JUDGMENT : Suman Shyam, J. Both these appeals arise out of judgment dated 20.07.2020 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Khonsa in Sessions Case No.04/2019 and therefore, are being taken up together for disposal by this common order. 2. We have heard Mr. S.D. Purkayastha, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.97/2021 and Mr. B. M. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.194/2020. We have also heard Mr. N.N.B. Choudhury, learned Public Prosecutor, State of Arunachal Pradesh appearing for the State/respondent No.1. Mr. Azad Ahmed, learned counsel has appeared on behalf of the informant/respondent No.2 in both these appeals. 3. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is to the effect that the victim Anwar Uddin had a mobile phone shop at the Longding Market. Initially, the shop of Anwar Uddin was situated towards the lower side of the market but since his mobile phone business did not pick up well at that location, hence, he had shifted his shop “P. K. Mobile” to the Longding market, by the side of the electronic shop run by appellant Nipen Das @ Kala. The re-location of the mobile phone shop of Anwar Uddin did not go down well with his competitor Nipen Das as a result of which, a business rivalry had cropped up in between appellant Nipen Das @ Kala and the victim Anwar Uddin. In order to silence his business rival, Nipen Das had conspired to eliminate Anwar Uddin and accordingly, he had hired appellant Ahon Wangsa to kill Anwar Uddin. On 03.02.2019, Nipen Das had asked Ahon Wangsa to cut Anwar Uddin with a ‘dao’ and kill him but when Ahon Wangsa expressed his inability to do so, Nipen Das had handed over a jug of acid to Ahon Wangsa, who then went to the shop of Anwar Uddin and threw the acid on the face of Anwar Uddin causing grievous injury to him while six other persons including some of the customers present in the shop had also received injury due to acid burns. Nipen Das had promised to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- to Ahon Wangsa for throwing acid on Anwar Uddin. 4. On 03.02.2019, Shri Sahnaj Hussain i.e. the brother of the victim, had lodged an ejahar before the Officer-in-Charge of Longding Police Station reporting the incident. Nipen Das had promised to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- to Ahon Wangsa for throwing acid on Anwar Uddin. 4. On 03.02.2019, Shri Sahnaj Hussain i.e. the brother of the victim, had lodged an ejahar before the Officer-in-Charge of Longding Police Station reporting the incident. In the ejahar, it was mentioned that around 17:43 hours on that day, an unknown miscreant suddenly came to “P. K. Mobile Shop” located at the Main Tiniali, Longding and threw acid from a jug on the face of his elder brother Md. Anwar Uddin. Six other persons present in the shop had also been sprinkled with acid. Based on the ejahar dated 03.02.2019, Longding Police Station Case No.07/2019 was registered under section 326(A) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the matter was taken up for investigation. During the course of investigation, police had recorded the statement of the witnesses and had also got the confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class (J.M.F.C.). The statement of witness Manai Wangsa was also recorded by the Magistrate. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted under sections 120B/326(A) of the IPC against three accused persons viz., Nipen Das @ Kala, Ahon Wangsa and Puman Wangnow. 5. As it was a case triable by the Sessions Court, the matter was committed to the Court of District & Sessions Judge, Longding at Khonsa. The learned trial court had framed charges against the accused persons under sections 120(B)/326-A read with section 34 of the IPC. The accused persons were accordingly, subjected to trial. 6. During trial, the prosecution side had examined as many as 10 witnesses. That apart, the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Longding, who had recorded the statement of the accused Ahon Wangsa under section 164 Cr.P.C. was also examined as CW-1. After recording the evidence of the prosecution side, the statement of the accused persons were recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein they had generally refused to comment on the incriminating materials placed before them and claimed ignorance. On conclusion of trial, the learned Sessions Judge had convicted the two appellants under sections 120B read with 326(A)/34 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 14 years for committing the offence under sections 120B and 326(A) of the IPC and also to pay a fine of Rs.12,00,000/-(Rupees Twelve Lakhs) with default stipulation. On conclusion of trial, the learned Sessions Judge had convicted the two appellants under sections 120B read with 326(A)/34 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 14 years for committing the offence under sections 120B and 326(A) of the IPC and also to pay a fine of Rs.12,00,000/-(Rupees Twelve Lakhs) with default stipulation. However, the co-accused Puman Wangnow was acquitted on the ground that the prosecution could not prove the charges brought against him beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Mr. S. D. Purkayastha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.97/2021 has assailed the impugned judgment on several grounds. According to Mr. Purkayastha, the prosecution has failed to establish that the liquid substance allegedly thrown by the accused Ahon Wangsa was acid by obtaining FSL report so as to bring the case within the ambit of section 326(A) of the IPC. Mr. Purkayastha has also argued that the confessional statement of his client (Ext-10) was not recorded after due compliance of the mandatory provisions of section 164(2) and (4) of the Cr.P.C inasmuch as the accused was not explained by the Magistrate that he was not bound to make a confession and if he did so, it might be used against him as evidence. The learned counsel further submits that the confessional statement (Ext-10) also does not go to show that the same was truthful and voluntary. According to the learned counsel, Ext-10 was inadmissible in the eye of law due to procedural violations and hence, ought not to have been relied upon by the learned court below. In support of his above contentions, Mr. Purkayastha has relied upon the following decisions :- (1) Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1957 SC 637 . (2) Dhananjay Reddy vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2001)4 SCC 9 . (3) Babubhai Udesinh Parmar vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2006) 12 SCC 268 . (4) Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh vs. Republic of India reported in (2011) 2 SCC 490 . 8. Mr. Purkayastha has further argued that during his examination under section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant/accused did not admit of having made a confession before the Magistrate and therefore, the alleged confession (Ext-10) ought to be treated as a retracted confession. 8. Mr. Purkayastha has further argued that during his examination under section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant/accused did not admit of having made a confession before the Magistrate and therefore, the alleged confession (Ext-10) ought to be treated as a retracted confession. By referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aloke Nath Dutta & others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2007) 12 SCC 230 and Shankaria vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (1978) 3 SCC 435 Mr. Purkayastha has argued that the court cannot base conviction of an accused solely on a retracted confession without there being any corroborative evidence. 9. By referring to the findings and observations recorded by the learned trial court in the impugned judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned court below has mis-read the statement of PW-6, Manai Wangsa recorded under section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. and treated the same as a substantive piece of evidence while observing that the said witness had become hostile although such a conclusion was clearly unsustainable in the eye of law. Referring to the evidence of the Investigating Officer (IO), Mr. Purkayastha has further submitted that by failing to produce the CCTV footage as well as the CDR, the entire basis of the prosecution story has been rendered fragile inasmuch as the testimony of PW-8 of having identified appellant Ahon Wangsa after going through the CCTV footage available from the shop of accused Nipen Das has become inadmissible evidence due to non-compliance of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. To drive home the point, Mr. Purkayastha has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Anvar P.V. vs. P.K. Basheer and others reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 as well as in the case of State (N.C.T. of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru reported in (2005) 11 SCC 600 to contend that any form of printout taken from an electronic device cannot be accepted as evidence without a certificate being issued under section 65B of the Evidence Act. