JUDGMENT : 1. Challenging order dated 26.08.2022 passed by XXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH-6) on I.A. filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, in O.S.No.3694/2021 this appeal is filed. 2. Appellant herein was plaintiff, while respondents herein were defendants no. 1 to 4 respectively in suit. They shall hereinafter be referred to as such. 3. O.S.No.3694/2021 was filed by plaintiff seeking for declaration that plaintiff was absolute owner of schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties (hereinafter referred to as ‘suit properties’ for short). He had also sought for declaration that gift deeds dated 21.06.2010; sale deeds dated 14.05.2007 and 05.03.1981; confirmation deed dated 29.11.2017 as null and void and cancel same as not binding on plaintiff; so also judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.8770/2012 passed by X Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, as not binding on plaintiff and for permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering/trespassing into suit properties etc. 4. In said suit, plaintiff had filed I.A.no.1 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC for temporary injunction restraining defendants no.1 and 2 from interfering/ trespassing into suit properties. Property bearing site no.19, municipal no.38/1/19, BBMP khata no.43 was schedule ‘A’ property, while site no.20, municipal no.38/1/20, BBMP khata no.47 was schedule ‘B’ property, both were formed in Sy.no.38/1, each measuring East to West 40ft. and North to South 60ft., totally 2400 sq.ft., situated at Mallathahalli, BBMP ward no.129, Yeshvantpura Hobli, Bengaluru North. 5. On consideration, trial Court initially granted ex-parte ad-interim order of injunction. Upon entering appearance, defendants no.1 and 2 filed written statement with counter claim. They also filed I.A.no.2 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC, seeking order of temporary injunction restraining plaintiff from interfering with peaceful possession of defendants over suit properties. 6. On consideration of both applications, trial Court under impugned order rejected I.A.no.1 filed by plaintiff and allowed I.A.no.2 filed by defendants, thereby restraining plaintiff from interfering with peaceful possession of defendants no.1 and 2 in respect of suit properties. 7. Challenging same, this appeal is filed by plaintiff. 8. Shri. Dinesh Rao, learned counsel appearing for plaintiff submitted that plaintiff purchased suit properties under two registered sale deeds dated 20.04.2021. However, defendant no.3 had executed two registered agreements of sale in favour of plaintiff on 07.11.2014 and put him in possession. Thereafter, name of plaintiff was entered in BBMP records. Challenging same, this appeal is filed by plaintiff. 8. Shri. Dinesh Rao, learned counsel appearing for plaintiff submitted that plaintiff purchased suit properties under two registered sale deeds dated 20.04.2021. However, defendant no.3 had executed two registered agreements of sale in favour of plaintiff on 07.11.2014 and put him in possession. Thereafter, name of plaintiff was entered in BBMP records. As such, plaintiff was in possession of above properties on date of suit. 9. It was further submitted that suit properties were earlier part of Sy.No.38 of Mallathahalli village, measuring 02 acres 12 guntas belonging to one Sri Veerabadraiah, who sold it to Sri Rudrahanumaiah under sale deed dated 21.03.1966. Said Rudrahanumaiah, further sold it to Sri Devegowda under sale deed dated 18.12.1966, who in turn sold 02 acres 11 guntas in favour of Sri Chikkanna under sale deed dated 11.09.1969. After his death, his wife and children sold 02 acres 11 guntas to Sri Veerabadrappa -defendant no.4 under sale deed dated 23.06.1971. Further as plaintiff owned adjacent properties viz., site nos.21 and 22, he purchased suit properties to have one big area for his venture. It was submitted that said plots were fenced and electricity connection was obtained from BESCOM and plaintiff was paying consumption charges which indicated that plaintiff was in possession. It was submitted that whether plaintiff's possession was lawful or otherwise, was required to be adjudicated after trial. Since, defendants no.1 and 2 in their application and objections to plaintiff's application were alleging that plaintiff was putting up construction, there was admission of plaintiff's possession. It was submitted that decree obtained by defendants no.1 and 2 against defendants no.3 and 4 in