JUDGMENT : N. Kotiswar Singh, J. Heard Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. D. Nandi, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A. No.67/2020 and Mr. A.M. Bora, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. D. Gogoi, learned counsel for the appellant in Crl.A.136/2021. 2. In Crl.A.67/2020, the appellant, Sanjib Talukdar, has challenged the order dated 30.11.2019 passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, Assam, Guwahati in Special (NIA) Case No2/2019 (RC 04/2019/NIA-GUW) by which the application of the appellant for release on bail was rejected. In Crl.A. No.136/2021, the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar has challenged the order dated 18.05.2021 passed by the Special Judge, NIA in Misc. (NIA) Case No.08/2021 arising out of NIA Case No.02/2019. 3. Both of these appeals are taken up together for disposal since both these appeals and impugned orders arise out of Special NIA Case No.2/2019 and the same FIR Case and both the appellants are facing the same trial and records are common, though the contentions raised in these two appeals are not necessarily the same. 4. Only reference to skeletal facts may suffice for the purpose considering these appeals/bail applications as can be culled from the records, specially the charge-sheet. 5. On 15.05.2019, while a police patrolling party of Geetanagar Police Station along with SSB personnel was conducting a checking at R.G. Baruah Road near Central Mall, Guwahat at around 7:40 P.M., one Chinmoy Lahkar, a co-accused was riding a motor cycle with Pappu Koch Bokoliyal, another accused, who were proceeding from Zoo Tiniali towards Ganeshguri, when they were stopped for frisking. At that moment, there the accused Pappu Koch Bokolial lobbed a grenade, which upon explosion caused injuries to 12 persons and grievously injuring to some. 6. In connection with that incident, an F.I.R. was registered being Geetanagar P.S. Case No.210/2019 under Section 325/326/307/121 of Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3/5 of Explosive Substance Act and Sections 10/13/16 and 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Consequently, a very comprehensive enquiry was carried out by the police and ultimately, the investigation was handed over to National Investigation Agency (NIA), which was re-registered as FIR No.RC-4/2019/NIA/GUW dated 26.06.2019. 7. Charge-sheet was filed on completion of enquiry against 10(ten) persons including the present two appellants and two have been shown absconders in Special NIA Case No.2 of 2019 before the Special Judge, NIA. Thus, 8(eight) accused are presently facing trial. 7. Charge-sheet was filed on completion of enquiry against 10(ten) persons including the present two appellants and two have been shown absconders in Special NIA Case No.2 of 2019 before the Special Judge, NIA. Thus, 8(eight) accused are presently facing trial. The present appellant, Sanjib Talukdar has been arrayed as Accused No.7. As far as the present appellant is concerned, the case against him is that he is an over ground worker of the United Liberation Front of Assam ULFA(I), a proscribed organization under the UA(P) Act, 1967 and he has been maintaining links with the cadres of ULFA (I) who are carrying out anti national activities including terrorist acts and he has been providing logistic support to the cadres of ULFA (I) by providing transportation of ULFA(I) cadres, thus, actively associated with the conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in pursuance of the goals of ULFA (I) along with other co-accused. 8. In course of the investigation, the investigating authority recovered photographs of the accused Sanjib Talukdar from the mobile phone of accused Pappu Koch Bokoliyal, which clearly established that the appellant is associated with the said co-accused who is a hardcore member of the ULFA. The photograph shows the appellant Sanjib Talukdar not only along with Pappu Koch Bokoliyal but also with other members of the ULFA in the jungle which indicates that he was roaming with the members of the ULFA. In another photograph he is seen in uniform of ULFA(I) with firearms in standing position which indicates that he has been getting training in handling arms. 9. The charge against the appellant, Sanjib Talukdar is also sought to be corroborated by evidence of a protected witness ”X”. 10. It has been also charged that the appellant has been using FacebookURLhttps://w.w.w.facebook.com/sanjib.talukdar.10 and G.mail account sanjibtalukdar530@gmail.com to communicate with other members of the ULFA (I). 11. During the investigation, the appellant preferred a bail application, which was rejected. Thereafter, after submission of charge-sheet, the appellant preferred another bail application which was rejected by the Trial Court on 30.11.2019 on the ground that charge-sheet has been already filed and there is no change of circumstance against which the present appeal has been preferred by Sanjib Talukdar. 11. During the investigation, the appellant preferred a bail application, which was rejected. Thereafter, after submission of charge-sheet, the appellant preferred another bail application which was rejected by the Trial Court on 30.11.2019 on the ground that charge-sheet has been already filed and there is no change of circumstance against which the present appeal has been preferred by Sanjib Talukdar. As regards the plea taken by the appellant that he is suffering from various ailments which would require proper treatment, which will not be possible if he is in detention, the Trial Court directed the jail authorities to provide the best medical treatment as permissible under the Jail Mannual and if required may be taken to either GMCH or other State hospitals where medical facilities are available so that he gets proper treatment. 12. Being aggrieved by the denial of bail by the Trial Court vide order dated 30.11.2019, the present appeal has been preferred. 13. Before this Court, the appellant has taken the following pleas. 14. The appellant is about 29 years old with a very brilliant academic career and pursuing his M.Phil and also was preparing for other competitive examinations. He had been adjudged the best debator in Science Debate Competition and was selected as a Project Scientist in Assam Science and Technology and Environment Council, Department of Science and Technology, Government of Assam. It has been submitted that he also participated in the BRICS, 2016 representing India as an NSS volunteer under the Ministry of Youth Affairs, Government of India. Unfortunately, the appellant has been continuously behind the bar for the last about 3½ years because of which his academic pursuits have been dislocated. 15. It has been also submitted that the appellant does not have any criminal antecedents and it is for the first time he has been falsely implicated in the present case. 16. It has been submitted that there is no evidence to the effect that the appellant was involved with ULFA and that he had been providing logistic support to the cadres of ULFA by providing transportation and participation and reconnaissance of the targets with ULFA (I) cadres. 17. It has been also submitted that the appellant was not involved in any manner in the aforesaid incident of bomb blast which occurred on 15.05.2019. 18. 17. It has been also submitted that the appellant was not involved in any manner in the aforesaid incident of bomb blast which occurred on 15.05.2019. 18. It has been also submitted that nothing incriminating has been recovered or seized from the possession of the appellant. 19. It is also submitted that the appellant had no contact with the alleged witness “X” and there was only a solitary call that was made by the appellant to the protected witness “X”. Further, NIA has not produced the transcripts to show as to whether talks actually took place between the appellant and other two accused Pappu Koch and Pranmoy Rajguru. 20. It has been further submitted that the Prosecution has listed 177 witnesses. However, till date, only 6 witnesses have been examined and about 237 documents are sought to be exhibited by the Prosecution and as such, it will take years to complete the recording of evidence of the prosecution. 21. It has been also submitted that the photos which have been sought to be used against the appellant are not dated, without stating as to when these were taken and as such, unless the original photos and photographers are examined, these will have no evidentiary value. 22. It has been also submitted that though charge has been framed under Section 121 A of IPC, no charge has been framed under Section 121 of IPC. 23. It has been also submitted that the appellant is presently suffering from various ailments, more particularly, Right Renal Kidney problem, Hyper inflected lungs, Tuberculosis, ENT problems, piles, thyroid, lumbar degenerative disorder. The appellant has also suffered from symptomatic Covid and dermatological issues (fungal infection) having general weakness, etc. and as such, in view of the fact that he has no criminal antecedents and was pursuing his academic course seriously, also in view of his poor health condition and prolonged incarceration for about 3½ years, he deserves to be released. 24. It has been submitted that there is hardly any material against the appellant and the charge is of not being an active member, but merely a sympathizer and over ground member. It has been submitted that merely the allegation that the appellant is a sympathizer of ULFA, will not warrant invoking stringent provisions of UA(P) Act. 24. It has been submitted that there is hardly any material against the appellant and the charge is of not being an active member, but merely a sympathizer and over ground member. It has been submitted that merely the allegation that the appellant is a sympathizer of ULFA, will not warrant invoking stringent provisions of UA(P) Act. In fact, it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that merely because a person is held to be a member of a proscribed organization, without being actively involved in any criminal activities, such a person cannot be charged under the stringent provisions of Section 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act much less, detained for such a long period. 