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant Ahon Wangsa has also argued that the prosecution has failed to prove any agreement between the accused persons to commit a crime and therefore, the charge brought under section 120B of the IPC also could not be substantiated. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant Ahon Wangsa has also argued that the prosecution has failed to prove any agreement between the accused persons to commit a crime and therefore, the charge brought under section 120B of the IPC also could not be substantiated. On such ground the learned counsel has prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment and for acquittal of his client due to want of evidence. 11. While supporting the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.97/2021, Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant Nipen Das @ Kala in Criminal Appeal No.194/2020 has submitted that his client was arrested on 01.03.2019 whereas the mobile phone from which threatening calls were allegedly made to the victim was seized from the shop of the appellant on 04.03.2019. Therefore, it is not a case where the mobile phone was seized from the custody of the appellant Nipen Das. Moreover, submits Mr. Choudhury, even Ext-3 seizure memo does not mention the IMEI number of the mobile phone and therefore, it is doubtful as to whether the mobile phone seized by Ext-3 at all has any nexus with the occurrence. Mr. Choudhury further submits that the I.O. had failed to collect evidence including the CDR so as to establish that phone calls were indeed made to the victim giving him a threat. Under the circumstances, submits Mr. Choudhury, there is no evidence available on record so as to convict his client under section 326(A) read with section 120B of the IPC. 12. By relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1964 SC 1184 Mr. Choudhury has further argued that the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person. He submits that there must be other evidence on record pointing at the guilt of the co-accused and it is only after an opinion is formed based on such evidence that the confession of the co-accused person can be looked into so as to derive assurance as to the conclusion of guilt. According to Mr. He submits that there must be other evidence on record pointing at the guilt of the co-accused and it is only after an opinion is formed based on such evidence that the confession of the co-accused person can be looked into so as to derive assurance as to the conclusion of guilt. According to Mr. Choudhury, save and except the confessional statement of appellant Ahon Wangsa, which was also not recorded in compliance with the mandatory prescription of law, there is nothing on record to even remotely implicate his client with the commission of an offence punishable under the law. Such being the position, according to Mr. Choudhury, the present is a fit case for acquittal. 13. Responding to the above, Mr. N.N.B. Choudhury, learned Public Prosecutor, State of Arunachal Pradesh, has argued that sufficient evidence has been brought on record by the prosecution to establish the charges framed against both the appellants/accused persons. Mr. Choudhury submits that the confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa was recorded after due compliance with the prescription of section 164 Cr.P.C. According to Mr. Choudhury, the accused persons were given two days time for reflection in the judicial custody before recording their statement. The fact that the learned Magistrate had explained the accused persons the consequence of their confession stands established from the fact that on being so explained, the appellant Nipen Das had refused to record his statement whereas appellant Ahon Wangsa had chosen to go ahead with the same. The aforesaid fact, viewed in the light of the evidence adduced by the Magistrate (CW-1), according to Mr. Choudhury, would leave no room for doubt that the statement of accused Ahon Wangsa was recorded by the learned Magistrate after following the due procedure laid down by law. Contending that once the confession is found to be recorded in compliance with the statutory provisions of law and the same appears to be voluntary and truthful, the statement of the accused can be and has been rightly relied upon by the learned trial court. In support of his above argument Mr. Choudhury has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manoharan vs. State by Inspector of Police, Variety Hall Police Station, Coimbatore reported in (2020) 5 SCC 782 . In support of his above argument Mr. Choudhury has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manoharan vs. State by Inspector of Police, Variety Hall Police Station, Coimbatore reported in (2020) 5 SCC 782 . Contending that the defence side did not raise any objection as regards the admissibility of Exts-9 and 10 when those were introduced by the witnesses, Mr. Choudhury has also argued that in the absence of any objection raised by the defence counsel, the appellants cannot now assail the validity of Exts-9 and 10 i.e. the statements of PW-6 and appellant Ahon Wangsa respectively, recorded by the learned Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 14. To sum up his arguments, Mr. Choudhury, learned Public Prosecutor, State of Arunachal Pradesh has argued that PW-8, Anwar Uddin is the victim and the eyewitness in this case who had identified appellant Ahon Wangsa as the person who had thrown acid on his face resulting into grievous injuries. The confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa leaves no room for doubt that appellant Nipen Das had hired him to kill the victim (PW-8) and it was in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy that appellant Ahon Wangsa had thrown acid on the face of the victim resulting into severe burn injuries on him while causing simple injuries to six other persons present in his shop. Therefore, submits the learned Addl. P.P., the charges brought against both the appellants stood fully established. 15. Mr. Azad Ahmed, learned counsel for the informant has supported the arguments advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor, State of Arunachal Pradesh and with the permission of the Court, has submitted that from the medical evidence available on record as well as the type of injuries suffered by PW-8, PW-9, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 it is established beyond doubt that appellant Ahon Wangsa had thrown acid upon the victim and the PW-8 is the eye-witness to the occurrence. Since Ahon Wangsa was known to PW-8, the victim could easily identify him through his wearing apparels and body language which was re-confirmed from the CCTV footage. The confessional statement of the accused/appellant Ahon Wangsa had also been recorded in due compliance with the requirement of section 164 Cr.P.C. Under the circumstances, the charges brought against the accused persons have been fully established by the prosecution side by adducing cogent evidence. 16. The confessional statement of the accused/appellant Ahon Wangsa had also been recorded in due compliance with the requirement of section 164 Cr.P.C. Under the circumstances, the charges brought against the accused persons have been fully established by the prosecution side by adducing cogent evidence. 16. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for both the sides and have also gone through the materials available on record. 17. The informant in this case is Shri Sahnaj Hussain, who is the brother of the victim Anwar Uddin. He was examined by the prosecution side as PW-1. In his deposition, PW-1 has stated that on 03.02.2019, which was a Sunday, a cricket match of the India team was going on. After watching the telecast of the cricket match, he went to the mobile shop of his elder brother Anwar Uddin. At about 6:00 p.m., he went to the market for purchasing some vegetables. When he was in the market, he had received a phone call from his brother asking him to come to the mobile shop and close the same. He then rushed to the shop of his brother and saw that lots of people had gathered in front of the shop. On reaching the place, he had found some odour which created a burning sensation in his nose. When he enquired from the people present there, they told him that someone had thrown acid on Anwar Uddin. By that time Anwar Uddin had been taken to the hospital. After the incident he had lodged an ejahar before the Longding Police Station but since he did not know as to who was the miscreant, he had not named any person in the F.I.R. He has stated that accused Nipen Das @ Kala and Ahon Wangsa had been identified by the witnesses. During his cross-examination this witness could not be shaken. 