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2022 DIGILAW 143 (MAN)

Thangminlun Zou v. State of Manipur

2022-08-03

M.V.MURALIDARAN

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 389 Cr.P.C. praying to suspend the order of conviction and fine and the sentence of the petitioner and execution thereof awarded vide judgment dated 17.12.2020 and the order of sentence dated 28.12.2020 passed by the learned Special Judge, Manipur in Special Trial Case No.100 of 2018 till the disposal of the connected appeal and to grant bail to the petitioner. 2. The petitioner, who has been arrayed as accused No.4 in Special Trial Case No.100 of 2018 on the file of the learned Special Judge, ND&PS, Manipur at Lamphelpat was convicted under Sections 21(c)/22(c) and Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [for short, 'the said Act'] and sentenced to undergo 15 years rigorous imprisonment each with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each to be paid within a period of one year from the date of sentence, failing which the petitioner shall serve another six months rigorous imprisonment. Challenging the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner, he has filed the criminal appeal before this Court. 3. Along with the appeal, the petitioner has filed the petition seeking to suspend the sentence stating that he has a very good case on merits and likely to succeed in the appeal filed by him on the ground that the mandatory provisions as prescribed under the said Act were not complied with by the prosecution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there are lot of infirmities in the impugned judgment and that the petitioner has a good case on merits in succeeding the appeal. He would submit that the petitioner is a bachelor and an educated youth and he is firmly rooted in society with his family members living very peacefully and also he is the only bread winner of his family. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner was in custody during trial and, in fact, while imposing sentence, he was brought from Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. 5. The learned counsel next submitted that the appeal would not be taken up for hearing in the near future and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to suspension of sentence pending appeal and that the petitioner undertakes to abide by the conditions imposed by this Court. 6. 5. The learned counsel next submitted that the appeal would not be taken up for hearing in the near future and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to suspension of sentence pending appeal and that the petitioner undertakes to abide by the conditions imposed by this Court. 6. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 32-A of the said Act so far as it ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to suspend the sentence imposed on a convict under the Act is unconstitutional and that when a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when the convict files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate Court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. 7. The learned counsel next submitted that the petitioner was in custody during trial and he had fully co-operated in the trial. According to the learned counsel, the detention of the petitioner during pendency of the appeal is a severe punishment to all his family members and thus prays for suspension of sentence pending appeal. 8. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to suspension of sentence, as it is barred by Section 32-A of the said Act. He would submit that since the petitioner was convicted under Sections 21(c)/22(c) read with Section 29 of the Act and sentenced to undergo 15 years of rigorous imprisonment and also he was aged 30 years at the time of commission of offence, the petitioner is not entitled to suspension of sentence. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that the High Court cannot override the bar provided under Section 32-A of the Act and that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Section 389 Cr.P.C. and therefore, the benefit cannot be extended to him. 9. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor then submitted that the Investigating Officer has examined number of witnesses in connection with the case and from their oral evidences and the documents produced by the prosecution, the learned Special Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioner and, accordingly, convicted the petitioner and imposed sentence aforesaid. 10. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that the prosecution has proved the seizure 80,000 nos. 10. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that the prosecution has proved the seizure 80,000 nos. of WY tablets and 2.677 kgs of heroin powder from the unauthorized possession of the petitioner. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no illegality and infirmity in passing the impugned judgment and the consequential sentence and, therefore, the question of suspension of the sentence does not arise. Further, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to be released on bail during the pendency of the appeal at this early stage in order to maintain the balance of rules of law vis-a-vis public confidence on judiciary and personal liberty of the convict. Arguing so, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that this Court cannot show any indulgence to the petitioner and, thus, prayed for dismissal of the petition. 11. This Court considered the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side and also perused the materials available on record. 12. The petitioner was convicted under Section 21(c)/22(c)/29 of the said Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 15 years each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each, in default to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment. The trial Court ordered that the sentences shall run concurrently. The judgment of the learned Special Judge is dated 17.12.2020 and sentence was imposed on 28.12.2020. The fact also remains that the petitioner is in judicial custody since his arrest. 13. In the instant case, the petitioner challenged the judgment of the learned Special Judge on various grounds as could be seen from the grounds of appeal. The petitioner has raised a ground that there is nothing on record to show that he has committed the offence alleged against him. According to the petitioner, there is not a shred of evidence to show that narcotic drug or psychotropic substances or controlled substance was seized from the possession of the petitioner. In fact, the learned Special Judge has not analyzed the evidence on record in the correct perspective and the petitioner was convicted based on the evidence of P.W.3 whose evidence is defective evidence and the prosecution cannot rely on the same. As such the impugned judgment and sentence are liable to be set aside. 