25. Further, it has been submitted that the delay in the trial, more particularly, when only a few witnesses have been examined out of 177 witnesses who are yet to be examined, would amount to violation of the fundamental right of the appellant to a speedy trial as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Under such circumstances the appellant would be entitled to bail. 26. The appellant accordingly, relied on the following decisions, (i) Thwaha Fasal Vs. Union of India, (2021) SCC OnLine 1000, [Criminal Appeal No.1302 of 2021, Disposed of on 28.10.2021. (ii) Amrit Ballav Goswami Vs. NIA, 2021 (2) GLT 751 [Crl.A. No.13/2021, decided on 10.03.2021]. (iii) Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 712 . (iv) Arup Bhuyan Vs. State of Assam, (2015) 12 SCC 702 . (v) Sri Indira Das vs. State of Assam, [Criminal Appeal No.1383 of 2007] (vi) Angela Harish Sontakke Vs. State of Maharashtra (2021) 3 SCC 723 . (vii) Abdul Nazar Madani Vs. State of T.N. and Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 204 . (viii) Dr. P. Varavara Rao Vs. National Investigation Agency & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.1206 of 2022 [arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5931 of 2022]. (ix) Adil Khan Vs. Vice Chancellor Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh and 4 Others, Writ C No.3297 of 2020. (x) Decision of High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Saleem Vs. State of Karnataka, Crl.A. No.130 of 2021. (xi) Decision of Bombay High Court in Crl.A. No.393 of 2019 in Mohammad Raisuddin Vs. (1) National Investigating Agency (2) The State of Maharashtra. (xii) Decision of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, Sri Nagar Bench in Bashir Ahmed Khan Vs. Union of India and Ors. State of Karnataka, Crl.A. No.130 of 2021. (xi) Decision of Bombay High Court in Crl.A. No.393 of 2019 in Mohammad Raisuddin Vs. (1) National Investigating Agency (2) The State of Maharashtra. (xii) Decision of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, Sri Nagar Bench in Bashir Ahmed Khan Vs. Union of India and Ors. [ OWP No.275/2017]. (xiii) Crl.A.(D) No. 15/2021, Crl.M. No.1064/2021 in Waheed ur Rehman Parra- Vs. UT of J&K through Investigating Officer, P/S Counter Intelligence. (xiv) Union Vs. Yasmen Mohammad Zahid @ Yasmen, (2019) 7 SCC 790 , [Criminal Appeal No.1200 of 2019, arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.461 of 2019]. 27. Seeking parity of treatment with another co-accused, namely, Sri Amrit Ballav Goswami (accused No.6) in the same trial who has been charged under Section 120B of the IPC and Sections 13, 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act, it has been submitted that since the said Amrit Ballav Goswami had been already released on bail by order dated 10.03.2021 by this Court, the appellant, Sanjib Talukdar may also be released on bail, seeking parity of treatment. 28. On the other hand, it has been submitted by Mr. D.K. Das, learned Senior counsel for the NIA that the charges against the appellant as serious. Apart from being an over ground activist, he has been in touch with the active ULFA members. The photographs certainly indicate he has been involved with ULFA and he is an active member who is trained in arms. 29. It has been submitted that as far as ailments are concerned, necessary medical treatment has been provided to him and it cannot be a ground for release on bail in view of the stringent provisions of Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, since the accusations are prima facie found to be true. 30. As regards delay in the trial, it has been submitted that it cannot be said of much a prolonged detention which will warrant release during the trial and accordingly, it has been submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. Crl. Appeal No.136/2021 (Prakash Rajkonwar) 31. The appellant Prakash Rajkonwar was also arrested in connection with the aforesaid Geetanagar Police Station Case No. 210/2019 which was transferred to the NIA and re-registered as FIR No.RC-04/2019/NIA/GUW dated 26.06.2019 and trial against the appellant along with other co-accused is continuing before the Special Judge, NIA in Special NIA Case No.02/2019. Crl. Appeal No.136/2021 (Prakash Rajkonwar) 31. The appellant Prakash Rajkonwar was also arrested in connection with the aforesaid Geetanagar Police Station Case No. 210/2019 which was transferred to the NIA and re-registered as FIR No.RC-04/2019/NIA/GUW dated 26.06.2019 and trial against the appellant along with other co-accused is continuing before the Special Judge, NIA in Special NIA Case No.02/2019. The appellant was arrested in connection with the said case on 10.06.2019. During investigation, the investigating authority seized four mobile phones, one computer CPU and four numbers of A4 papers containing some write-ups from the appellant’s residence. 32. The application seeking bail in connection with the said case was rejected by the Special Judge on 08.12.2020 by holding that on analysis of the materials and case diary, there appears to be reasonable ground for believing that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true that the appellant was giving support to the ULFA(I) organization, which is a banned organization as per Schedule II of the UA(P) Act, 1967. It was also observed by the learned Special Judge that the appellant was in touch and in coordination with some of the main co-accused in the present case through numerous phone calls. 33. The appellant Prakash Rajkonwar has also sought parity of the benefit of bail as given to the co-accused, namely, Amrit Ballav Goswami, who has been similarly charge-sheeted under Section 120B of the IPC and Sections 13, 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act. The bail application of Amrit Ballav Goswami, though initially declined by the Special Judge vide order dated 29.08.2020 was allowed by this Court in Crl. Appeal No.13/2021 vide order dated 10.03.2021. It has been submitted that since the appellant is also similarly situated as the aforesaid Amrit Ballav Goswami, he would be entitled to parity in treatment and be granted bail. Otherwise also, it has been submitted that it cannot be said that the charges against the appellant can be considered to be prima facie true inasmuch as these are not supported by any substantive material or evidence and there is no evidence linking the appellant with the aforesaid bomb blast which occurred in Zoo Road on 15.05.2019. Otherwise also, it has been submitted that it cannot be said that the charges against the appellant can be considered to be prima facie true inasmuch as these are not supported by any substantive material or evidence and there is no evidence linking the appellant with the aforesaid bomb blast which occurred in Zoo Road on 15.05.2019. It has been also submitted that since the appellant has been in incarceration for a long period since his arrest on 10.06.2019, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.A. Najeeb (supra), the appellant may be released on bail. 34. Thus, from the above, it appears that both the appellants have taken similar pleas for seeking bail, i.e., parity with Amrit Ballav Goswami, lack of material to show that the accusations against the appellants are prima facie true and additional ground that because of prolonged incarceration they would be entitled to be released on bail in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.A. Najeeb (supra). Parity with Amrit Ballv Goswami 35. We have perused the order dated 10.03.2021 passed by this Court in the case of Amrit Ballav Goswami in Crl. A. 13/2021 whereby Amrit Ballav Goswami was released on bail. 36. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submission advanced, we would like to refer to the observations and findings of this Court in the case of Amrit Ballav Goswami. This Court, while dealing with the bail application of Amrit Ballav Goswami, referred to the accusations against Amrit Ballav Goswami in paragraph 8 of the order, which are reproduced below:- “8. As noticed above, the incident involved in the NIA Special Case pertains to throwing granade upon the Police party on 15/05/2019. The appellant is one of the 8(eight) accused persons, against whom, charge sheet had been submitted by the NIA. After going through the materials on record, the learned Special Judge, NIA Court had found the following incriminating materials against the appellant:- “23. Upon perusing the charge sheet dated 11/11/2019, I find that para 17.24 of the same enumerated the findings against accused Sri Amrit Bhallav Goswami (A-6). i. That, the role and involvement of this accused emerged during the course of the investigation as one of the active over ground workers of the ULFA. ii. Upon perusing the charge sheet dated 11/11/2019, I find that para 17.24 of the same enumerated the findings against accused Sri Amrit Bhallav Goswami (A-6). i. That, the role and involvement of this accused emerged during the course of the investigation as one of the active over ground workers of the ULFA. ii. That the said accused is a surrendered cadre of ULFA and though he surrendered, he is still maintaining links with ULFA(I) and also involved in subversive activities and anti-national activities including terrorist acts. iii. That, he is encouraging people to take up antinational activities through meetings and social media posts. iv. That, he is also a member of ANMMMTA, which is a frontal organization of ULFA(I) and the aim of this organization is to create new country comprising all the states of N.E. India. v. That, this accused is providing ideological support to ULFA (I) and propagating its ideology to other people and he is also actively involved in the conspiracy in pursuance of the goals of ULFA (I) along with the other co-accused. vi. That, the accused posted a song relating to ULFA(I) in Facebook motivating people to fight against the Indian government. That, in this regard he is using Facebook ID www.facebook.com/amrit.goswamiasom and the Gmail ID to communicate with members of the ULFA CADRES. vii. That, this accused is encouraging people to take up arms struggle against the Union of India and in this regard he is encouraging the youth to join ULFA(I). In this connection, he was also arrested in Golaghat with regard to Golaghat Police Station Case No. 700/2018. viii. That, the aforesaid facts clearly establish that this accused is indulging in unlawful activities and is still associated with the ULFA (I) in its illegal activities, despite his surrender to the State authorities. ix. That, the CDR analysis of the mobile phone number – 8638798352 – of this accused revealed that he was in telephonic contact with other members of ULFA (I) and that he was also in contact with the other co-accused of this case, namely, Prakash Rajkonwar, Pranmay Rajguru and Jahnabee Saikia. ix. That, the CDR analysis of the mobile phone number – 8638798352 – of this accused revealed that he was in telephonic contact with other members of ULFA (I) and that he was also in contact with the other co-accused of this case, namely, Prakash Rajkonwar, Pranmay Rajguru and Jahnabee Saikia. x. The connectivity chart of the said mobile phone number of this accused has also been reproduced in the charge sheet and the same reveals that he exchanged 35 calls with Prakash Rajkonwar; 13 calls on another Number of Prakash Rajkonwar; 36 calls with Jahnabee Saikia and 17 calls with Pranmay Rajguru. xi. Page 28 of the charge sheet reveals that during the relevant time, Sri Amrit Bhallav Goswami (A-6) exchanged 104 calls with co-accused Jahnabee Saikia. Similarly, Page 33 of the charge sheet indicates that this accused exchanged 153 calls with another co-accused Pranmay Rajguru.” 