18. PW-2, Shri Rajibur Rehman was present in the mobile shop of the victim at the time of the incident. He has stated that on 03.02.2019 when he was talking to the shopkeeper, at that time, one person came and threw acid on the shopkeeper of the mobile shop viz. Anwar Uddin. Some of the acid had fallen on his legs. While throwing acid on Anwar Uddin, the person had his face covered by cloth. As such, he could not identify the person. 19. Anwar Uddin. Some of the acid had fallen on his legs. While throwing acid on Anwar Uddin, the person had his face covered by cloth. As such, he could not identify the person. 19. PW-3, Shri Subhash @ Santosh Das was another person who was present at the mobile shop when the incident occurred. He has deposed that while talking to Anwar Uddin, two more customers came to the mobile shop. During that time someone threw water like liquid substance on Anwar Uddin. There was smoke. He thought that it was hot water. Some drops of the liquid substance had also fallen on his face and hand. He could realize that it was acid that was thrown on Anwar Uddin. Thereafter, he went to the hospital for treatment. PW-3 has stated that he could not see the person who had thrown the acid. 20. PW-4, Shri Mona Das has stated that on the date of the incident, after closing his shop, as he was going towards his residence, at that time one Subhash Das, who was from the same colony, had asked him to wait and told that they would go together. While he was standing, all of a sudden, he had felt that some water like substance falling on his leg and he was feeling a burning sensation. Then he went to the hospital. 21. PW-5, Shri Nanwang Ronrang has deposed that on the date of the incident while he was standing in the mobile shop of Anwar Uddin, all of a sudden, an unknown person came there and threw some liquid chemical substance on Anwar. Some of the liquid fell on his hand and he could feel burning sensation. After the incident, people started to run. He could not see the person who had thrown the chemical. 22. PW-7, Shri Jawpha Wangsa was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police at the Longding Police Station on 03.02.2019 when the F.I.R. was lodged by the PW-1. PW-7 has deposed that the F.I.R. was received on 03.02.2019 wherein, it was mentioned that at around 17:43 hours, an unknown miscreant had come to P. K. Mobile shop and threw acid from a jar on the face of elder brother of the informant viz., Md. Anwar Uddin and ran away. Another six persons, who were standing near the place of occurrence, had also sustained injuries due to acid burning. Anwar Uddin and ran away. Another six persons, who were standing near the place of occurrence, had also sustained injuries due to acid burning. On receipt of the ejahar, Longding P.S. Case No.07/2019 was registered under section 326(A) of the IPC and the matter was endorsed to him for carrying out investigation. During investigation, he had forwarded all the seven victims to the C.H.C., Longding for medical treatment. He had submitted requisition for injury report of the victims and had also received the same. According to the report submitted by the doctor, two persons had sustained grievous acid burn injuries whereas, five others had sustained simple injuries. He had visited the place of occurrence, prepared a rough sketch map and recorded the statement of the victims under section 161 Cr.P.C PW-7 has also stated that he had seized the clothes of the victim having sprinkles of acid and also the jar which was used for throwing the acid. The seized materials were forwarded to FSL, Kolkata for expert opinion, which was yet to be received. 23. PW-7 has further deposed that during investigation it was revealed that on 13.02.2019, at around 20:24 hours, victim Anwar Uddin had received a threatening call from an unknown person with mobile number 7640860421 telling Anwar that he would face dire consequences if he comes to Longding again. On suspicion, shop of Nipen Das @ Kala was searched and one Itel mobile phone was recovered therefrom. The IMEI number of the phone and the seized SIM card of a different service provider was seized. The I.O. has further stated that he had obtained Call Detail Records (CDR) of the phone with IMEI number from which the threatening call was made to the victim. On examination of the CDR and IMEI number, it was found that the mobile which was recovered from the possession of accused Nipen Das was used for making threatening calls to the victim. PW-7 has further stated that he had arrested accused Nipen @ Kala, who had admitted his guilt and had also disclosed the name of co-accused Ahon and Puman, who had committed the offence. PW-7 has further stated that he had arrested accused Nipen @ Kala, who had admitted his guilt and had also disclosed the name of co-accused Ahon and Puman, who had committed the offence. One Manai Wangsa, who had accompanied the accused person on the fateful day was forwarded to the Magistrate for recording his statement under section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. The I.O. has further stated that he had forwarded the accused persons for recording their confessional statements and accused Ahon Wangsa had confessed his guilt before the learned JMFC whereas, the other accused person had refused to make any confession. On completion of investigation, he had submitted charge-sheet against the accused person Nipen Das under sections 120B/326(A) of the IPC. In so far as accused Ahon Wangsa and Puman Wangsa are concerned, charge-sheet was submitted under sections 120B/326(A)/465 of the IPC. 24. During cross-examination of PW-7 by accused Nipen Das, this witness has remained firm on his stand that the threatening phone call was made from Mobile No.7640860421 having IMEDI No.911600301676396 but the person was unknown. PW-7 has also admitted that the jug used for throwing acid was not sent for examination of fingerprint since the same had already been touched by many persons. The PW-7 had also replied that although Ahon and Manai Wangsa had stated that accused Nipen Das was watching from his shop, there was no other independent witness who had seen Nipen Das at the time of the occurrence. Nipen Das used to run a mobile shop at Longding market. 25. In his cross-examination by accused Ahon Wangsa and Puman Wangsa, PW-7 has stated that as per the doctor’s report, the victims had sustained acid burn injury. Hence, he found that the substance which was thrown upon the victim was acid. 26. The victim in this case, Md. Anwar Uddin was examined as PW-8. In his deposition he has stated that he is a businessman by profession and has a shop at Longding Town wherefrom, he used to sell mobile phones. His mobile phone shop was located towards the down side of the market and was running well. After a few days, accused Nipen Das had opened another mobile shop at the Longding Main Market. He used to get the mobiles (handset) and other materials for sale from Dimapur. Nipen had also started purchasing mobiles from the same shop at Dimapur. His mobile phone shop was located towards the down side of the market and was running well. After a few days, accused Nipen Das had opened another mobile shop at the Longding Main Market. He used to get the mobiles (handset) and other materials for sale from Dimapur. Nipen had also started purchasing mobiles from the same shop at Dimapur. Sometimes, Nipen Das used to accompany him to Dimapur for purchasing mobiles and they used to stay in the house of the shopkeeper at Dimapur and have food together. Sometimes, he and Nipen used to purchase materials from Tinsukia. At times, when Nipen Das went short of cash, he used to give assurance to the shopkeeper on behalf of Nipen. He was having a good relationship with Nipen but since his shop was situated on the downside of the market and the shop of Nipen was in the market, his business was going down. After a few days, he had found one shop in the market near the main road and shifted his mobile shop there. One day, Nipen came to him and asked him not to open his mobile shop there and rather go for a grocery shop or any other showroom. He