ORDER : 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 01.02.2010 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge, Shehera in Regular Civil Suit No.17 of 2006 as well as the judgment and order dated 10.02.2022 passed by the learned 6th Additional District Judge, Panchmahals in Regular Civil Appeal No.14 of 2010, the appellants – original plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal. 2. Heard Mr. S.P. Majmudar, the learned counsel assisted by Mr.H.J. Karathiya, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 3. Considering the fact that the Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “the Code”) and this Court has very limited scope to entertain the Second Appeal. While considering the concurrent findings recorded against the present appellants, this Court cannot go into the factual matrix of the matter. There is a settled principle of law that against the concurrent findings, while exercising the powers under Section 100 of the Code, the High Court has to take utmost care while appreciating the facts and the evidence which is recorded by the Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court. 4. In the present case, the case of the plaintiffs is that, the subject parcel of land which is allotted to one Kevalram Devaldas Khushlani as an evacuee property and the same was allotted to the said Kevalram on 07.05.1974 as a new tenure land. The subject parcel of land was situated at village Dhamnod of Panchmahal District, bearing revenue survey no.1 admeasuring 6 acres and 9 gunthas. Subsequently, the said parcel of land was sold to the present respondent – original defendant way-back in the year 1977. The said transaction was under challenge in the Civil Suit filed by the legal heirs of Kevalram Devaldas Khushlani being Civil Suit No.17 of 2006 in the Court of Principal Civil Judge at Shehera. The learned Civil Judge has, after considering the written statement of other side and the application filed under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11, framed the issues vide Exh.-13, which are as under : (1) Whether the Plaintiff proves that the suit property is ancestral property and is of Co-ownership ? (2) Whether the Plaintiff proves that there is no right, interest, concern of the Defendant in the suit property ? (2) Whether the Plaintiff proves that there is no right, interest, concern of the Defendant in the suit property ? (3) Whether the Plaintiff proves that Sale deed of the suit is dated 22/12/1977 is being against interest and right, it deserves to be rejected. (4) Whether the Defendant proves that suit of the Plaintiff is barred by limitation ? (5) Whether the Defendant proves that the suit is barred by necessary defect of party ? (6) Whether the Defendant proves that the Plaintiff is not entitled to file the present suit ? (7) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get the relief mentioned in suit ? (8) What order and Final order ? 4.1 After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence, the Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the present appellants vide its judgment and decree dated 01.02.2010. 4.2 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial court, the appellants preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.14 of 2010. The Appellate Court has considered the records of the Trial Court and after going through the records and the judgment of the Trial Court has framed the points of determination in paragraph no.4, which is as under : (1) Whether the Appellant proves that the registered sale deed No.2482 of the suit land is being false, null and void, against the right interest of the Appellant hence, deserves to be rejected ? (2) Whether the Plaintiff's suit is time barred ? (3) Whether the Appellant proves that order and decree passed at Exh.-117 in R.C.S. No.17/'06 on 1/7/2010 by the Principal Civil Judge of Shehra is erroneous, against the established principles of law and against the produced evidence ? (4) Whether interference requires in the judgement passed by the Principal Civil Judge of Shehra ? (5) What order ? 4.3 After going through the records of the Trial Court and after going through the documentary evidence produced before the Trial Court, the Lower Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the present appellants – original plaintiffs and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 10.02.2022. 4.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and decree, the present Second Appeal is preferred by the appellants – original plaintiffs. 5. 4.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and decree, the present Second Appeal is preferred by the appellants – original plaintiffs. 5. Considering the questions of law submitted by the appellant, this Court is of the confirmed opinion that there is no illegality or any perversity found in the impugned judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below, and, therefore, the present appeal is required to be summarily dismissed as there is no substantial question of law, question of law or even question of fact is involved. Considering the recent judgment of this Court passed in Second Appeal No.365 of 2019, the present Second Appeal is devoid of any merits as it does not involve any substantial questions of law. The Trial Court while passing the impugned judgment and decree dismissed the suit under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code and on all counts the present appellants – original plaintiffs failed before the Trial Court. 6. It is relevant to note herein that thought the Trial Court has rejected the application under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, has tried the suit after going through various documentary evidence produced by both the sides and after framing the issues with regard to the provisions of limitation, non-joinder of the necessary parties and other grounds the suit can be dismissed. The Trial Court has examined the complete details and has not committed any error while dismissing the suit. In furtherance thereto, the Lower Appellate Court has independently framed the issues in paragraph no.4 and decided the appeal on the said point of determination giving complete findings on all the aspects, therefore, I found no infirmity in both the impugned judgments of the Trial Court as well as of the Lower Appellate Court. 7. I have considered the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and after thoughtful consideration, first of all, the present second appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The requirement of Section 100 is that the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question or questions of law involved in the appeal as required under sub- section (3) of Section 100. The requirement of Section 100 is that the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question or questions of law involved in the appeal as required under sub- section (3) of Section 100. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100. Meaning thereby unless there is substantial question involved in the present appeal or it is framed by the Court, the appeal cannot be entertained or heard by the High Court. 