has not passed the preliminary examination in Accounts, will be neither confirmed nor be allowed to cross the efficiency bar; (b) Any clerk, who has not passed the final examination, will not be promoted to the Selection grade; (c) In case of non-availability of senior clerk, finally passed in Accounts Examination, any junior clerk, having passed the final Accounts Examination may be temporarily promoted to the Selection Grade; Provided that the junior clerk temporarily promoted to the Selection grade shall be reverted to the post of clerk if the clerk senior to him passes the final Accounts examination within two years from the date of his first supersession and is promoted with effect from any date within the said two years, otherwise the senior clerk would be treated junior to all the clerks promoted to the Selection grade prior to him.” 27. The statutory mandate as contained under the provision of Rule 157 (3) (J) fell for consideration before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Mohammad Shamsuddin vs. State of Bihar, 1983 PLJR 347 wherein it has been laid down by holding the provision of law as contained under Rule 157 (3) (J) not to be mandatory one. Subsequent thereto, the matter travelled to the larger Bench of the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra) and while dealing with the mandate of the provision as contained under Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1958 it has been laid down as under paragraph-17, 18 and 19 holding the provision of Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1958 to be mandatory since the same although speaks about promotion from lower hierarchy to higher hierarchy but considering the selection grade. It is also by way of upgradation to be a nature of promotion, as such, it has been mandated that since passing of the accounts examination is necessary for getting promotion from lower hierarchy to higher hierarchy, will also be applicable for the purpose of consideration of selection grade. For ready reference, paragraphs- 17, 18 and 19 of the said judgment reads as under: “17. The question as to the legal effects of the amendment dated 29.3.82 has to be considered in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court. When the amendment was made on 29.3.82 the situation was that the posts of Lower Division and Upper Division clerks stood amalgamated with effect from 1.5.80 and 10% of the clerical posts had been earmarked as senior selection grade posts vide Government order dated 18.12.81 with effect from 1.4.81 in the light of the recommendation of the Fourth Pay Revision Committee, in addition to the selection grade created vide Government Order dated 24.1.69 with effect from 1.4.64. After the amalgamation of the L.D./U.D. posts the provision of rule 157(3)(J) had apparently become redundant, there was no question of any promotion to the Upper Division and, therefore, the question of the L.D. clerk passing examination in Accounts for his promotion to the Upper Division did not arise when the selection grade and senior selection grades had come into existence. By the said amendment the State Government simply made the erstwhile provisions meant for promotion to the Upper Division applicable to promotion to the selection grades. As I have observed above, though rule 157(3)(J) has undergone changes at different times, passing the Accounts examination has always been treated as an essential qualification for promotion of the clerical staff. In fact, when there were „efficiency bars' in the pay scales such a qualification was treated as essential even for crossing the efficiency bar. Thus, by amendment dated 29.3.82 nothing new was done. A provision which already existed, though in different terminology in the sense that it was applicable to the Upper Division posts, made applicable to selection grade posts which had come into existence in the meantime. With the amalgamation of the Lower Division and Upper Division posts the rule as it stood having become redundant, and there being no provision holding the field regarding promotion to the selection grades, the State Government was certainly competent to issue administrative instructions. With the amalgamation of the Lower Division and Upper Division posts the rule as it stood having become redundant, and there being no provision holding the field regarding promotion to the selection grades, the State Government was certainly competent to issue administrative instructions. Had the field been occupied by statutory rules it could not have done so as it might constitute encroachment upon an occupied field. The ratio of the decision in Sant Ram Sharma's case is that if the statutory rule and the executive instruction can stand side by side, such instruction cannot be said to be invalid or illegal. The test thus would be whether the administrative instructions are inconsistent or repugnant to the statutory rule. In the instant case, the statutory rule having become redundant and inapplicable there was no question of repugnancy or inconsistency. As a matter of fact, as stated above, the amendment was to the same effect as the erstwhile rule, the only material difference is that the provision was made applicable to selection grades in place of the Upper Division posts. It must be pointed out, in fairness to the respondents, that no attempt was made on the side of the petitioners to submit that the amendment dated 29.3.82 was repugnant to or inconsistent with the erstwhile rule, the thrust of their argument was that without framing statutory rules with respect to the selection grade posts, passing the Accounts examination could not be made essential for promotion to the Selection Grades by administrative instructions. 