did not agree to the proposal of Nipen. After a few days, Nipen Das again came to his shop and made a proposal for opening a partnership shop which he had declined. Thereafter, he started receiving unknown phone calls and messages threatening him and also demanding money. He had disclosed about the same to Nipen but he started to avoid him. 27. PW-8 has further stated that on the date of the incident, he was in his shop. At that time, accused Puman came to his shop and asked for a “tamper glass” of mobile. When he gave the “tamper glass” to Puman, he replied that he did not want the tamper glass and went away. At that time, accused Ahon was standing nearby with his face covered by a scarf. Ahon had thrown acid on him. He knew Ahon Wangsa as he used to work in the shop of Nipen Das and sometimes he used to bring customers to his shop. In return, he (PW-8) used to give him commission. At the time of the incident, he could recognize Ahon Wangsa from his wearing apparels and body language even though his face was covered. He knew Ahon Wangsa as he used to work in the shop of Nipen Das and sometimes he used to bring customers to his shop. In return, he (PW-8) used to give him commission. At the time of the incident, he could recognize Ahon Wangsa from his wearing apparels and body language even though his face was covered. After the incident, he was taken to the hospital at Longding and from there to Dibrugarh for treatment. There was CCTV footage of the incident at the traffic point. After about 15/16 days of the incident, an unknown person had threatened him over phone telling him that acid was thrown on him with the intention to kill him. After receiving the call from the unknown caller, he had informed the matter to the I.O. and gave him the phone number of the unknown caller. Initially, he did not suspect Nipen Das for commissioning the offence. But after a few days, the I.O. had informed him that Nipen Das is the person who had caused the acid attack upon him. 28. During his cross-examination by accused Nipen Das, PW-8 has stated that he could not identify the miscreant as acid had fallen on his face but later on, when CCTV footage was shown to him, he could recognize accused Ahon to be the miscreant. He had made a similar reply during cross-examination by accused Ahon Wangsa and Puman Wangnow by saying that he could make out from the body language of the person that it was Ahon Wangsa. Although he did not state before the police that Ahon Wangsa was the miscreant, yet, after his treatment, the CCTV footage was shown to him wherefrom, he could recognize that it was Ahon Wangsa who had thrown acid upon him. 29. PW-9, Shri Aftar Uddin is the brother of Anwar Uddin (PW-8). He has deposed to the effect that while his brother was shifting the mobile shop to the main market, accused Nipen had asked him to tell his brother not to open the mobile shop in the market. He had also proposed for doing joint business with his brother. According to PW-9, Nipen had also threatened him by saying that otherwise there may be some problem in future. He had also proposed for doing joint business with his brother. According to PW-9, Nipen had also threatened him by saying that otherwise there may be some problem in future. PW-9 was present in the mobile shop of Anwar Uddin at the time of the incident and he has also stated that all of a sudden, some water like substance had fallen on him. Initially, he thought that somebody was making a prank by throwing water upon them but very soon he started to feel burning sensation on the places where the liquid substance had touched his body. There was smoke everywhere and he was unable to see his brother after the incident. He had sustained acid burn injury over both his legs including back. 30. PW-10, Dr. Tangseng Techi was the EMO posted at Longding CHC on 03.02.2019. He has deposed that on that day, at about 6:00 p.m., seven injured persons came to the hospital for treatment. They were Anwar Uddin (PW-8), Aftar Uddin (PW-9), Khila Ronrang, Nanwang Ronrang (PW-5), Santosh Das (PW-3), Mona Das (PW-4) and Rajibur Rehman (PW-2). These persons had complained that they had sustained burn injuries allegedly caused by acidic substance. On examination he found that Anwar Uddin (PW-8) had sustained 3rd degree burn on his face, upper arm and neck. There was corneal damage of the patient. The type of injury was grievous. He had referred Anwar Uddin for higher medical treatment. He had also found that Aftar Uddin (PW-9) had suffered 3rd degree burn on both lower extremities/ legs. The type of injury was grievous. He had referred PW-9 for higher medical treatment. On examination he found that the injuries suffered by Khila Ronrang, Nanwang Ronrang, Santosh Das and Rajibur Rehman were simple burn injuries. During his cross-examination, PW-10 has stated that he could not say the age of the injury. The patients came themselves. The injuries were caused by dilute acid. PW-10 has, however, clarified that the injuries sustained by the patient may also be caused by throwing boiling water. 31. From a careful analysis of the evidence brought on record, we find that the incident is not denied by both the appellants. The patients came themselves. The injuries were caused by dilute acid. PW-10 has, however, clarified that the injuries sustained by the patient may also be caused by throwing boiling water. 31. From a careful analysis of the evidence brought on record, we find that the incident is not denied by both the appellants. From the evidence of PW-8, who is the injured victim in this case, it is firmly established that the incident took place on 03.02.2019 at around 7:45 p.m. when the victim was in his shop named “P. K. Mobile” which was situated in the Longding Market. At that time, PWs-2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 were also present in the mobile shop. All these witnesses have stated that all of a sudden, someone came and threw liquid substance from a jug on the face of PW-8 and droplets of such liquid substance also fell on the parts of their body. PWs-2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 have also deposed in one voice that they had felt burning sensation on their skins and there was odour and smoke all around. After the incident, the miscreant ran away. The victims including the PW-8 had suffered burn injuries and were rushed to the hospital. 32. The doctor (PW-10) has deposed that all the seven injured persons including the PW-8 were brought to the hospital at around 6:00 p.m. on 03.02.2019 and he had examined them. According to PW-10, seven injured persons had suffered burn injuries. The doctor has also deposed that the victim Anwar Uddin (PW-8) had suffered 3rd degree burn on the face, upper arm and neck. There was corneal damage of this patient. The type of injury was grievous and therefore, he had referred him for higher medical treatment. The PW-10 has further deposed that Aftar Uddin (PW-9) had also sustained 3rd degree burn on both lower extremities/legs and the type of injury was grievous. As such, he had referred him for higher medical treatment. Insofar as the remaining injured persons were concerned, according to PW-10, they had sustained simple burn injuries. PW-10 had proved the injury reports submitted by him as Exts-14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 by identifying his signatures therein. During cross-examination, the doctor has opined that the injury was caused by dilute acid. 33. Insofar as the remaining injured persons were concerned, according to PW-10, they had sustained simple burn injuries. PW-10 had proved the injury reports submitted by him as Exts-14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 by identifying his signatures therein. During cross-examination, the doctor has opined that the injury was caused by dilute acid. 33. From the above evidence led by the prosecution side, it is established that on the date of the incident an unknown person had thrown liquid substance targeting the PW-8 but other persons present in the shop had also suffered burn injuries due to droplets of the liquid falling on them. The medical evidence available on record, read in the light of the testimonies of the injured victims and the photographs of the victim available on record, leaves no room for doubt that such type of injuries could not have been caused by boiling water but by acid burn. Such acid burn had evidently caused permanent deformity on the limbs of the victim and has also disfigured his face. Section 326(A) is applicable not only in cases where injury is caused by throwing acid but also in case of causing injury by using any other means. Therefore, although there is no FSL report available in this case, yet, having regard to the materials on record, we are inclined to agree with the findings of the learned trial court that the victim had suffered acid attack on the day of the incident. 