O.S.No.8770/2012 was not binding on plaintiff. It was submitted that said suit was filed on 12.12.2012 and decreed on 31.03.2015. However, registered agreements of sale was executed by defendants no.3 and 4 on 07.11.2014, which was prior to decree. It was submitted that though, sale deeds dated 20.04.2021 in respect of suit properties were subsequent to decree, they were executed in pursuance of prior agreements of sale. 10. It was submitted that under registered partition on 12.01.2012 between family members of Veerabadrappa, land in Sy.No.38 fell to share of defendant no.3. It was submitted that though, sale deeds dated 20.04.2021 in respect of suit properties were subsequent to decree, they were executed in pursuance of prior agreements of sale. 10. It was submitted that under registered partition on 12.01.2012 between family members of Veerabadrappa, land in Sy.No.38 fell to share of defendant no.3. Therefore, as on date of execution of sale deed by Sri Veerabadrappa to defendants no.1 and 2, he had no valid title in respect of land in Sy.No.38 in view of above mentioned registered partition. Therefore, claim of title by defendants no.1 and 2 in respect of suit properties was questionable. 11. It was submitted that in its reasoning, trial Court had observed that whether decree in O.S.No.8770/2012 would bind plaintiff was required to be adjudicated. In any case, since decree in O.S.No.8770/2012 was only for permanent injunction, without prayer for declaration, said decree would not bind plaintiff. It was further submitted that admittedly, plaintiff had begun construction by investing substantial amount of Rs.1.5 crores by availing loan and impugned order stopping construction would subject him to grave financial hardship. It was submitted that plaintiff -appellant was willing to give undertaking that he would not claim equity in event of loosing suit and subject to such condition, he may be permitted to complete construction. 12. Learned counsel further submitted that while passing impugned order, there was no proper consideration of facts and circumstances under which applications were filed by plaintiff and defendants and Trial Court also failed to examine whether defendants could maintain an application for injunction against plaintiff. Impugned order was passed by trial Court, as if while considering I.A.no.2 filed by defendants no.1 and 2 and consequently rejecting plaintiff's application. It was submitted that in I.A.no.2, defendants no.1 and 2 sought for injunction restraining plaintiff from interfering with peaceful possession. In affidavit filed in support of their application, they alleged that under protection of order of ad-interim injunction, plaintiff began putting up construction. It was submitted that putting up construction would not fall within any of circumstances enumerated in Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) of CPC, as it did not amount subjecting property in dispute of being wasted, damaged or alienated. Therefore, such application filed by defendants was misconceived. Hence, trial Court erred in entertaining same. 13. It was submitted that putting up construction would not fall within any of circumstances enumerated in Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) of CPC, as it did not amount subjecting property in dispute of being wasted, damaged or alienated. Therefore, such application filed by defendants was misconceived. Hence, trial Court erred in entertaining same. 13. It was also submitted that even a defendant who had sought counter claim could not maintain such application and similar issue was pending consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP.no.12678-79/2021. 14. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon Full Bench decision of this Court in case of Smt.Shankunthalamma and Ors. v/s Smt.Kanthamma and Ors., ILR 2014 KAR 6025 = AIR 2015 KAR 13 for proposition that defendants could seek injunction against plaintiff only under circumstances enumerated in Rule 1 of Order XXXIX of CPC. In circumstances other than those provided in Rule 1, defendants were required to file separate suit. 15. It was submitted that this Court in W.P.no.205471/2016, disposed of on 10.11.2016 had followed ratio of full Bench decision and affirmed rejection of application for temporary injunction filed by defendants against plaintiffs to prevent them from interfering with plaintiffs possession. It was submitted that since relief in I.A.no.2 in present case was similar, said ratio would apply. 