37. Though the learned Special Judge took the view that the aforesaid acts indicate involvement of the said Amrit Ballav Goswami, this Court took the view that ANMMMTA is not a banned organization as per First Schedule contained in the UA(P) Act, 1967. The allegation against the said Amrit Ballav Goswami was that he is a sympathizer of ULFA (I) providing ideological support to the banned organization. This Court, however, held that though the technical analysis report and CDR suggest that there are some materials to indicate that the said Amrit Ballav Goswami was in touch with the ULFA (I) cadres, who are co-accused in the case, the relevant date, time or the content of such communication are not available and the materials placed before the Court do not prima facie implicate said Amrit Ballav Goswami in the incident that took place on 15.05.2019 so as to link the said Amrit Ballav Goswami with the commission of offences under Sections 325/326/307/121 IPC read with Sections 3/5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 10/13/16/20 of the UA(P) Act. Rather, it appears that the needle of suspicion had gone towards the said Amrit Ballav Goswami largely due to his antecedents, more particularly, his past association with the banned organization ULFA and its cadres. 38. This Court also went on to observe that there is no material to indicate that the said Amrit Ballav Goswami was involved in committing an offence which is punishable under Section 120B of the IPC. 38. This Court also went on to observe that there is no material to indicate that the said Amrit Ballav Goswami was involved in committing an offence which is punishable under Section 120B of the IPC. This Court further observed that the allegations are no doubt serious and whether NIA succeeds in producing enough evidence leading to the conviction of the appellant is a matter that can be gone into only during trial. This Court went on to observe that, however, having regard to the materials placed before the Court, the Court was of the prima facie view that there is no good ground to presume that the said Amrit Ballav Goswami was involved in the incident of lobbing hand grenade upon the police party on 15.05.2019. This Court also observed that the said Amrit Ballav Goswami is a family man having his permanent residence at Golaghat and he is also serving in a School since past several years. Hence, the Court did not see any possibility of the appellant fleeing the trial. Accordingly, the Court took the view that the impugned order dated 29.08.2020 passed by the Trial Court is unsustainable in the eyes of law and accordingly set aside the same. 39. We will examine as to whether the case of the present appellants are also similar with that of Amrit Ballav Goswami. 40. As regards the submission that the case of Sanjib Talukdar is similar with that of Amrit Ballav Goswami, inasmuch as he is also charged of being an active supporter of ULFA (I) and maintains links with its cadres and actively participated in reconnaissance of ULFA (I) cadre, while the materials in respect of Amrit Ballav Goswami and that of the present appellant Sanjib Talukdar appear to be similar, yet there is a difference. Apart from the similarity in the allegation against both of them, there is a highly incriminating material against the appellant Sanjib Talukdar in the present case, in the form of the photographs of the appellant Sanjib Talukdar extracted from the mobile phone of another co-accused Pappu Koch which show that the appellant is associated with said Pappu in operational activities. The said photographs indicate that he was roaming with the members of ULFA with arms in his hands. In another photograph, he was seen in the uniform of ULFA(I). The said photographs indicate that he was roaming with the members of ULFA with arms in his hands. In another photograph, he was seen in the uniform of ULFA(I). There is another incriminating material in the form of statement of protected witness ‘X’ recorded under Section 164 Cr. PC in which the said witness ‘X’ has stated that he received a phone call from the appellant Sanjib Talukdar on 30.04.2019 stating that one student from upper Assam is coming to Guwahati and to help him if he seeks any help. Accordingly, the said witness ‘X’ met the said person who introduced himself as a student and after a few days of the said meeting, the grenade blast took place in front of Guwahati Central Mall and later on going through the social media, the said witness ‘X’ could learn that the said person whom the appellant Sanjib Talukdar introduced was involved in the said bomb blast. 41. Thus, we are unable to take the view that case of the present appellant, Sanjib Talukdar, stands in equal footing with the said Amrit Ballav Goswami because of the additional incriminating materials against him. At this stage, we are unable to examine as to the veracity of the photographs as well as the statement of the said protected witness ‘X’ as these are to be scrutinized in detail in course of trial, yet these materials cannot be ignored by the Court while considering bail application. 42. As regards the other appellant, Prakash Rajkonwar, we will examine it later when we consider his case. 43. For consideration of bail by the Court as provided under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967, apart from the normal judicial exercise undertaken by a Court for grant of bail in respect of serious offences, two additional pre-requisites are required to be fulfilled when anyone who is accused of committing an offence under certain Sections of the UA(P) Act, seeks bail. Proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release, Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. 44. Thus, in order to consider any application for grant of bail under the UA(P) Act, the following aspects have to be kept in mind by a Court:- (i) If the person is accused for committing an offence punishable under Chapter-IV and V, bail cannot be granted unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for release on bail. (ii) Bail cannot be granted if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or report made under Section 137 Cr.PC, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusations against such person are prima facie true. 45. In the present case, as can be seen from the charge-sheet, the appellant Sanjib Talukdar, has been charged for committing offence under Sections 120B/121/121A of the IPC and Sections 18, 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act. 46. Since Section 18 falls under Chapter-IV and Sections 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act under Chapter-VI, clearly the stringent provisions of Section 43D(5) will come into operation in respect of appellant, Sanjib Talukdar. If the Court is of the view that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true, such a person shall not be entitled to be released on bail as provided under Section 43D(5). The aforesaid provision has received consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Investigation Agency Vs. If the Court is of the view that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true, such a person shall not be entitled to be released on bail as provided under Section 43D(5). The aforesaid provision has received consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Investigation Agency Vs. Jahur Ahmed Shah Watali, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1 , in which it has been explained that by its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accused in the First Information Report must prevail until contradicted, overcome or disproved by other evidence and on the face of it shows complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It was further observed that it must be good and sufficient on its facts to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. It was also observed that in one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court is to opine that the accusation is prima facie true as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the UA(P) Act. Paragraph 23 of the decision in Watali (supra) reads as under:- “23. By virtue of the proviso to subsection (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to offences under the 1967 Act as well. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the Investigating Agency in reference to the accusation against the concerned accused in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act. Nevertheless, we may take guidance from the exposition in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma ( (2005) 5 SCC 294 ), wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the scope of power of the Court to grant bail. In paragraphs 36 to 38, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 316-17) “36. Nevertheless, we may take guidance from the exposition in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma ( (2005) 5 SCC 294 ), wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the scope of power of the Court to grant bail. In paragraphs 36 to 38, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 316-17) “36. Does this statute require that before a person is released on bail, the court, albeit prima facie, must come to the conclusion that he is not guilty of such offence? Is it necessary for the court to record such a finding? Would there be any machinery available to the court to ascertain that once the accused is enlarged on bail, he would not commit any offence whatsoever? 37. Such findings are required to be recorded only for the purpose of arriving at an objective finding on the basis of materials on record only for grant of bail and for no other purpose. 