34. Coming to the next question as to whether the appellants have been properly identified and to that extent, whether the charges brought against them could be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, we may note herein that in his testimony, the PW-8 has claimed that he could identify appellant Ahon Wangsa from his wearing apparels and body language even though his face was covered. This testimony of PW-8 could not be shaken during his cross-examination by accused Ahon Wangsa. PW-8 has also stated that just before the incident, accused Ahon Wangsa once came by covering his face and from the body language, he could make out that it was Ahon Wangsa. Subsequently, video footage of the occurrence, captured in a traffic point, was shown to him wherefrom, he could ascertain that it was none other than accused Ahon Wangsa who had thrown acid on that day. Subsequently, video footage of the occurrence, captured in a traffic point, was shown to him wherefrom, he could ascertain that it was none other than accused Ahon Wangsa who had thrown acid on that day. His aforesaid testimony has not been challenged by the defence side during cross-examination of this witness. What is to be noted herein is that PW-8 is the injured victim and an eye-witness to the occurrence and he has stated that Ahon Wangsa used to come to his shop frequently with customers and he (PW-8) used to pay commission to him. As such, with a little observation and on due verification it would not at all be difficult for the PW-8 to identify Ahon Wangsa even if his face was covered. 35. Mr. Purkayastha has argued that the electronic evidence in the form of CCTV footage would be inadmissible in the absence of a certificate under section 65-B of the Evidence Act. However, what needs to be noted herein is that the prosecution has not produced the CCTV footage before the court. The PW-8 has merely stated that he could verify and ascertain the identity of Ahon Wangsa from the CCTV footage. The said fact has come out in his oral evidence. As such, there is no question of applicability of section 65-B of the Evidence Act in this case. In view of the above, the decision in the case of Anvar P.V. (supra) would not have any relevance in this case. 36. We have also noticed that there is no evidence to suggest any previous enmity between the victim PW-8 and Ahon Wangsa and therefore, we do not see any reason as to why the PW-8 would falsely implicate Ahon Wangsa in the matter. 37. Having held as above, we now turn to the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa which was recorded by the Magistrate (CW-1) wherein he had admitted his guilt. 38. The statement of Ahon Wangsa was recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Longding on 08.03.2019 when he was produced from judicial custody. In his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., Ahon Wangsa has stated that on 03.02.2019, at about 3-4 p.m., Nipen Das @ Kala had asked him to kill Anwar (victim) by a “dao” by saying that “Anwar ko Kaatkar khatam kardo”. In his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., Ahon Wangsa has stated that on 03.02.2019, at about 3-4 p.m., Nipen Das @ Kala had asked him to kill Anwar (victim) by a “dao” by saying that “Anwar ko Kaatkar khatam kardo”. When he asked him as to why, Kala had told him that whenever he went to Tinsukia for taking stuff for his mobile shop, Anwar used to block him and take his stuff such as mobile and its accessories. He then replied by saying that he would not be able to kill Anwar with a dao. Then Kala gave him an easy way out to kill Anwar and he went to his house and returned with one jug full of some liquid (acid) and gave it to him. Kala asked him to throw the liquid on the face of Anwar and run from the scene and thereafter, take Rs.10,000/-(Ten Thousand) from him in the next morning. Accordingly, he took the jug of acid from Kala and threw it on the face of Anwar and ran away from the scene. Accused/appellant Ahon Wangsa had further stated that after one day, Kala had called him up and asked him to come to his house. When he reached his house, Kala gave him a mobile phone with a SIM card and asked him to call Anwar and tell him that acid was thrown on his face because Anwar had raped his (Ahon’s) girlfriend and then Kala had also asked him to call up the SP (Superintendent of Police), Longding and tell him that he had thrown acid on the face of Anwar because Anwar had raped his girlfriend. Thereafter, Kala had told him to destroy the SIM card by chewing it and accordingly, after calling up Anwar and SP, Longding, he had destroyed the SIM by chewing it and thereafter, returned the mobile phone to Kala at his shop. After 4-5 days of the incident, he and Puman went to the house of Nipen and asked for the money but he (Nipen) gave one phone REDMI MI 6A mobile phone valued at Rs.6000/- only and refused to give them any money. They took the mobile phone and went back home. On the next day, he had gone to Pongchau and Puman left for Khonsa. From there he was arrested and brought to Longding. 39. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Smti. They took the mobile phone and went back home. On the next day, he had gone to Pongchau and Puman left for Khonsa. From there he was arrested and brought to Longding. 39. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Smti. Epi Kapu, who had recorded the confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa under section 164 Cr.P.C. was examined as Court Witness (CW-1). The CW-1 has deposed that on the prayer of the I.O. she had recorded the confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa on 08.03.2019 and had also recorded the statement of witness Manai Wangsa on 20.03.2019. Accused Ahon Wangsa was produced before her from judicial custody. Before recording his statement, she had made the accused person understand that she was a Magistrate and that he was not bound to make a confession. She had also made him understand that the confessional statement, if recorded, would be used as a piece of evidence against him during trial. Accused Ahon Wangsa had voluntarily confessed before her and she had recorded his confessional statement. CW-1 has further stated that Ahon Wangsa had confessed before her that on 03.02.2019 at about 03-04 p.m., accused Nipen Das @ Kala had asked him to kill one Anwar Uddin. Nipen Das had asked him to cut Anwar with a dao and kill him. On being enquired about the reason for doing so, Nipen Das told Ahon Wangsa that he wanted to kill Anwar Uddin as the latter used to take the mobile accessories which was supplied by the dealers from Tinsukia. Both Nipen Das and Anwar Uddin used to run mobile shops and hence, there was business rivalry between them. When Ahon Wangsa expressed his inability to kill Anwar by cutting him, then NIpen Das @ Kala told Ahon that he would give him an easy way to kill Anwar Uddin. Accordingly, Nipen Das gave him one jug filled with liquid substance and asked Ahon Wangsa to throw the same on the face of Anwar Uddin and run away. Nipen Das also told him that he would give Rs.10,000/- to Ahon Wangsa on the next day for doing the same. Accordingly, Ahon Wangsa had thrown the liquid substance on the face of Anwar Uddin and ran away. Nipen Das also told him that he would give Rs.10,000/- to Ahon Wangsa on the next day for doing the same. Accordingly, Ahon Wangsa had thrown the liquid substance on the face of Anwar Uddin and ran away. On the next day, accused Nipen Das @ Kala had given him one mobile phone with SIM card and asked him to call Anwar Uddin and SP, Longding and tell them that Anwar Uddin was having an illicit relationship with his girlfriend and hence, acid was thrown on him. As directed by Nipen Das, accused Ahon Wangsa had called Anwar Uddin and SP, Longding. Thereafter, he had destroyed the SIM card and returned the mobile phone to Nipen Das. The mobile phone used for calling Anwar Uddin and SP, Longding was later recovered from Nipen Das by the police. After 4-5 days of the incident, accused Ahon Wangsa and Puman Wangsa went to the house of Nipen Das @ Kala asking for Rs.10,000/- but Nipen Das gave him one mobile phone valued at Rs.6000/- with a SIM card but refused to pay any further amount. CW-1 has also deposed that after recording his confessional statement accused Ahon Wangsa was sent to judicial custody. CW-1 has proved Ext-10, the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa recorded by her. CW-1 has also identified the thumb impression of Ahon Wangsa in Ext-10 taken in her presence. 