14. In fact, the learned Special Judge has not analyzed the evidence on record in the correct perspective and the petitioner was convicted based on the evidence of P.W.3 whose evidence is defective evidence and the prosecution cannot rely on the same. As such the impugned judgment and sentence are liable to be set aside. 14. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is violation of Section 41(2) of the Act and that the arresting authority has not complied with Section 50 of the said Act at the time of search and seizure. 15. In Kailash Chowdhury v. State of Assam, 2001 (3) GLT 184, the Gauhati High Court held that search, seizure, arrest and investigation in violation of Sections 41 and 42 of the said Act is illegal and the trial on the basis of illegal search, seizure and investigation held vitiated. 16. In Beikhokim alias VeikhokinKukini v. State of Manipur, 1996(II) GLT 449, the Full Bench of Gauhati High Court held as under: '14. On the question whether recording of the informationin writing, as required u/s 42(1) is mandatory or not, reference may also be made to sub-section (2) of Section 42 which provides that where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-section (1) or record grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate superior official. The provision clearly brings out intention of the legislature to make the aforesaid provision under Section 42(1) regarding recording of the information, if any, in writing to be mandatory. In fact in the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 15 of the judgment of Balbir Singh's case (supra) Supreme Court clearly observed in unqualified and unambiguous terms that the aforesaid requirement of Section 42(1) is mandatory. Supreme Court in that case observed as follows: 'The object of NDPS Act is to make stringent provision for control and regulation of operations relating to those drugs and substances. At the same time, to avoid harm to the innocent persons and to avoid abuse of the provisions by the officers, certain safeguards are provided which in the context have to be observed strictly. At the same time, to avoid harm to the innocent persons and to avoid abuse of the provisions by the officers, certain safeguards are provided which in the context have to be observed strictly. Therefore, those provisions make it obligatory that such of those officers mentioned therein, on receiving an information, should reduce the same to writing and also record reasons for the relief while carrying out arrest or search as provided under the proviso to Section 42(1). To that extent they are mandatory. Consequently the failure to comply with those requirements thus affects the prosecution case and therefore vitiates the trial.' 17. In Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '14. Sub-section (2) of Section 42 contains a procedural directive to the officer who takes down any information in writing under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto to send forthwith a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.' 18. In Sukhdev Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 212 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '25. There is patent illegality in the case of the prosecution and such illegality is incurable. This is a case of total non-compliance, thus the question of substantial compliance would not even arise for consideration of the Court in the present case. The twin purposes of the provisions of Section 42 which can broadly be stated are that: (a) it is mandatory provision which ought to be construed and complied with strictly; and (b) compliance of furnishing information to the superior officer should be forthwith or within a very short time thereafter and preferably post-recovery (sic prior to recovery).' 19. It appears that one of the grounds urged by the petitioner for setting aside the impugned judgment is that the mandatory provisions as prescribed under Sections 41 and 42 of the said Act were not complied with by the arresting authority at the time of arrest and seizure of the alleged contraband. The said aspect of the matter cannot be gone into at this stage, as the same would involve arguments, coupled with the judicial pronouncements in that regard. 20. Now the point that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to suspension of sentence imposed on him by the learned Special Judge pending appeal. 21. Mr. Th. The said aspect of the matter cannot be gone into at this stage, as the same would involve arguments, coupled with the judicial pronouncements in that regard. 20. Now the point that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to suspension of sentence imposed on him by the learned Special Judge pending appeal. 21. Mr. Th. Tolpishak, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the appeal would not be taken up for final hearing in the near future and the petitioner has got family and he has to look after his family. 22. Under Section 32-A of the said Act, no sentence awarded under the Act shall be suspended or remitted or commuted. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dadu alias Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 437 held that Section 32-A is unconstitutional to the extent it takes away the right of the Court to suspend the sentence of a person convicted under the said Act. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that taking away of the right of the executive to suspend, remit and commute sentences under the said Act is valid. The said decision further clarifies that the appellate Court can suspend sentence imposed under the said Act, subject to the conditions set out in Section 37 of the said Act. 23. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer Section 37 of the said Act, which reads thus: '37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force, on granting bail.' 24. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force, on granting bail.' 24. In Dadu alias Tulsidar (supra), the Apex Court held: '25. Judged from any angle, the section insofar as it completely debars the appellate courts from the power to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act cannot stand the test of constitutionality. Thus Section 32-A insofar as it ousts the jurisdiction of the court to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act is unconstitutional. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Allahabad High Court in Ram Charan case (1991) 9 LCD 160 (All) has correctly interpreted the law relating to the constitutional validity of the section and the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Ishwar Singh M.Rajput case (1990) 2 Guj LR 1365 cannot be held to be good law.' 25. Time and again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court held that when a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and the appellate Court finds that due to practical reasons the appeal cannot be disposed of expeditiously, it can pass appropriate orders for suspension of sentence. 26. In Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai and others v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 4 SCC 421 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '3. When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course, if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach. But if for any reason the sentence of a limited duration cannot be suspended every endeavour should be made to dispose of the appeal on merits more so when a motion for expeditious hearing of the appeal is made in such cases. Otherwise the very valuable right of appeal would be an exercise in futility by efflux of time. But if for any reason the sentence of a limited duration cannot be suspended every endeavour should be made to dispose of the appeal on merits more so when a motion for expeditious hearing of the appeal is made in such cases. Otherwise the very valuable right of appeal would be an exercise in futility by efflux of time. When the appellate court finds that due to practical reasons such appeals cannot be disposed of expeditiously the appellate court must bestow special concern in the matter of suspending the sentence, so as to make the appeal right, meaningful and effective. Of course, appellate courts can impose similar conditions when bail is granted.' 27. In Union of India v. Ram Samujh and another, (1999) 9 SCC 429 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Court to grant bail is circumscribed by the Act. The bail can be granted and sentence suspended in a case where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence for which he is convicted and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail and during the period of suspension of sentence. 28. In the instant case, as could be seen from the grounds of appeal, the petitioner has challenged the judgment of the learned Special Judge on various grounds and he has got arguable case. It is to be noted that originally there were 13 accused and the learned Special Judge acquitted all others except the petitioner who being accused No.4 and one Tung Khan MungZou @ MungZou, accused No.2 from the charges. Anyhow, this Court is not concerned with the merits of the appeal and the concern is only with regard to the point whether the petitioner is entitled to suspension of sentence pending appeal. 29. As stated supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai (supra), held that the prayer for suspension of sentence pending appeal should be considered liberally unless there is any statutory restriction. As per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dadu alias Thulsidas (supra), Section 32-A of the ND&PS Act does not in any way affect the powers of the authorities to grant parole and a sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the appellate Court. 30. As per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dadu alias Thulsidas (supra), Section 32-A of the ND&PS Act does not in any way affect the powers of the authorities to grant parole and a sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the appellate Court. 30. Where an appeal is preferred against conviction under the said Act before the High Court, the High Court has ample power and discretion to suspend the sentence. That discretion has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. While considering the suspension of sentence, each case has to be considered on the basis of the nature of the offence, the manner in which the occurrence had taken place, whether bail granted earlier had been misused. There was no straitjacket formula which could be applied in exercising discretion and the facts and circumstances of each case would govern the exercise of judicious discretion while considering an application filed by a convict under Section 389 Cr.P.C. 31. In the instant case, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the present application for release and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor also opposed the application. However, prima facie, this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds in the appeal to succeed. 32. Admittedly, the petitioner was arrested on 19.6.2018 and since then he was in judicial custody. That apart, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner the appeal is of the year 2020 and due to practical reasons, the appeal cannot be taken up in the near future and disposed of expeditiously. Therefore, this Court finds that this is a fit case to suspend the sentence imposed on the petitioner pending appeal, however, subject to stringent conditions. The petitioner also undertakes that while on bail he will not likely to commit any offence. 33. As stated supra, in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai (supra) and the fact that the present appeal would take substantial time to come up for final hearing, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the appeal, this Court is inclined to suspend the sentence imposed on the petitioner/appellant. 34. 34. Accordingly, the sentence imposed on the petitioner in Special Trial Case No.100 of 2018 dated 28.12.2020 on the file of the learned Special Judge, (NDPS), Manipur at Lamphelpat alone is suspended, subject to the compliance of the following conditions by the petitioner: (a) The petitioner is directed to be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond for Rs.1 lakh (Rupees One Lakh) with two sureties in the like sum to the satisfaction of the learned Special Judge, (NDPS), Manipur at Lamphelpat. (b) The petitioner, on his being enlarged on bail, is directed to report before the learned Special Judge, NDPS, Manipur at Lamphelpat on all Tuesdays and Fridays at 10.00 A.M. till the disposal of the appeal pending before this Court.. (c) The petitioner shall also report before the Border Affairs Police Station on the first Monday of every month at 10.00 A.M. (d) The petitioner shall not indulge in any criminal activities during the period of suspension of sentence. (e) The Border Affairs Police is directed to monitor the petitioner and if they find the petitioner involved in any criminal activities, the Border Affairs Police is at liberty to bring it to the notice of this Court through the Public Prosecutor. (f) The petitioner shall not leave the jurisdiction of the Court. (g) In case of violation of any condition, the prosecution may ask for cancellation of bail. (h) It is made clear that this Court has not delved into the merits of the appeal.