38. We are furthermore of the opinion that the restrictions on the power of the court to grant bail should not be pushed too far. If the court, having regard to the materials brought on record, is satisfied that in all probability he may not be ultimately convicted, an order granting bail may be passed. The satisfaction of the court as regards his likelihood of not committing an offence while on bail must be construed to mean an offence under the Act and not any offence whatsoever be it a minor or major offence. … What would further be necessary on the part of the court is to see the culpability of the accused and his involvement in the commission of an organised crime either directly or indirectly. The court at the time of considering the application for grant of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was possessed of the requisite mens rea….” And again in paragraphs 44 to 48, the Court observed: “44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. 45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail. 46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in subsection (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.” 47. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.” 47. It may be noted that it was also observed in Thwaha Fasal (supra) that the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at the stage of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail is markedly different from discussing the merits and demerits of evidence. Elaborate examination or discussion of evidence is not required to be done at this stage and at that stage the Court is merely expected to record the finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding involvement of the accused in commission of the stated offence or otherwise. 48. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, we will examine as to whether it can be said, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant Sanjib Talukdar that there are reasons for believing that the accusations against the present appellants are not prima facie true so as to enable him to be enlarged on bail. 49. We have gone through the charge-sheet as it forms the basis of the allegations against him for which the appellant, Sanjib Talukdar, has been set up for trial. 50. On perusal of the charge-sheet, what one would notice is that the charge-sheet refers to the activities of ULFA(I) which has been declared to be a terrorist organization and listed at Serial No.11 of the UA(P) Act whose goal and objective is to set Assam free from India and turn Assam into an independent country, which the ULFA hopes to achieve by means of armed inexertion by means of political and social mobilization of the people through propaganda, and in pursuance of this object, ULFA has been engaged in war against the Government of India and carrying out attacks on the armed forces of India and also resorting to violent terrorist acts. As part of the objectives of the ULFA, the top leaders of ULFA including Paresh Baruah and Arunodoy Asom, who are also accused in the same trial along with the appellant Sanjib Talukdar and shown to be absconding, conspired to carry out terrorist acts in the State of Assam. As part of the objectives of the ULFA, the top leaders of ULFA including Paresh Baruah and Arunodoy Asom, who are also accused in the same trial along with the appellant Sanjib Talukdar and shown to be absconding, conspired to carry out terrorist acts in the State of Assam. In pursuance of this conspiracy, several ULFA cadres including the hardcore cadre of ULFA(I), accused Pappu Bokoliyal who is co-accused No.1 in the trial was dispatched from ULFA(I) camp at Myanmar to carry out terrorist acts in the State of Assam in the month of April, 2019 and the said Pappu Koch Bokoliyal was instructed to take help of other co-accused, namely, Jahnabi Saikia, Pranmoy Rajguru, Indra Mohan Bora and Sanjib Talukdar and proceed to Guwahati for carrying out terrorist activities. It has been also alleged that in order to carry out the said exercise, the accused Pappu was directed to take help of the appellant Sanjib Talukdar in scouting for possible targets in Guwahati city. For the said terrorist act, Pranmoy Rajguru and accused Jahnabi Saikia were instructed to provide necessary assistance and logistic support to Pappu and accordingly, such assistance were provided which also involved Chinmoy Lahkar. It has been also alleged that pursuant to the said conspiracy as per direction of Paresh Baruah and Arunodoi Asom, the accused Pappu, Chinmoy Lahkar, Pranmoy Rajguru and Jahnabi Saikia assembled at Zoo Road on 15.05.2019 and organized a short meeting and carried out a reconnaissance of the target area and accordingly, the said terrorist act of lobbing grenade from the motor cycle run by Chinmoy Lahkar and Pappu Koch as a pillion rider was executed in which incident 12 persons received injury and some of them grievous injuries. In course of investigation, on search of the house of the accused Jahnabi Saikia, one 9 mm pistol along with 25 rounds of live ammunition, two magazines, huge quantity of ammunitions and materials like powder like explosives, one packet of gelatin weighing 900 grams suspected to be used in making IED and printed documents relating to the proscribed organization ULFA were recovered. The investigation was thereafter, handed over to NIA. In the charge-sheet, it has been specifically mentioned in paragraph 17.7 about the involvement of the appellants in the following words:- “17.7. The investigation was thereafter, handed over to NIA. In the charge-sheet, it has been specifically mentioned in paragraph 17.7 about the involvement of the appellants in the following words:- “17.7. During the course of the investigation, involvement of accused persons namely Indra Mohan Bora (A-5), Amrit Ballav Goswami (A-6), Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) and Prakash Rajkonwar (A-8) in the conspiracy of ULFA and their involvement in the grenade blast near Central Mall Guwahati have clearly emerged.” 51. Coming to the specific role of the appellant Sanjib Talukdar, and the evidence collected against him, these are specifically mentioned in paragraphs 17.25 and 17.26 of the charge-sheet, which read as follows:- “17.25. Evidence against Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) (i) The role and involvement of accused Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) emerged during the course of investigation as one of the over ground workers of United Liberation Front of Assam, Independent (ULFA-I). ii) The accused is an active supporter and activist of ULFA(I) and he is maintaining links with cadres of ULFA (I) who are carrying out subversive and anti-national activities including terrorist acts. He has provided logistic support to the cadres of ULFA(I) by providing transportation to ULFA(I) cadre and has actively participated in the reconnaissance of the targets with ULFA (I) cadre. He is also actively associated with the conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in pursuance of the goals of ULFA(I) with other co-accused. iii) The photographs of Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) was extracted from the mobile phone of Pappu Koch Bokoliyal @ Bijoy Asom @ Anvi @ Rajini (A-1) which establish that accused Sanjib Talukdar is associated with accused Pappu Koch in operational activities. The photographs of Sanjib Talukdar was clicked with accused Pappu Koch Bokiliyal (A-1) and other members of ULFA(i) in the jungle which indicates that he was roaming with the members of ULFA. In other photographs, he was in the uniform of ULFA (I) with a fire arms in standing position aiming at something though the said fire arms which strongly indicate that he has got training with ULFA(I) in handling arms. iv) The statement of protected witness X in the form of 161 & 164 Cr. PC establish the association of accused Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) with Pappu Koch Bokoliyal (A-1). iv) The statement of protected witness X in the form of 161 & 164 Cr. PC establish the association of accused Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) with Pappu Koch Bokoliyal (A-1). v) During the further course of investigation, it came to light that the accused Sanjib Talukdar was using facebook URL https/www.facebook.com/sanjib talukdar.10 and gmail account sanjibtalukdar530@gmail.com to communicate with other members of ULFA(I). 17.25.2 The analysis of CDRs of the mobile used by accused Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) confirmed the conspiracy. i) On the revelation made by the accused Sanjib Talukdar (A-7), the CDR of the mobile numbers 9508019463, 8638953724 used by Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) was collected from the concerned service providers and studied. It was found that the accused was in telephonic contact with other members of ULFA(I). ii) During the analysis of CDR of mobile no.9508019463, it has been revealed that accused Sanjib Talukdar using the said mobile number was in telephonic contact with accused Pappu Koch Bokoliyal (A-1) and Pranmay Rajguru (A-3). iii) Customer Application Form (CAF) of mobile phone numbers 9508019463, 8638953724 received from concerned service provider establish that accused Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) is the actual subscriber and user of the said mobile numbers.” 52. As per CDR Technical Analysis report produced before this Court, the appellant Sanjib Talukdar was using two mobile numbers viz 9508019463 and 8638953724. With the mobile number 9508019463 he was in connection with Pranmoy Rajguru and Pappu during 18.01.2019 and 30.03.2019 with five calls. Similarly, he was in touch with Pappu from 25.04.2019 to 27.04.2019 with three calls. With other mobile number, the appellant was in touch with Pranmoy Rajguru on February, 2019. Similarly, he was in touch with other co-accused Pappu from 27.04.2019 to 04.05.2019 with 13 calls. That apart, the investigating authority also had collected other evidences in the form of photographs and in the form of evidence of the protected witness ‘X’ as discussed above. If the aforesaid evidences are considered together which of course will be subjected to scrutiny during trial, yet on prima facie consideration, it cannot be said that the allegations are not true. 53. As also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsing Sharma Vs. If the aforesaid evidences are considered together which of course will be subjected to scrutiny during trial, yet on prima facie consideration, it cannot be said that the allegations are not true. 53. As also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsing Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 377 , as discussed in Thwaha Fasal (supra), an elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not permissible at this stage inasmuch as the Court has to see only the prima facie nature of the evidence and examine these only with an uncritical observation as to whether it amounts to disclosure of a prima facie case to see whether the accusations can be prima facie true or not. Prima facie view of a matter is to treat certain things as correct at the first impression until proved otherwise. If the aforesaid evidences collected against the appellant Sanjib Talukdar remain uncontroverted, it would appear that the accusations made against him are prima facie true. 54. Under the circumstances, in the light of the evidences which have been brought on record, we are of the view that it can be said that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellant Sanjib Talukdar are prima facie true. 55. The fact that Sanjib Talukdar was in touch with other co-accused on days in close proximity prior to the bomb blast cannot be brushed aside. The allegation of the prosecution is bolstered by other incriminating materials in the form of photographs and the evidence of protected witness ‘X’. Accordingly, in the case of Sanjib Talukdar, we are of the view that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against him are prima facie true. In that event, the appellant would not be entitled to bail. (Crl.Appeal No.136 of 2021) Prakash Rajkonwar 56. Coming to the other appellant Prakash Rajkonwar, though the charge-sheet mentions his role and his involvement as one of the over ground workers of ULFA and espousing the ideology of ULFA, and encouraging other people to take up anti-national activities through meetings and social media post, apart from the fact that certain materials were recovered from his mobile phone, we would like to examine whether there are any other material against him so as to render the accusation against him to be prima facie true. 57. 