18. At this stage, I would like to point out the distinction between promotion to higher posts and promotion to selection grade. ‘Promotion’ normally implies promotion to the higher posts with a higher pay. The concept of ‘selection grade’ was evolved by the Central Pay Commission with the object of providing incentive to employees who have no outlets or very limited outlets for promotion to higher posts, carrying a “somewhat” higher scale of pay without change in the duties. Such posts which were normally not to exceed 10% of the total posts were described as “selection grades” as distinct from higher posts in the hierarchy. After noticing the recommendation of the Central Pay Commission the Supreme Court in the case of Lalit Mohan Deb v. Union of India (supra) observed, “It is well recognised that a promotion post is a higher post with a higher pay. After noticing the recommendation of the Central Pay Commission the Supreme Court in the case of Lalit Mohan Deb v. Union of India (supra) observed, “It is well recognised that a promotion post is a higher post with a higher pay. A selection grade has higher pay but in the same-post. A selection grade is intended to ensure that capable employees who may not get a chance of promotion on account of limited outlets of promotions should at least be placed in the selection grade to prevent stagnation on the maximum of the scale. Selection grades are, therefore, created in the interest of greater efficiency”. 19. If passing the Accounts examination was an essential condition for promotion of the Lower Division clerks to the Upper Division, a higher post, I fail to appreciate as to how a similar qualification with respect to promotion to the “selection grade posts” laid down by amendment dated 29.3.82 can in any manner be said to be repugnant to or inconsistent with the rule as it stood earlier. Unfortunately, the distinction between Upper Division posts as a promotional post and selection grade was not pointed out to this Court in Shamsuddin's case with the result that this Court treated both the posts at par. The concession of the State Government was limited to promotion to the Upper Division vide paragraph 7 of the judgment. The post of Upper Division clerks being no more in existence there was no question of a clerk passing any departmental examination in Accounts for his promotion to such post, but treating the post of Upper Division clerk at par with selection grade the Court gave a general direction (sic) the cases of the petitioners for their promotion to the “selection grade post” have to be considered on merits from the due date without requiring them to pass examination in Accounts. If the amendment dated 29.3.82 had been brought to the notice of the Court, perhaps, such a finding/observation might not have been made.” 28. The judgment of the Full Bench has clarified the clause about the mandatory feature of provision as contained under Rule 157 (3) (J), therefore, it is not in dispute that passing of the accounts examination is mandatory for getting the promotion either hierarchal promotion or the selection grade. The judgment of the Full Bench has clarified the clause about the mandatory feature of provision as contained under Rule 157 (3) (J), therefore, it is not in dispute that passing of the accounts examination is mandatory for getting the promotion either hierarchal promotion or the selection grade. It requires to refer herein that there is little difference in selection grade and time bound promotion since selection grade is to be granted in a post for carving out the post under the category of grade but in the time bound promotion, there is no carving out rather the same is to be governed by way of policy decision, whereby and whereunder, if one or the other employee has completed 10 years of service as per the Circular prevalent at the relevant time, the concerned employee will be entitled for first time bound promotion and on completion of 15 years of service after completion of 10 years of service, i.e., on completion of 25 years of service, the concerned employee will be entitled for grant of second time bound promotion. 29. The issue of consideration of time bound promotion in absence of passing of accounts examination has fell for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 354 of 2018 (The State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Sami-Ur Rahman @ S. Rahman and Ors.) and putting reliance upon the judgment rendered in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra), it has been laid down that passing of the accounts examination is also mandatory for the purpose of grant of upgradation under time bound promotion. vs. Sami-Ur Rahman @ S. Rahman and Ors.) and putting reliance upon the judgment rendered in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra), it has been laid down that passing of the accounts examination is also mandatory for the purpose of grant of upgradation under time bound promotion. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment, i.e., L.P.A No. 354 of 2018, reads as under: “8) With regard to the Second issue, which has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner by taking a reference of the two orders passed by other learned Single Judges of this Court being W.P. (S) No. 5579 of 2010 and W.P. (S) No. 3274 of 2014, this Court, on its perusal, finds that that the learned Single Judges have gone into the question of conducting of the departmental examinations, but, since we have clarified the issue on fact from the affidavit given in this regard by the State Government through its General Administrative Department dated 22.04.2021 wherefrom it is evident that the Water Resources Department has conducted the examination and, therefore, on these facts, the judgments rendered by other learned Single Judges of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 5579 of 2010 and W.P. (S) No. 3274 of 2014 are not applicable in the facts of this case. The said judgments are also not applicable on the ground of provision of Rule 157(3)(J) of the Bihar Board’s Miscellaneous Rules, 1958, which reads as under: - “(J)(a) Any clerk, who has not passed the preliminary examination in Accounts, will be neither confirmed nor be allowed to cross the efficiency bar; (b) Any clerk, who has not passed the final examination, will not be promoted to the Selection grade; (c) In case of non-availability of senior clerk, finally passed in Accounts Examination, any junior clerk, having passed the final Accounts Examination may be temporarily promoted to the Selection Grade; Provided that the junior clerk temporarily promoted to the Selection grade shall be reverted to the post of clerk if the clerk senior to him passes the final Accounts examination within two years from the date of his first supersession and is promoted with effect from any date within the said two years, otherwise the senior clerk would be treated junior to all the clerks promoted to the Selection grade prior to him.” Thus, it prescribes passing of the Accounts Examination for the purpose of promotion to the selection grade. The aforesaid provision has fell for consideration in Md. Samsuddin Vs. State of Bihar, 1983 PLJR 347 , but this judgment also fell for consideration before the Larger Bench of the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, 2000 (4) PLJR 262 (FB) wherein it has been laid down that clerks of the Muffasil offices could/can not be promoted to the selection grade posts without passing final examination in Accounts except during the period 01.05.1980 and 29.03.1982. The aforesaid judgment admittedly has not been brought to the notice either before the learned Single Judges who had passed the judgment in W.P. (S) No.5579 of 2010 and W.P. (S) No.3274 of 2014 or before the learned Single Judge of this case, otherwise, such orders could not have been passed. 9) It is settled position of law that the order passed by the Larger Bench binds the Single Benches as also the Division Benches. Reference is made in this regard to the judgment rendered in Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 1 , paragraphs-84, 86 & 88 which read as under:- “84. 9) It is settled position of law that the order passed by the Larger Bench binds the Single Benches as also the Division Benches. Reference is made in this regard to the judgment rendered in Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 1 , paragraphs-84, 86 & 88 which read as under:- “84. In State of Bihar vs. Kalika Kuer, the Court elaborately considered the principle of per incuriam and held that the earlier judgment by a larger Bench cannot be ignored by invoking the principle of per incuriam and the only course open to the coordinate or smaller Bench is to make a request for reference to the larger Bench. 86. In Central Board of Dwaoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharashtra, the Constitution Bench interpreted Article 141, referred to various earlier judgments including Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Mumbai Shramik Sangha and Pradip Chandra Parija vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and held that "the law laid down in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength and it would be inappropriate if a Division Bench of two Judges starts overruling the decisions of Division Benches of three Judges. The Court further held that such a practice would be detrimental not only to the rule of discipline and the doctrine of binding precedents but it will also lead to inconsistency in decisions on the point of law; consistency and certainty in the development of law and its contemporary status - both would be immediate casualty (Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community case, SCC p. 682, paras 12 & 10). 88. In U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh vs. Daya Ram Saroj, the Court noted that by ignoring the earlier decision of a coordinate Bench, a Division Bench of the High Court directed that part-time tube-well operators should be treated as permanent employees with same service conditions as far as possible and observed: "26. Judicial discipline is self-discipline. It is an inbuilt mechanism in the system itself. Judicial discipline is self-discipline. It is an inbuilt mechanism in the system itself. Judicial discipline demands that when the decision of a coordinate Bench of the same High Court is brought to the notice of the Bench, it is to be respected and is binding, subject of course, to the right to take a different view or to doubt the correctness of the decision and the permissible course then open is to refer the question or the case to a larger Bench. This is the minimum discipline and decorum to be maintained by judicial fraternity." 