40. CW-1 has further deposed that on 20.03.2019, she had recorded the statement of witness Manai Wangsa (PW-6) under section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. Manai Wangsa is an eye-witness to the incident. He had stated before her that he (Manai Wangsa) used to reside in the rented house of Puman. On the date of the incident, accused Ahon Wangsa had called him over phone but he did not speak to him. Thereafter, Ahon Wangsa came to their house and asked Manai and Puman to accompany him to the market. Accordingly, three of them went to the market and entered the shop of Nipen Das. At that place Ahon and Nipen had discussed something in a secretive manner. Manai has stated that he had heard Nipen Das telling Ahon Wangsa “Jese bola hei wese karo” (do as I have said). Thereafter, Ahon had asked Manai and Puman to wait near the shop of Anwar Uddin. At that place Ahon and Nipen had discussed something in a secretive manner. Manai has stated that he had heard Nipen Das telling Ahon Wangsa “Jese bola hei wese karo” (do as I have said). Thereafter, Ahon had asked Manai and Puman to wait near the shop of Anwar Uddin. When Manai and Puman were waiting near the shop of Anwar Uddin, he (Manai) had seen Ahon Wangsa going to that place holding a jug in his hand and covering his face. Manai has stated that he had identified Ahon from his cut mark on the cheek and his wearing apparels as well as physical appearance. Ahon went to the shop of Anwar Uddin and threw the liquid substance in the jug on the face of Anwar Uddin and ran away. At that night, Ahon came to the house of Manai and stayed there but Manai did not talk to him as he had seen the pain and suffering of Anwar Uddin and others due to the acid thrown on them by Ahon. On 05.03.2019, police came to the residence of Manai and enquired about Ahon. Then he disclosed before the police that Ahon Wangsa had left for Pongchau. CW-1 has exhibited the statement of Manai Wangsa recorded by her under section 164 Cr.P.C. as Ext-9 by identifying her signature therein. 41. During her cross-examination by accused Nipen Das, CW-1 has replied that she had made a note regarding statutory compliance while recording the confessional statement of the accused and before recording his statement, she had repeatedly asked the accused as to whether he was confessing voluntarily. On being satisfied that the confession was being made voluntarily, she had proceeded to record his confessional statement. CW-1 has further stated that accused Ahon Wangsa had been arrested on 06.03.2019 and on the same day, he was produced before her. She had remanded Ahon Wangsa to judicial custody. On 08.03.2019, a prayer for recording confessional statement of the accused was received by her and on the same day she had recorded the confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa. This witness has further stated that she had recorded the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa inside her chamber, in presence of a Stenographer. Before recording his statement, accused Ahon Wangsa was given about two hours time for reflection. This witness has further stated that she had recorded the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa inside her chamber, in presence of a Stenographer. Before recording his statement, accused Ahon Wangsa was given about two hours time for reflection. There was no police person present at that place while recording the confessional statement of accused and during the reflection time, accused Ahon Wangsa was kept alone inside a room in the court campus. 42. During her cross-examination by accused Ahon Wangsa and Puman Wangnow, CW-1 has stated that after receiving the prayer of the I.O. for recording the confessional statement of the accused persons, she asked both the accused as to whether they wanted to make a confession. Accused Nipen Das @ Kala had initially confessed before her but when she explained to him as regards the consequences that may ensue upon the accused due to recording of their confessional statement, Nipen Das had refused to record his confessional statement. That is why, the confession of Nipen Das was not recorded. CW-1 has, however, stated that accused Ahon Wangsa had voluntarily confessed even after explaining to him the consequences of recording his confessional statement. 43. By placing reliance on the decisions in Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh (supra), Dhananjay Reddy (supra) and Babubhai Udesinh Parmar (supra), the learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.97/2021 has argued that the confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa was not recorded after adhering to the procedure prescribed under section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. inasmuch as the accused was not informed about the fact that his confession might be used against him as evidence. However, from a careful scrutiny of Ext-10 i.e. the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa, we find that the following endorsement was made by the learned JMFC at the bottom of Ext-10 :- “I have examined Shri Ahon Wangsa that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so any confession, it may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct and it contains full and true account of the statement made by him.” 44. By laying emphasis on the use of the expression “examined” in the above endorsement of the learned JMFC, Mr. It was taken in my presence and hearing and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct and it contains full and true account of the statement made by him.” 44. By laying emphasis on the use of the expression “examined” in the above endorsement of the learned JMFC, Mr. Purkayastha has argued that there was no requirement for examining the accused but the learned Magistrate ought to have explained to him that he was not bound to make confession which has not been done in the present case. After careful reading of the confessional statement as well as the testimony of CW-1 we are unable to agree with such submission of Mr. Purkayastha for the following reasons. The use of the expression “examined” appears to be a grammatical/ typographical error which stands clarified from the remaining part of the endorsement which makes it clear that the accused was explained about the consequences of his confession. That apart, it also appears from the testimony of CW-1 that accused Nipen Das had also initially confessed his guilt before the learned JMFC but when she had explained to him the consequences of recording the confessional statement then, Nipen Das refused to record his confession. However, accused Ahon Wangsa voluntarily confessed even after explaining to him the consequences of recording such confessional statement. The above testimony of CW-1 clarifies the matter and lends ample credence to our view that the expression “examined” ought to be read as “explained” in the context of the confessional statement (Ext-10). If that be so, it cannot be said that the accused persons were not explained about the consequences of recording their confessional statement. 45. From the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa (Ext-10) we also find that he was produced from the judicial custody and was also sent back to judicial custody after recording his confessional statement and there was no police personnel present when the reflection time was given to him by the learned Magistrate. The accused was also asked as to why he wanted to confess and he replied that he wanted to tell the truth. The accused has also clarified that he was aware that he was not bound to confess. 46. The accused was also asked as to why he wanted to confess and he replied that he wanted to tell the truth. The accused has also clarified that he was aware that he was not bound to confess. 46. Insofar as the argument advanced by the appellant’s counsel that there is no indication in the confessional statement that the accused was informed that he would not be sent back to police custody even if he refuses to confess and to that extent, Ext-10 suffers from infirmity rendering the same inadmissible in the eye of law, we are also unable to agree with such submission of the learned counsel for the appellant on account of the fact that the accused was evidently produced from judicial custody and he was also sent back to judicial custody after recording his confessional statement. It has come out from the evidence on record that there was no police personnel present in the office of the learned Judicial Magistrate nor was there any application for sending the accused to police custody. Under the circumstances, the mere fact that the learned Magistrate has not made an endorsement in Ext-10 to the effect that the accused was informed that he would not be sent to police custody even if he refuses to confess, in our opinion, would not have any material bearing in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant has also not been able to show any prejudice being caused to the accused on such count. 