57. The CDR and Technical Analysis Report produced before us show that he had used two mobile numbers 8403942607 and 7002928847. With mobile number 8403942607 he was in touch with Pranmoy Rajguru with 15 calls from 23.08.2018 to 21.11.2018. Similarly, he was in touch with Amrit Ballav Goswami, who has been released on bail during 04.08.2018 to 05.09.2018 with 46 calls. With the other mobile number, he was in touch with Jahnabi Saikia between 18.09.2018 to 22.09.2018 with 3 calls, with Pranmoy Rajguru from 09.09.2018 to 04.05.2019 with 47 calls, with Amrit Ballav from 15.06.2018 to 21.04.2019 with 32 callls. While the aforesaid CDR and Technical Analysis Report certainly indicates that the appellant was in touch with accused Pranmoy Rajguru, Amrit Ballav and Jahnabi Saikia in 2018-2019, there is nothing in the charge-sheet as to his exact involvement except for the blunt statement mentioned under paragraph 17.7 of the charge-sheet quoted above. Unlike in the case of Sanjib Talukdar where there is a specific allegation made in the charge-sheet as mentioned in para 16.5 that the prime accused Pappu Koch Bokoliyal was instructed by ULFA High Command to take help of other co-accused, Jahnabi Saikia (A-2), Pranmoy Rajguru (A-3) and Indra Mohan Bora (A-5) and Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) and proceed to Guwahati for carrying out the terrorist acts. In paragraph 16.6 of the charge sheet, it is also mentioned that on reaching Guwahati, prime accused Papu Koch was instructed to select targets for terrorist attacks and to take help of Sanjib Talukdar (A-7) in scouting for possible targets in Guwahati city. 58. However, as far as the present appellant is concerned, no such specific role has been assigned to him except for stating that he was in touch with above three accused through mobile phone. 59. In course of the hearing, the prosecution has also placed on record a supplementary charge-sheet which shows the statement of one Jiban Moran who was holding a high post of Major General of ULFA(I) who mentioned about various activities of ULFA, Paresh Baruah and Arunodoy Dahotia and the grenade blast at Zoo Road Tiniali on 15.05.2019 which was allegedly carried out by Pappu Koch with the help of Chinmoy Lahkar, Pranmoy Rajguru and Jahnabi. However, he did not make any specific mention about the role played by the present appellant except for stating that Amrit Ballav and present appellant constantly talked to Paresh Bauah on whose instructions Amrit Ballav and the present appellant worked for creation of independent Assam, which is also called as ANMMMTA and recruited new cadres. However, nothing has been indicated as to how the present appellant recruited cadres for ULFA much less any role in the bomb blast which occurred on 15.05.2019. In the bail order passed by this Court in favour of Amrit Ballav, it was observed by this Court that the said ANMMMTA is not a banned organization as per Schedule contained in the UA(P) Act. 60. The prosecution has pointed out some provocative or rebellious statements made by the present appellant in some of the chats attributed to appellant Prakash Rajkonwar. In one chat, amongst others, it has been stated that ANMMMTA is the geographical area where we all indigenous inhabitants viz “Arunachalis, Nagas, Meghalayans, Manipuris, Mizoes, Tripuris and Assamese have been living by consuming our own air, water and food gifted by the nature. The geographical area surrounding by the neighbouring countries, i.e. China in the north, Myanmar in the east, Bangladesh in the south-west India in the west and Bhutan in the North-East is not so called North-East but let us introduce ourselves as ANMMMTA (consisting with the initial letters of 7 sisters). Whereas we must have freedom by birth but we have been binded with the chain of slavery of exploiters. So we must awake and understand our right by birth viz ANMMMTA”. In the other chat, it has been stated that, “Yes brother, there are so many insurgent groups individually fight against in respectively so many occasion – everybody have seen – but unfortunately all their issues have been on nutral neither forwarded nor have any solution – rather than loosing time and human power – and have spoiled out power and strength – We the all insurgent group of north east must realize the goi democracy which never smoothly give us any solution that have asked – now the time has changed all of us understand the central govt. policy about us – yet we have time opportunity. If the ANMMMTA collectively want to come out from the surrounding of GOI seems it would be not hard nor impossible for us. policy about us – yet we have time opportunity. If the ANMMMTA collectively want to come out from the surrounding of GOI seems it would be not hard nor impossible for us. In our crossed time we have already sacrifice out vast number of human resources in the name of revolt and other agitation. Here I have a humble plea to all of my beloved naga tripuri arunachali meghalayas Manipuri and mizo brothers cum friends also seniors who love and respect the vast so called north east region hello dear brothers please share mids our first individual comments about the above cited motto. Hope you will express your opinion freely whether positive or negative in both sides. Thanks friends cum brothers. Once if we stand united it could be the supreme power for us to reach our destiny. If you ready to friendly talk about us please will be grateful to you. Note yes there are so many problems among our seven states mids but if we conjointly proceed to aiming to the motto or our goal we can solve our all inter states related every problems in sharing a table talks without hesitating- I hope all of you deeply feel these for our future generation for the vast regions security. Think it feel it. This is the only unique way left for us for the north east indigenous peoples safety and security – Cntilao.” 61. Though the said comments were made by Chao Nam Ti Lao which is the nick name of Prakash Rajkonwar can be provocative and tend to support separation it does not mention ULFA nor does it speak of any violent overthrow of the Government of India by use of arms. The said chats also do not indicate any clear support to ULFA, though the chat certainly indicates seditious tendency of the author. 62. However, we do not see that he has been charged under Section 121 and 121A IPC as in the case of some other co-accused. The appellant Prakash Rajknownar is similarly charged as that of Amrit Ballav Goswami i.e., under Section 120B IPC and Sections 13, 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act. 63. 62. However, we do not see that he has been charged under Section 121 and 121A IPC as in the case of some other co-accused. The appellant Prakash Rajknownar is similarly charged as that of Amrit Ballav Goswami i.e., under Section 120B IPC and Sections 13, 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act. 63. As we proceed to examine, it would be appropriate to examine the grounds mentioned by the learned Special Judge in rejecting the bail of the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar which are found in paragraph 24 of the impugned order which are reproduced as follows:- “i). Paragraph 17.26 of the charge-sheet enumerates the findings against accused A-8 upon investigation. It is stated that he is found to be one of the over ground workers of the banned ULFA espousing its ideology through various modes including social media. ii). It is stated that investigation has also revealed that the accused A-8 conceived the idea of an organization ANMMMTA – as a country comprising all the North-East States of Indian and in this context, it is stated in the charge-sheet that the same coincides with the ideology of ULFA for secession of Assam from India through violent means. iii) That investigation has further revealed that several PDF files were extracted from his mobile and these documents were found to be regarding use of explosives, explosive devices, bombs IUDs etc. There are also PDF files regarding guerrilla warfare and military studies. iv). That the investigation has found that the accused A-8 posted in the social media through his facebook account regarding the said organization ANMMMTA. The investigation reveals that the accused A-8 was using through mobile nos.7002928847 and 8403942607 and that CDR analysis of these mobile numbers revealed that he exchanged numerous calls with co-accused Pranmoy Rajguru A-3, Jahnabee Saikia A-2 and Amrit Ballav Goswami A-6. v). That the said findings in the charge-sheet also find support from D-83 which contains the detailed CDR analysis of the telephone calls made by A-8 during the relevant time from his above two mobile numbers. vi). That witness No.13 Sri Putul Baishya, police official, in his statement stated that upon asking A-8 regarding his nick name Chao Nam Ti Lao he stated that he himself gave the nick name for disguising his actual identity. vi). That witness No.13 Sri Putul Baishya, police official, in his statement stated that upon asking A-8 regarding his nick name Chao Nam Ti Lao he stated that he himself gave the nick name for disguising his actual identity. Witness Nos.50, 51 and 52, namely, Uttam Bora, Birinchi Goswami and Sundar Rajkhowa stated about seizure of mobile phones etc from the house of A-8. vii). That document D-45 is regarding the seizure of the mobile phones from the accused A-8. Apart from the mobile phones one CPU and some paper containing write-ups were also seized from A-8. viii). That the investigation has revealed that A-8 played a role in propagating the ideology of ULFA. ix) That the investigation has revealed a single conspiracy on the part of all the accused persons to wage war against India and to target security forces. x). That the investigation has revealed the association with A-8 with senior ULFA cadres Arunodoi Dahotia and Paresh Baruah. xi). That the investigation has revealed that A-8 is keeping links and association with ULFA(I) and that he facilitated the formation of a frontal organization for the ULFA(I). xii). That the investigation has revealed that A-8 propagates the ideology of ULFA(I) and encourages war against Indian and that his cell phone analysis showed materials about guerrilla warfare and preparation of IED. xiii) That the investigation has revealed that the transcripts of his facebook chats showed incriminating materials against A-8 with regard to activities of the ULFA(I).” 