8. Considering the proviso of Section 100 is to the effect that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. It is abundantly clear that when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. In the present appeal, learned counsel has suggested the following questions of law: [A] Whether both the Hon’ble Courts below have committed substantial error of law in not appreciating that the sale deed in question was illegal, void and in violation of the interest and share of the plaintiffs-appellants? [B] Whether both the Hon’ble Courts below have committed substantial error of law in holding that the suit of the plaintiffs was barred by limitation in the facts and circumstances of the present case? [C] Whether both the Hon’ble Courts below have wrongly appreciated the oral testimonies of the parties and have completely misread the same? [B] Whether both the Hon’ble Courts below have committed substantial error of law in holding that the suit of the plaintiffs was barred by limitation in the facts and circumstances of the present case? [C] Whether both the Hon’ble Courts below have wrongly appreciated the oral testimonies of the parties and have completely misread the same? [D] Whether both the Hon’ble Courts below have wrongly considered the revenue records, which are only for fiscal purposes and have not appreciated the fact that the entry in the revenue record does not create any right, title or interest? [E] Whether the judgment, order and decree of the Hon’ble lower appellate court below is contrary to the provisions of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? 9. Considering the recent pronouncement of the Apex Court that while exercising powers under Section 100 of the Code, this Court has very limited scope, this Court cannot go into the facts of the matter. Only in case of any perversity or in case any question of law arise or any substantial question of law is involved, then in that case, this Court can exercise powers under Section 100 of the Code as discussed hereinabove. 10. It is profitable to referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case Kashmir Singh Vs. Harnam Singh reported in (2008) 12 SCC 786, wherein, the Apex Court has observed in paragraphs no.9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15 as under:- “9. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed u/s. 100 of the Code. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. In exercise of the powers under this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. V/s. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 held that : "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 10. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 11. The question of law raised will not be considered as a substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India V/s. Ramkrishna Govind Morey, 1976 1 SCC 803 held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference.(See: Kondiba Dogadu Kadam V/s. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Others, 1999 3 SCC 722 ). 12. This Court in Reserve Bank of India V/s. Ramkrishna Govind Morey, 1976 1 SCC 803 held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference.(See: Kondiba Dogadu Kadam V/s. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Others, 1999 3 SCC 722 ). 12. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Sec. 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Art. 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta V/s. T. Ram Ditta, AIR 1928 PC 172 , the phrase 'substantial question of law' as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Sec. 100 (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sri Chunilal's case (supra), the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao V/s. Noony Veeraju, AIR 1951 Mad 969 : "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." 13. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." 13. This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial as quoted in Sir Chunilal's case (supra). 15. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See : Santosh Hazari V/s. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs., 2001 3 SCC 179 ).” 11. Considering the questions suggested by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, it does not require any further hearing or re- determination. The question is practically covered by the decision of the highest court and/or there is no further determination of any of the questions suggested by the learned counsel is required. Considering the test which is enumerated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sir Chunilal’s case (supra) for determining whether a question of law raised in a given case is substantial question. Considering the test which is enumerated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sir Chunilal’s case (supra) for determining whether a question of law raised in a given case is substantial question. The substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. 12. The principles relating to Section 100 relevant for this case may be summarized thus:- (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. 13. In case of Gurnam Singh and others Vs. Lehna Singh, (2019) 7 SCC 641 ; the Apex Court has observed in paragraphs no.14 an 15 as under:- “14. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the case of Ishwar Dass Jain (Supra). In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held : Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise. 15. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise. 15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in re-appreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, which were on re-appreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the First Appellate Court in exercise of powers under Section 96 of the CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the First Appellate Court. First Appellate Court dealt with, in detail, the so called suspicious circumstance which weighed with the learned Trial Court and thereafter it came to the conclusion that the Will, which as such was a registered Will, was genuine and do not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC.” 14. In view of the aforesaid settled principles, it appears that the both the Courts below have not committed any error either on facts or on law. As per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gurnam Singh (supra), framing of substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code. Considering the issue involved in the present appeal and the contentions raised on the basis of the factual aspects of the matter, this Court not thought it fit to enter into the factual aspects which does not involved any substantial question of law. It is also relevant to note here that the re-appreciation of the evidence is impermissible by this court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code. 15. It is also relevant to note here that the re-appreciation of the evidence is impermissible by this court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code. 15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, submissions canvassed by the learned counsel for the respective parties and the decisions cited at the Bar, I find no reason to entertain the present appeal. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and it is summarily dismissed. No order as to costs. 17. In view of the disposal of the main appeal, connected civil applications shall stand disposed of. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated forthwith.