47. In the case of Dhananjay Reddy (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that recording of confession under section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was a very solemn act which the Magistrate is obliged to perform by taking due care to ensure that al requirements of section 164 are fully satisfied and that the Magistrate should not adopt a casual approach. In Dhananjay Reddy (supra) it has been held that it would be necessary in every case to put the questions prescribed by the High Court circular which is intended to be put under sub-section (3) of Section 164 Cr.P.C. and no element of casualness should be allowed to creep in. The Magistrate should be fully satisfied that the confessional statement of the accused was in fact and in substance voluntary. The Magistrate should be fully satisfied that the confessional statement of the accused was in fact and in substance voluntary. A similar view has been expressed in the case of Babubhai Udesinh Parmar (supra) wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 164 Cr.P.C. are meant to provide safeguards for an accused and therefore, such provisions were required to be strictly complied with. 48. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that it is a case of retracted confession. However, from a minute reading of the statement of Ahon Wangsa recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. we find that he did not deny that his confession was recorded by the Magistrate but had merely feigned ignorance. The mere fact that the accused did not specifically admit of having recorded his confession, cannot, in our view, be treated as retraction of the confession. Moreover, Ext-10, which is the confessional statement of the accused was also admitted in evidence without any objection from the defence counsel. 49. From a careful reading of the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa, proved as Ext-10, as well as the testimony of CW-1 i.e. the Judicial Magistrate First Class, who had recorded the same, we are of the view that the learned Magistrate had not only complied with the requirements of Section 164(3) Cr.P.C. before recording the confessional statement of the accused person but she had also recorded the same after providing sufficient reflection time to the accused as may be justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and also after reaching proper satisfaction about the fact that the accused was willing to make the confession voluntarily. Moreover, in her deposition, the CW-1 has also reproduced in her own voice, the nature of confession made by Ahon Wangsa before her. The evidence of CW-1 has remained un-assailed on such count and therefore, lends further assurance to the voluntariness and truthfulness of his confession. The confession of accused Ahon Wangsa, when read in the light of the other evidence available on record, goes to show that his confessional statement is truthful and therefore, have been rightly relied upon by the learned trial court. 50. The confession of accused Ahon Wangsa, when read in the light of the other evidence available on record, goes to show that his confessional statement is truthful and therefore, have been rightly relied upon by the learned trial court. 50. From the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa, we are left with no manner of doubt that he was the one who had thrown acid on the date of the incident and he did so under the instruction of Nipen Das @ Kala. The motive behind the occurrence, which is the business rivalry between Nipen and Anwar has also clearly come out from the evidence of PW-9 read with the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa. It has also come out from the materials on record that accused/appellant Nipen Das had instructed Ahon Wangsa to eliminate the victim (PW-8). It has also come out from the materials available on record that the involvement of Nipen Das came to light during the course of investigation and it was PW-7 (I.O.) who had informed the victim that it was Nipen Das who had caused the attack upon him. From the evidence of PW-8 it also appears that he had a good relationship with Nipen Das and there was no reason for the victim to falsely implicate Nipen Das. Rather it was Nipen Das who was harbouring malice against the victim and that was clearly on account of some business rivalry. 51. In the above context, it would be pertinent to mention herein that the statement of PW-6, Manai Wangsa, who was known to the accused Ahon Wangsa was also recorded by the learned JMFC under section 164 Cr.P.C. and the said statement was exhibited and proved by the CW-1 as Ext-9. A reading of Ext-9 goes to show that PW-6 had stated in his statement recorded before the Magistrate that on the date of the incident, he and Puman Wangsa had accompanied Ahon Wangsa to the market. On reaching the market, Ahon Wangsa took them to Nipen Das’s mobile shop and on reaching there, Nipen Das and Ahon Wangsa went to the backside of the mobile shop and both of them started speaking secretly. There, he had heard Nipen Das saying “joh hum bolah hai waisa karo” (whatever I had asked, do it accordingly). On reaching the market, Ahon Wangsa took them to Nipen Das’s mobile shop and on reaching there, Nipen Das and Ahon Wangsa went to the backside of the mobile shop and both of them started speaking secretly. There, he had heard Nipen Das saying “joh hum bolah hai waisa karo” (whatever I had asked, do it accordingly). After that, Ahon Wangsa had asked him and Puman to wait for him near Anwar’s shop and then they went there. He then went for urinating towards backside of a book stall and when he returned back, he found Puman smokng near Anwar’s shop. When he went near Puman, he saw one person coming from the downside area towards Anwar’s shop wearing “dust mask” with both his hands at the backside of the body carrying one jug. When he saw the person from a closer distance, he could recognize that the masked person was none other than Ahon Wangsa. Ahon Wangsa came to Anwar’s shop and threw the jug of acid on his face. Thereafter, Ahon Wangsa ran away from the scene. 52. However, PW-6 Manai Wangsa did not entirely support his above statement while deposing before the Court. In his deposition, PW-6 has merely stated that on the date of the incident, Puman was with him. Ahon went to the residence of his brother. He had asked them to meet at P. K. Mobile shop. Accordingly, he along with Puman went to the mobile shop and was waiting for Ahon. At that time, he had heard the sound of shouting coming from the mobile shop. A boy had thrown acid and ran away from the place of occurrence. He could not identify the person who had thrown acid. PW-6 has further stated that on that night he stayed with Ahon and Puman. After two days, they went to their village. He was at Longding. Police arrested him and on the next day police had arrested Ahon as they were together. 53. The learned trial court had treated PW-6 as a hostile witness since he did not support the prosecution story by corroborating his earlier statement (Ext-9) recorded by the Magistrate. However, there is no indication to the effect that the PW-6 was declared as a hostile witness. In that view of the matter, we are unable to agree with such observation of the learned trial court. However, there is no indication to the effect that the PW-6 was declared as a hostile witness. In that view of the matter, we are unable to agree with such observation of the learned trial court. Merely because there is a difference between the statement of a prosecution witness in his deposition and previous statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., it cannot be readily presumed that the witness had turned hostile unless a request to that effect is made by the prosecution side during trial and the same is accepted by the trial court for reasons to be recorded. However, what is noteworthy is the fact that even if there is some variance in the testimony of PW-6, even then, save and except identifying Ahon Wangsa, as the miscreant who had thrown acid on PW-8 on the date of the incident, the evidence of PW-6 is substantially in tune with the sequence of events immediately before and after the occurrence as per the version in Ext-9. In other words, the statement of PW-6 recorded by the Magistrate substantially corroborate his version given before the court except for naming Ahon Wangsa as the culprit. 