10) As the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh’s case (supra) has laid down a rule of passing the departmental examination mandatory, there cannot be any relaxation in grant of upgradation in the pay scale. However, matter would have been different if the examination would not have been conducted by the concerned authority and in such circumstances, such employee would not have been made to suffer, but that is not the case herein as would be evident from the detailed table as referred herein above that the Water Resources Department has conducted the examination, but the writ petitioner has chosen not to appear in the aforesaid departmental examination, however, he has appeared in the departmental examination held in the year 2013 from which date the benefit of upgradation of pay scale has been granted. 11) Thus, it is evident that the proposition has been laid down that the judgment passed by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any Bench of lesser strength. Herein the judgment rendered by the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh’s case (supra) in this context has not been relied upon by the learned Single Judge of this Court while passing the impugned judgment or even has not been relied upon in the orders passed by the other learned Single Judges basing upon which the order impugned has been passed which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal.” 30. Now coming to the fact of the given case wherein it is not in dispute that the writ petitioners have not passed the accounts examination. Now coming to the fact of the given case wherein it is not in dispute that the writ petitioners have not passed the accounts examination. But the contention has been raised that passing of the accounts examination was not mandatory by way of policy decision of the Forest Department dated 14.06.1988 as contained under Memo No. 3345 appended as Annexure-7 to W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2008. 31. The question now is to be considered as to whether the policy decision of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Bihar can be said to admissible for the purpose of consideration of benefit under the time bound promotion by discarding the mandate of the statute as contained under Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1947. 32. There is no dispute that the State of Jharkhand has come out with the Rules of executive business by allocating works department-wise. The Personnel department has been conferred with the power to act as nodal department to make out a rule. For ready reference, the same is being referred herein: dkfeZd ,oa iz’kklfud lq/kkj foHkkx 55- fdlh lsok] laoxZ in lewg ;k in dh HkrhZ] fu;qfDr ;k izksUufr laca/kh fu;ekoyh vFkok buls lacaf/kr uhfr ;k izfdz;k fo”k;d vf/klwpu ladYi ;k vkns’k iz[;kfir djus ds igys dkfeZd ,oa iz’kklfud lq/kkj foHkkx ls ijke’kZ dj fy;k tk,xkA 33. Likewise the business has been allocated also to the Forest Department but it does not find mention that the forest department has been conferred with any power to make out a policy decision. The same has rightly been done otherwise there will be conflict of interest department-wise. 34. This Court is of the view on the basis of the fact that the rules of executive business has been carved out in view of the provision of Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the business has been allocated in between the different departments of the State and once the rules of allocation has been carved out that the State of Jharkhand holding the Personnel Department to be the nodal department to make out the rules, other department has got no business to make out a rule and that has been done to avoid any conflicting situation within the State. The aforesaid aspect of the matter pertaining to the binding effect of the decision so taken by the Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 91 of 2020 (Dr. Sweta Kumari @ Sweta Kumari vs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.). Relevant part of the said judgment reads as under: “… the decision of the Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasa Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, which is the nodal department to make out the Rules in the State ….” 35. This Court, therefore, is of the view that once the business has been allocated in between the different departments, whereby and whereunder, the Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department has been considered to be Nodal Department to formulate the rules which does suggest that the rules framed by the Personnel Department will have binding effect upon all the departments. There is purpose to allocate the business to different departments of the State and once the Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department has been considered to be Nodal Department to formulate the rules, it is incumbent upon all the departments of the State to follow the same. It further requires to refer herein that the Department of Forest, as per the rules of executive business, has not been conferred with the power to formulate any rules/policy decision, as such, the policy decision so formulated by the Forest Department dated 14.06.1988 cannot be considered to be enforceable. Further, the Personnel Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department has not made such rule of waiving the condition of not passing the departmental examination for the purpose of getting upgradation in pay scale either under Assured Career Progression Scheme or Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme and has rightly not done so since there is availability of rule as under the provision of Rules 157 (3)(J) of the Rules, 1947, which has been considered by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra). 