16. It was further submitted that in Sri. Abdul Wajid v/s Smt.Banu Bi and Others, M.F.A.no.4047/2020, disposed on 25.11.2021, under similar circumstances where construction of building was substantially completed, this Court had held that comparative hardship would be upon respondent if he were to be stopped from proceeding with construction. It was also observed that, plaintiff had not sought injunction against demolition of building and construction but to restrain respondent from changing nature of schedule property. Therefore, it upheld finding that there was prima facie case and about comparative hardship and injury. 17. Relying upon decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in ECE Industries Ltd., v/s S.P. Real Estate Developers P. Ltd., and another, (2009) 12 SCC 773 , it was submitted that in a suit where plaintiff -agreement holder alleged that he had not received entire consideration and therefore sought temporary injunction against defendant from proceeding with construction, Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that where substantial construction was made on suit property by investing crores of rupees, plaintiff would not suffer substantial injury if construction was not stopped. Under such circumstances, Hon'ble Supreme Court had permitted defendants to complete construction subject to an undertaking not to claim equities in case result of suit went against it. It was submitted that, since in present case also, construction had begun and plaintiff was ready to give undertaking not to claim equities, order of injunction against plaintiff/appellant required to be set aside. It was submitted that, ratio in ECE Industries (supra) was followed by this Court in Sri Hemant S/o Late Subhash Chandra Bose v/s N. Jayarama Reddy, M.F.A.No.8149/2017, disposed of 13.12.2017, by setting aside order of temporary injunction granted against proceeding with construction by directing defendant to file affidavit undertaking to vacate possession of suit properties in event of plaintiff succeeding in suit. 18. On other hand, Sri. S.V.Giridhar, learned counsel for defendants no.1 and 2 opposed appeal. 19. At outset, learned counsel pointed out that submission of counsel for plaintiff/appellant about pendency of issue before Hon'ble Supreme Court whether defendant could claim injunction against plaintiff in SLP.nos.12678-79/2021 was utterly false and misleading, as said petition was already dismissed on 15.11.2021. Copy of said order as well as copy of judgment in MFA.no.102788/2020 and connected matter in Tamminedi Ramkrishna and Anr. v/s Smt.N. Jayalakshmi, passed by this Court, against which above SLP was filed, were produced. Referring to same, it was submitted that said petition did not involve issue about right of defendant in Counter claim to seek temporary injunction against plaintiff. Therefore, there was attempt to mislead Court by reckless and unscrupulous reference. 20. Without prejudice, even on merits, it was submitted that suit properties were originally part of survey no.38/1 of Malathahalli. It was owned by Sri Veerabadrappa -defendant no.4 along with his brother Sri Rudrahanumaiah to an extent of 02 acres 12 guntas. On 21.03.1966, defendant no.4 sold his half share in said land in favour of his brother, who in turn sold it to Sri Devegowda under sale deed dated 18.12.1966. Afore said Devegowda sold it to Sri Chikkanna under sale deed dated 11.09.1969. After his death, his wife and children sold said land back to Veerabadraiah -defendant no.4 under sale deed dated 23.06.1971. It was further submitted that, said defendant no.4 formed layout and sold two sites i.e., site no.19 and 20 therein which are suit properties herein. Afore said Devegowda sold it to Sri Chikkanna under sale deed dated 11.09.1969. After his death, his wife and children sold said land back to Veerabadraiah -defendant no.4 under sale deed dated 23.06.1971. It was further submitted that, said defendant no.4 formed layout and sold two sites i.e., site no.19 and 20 therein which are suit properties herein. It was submitted that, site no.19 was sold under registered sale deed dated 05.03.1981 in favour of Sri. Anil Baheti; site no.20 was sold in favour of his brother Sri. Ramesh Baheti on 12.03.1981. It was submitted that, aforesaid Ramesh and Anil in turn, sold said sites in favour of father of defendants no.1 and 2 under registered sale deed dated 14.05.2007. Thereafter, on 21.06.2010, they were gifted in favour of defendants no.1 and 2 respectively under registered gift deeds dated 21.06.2010. On 