64. As regards the finding No.(i), as discussed above, in the charge-sheet, Prakash Rajkonwar is held to be one of the over ground workers of the banned ULFA espousing its cause, which has not been supported by any material except for the phone calls made to three accused persons and the chats. 65. Coming to the finding No.(ii), it is alleged that the appellant conceived the idea of formation of ANMMMTA, which coincides with the ideology of ULFA for secession of Assam from India through violent means. However, as mentioned above ANMMTA is not yet declared as a proscribed organization, and nowhere, the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar has used ULFA’s name in any of his writings. 66. As regards finding No.(iii) that several PDF files were extracted from the mobile number of the appellant, which were found to be regarding use of explosive, explosive devices, bombs, IEDs, etc, it does not prove any criminal activity. 66. As regards finding No.(iii) that several PDF files were extracted from the mobile number of the appellant, which were found to be regarding use of explosive, explosive devices, bombs, IEDs, etc, it does not prove any criminal activity. It may at best can be said to be a preparatory act inasmuch as nothing has been brought on records to the actual use of the said materials for preparing explosives or explosive devices etc. There is no evidence that the said appellant had used the said knowledge in making bombs or had transmitted to some persons who had used it to make explosives or IEDs. It is merely storage of certain objectionable but not illegal or banned materials which per se do not suggest that he is involved in any specific subversive or terrorist activity. The appellant Prakash Rajkonwar has not been accused of participating in the bomb blast which occurred on 15.05.2019 in any manner. 67. Regarding the finding No.(iv) that the appellant posted in the social media through his facebook account regarding ANMMMTA, as mentioned above, as also observed by this Court in the case of Amrit Ballav Goswami, ANMMMTA is not a proscribed organization and as such stringent provisions of Sections 38 and 39 cannot be invoked as it is only meant for proscribed terrorist organizations which ANMMMTA is not. 68. Regarding the finding No.(v), the only incriminating material is the phone calls through the two mobile numbers by the appellant Amrit Ballav Goswami without indicating as to whether he was involved in giving shelter to any of the accused or undertaking reconnaissance as alleged against the appellant Sanjib Talukdar. In the entire charge-sheet, there is not even a whisper not to mention of any allegation that Prakash Rajkonwar had played any specific role in the entire saga of the bomb blast which took place on 15.05.2019. 69. Regarding the finding No.(vi), even if it is assumed that the appellant had used another name Chow Nam Ti Lao, for disguising his real identity, it cannot be an offence within the meaning of Section 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act unless it is shown that he was taking part in any subversive act in support of ULFA in that name. 70. 70. Coming to the finding No.(vii) that apart from the mobile phones, one CPU and some papers containing write-ups were seized, that seizure does not necessarily make a ground for invoking Section 38 or 39 of the UA(P) Act without any further incriminating materials to connect with any terrorist activity. 71. Coming to the finding No.(viii), that he played an active role as a member of ANMMMTA, it is nowhere mentioned in what way he had played the role. He has been accused of espousing the cause of ANMMMTA but as mentioned above the link between ANMMMTA and ULFA had not been shown in the order to hold that it is proscribed organization. This Court has already held in Amrit Ballav Goswami’s case that ANMMMTA is not a banned organization within the purview of the UA(P) Act, 1967. 72. Coming to the finding No.(ix) that the investigation has revealed a single conspiracy on the part of all the accused to wage war against India and to target security forces, it is devoid of any material. No charge has been framed against the present appellant under Sections 121/122/123/124A of the IPC as in the case of some other co-accused. 73. Coming to the finding No.(x) that investigation reveals his association with senior ULFA cadres Arunodoy Asom and Paresh Baruah, there is no material except for the statement of one Jiban Moran that Amrit Ballav and Prakash constantly talks to Paresh Baruah and on his order, they worked for creation of independent Assam. This statement of Jiban Moran is a very general and vague statement without disclosing when and how the appellant used to talk to the two leaders of ULFA. 74. Coming to the finding No.(xi) that the accused No.8 is keeping links and association with ULFA, there is no evidence and nothing has been shown that ANMMMTA is a frontal organization of ULFA(I). 75. Coming to the finding No.(xii) that accused No.1 propagates the ideology of ULFA, it does not appear to be supported by record. There is no material to show that the appellant has been waging war against India. Recovery of certain PDF files for making bombs cannot be the basis for holding that he is supporting the ideology of ULFA. 75. Coming to the finding No.(xii) that accused No.1 propagates the ideology of ULFA, it does not appear to be supported by record. There is no material to show that the appellant has been waging war against India. Recovery of certain PDF files for making bombs cannot be the basis for holding that he is supporting the ideology of ULFA. Something more than possession of such literature, by way of use of such literature is required to be shown, which is absent in the case of the appellant Praksh Rajkonwar. 76. Coming to the finding No.(xiii) that transcripts of the facebook account of the appellant shows incriminating materials with regard to the activities of ULFA(I), it is also not borne by the record. There is not even a mention of the name of ULFA in all these writings. 77. As regards invoking of Section 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act, the same has been explained by the Supreme Court in Thwaha Fasal(supra) that mere association with a terrorist organization is not sufficient to invoke Section 38 of the UA(P) Act, 1967 and mere support is not a terrorist act unless there is an intention in furthering the activities of the terrorist organization. Therefore, even if it is assumed that appellant Prakash Rajkonwar had espoused the cause of ULFA, the prosecution has to show that he in fact performed or committed an act or action with the intention to support or further the activities of the terrorist organization, which is not present in the case against Prakash Rajkonwar. 78. In the present case, as discussed above, there was a bomb blast in which some of the accused have been shown to be directly involved by way of giving shelter by procuring arms and ammunitions and also throwing of hand grenade but nowhere the role of the appellant Prakash had been mentioned in the entire transaction of the aforesaid criminal act. Though it has been alleged that he was in contact with three accused, nothing has been mentioned in what manner he had communicated with the three accused, as to whether it was by way of giving advice how to carry out the terrorist act or assisted in any manner in the act of preparing the explosives or in throwing grenade. Nothing has been mentioned at all in the charge-sheet about any such active role played by the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar. Nothing has been mentioned at all in the charge-sheet about any such active role played by the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar. Even though the Investigating Authority has mentioned abut seizure of certain PDF files for making IED, again, the Investigating Authority has not mentioned in what manner the said data stored in the mobile phone of the accused has been used for making bombs or helped any of the other accused in any manner in the execution of the aforesaid act of throwing grenade. Use of offensive sentence or words in the facebook also does not show clear support to the activities of ULFA(I). It shows support of ANMMMTA, which is not a banned organization. Though such use may be secessionist, yet mere use of secessionist words or expression or feeling without any overt or covert secessionist act cannot attract the provisions of Section 38 and 39 of the UA(P) Act as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thwaha Fasal (supra). 79. In this regard, we may refer to paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of Thwaha Fasal (supra) which read as follows:- “10. In this case, there is no allegation against the accused nos.1 and 2 of committing any terrorists act. Chapter V contains provisions for forfeiture of proceeds of terrorism with which we are not concerned. 