54. From the evidence brought on record by the prosecution as well as the confessional statement of the accused Ahon Wangsa (Ext-10) it is firmly established that on the date of the incident it was none other than Ahon Wangsa who had thrown acid on PW-8. 55. The other question that would arise for decision in this case is whether the materials on record are sufficient to implicate Nipen Das @ Kala and prove the charge of criminal conspiracy brought against them. In the case of Haricharan Kurmi (supra) relied upon by Mr. 55. The other question that would arise for decision in this case is whether the materials on record are sufficient to implicate Nipen Das @ Kala and prove the charge of criminal conspiracy brought against them. In the case of Haricharan Kurmi (supra) relied upon by Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.194/2020, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had discussed about the probative value of confession of a co-accused in the light of Section 30 of the Evidence Act and held that while dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused, it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it would be permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. In that case, the charge brought against the accused persons was under Section 396 of the IPC for having committed dacoity and murder. The learned Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur had found all the six accused persons guilty of the offence charged and accordingly, convicted them and sentenced each of them to suffer imprisonment for life. The High Court of Judicature at Patna had confirmed the conviction of five out of the six appellants/accused and acquitted one by giving benefit of doubt. What is to be noted herein that in the case of Haricharan Kurmi (supra) there was no charge framed under section 120-B of the IPC. 56. We are also of the view that the evidence of PW-7 has deposed about the manner in which threatening call was traced out to be made from the mobile phone bearing No.7640860421 having IMEI No.911600301676396, which was seized by him from the shop of Nipen Das. Mr. Choudhury has argued that in the seizure memo of the mobile phone the IMEI has not been mentioned. Moreover, when the mobile phone was seized, at that time, the appellant Nipen Das was already in jail. Therefore, the seizure of the mobile phone would not have any material bearing in this case. Mr. Choudhury has argued that in the seizure memo of the mobile phone the IMEI has not been mentioned. Moreover, when the mobile phone was seized, at that time, the appellant Nipen Das was already in jail. Therefore, the seizure of the mobile phone would not have any material bearing in this case. The above argument of the appellant’s counsel cannot be accepted on account of the fact that the mobile phone was admittedly and evidently seized by the I.O. from the mobile shop “Das Mobile Center” owned by the appellant Nipen Das on 04.03.2019 at around 7:20 hours. There is cogent evidence on record to show that the threatening call to the victim was made from the said mobile phone. The I.O. only said that the person making the call could not be identified. It is possible that at the time of seizure of the mobile phone, the IMEI number was not readily available. That, in all probability was the reason, why the IMEI number of the mobile phone is not mentioned in the seizure list. The I.O. (PW-7) has, however, deposed that the IMEI number of the mobile phone was subsequently traced out and he has also produced the same before the court. 57. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with things said or done by a conspirator in reference to common design. Section 10 is reproduced herein below :- “Section 10.--Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design. Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.” 58. We have already noted that from the evidence brought on record, the business rivalry between Nipen Das and the victim PW-8 has been well established. We have already noted that from the evidence brought on record, the business rivalry between Nipen Das and the victim PW-8 has been well established. The evidence of PW-9 further goes to show that Nipen Das had not only tried to prevent the victim to open/shift his mobile shop to a location near his (Nipen’s) shop but the latter had even threatened the victim of dire consequences if he had failed to oblige. It has also come out from the evidence of the I.O. (PW-7) that threatening phone calls had been made to the victim from a mobile phone which was later seized from the shop of the appellant Nipen Das. The evidence on record also shows that Ahon Wangsa used to work for Nipen. The above circumstances, proved by the prosecution, furnishes important links in the chain of circumstances so as to prove the guilt of the appellant/accused Nipen Das. 59. The confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa clearly establishes the fact that appellant Nipen Das had conspired with him to kill the victim Anwar Uddin (PW-8) and in furtherance of a common design to commit an offence punishable under the law, Nipen Das had handed over the jug full of acid to Ahon Wangsa and advised him to throw it on the face of the victim. Accordingly, Ahon Wangsa had executed the plan. 60. Law is well settled that in case of a criminal conspiracy, direct evidence is very difficult to find because such conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy. Save and except confession of a co-accused, it may not be possible to find evidence of criminal conspiracy. Under such circumstances, the confessional statement of a coconspirator cannot be brushed aside if the same fits into the prosecution story established by other evidence brought on record. 61. We have already held that the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa (Ext10) was recorded after complying with the procedural requirements laid down by Section 164 Cr.P.C and the same in our view, is also truthful and voluntary in nature. During his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., Ahon Wangsa has not denied of having recorded his confessional statement by the Magistrate but has merely feigned ignorance about it by stating that “I do not know about the same”. The above response of the accused person cannot be treated as retraction of his confession. During his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., Ahon Wangsa has not denied of having recorded his confessional statement by the Magistrate but has merely feigned ignorance about it by stating that “I do not know about the same”. The above response of the accused person cannot be treated as retraction of his confession. If that be so, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the confessional statement of accused Ahon Wangsa is not only admissible but the same has also been duly proved by the prosecution side. Since Ahon Wangsa and Nipen Das were jointly tried for the same offences, hence, in view of the provision of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa could have been and has been rightly relied upon by the learned trial court to convict appellant Nipen Das. 62. In the case of State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. Nalini and others reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the conditions which must be fulfilled for attracting Section 30 of the Evidence Act. The observations made in paragraph 685 are relevant and therefore, are being reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “685. A plain reading of Section 30 of the Evidence Act discloses that when the following conditions exist, namely, (i) more persons than one are being tried jointly,; (ii) the joint trial of the persons is/or the same offence’, (iii) a confession is made by one of such persons (who are being tried jointly for the same offence); (iv) such a confession affects the makers as well as such persons (who are being tried jointly for the same offence); and (v) such a confession is proved in court, the court may take into consideration such confession against the maker thereof as well as against such persons (who are being jointly tried for the same offence)”. 63. After considering the materials on record as well as the confessional statement of Ahon Wangsa, we are of the view that the same squarely meets the requirement of the law laid down in the case of Nalini and others (supra). 64. For the reasons discussed herein above, both these appeals are held to be devoid of any merit and the same are accordingly dismissed. Send back the LCR.