12.01.2012, defendants no.3 and 4 and Smt.Shantamma, wife of defendant no.3 entered into registered partition deed. Said partition was suppressed by plaintiff. On other hand, plaintiff asserts that he became owner of suit properties under gift deed executed by wife of defendant no.3. It was submitted that, O.S.No.8770/2012 was filed by defendants no.1 and 2 against defendants no.3 and 4 as well as Smt. Shantamma, wife of defendant no.3. In said suit, defendants no.1 and 2, who are defendants no.3 and 4 herein had filed counter claim, claiming interests in suit properties on basis of sale deeds and gift deeds and had also sort counter injunction. However, thereafter on 29.11.2017, confirmation deed was executed by defendants no.3 and 4 and also Smt. Shantamma subscribing to judgment and decree in O.S.No.8770/2012. 21. It was further submitted that though plaintiff claimed to have been put in possession of suit properties in pursuance of agreement of sale dated 07.11.2014, but copy of said agreement produced as documents no.3 and 4 along with plaint would reveal that absolutely there were no averments about delivery of possession in recitals. In fact, recitals would specifically state that possession was retained by vendor. Therefore, assertion of plaintiff that he being in possession from date of agreement of sale was totally false. Learned counsel further submitted that in paragraphs no.3 and 4 of plaint, it was stated that he came in possession as per sale deed dated 20.04.2021 and possession under agreement of sale was not at all pleaded. Therefore, assertion of plaintiff that he being in possession from date of agreement of sale was totally false. Learned counsel further submitted that in paragraphs no.3 and 4 of plaint, it was stated that he came in possession as per sale deed dated 20.04.2021 and possession under agreement of sale was not at all pleaded. It was further submitted that plaintiff was not bonafide purchaser would stand demonstrate by fact that on 19.04.2021 itself, plaintiff had filed caveat petition no.2077/2021 only against defendant no.1 that too, by specifically referring to sale agreement and gift deed. Thereafter on 25.05.2021, he files caveat petition no.2285/2021 against both defendants no.1 and 2. Therefore, plaintiff was aware of interest of defendants no.1 and 2 prior to purchase of suit properties. 22. It was submitted that I.A.no.2 was filed by defendants no.1 and 2 under provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 1(c) of CPC, as they would be plaintiffs in view of counter claim filed by them against plaintiff in respect of suit properties. It was submitted that such application had to be treated as if filed by plaintiff and would therefore be maintainable. Relying upon various decisions to contend otherwise was misconceived. It was submitted that even on merits suit filed by plaintiff against registered sale deed without corresponding challenge by plaintiff's vendors i.e. defendants no.3 and 4 would be untenable and especially so, since they did not question decree passed in O.S.no.8770/2012. 23. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon following decisions: Sl.no. Citation Proposition 1. 1956 SCC OnLine KER 132 BF Varghese v/s Joseph Thomas That defendant can move for injunction against plaintiff without filing a counter claim only in some cases, where his claim to relief arose out of plaintiff's cause of action or was incidental to it. 2. ILR 1974 KAR 1533 Suganda Bai v/s Sulu Bai and Ors. 3. ILR 1989 KAR 962 Ramaiah v/s Gowdappa 4. AIR 2006 KAR 135 B. Lakshminarayan v/s Corporation of City of Bangalore and Anr. 5. ILR 2014 KAR 6025 Smt.Shankuthalamma and Ors. v/s Smt.Kanthamma and Ors. 2. ILR 1974 KAR 1533 Suganda Bai v/s Sulu Bai and Ors. 3. ILR 1989 KAR 962 Ramaiah v/s Gowdappa 4. AIR 2006 KAR 135 B. Lakshminarayan v/s Corporation of City of Bangalore and Anr. 5. ILR 2014 KAR 6025 Smt.Shankuthalamma and Ors. v/s Smt.Kanthamma and Ors. That both plaintiff and defendant can maintain application under Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) of CPC., for reliefs set out in said provision AND in cases which do not fall under Rule 1, Court as inherent jurisdiction to grant relief of injunction if it is satisfied that such an order is necessary to meet ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court and nothing in Code would limit or effect such inherent power. 6. (1992) 1 SCC 719 Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v/s Prahlad Singh and Ors., That while considering application for grant of injunction, conduct of parties is relevant. 