12. The offence punishable under Section 20 is attracted when the accused is a member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist organisation which is involved in terrorist act. Section 20 is not attracted unless the terrorist gang or terrorist organisation of which the accused is a member is involved in terrorist act as defined by Section 15. Section 20 provides for a punishment of imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life and fine. 11. On plain reading of Section 38, the offence punishable therein will be attracted if the accused associates himself or professes to associate himself with a terrorist organisation included in First Schedule with intention to further its activities. In such a case, he commits an offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation covered by Section 38. The person committing an offence under Section 38 may be a member of a terrorist organization or he may not be a member. In such a case, he commits an offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation covered by Section 38. The person committing an offence under Section 38 may be a member of a terrorist organization or he may not be a member. If the accused is a member of terrorist organisation which indulges in terrorist act covered by Section 15, stringent offence under Section 20 may be attracted. If the accused is associated with a terrorist organisation, the offence punishable under Section 38 relating to membership of a terrorist organisation is attracted only if he associates with terrorist organisation or professes to be associated with a terrorist organisation with intention to further its activities. The association must be with intention to further the activities of a terrorist organisation. The activity has to be in connection with terrorist act as defined in Section 15. Clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 38 provides that if a person charged with the offence under sub-section (1) of Section 38 proves that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation during the period in which the name of the organisation is included in the First Schedule, the offence relating to the membership of a terrorist organisation under sub-section (1) of Section 38 will not be attracted. The aforesaid clause (b) can be a defence of the accused. However, while considering the prayer for grant of bail, we are not concerned with the defence of the accused.” (emphasis added) 80. Under the circumstances, we are unable to agree with the finding of the learned Special Judge that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made against him as far as Section 38 and 39 are prima facie true. In view of the scant materials shown, it cannot be said that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar are prima facie true. 81. Accordingly we are of the view that the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar will be entitled to be released on bail. However, our view is only for the purpose of consideration of the bail application and would not have a bearing in the trial against the present appellant. 82. 81. Accordingly we are of the view that the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar will be entitled to be released on bail. However, our view is only for the purpose of consideration of the bail application and would not have a bearing in the trial against the present appellant. 82. We are also persuaded to take the view that the case of the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar bears close resemblance with Amrit Ballav Goswami which enables the appellant to claim parity with him for the purpose of grant of bail. As discussed above, the basic charges against Amrit Ballav Goswami as also reflected in the order of this Court in Crl.A. No.13/2021 are that, (i) Amrit Ballav Goswami is a active member of ULFA, (ii) inspite of being surrendered, he is still maintaining links with ULFA and engaged in subversive activities and anti-national activities including terrorist acts, (iii) he is an active member of ANMMMTA, a frontal organization of ULFA(I), (iv) he has been providing ideological support to ULFA and propagating its ideology, (v) he posted a song relating to ULFA(I) in Facebook motivating people to fight against the Indian Government and he is using Facebook and G.Mail Id to communicate with the members of the ULFA cadres, (vi) he is encouraging people to take up arms struggle against the Union of India and he is encouraging the youths to join ULFA, (vii) the CDR analysis of the mobile phone shows that he is in contact with the ULFA cadres and other co-accused Prakash Rajkonwar, Pranmoy Rajguru and Jahnabi Saikia. If we compare the basic charges against the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar, these appear to be similar to that of Amrit Ballav Goswami that (i) he is an active member of ULFA, (ii) he is involved in subversive anti national activities (iii) he is encouraging anti national activities by using social media posts, (iv) he is also a member of the ANMMMTA, a frontal organization of ULFA, (v) he is propagating the ideology of ULFA to work the people, (vi) he is using his Facebook and G.Mail to connect with the cadres of ULFA, (vii) he is engaged in the unlawful activities, (viii) he has been in contact with other ULFA cadres and co-accused Pranmoy Rajguru, Jahnabi Saikia and Amrit Ballav Goswami. The only additional charge against the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar is the recovery of PDF files. The only additional charge against the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar is the recovery of PDF files. As discussed above, the said PDF files are not illegal materials whose possession is banned or prohibited and also nothing has been shown to indicate that the said material was used for the purpose of making explosives, IED etc. It is merely a possession of certain harmful materials without showing how these were being used for other persons or that these were used actually for terrorist activities. As regards other allegations, these appear to be same as Amrit Ballav Goswami. In respect of Amrti Ballav Goswami, this Court, after examining the charges against him took the view that first of all, ANMMMTA is social organization which has not yet been banned, and that it is a frontal organization of ULFA has not been shown. As regards, CDR, particulars of the date and time, have not been shown. Though in the present case, in the case of appellant Prakash Rajkonwar, the same has been shown, yet, it does not disclose as to the nature of communication between the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar and other accused persons to implicate him in the criminal act of the bomb blast. Therefore, the case against the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar appears to be similar to that of Amrit Ballav Goswami. 83. It has not been brought to our notice also that though this Court had granted bail to Amrit Ballav Goswami by order dated 10.03.2021 passed in Crl.A.13/2021, the said order had not been challenged before the higher judicial forum and as such, we would consider that the finding and observation of this Court in Crl.A. 13/2021 has remained unchallenged. 84. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that apart from the reasons we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs, we are also persuaded to take the view that the case of appellant Prakash Rajkonwar appears to have close resemblance with that of Amrit Ballav Goswami without any substantial difference as regards the allegations against them and as such, we are of the view that the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar will be entitled to bail on this score also. 85. Accordingly, we allow the appeal (Crl.A. No.136/2021) as far as appellant Prakash Rajkonwar is concerned and reject the bail prayer of appellant Sanjib Talukdar (Crl.A. No.60/2020). 86. 85. Accordingly, we allow the appeal (Crl.A. No.136/2021) as far as appellant Prakash Rajkonwar is concerned and reject the bail prayer of appellant Sanjib Talukdar (Crl.A. No.60/2020). 86. Even though we are rejecting the bail of appellant, Sanjib Talukdar, we have kept in mind the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.A.Najeeb (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the competing claim of an accused of the right to speedy trial, which is a facet of the Fundamental Right as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and rigours of criminal justice system to try and punish a guilty in serious offences in accordance with law, and the power of the Constitutional Court to intervene and grant bail under certain circumstances where a serious prejudice is caused to an accused due to prolonged trial. In that regard, we may reproduce the paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of K.A. Najeeb (supra), which reads as under:- “17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA perse does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well as the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial. 18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected. 19. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the Respondent on bail is that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the wellsettled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.” 87. We will refer to some of the decisions relied upon by the appellants where bail were granted due to prolonged detention. In K.A. Najeeb (supra) the accused had been in jail for more than five years and as many as 276 witnesses were left to be examined. Under the circumstances, keeping in mind the length of period undergone by the accused in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed soon, the High Court granted bail which was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Thwaha Fasal (supra), both the accused were in custody for more than 570 days but the Hon’ble Supreme Court also found that the accusations against them were not primafacie true. It may be noticed that in Dr. P. Varavara Rao (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that the appellant was about 82 years old who had already undergone 2½ years of detention and was suffering from various ailments and as his medical condition had not improved, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted bail. It may be noticed that in Dr. P. Varavara Rao (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that the appellant was about 82 years old who had already undergone 2½ years of detention and was suffering from various ailments and as his medical condition had not improved, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted bail. It thus appears that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was persuaded to grant bail because of his old age and various ailments he was suffering from. In Angela Harish Sontakke (supra), as the accused was in custody for more than 5(five) years and the trial was yet to commence and as she was acquitted of similar charges leveled against her in other cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court released her on bail. In Mohammad Raisuddin (supra), the Bombay High Court released the accused as he was in custody for more than 7(seven) years. 