36. (supra). 36. By taking into consideration the aforesaid allocation, according to the considered view of this Court, if the benefit of time bound promotion as is being claimed to be granted on the basis of the policy decision dated 14.06.1988, issued by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, State of Bihar, the same since is in conflict with the rule which was prevalent prior to the aforesaid communication dated 14.06.1988 which subsequently given the mandatory status to be observed with passing of the accounts examination, has been held to be mandatory by the judicial pronouncement of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra). 37. This Court, after discussing the aforesaid fact, has scrutinized the order passed by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has considered the policy decision dated 14.06.1988 while interfering with the decision of the State authority whereby and whereunder, the writ petitioners have been denied with the claim of the time bound promotion on the ground that they have not passed the accounts examination. 38. But, it appears that the judgment rendered by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra) or there is no reference of Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1947 has been made by the State of Jharkhand and in absence thereof, the impugned order has been passed showing interference with the impugned decision of the administrative authority. 39. This Court, therefore, is of the view by taking into consideration the law laid down by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra) coupled with the decision of the co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 354 of 2018, that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires interference. 40. Accordingly, the order dated 19.01.2018 passed in W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2008 and W.P.(S) No. 3566 of 2008, is hereby quashed and set aside. 41. In consequence thereof, the part of the order dated 23.08.2003 as contained in memo no.98 in L.P.A. No. 434 of 2018 and order dated 20.07.2005 as contained in memo no.54 in L.P.A. No. 480 of 2018, so far as it relates to grant of upgradation, is hereby affirmed. 42. 41. In consequence thereof, the part of the order dated 23.08.2003 as contained in memo no.98 in L.P.A. No. 434 of 2018 and order dated 20.07.2005 as contained in memo no.54 in L.P.A. No. 480 of 2018, so far as it relates to grant of upgradation, is hereby affirmed. 42. Now the issue of recovery as has been decided to be done by the State authority is concerned, Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners has submitted that there cannot be any recovery on the basis of the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors., (2015) 4 SCC 334 wherein the guidelines has been stipulated as to under which circumstances the recovery is not to be made. Relevant passage of the said judgment reads as under: “18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law: (i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service). (ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.” 43. It also requires to refer herein that prior to the aforesaid judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. It also requires to refer herein that prior to the aforesaid judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. (supra) there was judgment rendered in Sahib Ram vs. State of Haryana and Ors., 1995 Supp (1) SC 18 wherein the law has been laid down that if there is no misrepresentation on the part of the concerned employee, there cannot be any recovery as would be evident from paragraph-5, which reads as under: “5. Admittedly the appellant does not possess the required educational qualifications. Under the circumstances the appellant would not be entitled to the relaxation. The Principal erred in granting him the relaxation. Since the date of relaxation the appellant had been paid his salary on the revised scale. However, it is not on account of any misrepresentation made by the appellant that the benefit of the higher pay scale was given to him but by wrong construction made by the Principal for which the appellant cannot be held to be at fault. Under the circumstances the amount paid till date may not be recovered from the appellant. The principle of equal pay for equal work would not apply to the scales prescribed by the University Grants Commission. The appeal is allowed partly without any order as to costs.” 44. It is evident from the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. (supra) wherein guideline stipulates that recovery will not be permissible from the concerned employee if he has already retired or is to be retired within the period of one years or the concerned employee is holding the post of Class-III or Class-IV. 45. Here, in the given facts of the case, it is admitted case of the State so far as it relates to the policy decision of the Forest Department where policy decision has been taken about passing of the accounts examination not to be mandatory and in that pretext, the writ petitioners were given the benefit of time bound promotion. 