24. Sri. C.P. Dhananjaya, learned counsel for respondents no.3 and 4 – defendants no.3 and 4 sought for passing appropriate orders. 25. In reply, Sri. Dinesh Rao, learned counsel for plaintiff conceded that SLP in Tamminedi Ramkrishna’s (supra) case was dismissed and prayed for ignoring references to same. He further submitted that Full Bench of this Court in Smt.Shankunthalamma's case (supra) had held that only in circumstances availing under Rule 1 of Order XXXIX, defendant could seek injunction and in other cases, he was required to file separate suit. It was further submitted that Hon'ble Supreme Court in ECE Industries (supra) had specifically considered case where there was substantial construction was undertaken and vacated interim injunction and therefore sought for allowing appeal. 26. Heard learned counsel, perused impugned order and records. 27. From above submission, point that arises for consideration in this appeal is: “Whether impugned order rejecting I.A.no.1 filed by plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC and allowing I.A.no.2 filed by defendants no.1 and 2 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC and thereby granting injunction against plaintiff from interfering with peaceful possession of 'A' and 'B' properties?” 28. From above submissions, it is seen that there is no dispute between parties about 'A' and 'B' properties being part of Sy.no.38 of Mallathahall, totally measuring 02 acres 12 guntas. From above submissions, it is seen that there is no dispute between parties about 'A' and 'B' properties being part of Sy.no.38 of Mallathahall, totally measuring 02 acres 12 guntas. There is also no dispute about said land originally belonging to Veerabadraiah and Rudrahanumaiah and subsequent transfer firstly in favour of Rudrahanumaiah on 21.03.1966, secondly in favour of Devegowda on 18.12.1966 and thirdly in favour of Chikkanna on 11.09.1969 and fourthly in favour of defendant no.4 – Veerabadrappa. 29. Thus, plaintiff claims title and possession over suit properties under two registered sale deeds dated 20.04.2021, in pursuance of registered agreements of sale dated 07.11.2014 with defendant no.3 and asserts that his name was entered in revenue records and being owner of adjacent sites no.21 and 22 had intended to consolidate said sites for his venture and fenced all sites together and obtained electricity connection from BESCOM in respect of site no.21 and paying property tax indicating his possession. 30. While defendants no.1 and 2 claim that after purchase of land from wife and children of deceased Chikkanna, defendant no.4 formed layout in Sy.no.38/1 measuring 02 acres 11 guntas and sold two sites in said layout viz., sites no.19 and 20 in favour of Sri. Anil K Baheti and Sri. Ramesh K Baheti under sale deeds dated 05.03.1981 and 12.03.1981, their father purchased said sites from said Anil and Ramesh under registered sale deeds dated 14.05.2007 and thereafter gifted them to defendants no.1 and 2 on 21.06.2010 and as such, they were in possession, their names were entered in revenue records and they were paying taxes in respect of said sites. It is further case of defendants no.1 and 2 that defendant no.4 in collusion with his son -defendant no.3 and his daughter-in-law entered into illegal deed of partition on 12.01.2012. When on strength of said partition, defendants no.3 and 4 attempted to interfere with peaceful possession of defendants no.1 and 2 in respect of suit properties, they were constrained to file O.S.no.8770/2012 on 12.12.2012 against defendants no.3 and 4 and also wife of defendant no.3 seeking relief of permanent injunction. In said suit, defendants therein filed written statement and also counter claim. In said suit, defendants therein filed written statement and also counter claim. But said suit came to be decreed on 31.03.2015, granting perpetual injunction by observing that deed of partition was nominal document and vendor of plaintiff herein did not have any right in respect of suit properties either to execute agreements of sale on 07.11.2014 or subsequent sale deeds dated 21.04.2021. 31. While plaintiff in I.A.no.1 alleges that on 25.04.2021 and 09.05.2021, defendants no.1 and 2 attempted to trespass into suit properties leading to filing of police complaint against them on 09.05.2021. He also asserted that defendant no.3 had filed police complaint against defendants no.1 and 2 on 10.06.2021 for concocting deed of confirmation dated 29.11.2017 and filed another complaint to Joint Commissioner, BBMP for cancellation of Khata of defendants no.1 and 2 in respect of suit properties to substantiate prima facie case, illegal interference, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury and praying for granting of temporary injunction. 