88. In the present case, we have noted that the appellant Sanjib Talukdar has been in custody for more than 3 ½ years. Though we have rejected his bail application on the ground that the accusation against him appears to be prima facie true, if there is any further delay in concluding the trial, without any substantive progress, we are of the view that he will have a legitimate claim to be released on bail because of prolonged incarceration. 89. The question which may arise for consideration as regards appellant Sanjib Talukdar is, what would be the period of incarceration because of which Sanjib Talukdar can legitimately make a claim for release on bail on the basis of the principle enunciated in K.A. Najeeb (supra)? As discussed above, he has already been in custody for more than three and half years. What we have also observed is that in spite of Sanjib Talukdar being implicated in the bomb blast case and accused of having links with the proscribed ULFA organization, it does not appear that he is a hardened and hardcore member of ULFA. Otherwise, he would have left his family, studies and would have been actively involved in various terrorist activities. From the records it appears that he is a student and young man of about 29 years and has a good academic record and was undergoing M.Phil course when he was apprehended in connection with the bomb blast incident of 15.05.2019. Otherwise, he would have left his family, studies and would have been actively involved in various terrorist activities. From the records it appears that he is a student and young man of about 29 years and has a good academic record and was undergoing M.Phil course when he was apprehended in connection with the bomb blast incident of 15.05.2019. He, however, appears to have been fascinated with the ULFA with narcissistic and false sense of bravado evidenced by his photographs of posing with arms in camouflaged uniform displaying a misguided notion of patriotism. Perhaps, he can be described more as an exuberant over-ground activist or a sympathiser of ULFA, whose services were cynically utilised by others for their nefarious activities. Incidentally, in the bomb blast incident, the prosecution has ascribed only a marginal role to him of undertaking reconnaissance. He has not been charged of taking a major role in the bomb blast incident. He has not been accused of making or collecting arms or grenades or storing them or using them for terrorist activities. We have also noted that he has not been implicated in any other criminal case. Thus, considering the aforesaid background of the appellant Sanjib Talukdar, we are the view that if his detention is continued beyond 4 (four) years, without any substantial progress in the trial with the unlikelihood of the trial being concluded in near future, he can be released on bail in the light of the decision in K.A. Najeeb (supra). 90. It may be also mentioned that while directing in K.A. Najeeb (supra) that in spite of stringent provisions under Section 43D (5) of UA(P) Act, if there be any gross delay in disposal of cases where under-trials remain in jail for a long period, which would entitle them to be released on bail on the ground that it may amount to denial of request to speedy trial now considered a facet of the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the decision in Shaheen Welfare Association Vs. Union of India and Others., (1996) 2 SCC 616 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case of Shaheen Welfare Association (supra) was dealing with bail applications arising out of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 wherein the Supreme Court envisaged 4(four) categories of under-trials, viz. Union of India and Others., (1996) 2 SCC 616 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case of Shaheen Welfare Association (supra) was dealing with bail applications arising out of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 wherein the Supreme Court envisaged 4(four) categories of under-trials, viz. (a) hardcore undertrials whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other undertrials whose over acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3 and/or 4 of the TADA Act; (c) undertrials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 4, but by virtue of Section 120-B or 147, IPC and ; (d) those undertrials who were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of TADA. The Supreme Court proposed different approaches to deal with the aforesaid categories and held that those undertrials falling in group (a) cannot receive liberal treatment. It was held that cases of undertrials falling in group (b) would have to be differently dealt with, if they have been in prison for five years or more and their trial is not likely to be completed within the next six months, they can be released on bail unless the court comes to the conclusion that their antecedents are such that releasing them may be harmful to the lives of the complainant, the family members of the complainant, or witnesses. It was also held that cases of undertrials falling in groups (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released if they have been in jail for three years and two years respectively. Para Nos. 13 and 14 of Shaheen Welfare Association (supra) read as follows, “13. It was also held that cases of undertrials falling in groups (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released if they have been in jail for three years and two years respectively. Para Nos. 13 and 14 of Shaheen Welfare Association (supra) read as follows, “13. For the purpose of grant of bail to TADA detenues, we divide the undertrials into three classes, namely, (a) hardcore undertrials whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other undertrials whose overt acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3 and/or 4 of the TADA Act; (c) undertrials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and A, but by virtue of Sections 120B or 147, I.P.C., and; (d) those undertrials who were found possessing Incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of TADA. 14. Ordinarily, it is true that the provisions of Sections 20(8) and 20(9) of TADA would apply to all the aforesaid classes. But while adopting a pragmatic and just approach, no one can dispute the fact that all of them cannot be dealth with by the same yardstick. Different approaches would be justified on the basis of the gravity or the charges. Adopting this approach we are of the opinion that undertrials falling within group (a) cannot receive liberal treatment. Cases of undertrials falling in group (b) would have to be differently dealt with, in that, if they have been in prison for five years or more and their trial is not likely to be completed within the next six months, they can be released on bail unless the court comes to the conclusion that their antecedents are such that releasing them may be harmful to the lives of the complainant the family members of the complainant, or witnesses. Cases of undertrials falling in groups (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released if they have been in jail for three years and two years respectively. Cases of undertrials falling in groups (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released if they have been in jail for three years and two years respectively. Those falling in group (b) when released on bail may be released on bail of not less than Rs.50,000/-with one surety for like amount and those falling in groups (c) and (d) may be released on bail on their executing a bond for Rs.30 000/-with one surety for like amount subject to the following terms: (1) The accused shall report to the police station once a week; (2) The accused shall remain within the area of jurisdiction of the Designated Court pending trial and shall not leave the area without the permission of the Designated Court; (3) The accused shall deposit his passport, if any with the Designated Court. If he does not hold a passport he shall file an affidavit to that effect before the Designated Court. The Designated Court may ascertain the correct position from the passport authorities if it deems it necessary; (4) The Designated Court will be at liberty to cancel the bail if any of these conditions is violated or a case for cancellation of bail is otherwise made out.” (5) Before granting bail a notice shall be given to the public prosecutor and an opportunity shall be given to him to oppose the application or such release. The Designated Court may refuse bail in-very special circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing.” 91. In the present case, we are of the prima facie view that the appellant does not appear to be a hardcore undertrial and his role is marginal in the bomb blast incident of 15.05.2019 and as such, his bail can be considered even before completing 5(five) years of detention, if he has completed 4(four) years of detention, if there is no likelihood of trial being completed in near future. 92. Accordingly, while dismissing his bail application, we grant liberty to the appellant Sanjib Talukdar to approach this Court again on completion of 4(four) years of detention, if in the meantime, there is no substantial progress in the trial, and there is no possibility of concluding the trial in near future, for seeking release on bail in the light of the observations made in K.A. Najeeb (supra). 93. 93. In allowing the bail prayer of appellant Prakash Rajkonwar in Crl.A.No.136/2021, we direct his release on bail on furnishing bond of Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand) only and two local sureties of like amount including one Government servant having more than five years of service left. It is also directed that the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar shall not indulge in any activity which is detrimental to maintenance of peace and security of the State and he shall not in any manner, either directly or indirectly, try to influence any of the witnesses and be in touch with any of the other co-accused. The appellant Prakash Rajkonwar shall also not leave the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, NIA without prior written permission of the Special Judge. It is also made clear that violation of the conditions imposed by this Court may lead to cancellation of the bail granted to the appellant Prakash Rajkonwar. 94. Accordingly, Crl.A. No.136 of 2021 is allowed. Crl.A. No.67 of 2020 is, however, dismissed with liberty to the appellant Sanjib Talukdar to approach this Court again as observed earlier.