46. Here, in the given facts of the case, it is admitted case of the State so far as it relates to the policy decision of the Forest Department where policy decision has been taken about passing of the accounts examination not to be mandatory and in that pretext, the writ petitioners were given the benefit of time bound promotion. 46. The question now is to be looked into that when the Forest Department has given the benefit of time bound promotion on the basis of their own Circular then where is the misrepresentation on the part of the writ petitioners and can the State be allowed to recover the salary said to have been paid excess to their entitlement. 47. This Court, after giving thoughtful consideration that there is no misrepresentation on the part of the writ petitioners and if any excess amount has been paid, the same in the light of the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. (supra) cannot be said to be permissible to recover the said amount. 48. But, it needs to refer herein that since we are considering the Circular dated 14.06.1988 by which the time bound promotion has been granted in favour of the writ petitioners it does not mean that we are holding the decision of the authority to be correct since the aforesaid circular itself was issued in complete defiance of the statutory mandate as contained under Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1947 coupled with the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maheshwar Prasad Singh & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (supra). But, the question which requires to be considered by this Court as to whether if the policy decision dated 14.06.1988 is contrary to the provision as contained under Rule 157 (3) (J) of the Rules, 1947 then also there can be an order of recovery if the benefit has been granted in favour of the writ petitioners by the Department itself by making the aforesaid policy decision. The answer of this Court is that since the writ petitioners have been granted the benefit of upgradation in pay scale on the basis of the policy decision formulated by the Forest Department even accepting it to be incorrect policy decision then also there cannot be any recovery on the ground that the upgradation of pay scale so granted cannot be considered to be on the basis of any misrepresentation on fact made by the writ petitioners, as such, if the recovery will be allowed to be made of the excess payment so made in favour of the writ petitioners that will be in the teeth of the judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. (supra). 49. However, if the writ petitioners are not entitled to get any financial benefit, they cannot be allowed to take undue advantage beyond the entitlement otherwise, the same will allow the illegality to be perpetuated which is not permissible as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , wherein at paragraphs-56 and 57 it has been observed which reads as under: “56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief.) 57. This principle also applies to judicial pronouncements. Once the court comes to the conclusion that a wrong order has been passed, it becomes the solemn duty of the court to rectify the mistake rather than perpetuate the same. While dealing with a similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P. [1993 Supp (4) SCC 536 : AIR 1993 SC 1048 ] observed as under : (SCC p. 551, para 12) “12. … „2. … To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. While dealing with a similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P. [1993 Supp (4) SCC 536 : AIR 1993 SC 1048 ] observed as under : (SCC p. 551, para 12) “12. … „2. … To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this, we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter [1 NY 3 (1847) : A.M.Y. p. 18] at p. 18: “a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible and, therefore, ever ready to learn : great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead : and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors.”” 50. This Court, after having discussed the fact in entirety as referred above, is of the view that so far as the part of recovery as has been decided to be recovered by the impugned decision as contained in order no.43 dated 20.06.2008 [in W.P.(S) No. 3573 of 2008] and order no. 747 dated 10.10.2007 [in W.P.(S) No. 3566 of 2008] is hereby quashed and set aside. 51. In the result, the instant appeals stand partly allowed, accordingly, disposed of. 52. Before parting with the order, submission has been made that the State authority may be directed to fix the consequential benefits on the basis of the entitlement of the writ petitioners since the writ petitioners have already retired from service. 53. Upon this, Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that there will be no further delay in calculating the retirement/pensionary benefit and it will be done within the period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 54. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. 55. Interim stay, if granted, shall stand vacated.