32. On other hand, defendants no.1 and 2 allege in IA No.2 that under strength of illegal deed of partition dated 12.01.2012, alleged agreements of sale dated 07.11.2014 and sale deeds dated 20.04.2021, plaintiff had filed false and frivolous suit and after obtaining ex-parte ad-interim order of temporary injunction began putting up construction of compound wall and construction in suit properties and contended that since plaintiff claimed to have acquired title from defendants no.3 and 4, who had suffered decree of perpetual injunction at hands of defendants no.1 and 2 wherein deed of partition, agreements of sale and sale deeds of plaintiffs were held to be illegal, they contend to have established prima facie case, illegal interference, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury if plaintiff were not restrained from proceeding with construction. 33. While passing impugned order, trial Court took note of observations made in O.S.no.8770/2012 as substantiating right, title and interest of defendants no.1 and 2 in respect of suit properties. It observed that mere filing of complaint by defendants no.3 and 4 and also plaintiff relying upon electricity bill, which did not specify address to conclude that plaintiff had failed to establish prima facie case and balance of convenience. It observed that decree in O.S.no.8770/2012 as well as deed of confirmation executed by defendants no.3 and 4 and Smt. Shanthamma as establishing prima facie case and balance of convenience by defendants no.1 and 2. It observed that decree in O.S.no.8770/2012 as well as deed of confirmation executed by defendants no.3 and 4 and Smt. Shanthamma as establishing prima facie case and balance of convenience by defendants no.1 and 2. It observed that plaintiffs claim of acquiring title from defendants no.3 and 4 required trial. It also observed that filing of caveat petition by plaintiff against defendant no.1 indicated that plaintiff had knowledge of interest of defendants no.1 and 2 in suit properties. It also took note of fact that defendants no.3 and 4 were parties to O.S.no.8770/2012, but had not challenged decree passed therein. 34. Main contention urged in this appeal is whether defendants no.1 and 2 can maintain application for temporary injunction against plaintiff to restrain him from interfering with possession. According to plaintiff, such application would fall within ambit of Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) of CPC, which as per decision of Full Bench of this Court in Smt.Shakunthalamma’s case (supra) was available only to plaintiff and defendants were required to file separate suit. 35. This Court in above case held as follows: “33. The correct legal position as is clear from the statutory provision is as under: (i) Both the plaintiff and the defendant can maintain an application under Order XXXIX Rule 1(a) of the Code for the reliefs set out in the said provision; (ii) Insofar as relief under Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) and (c) is concerned, such a relief is available only to the plaintiff and the defendant cannot maintain an application for the said reliefs in a suit filed by the plaintiff, irrespective of the fact that his right to such relief arises either from the same cause of action or a cause of action that arises subsequent to filing of the suit. However it is open to the defendant to maintain a separate suit against the plaintiff and seek relief provided under Order 39 Rule 1(b) and (c) of the Code. (iii) In cases which do not fall under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code, the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief of injunction in its discretion, if it is satisfied that such an order is necessary to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the court and nothing in this Code shall limit or otherwise affect such inherent power of the court”. 36. 36. Though learned counsel have also relied upon several other judgments which considered permissibility of defendant/s maintaining application for temporary injunction against plaintiff, it is seen that in instant case, defendants no.1 and 2 have sought counter claim against plaintiff, wherein they have sought for decree of declaration that agreements of sale dated 07.11.2014 and sale deeds dated 20.04.2021 as null and void ab initio and not binding on suit properties or defendants no.1 and 2; they have also sought for perpetual injunction restraining plaintiff from interfering with their peaceful possession in respect of suit properties. 