JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. I.A. No. 6174 of 2022: 1. This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 23 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 2. No counter affidavit to the delay condonation application has been filed. 3. Heard the parties. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and considering the statements made in this application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in preferring this appeal within time. 5. Accordingly, this interlocutory application is allowed and the delay of 23 days in preferring this appeal, is hereby condoned. 6. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard at this stage for final disposal. L.P.A. No. 270 of 2022: 7. This intra court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 14.02.2022 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 1566 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, direction was sought for upon the respondents to consider the case of the writ petitioner no.1 to 6 and 8 who are the legal heirs of the displaced persons whose lands have been acquired by the Central Coalfields Limited under the provision of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1957, has been declined to be interfered with. 8. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petitions required to be enumerated, read as under: One Budhu Manjhi was the recorded of the lands of Khata No. 10 Plot Nos. 140, 141, 170, 175, 184, 192, 283 to 286, 290 to 293, 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312, 329, 330, 331, 333, 343, 344, 345, 347, 416, 417, 418, 539, 541, 542, 675, 689, 693, 697, 702, 703, 727, 728 & 729 measuring 22.41 acres appertaining to village-Urimari, P.S. Barkagaon, Thana No. 155, District-Hazaribagh. Thereafter, Budhu Manjhi died leaving behind Jora Manjhi who also died leaving behind two sons, Khara Manjhi and Chopan Manjhi. All the writ-petitioners are the descendants and legal heirs of Khara Manjhi, whereas the said Chopan Manjhi died issueless. Thereafter, Budhu Manjhi died leaving behind Jora Manjhi who also died leaving behind two sons, Khara Manjhi and Chopan Manjhi. All the writ-petitioners are the descendants and legal heirs of Khara Manjhi, whereas the said Chopan Manjhi died issueless. It is further the case of the petitioners that the entire lands measuring 22.41 acres was acquired by the respondents in 1975 and against the said acquisition, Chopan Manjhi, one of the son of Jora Manjhi was provided employment by the respondents in the year, 1982 under Land Looser Scheme. Though an employment was given by the respondents to Chopan Manjhi being one of the co-sharers of the land acquired, no employment was provided to any other descendant of the recorded tenant Budhu Manjhi. As per the Scheme, one employment was to be provided to one family member against the acquisition of 3 acres of land, but employment was given to only one of the family members i.e. Chopan Manjhi, whereas, they were entitled for six employment against the remaining 19.41 acres of acquired land. Accordingly, the writ-petitioners represented several times before the respondents for employment as the writ-petitioners were entitled for employment against the acquisition of land belonging to common ancestor under the provisions of the Act, but the respondents have provided the same. 9. The writ-petitioner being aggrieved with the same, have approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1566 of 2017 seeking direction upon the respondents to provide appointment on the ground of the land having been acquired which was owned by their ancestors. 10. Learned Single Judge, while hearing the matter has declined to pass any positive direction on the ground that the writ-petitioners have approached to this Court after lapse of about 42 years from the date of acquisition, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 11. Mr. Om Prakash Prasad, learned counsel for the appellants-writ petitioners has assailed the order passed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the land since has been acquired by the CCL and they have also come out with the scheme to provide appointment but not provided the same which an arbitrary exercise of the respondent concerned and the aforesaid fact has not been considered in right perspective by the learned Single Judge, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 12. 12. It has further been submitted that the learned Single Judge has taken the reason while declining to pass any positive direction that since the writ petitioners have approached this Court after lapse of about 42 years, which according to the learned counsel cannot be said to be justified reason since the land admittedly has been acquired which was owned by the ancestors of the writ petitioners being the main source of livelihood and as there was already a scheme floated by the CCL, therefore, there is no reason to deny such opportunity. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel for the respondent-CCL has defended the order passed by the learned Single Judge and has submitted that the writ petition has rightly been dismissed on the ground of applicability of the principle of delay and laches. It has been submitted that the principle to be followed while exercising the writ jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is primarily to look into the laches committed on the part of the writ petitioner while entertaining the writ petition and if there is delay, the writ petition is required to be dismissed. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, if has dismissed the writ petition, it cannot be said to suffer from error. 14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 15. The grievance of the writ petitioners is that the land owned by the ancestors has been acquired way back in the year 1975 but the appointment has not been provided, therefore, in the year 2017 a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1566 of 2017 has been filed seeking direction upon the respondents to provide appointment in favour of the writ petitioners. 16. The learned Single Judge after appreciating the rival submission advanced on behalf of the parties has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay of 42 years, which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 17. 16. The learned Single Judge after appreciating the rival submission advanced on behalf of the parties has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay of 42 years, which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 17. This Court, after going through the factual aspect involved in this case has gone across the order passed by the learned Single Judge and has found therefrom that the sole ground taken in dismissing the writ petition is that the writ petition has been filed after lapse of 42 years. 18. It is settled position of law that while exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, although there is no applicability of limitation act but the principle of delay and laches is required to be looked into since the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the power of equity and the party can only be allowed to approach the Court within a reasonable period. If any litigant is approaching the Court invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India it is primary duty to approach the said Court within a reasonable time. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Pan Singh and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 278 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court by referring to the judgment rendered in Lipton India Ltd. and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., (1994) 6 SCC 524 has observed at paragraph-17, which reads as under: “17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.” 19. This Court, after having discussed the principle of law as above and after going through the order passed by the learned Single Judge has found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has also taken into consideration the applicability of principle of delay and laches by making note of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Renuka Bala Devi vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2011) 3 JLJR 362 , pr. 6 & 8 ; P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 , pr. 2 and Shiv Dass vs. Union of India and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 274 , pr. 9. 6 & 8 ; P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 , pr. 2 and Shiv Dass vs. Union of India and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 274 , pr. 9. Paragraphs-6 & 8 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Renuka Bala Devi vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. read as under: “6. From the rival submissions, it appears that though, a scheme was floated by the respondent BCCL for granting employment to the members of the family of the land holders for every two acres of the land acquired, it was up to the land holders to inform and submit their claim seeking employment for the members of their family in accordance with the scheme floated. As it appears, the petitioner had made her claim for the first time in the year 1990 and that too, for only one employment. In the application or in the affidavit submitted by her for seeking employment, it does not appear that she had reserved her right for seeking any further employment, nor has she indicated even remotely in her application that she wants the number of employments in proportion to the area of land acquired. 7. … 8. It is apparent from the aforesaid facts that having claimed only one employment, the petitioner, for more than 20 years thereafter, did not opt for any further employment and the respondents have rightly considered such conduct on the part of the petitioner as an act of waiver of her claim for any further employment. After such belated period of more than 22 years from the date of acquisition of the lands, the petitioner cannot possibly claim the benefit of the policy which, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, has now been withdrawn.” Paragraph-2 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu reads as under: “2. … … … It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. … … … It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.” Paragraph-9 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shiv Dass vs. Union of India and Ors. reads as under: “9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1967 SC 993 ). There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray, ( AIR 1976 SC 2617 ) making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik ( AIR 1976 SC 1639 ). 20. This Court, therefore, is of the view that if the learned Single Judge has taken the ground of delay and laches to dismiss the writ petition, the same, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from error. 21. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and stands dismissed.