37. In view of Order VIII Rule 6(A)(2) and (4) of CPC, counter claim would have to be treated as plaint and would be governed by rules applicable to plaint. Therefore, defendants no.1 and 2 herein would be in position as plaintiffs and can maintain application for temporary injunction against respondent in counter claim – plaintiff herein. None of judgments cited by plaintiff involved above fact situation. Though, learned counsel for plaintiff strenuously contended that putting up of construction would not fall within ambit of Rule 1(a) of Order XXXIX of CPC, in view of fact that applicants in I.A.no.2 would be in position of plaintiff, they would not suffer restrictions as held in Smt.Shakunthalamma’s case (supra). 38. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mohd. Mehtab Khan Vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan & Others, 2013 (9) SCC 221 , has held that scope of interference in an appeal under Order XLIII of CPC against discretionary order passed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC would be limited to examining, whether it suffered from palpable error or untenable and further held that even if view taken were a possible view, there would be no scope for interference. 39. In instant case, it is specifically alleged in I.A.no.2 filed by defendants no.1 and 2 that under cover of ex-parte ad-interim injunction, plaintiff had began construction. On other hand, plaintiff has not stated about beginning construction or alleged interference with construction by defendants. Therefore, view taken by trial Court to injunct plaintiff can be considered as a measure to prevent abuse of process of Court and to meet ends of justice, which circumstance would avail to both plaintiff and defendants alike. 40. On other hand, plaintiff has not stated about beginning construction or alleged interference with construction by defendants. Therefore, view taken by trial Court to injunct plaintiff can be considered as a measure to prevent abuse of process of Court and to meet ends of justice, which circumstance would avail to both plaintiff and defendants alike. 40. Insofar as fervent submission of learned counsel for plaintiff that as plaintiff had put up substantial construction by spending over Rs.1.5 Crores, by availing loan and therefore plaintiff be permitted to complete construction and that he was willing to give undertaking that he would not claim equity in event of loosing suit, it is seen that plaintiff nowhere pleaded about construction. Even in his rejoinder statement, which he adopted as his objections to application filed by defendants, plaintiff did not plead either about substantial investment/expenditure or extent of construction. 41. From assertion of defendants in affidavit filed in support of I.A.no.2, plaintiff had began construction of compound wall. Photographs produced do not indicate that substantial extent of construction having taken place. Therefore plaintiff cannot avail benefit of ratio of decision laid down in ECE Industries (supra) or decisions rendered following it in Sri. Hemant S/o Late Subhash Chandra Bose vs. N.Jayarama Reddy in M.F.A.No.8149/2017. Construction being at initial stage, it would be apt for parties to maintain status-quo during pendency of suit. Viewed in said light, impugned order does not suffer from palpable error as to call for interference. 42. On perusal of entire plaint, application and affidavit filed in I.A.no.1, there is no explanation or even an assertion about when and how plaintiff came into possession of suit properties. Therefore, contention of plaintiff to have come in possession in pursuance of registered agreements of sale dated 07.11.2014 is unacceptable and contrary to own record as agreement of sale, copy of which was produced herein contains specific recital that "possession was retained by seller". Even otherwise, it is not plaintiff's case that he obtained possession under agreement of sale. Thus there is sufficient justification for rejection of plaintiff’s application and for allowing defendants’ application. 43. Thus point for consideration is answered in negative. Hence, I pass following: ORDER i. Appeal is dismissed with costs. ii. Consequently, pending applications are disposed of.