JUDGMENT : 1. The instant writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder, the decision of the respondent-Bank as contained in letter dated 17.10.2013, by which the representation filed by the petitioner in pursuance to the order passed by this Court dated 09.07.2013 in W.P.(C) No. 2304 of 2013, has been rejected denying the refund of an amount to the tune of Rs.4,25,000/- on the ground that the statutory amount as per the mandate of the provision of sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, hereinafter referred to the Rules, 2002, has not been complied with by the writ petitioner, the auction purchaser. 2. The facts leading to this case are that the borrower, namely, M/s Sagar Enterprises has made an application for sanction of loan from the respondent-Bank. The loan has been sanctioned subject to mortgaging the property in the names of Smt. Bindu Devi and Smt. Deepak Devi. The loan account felled under the category of Non-Performing Asset (NPA), therefore, proceeding has been initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2002, by taking recourse of recovery of the amount from the borrower by issuing notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, 2002. The option given to the borrower failed. The aforesaid failure on the part of the borrower prompted the Bank to take the symbolic possession of the property in question by taking recourse of Section 13(4) of the Act, 2002. The respondent-Bank has simultaneously, under the provision of Section 13(4) of the Act, 2002, came out with the auction notice for sale of the mortgaged property in order to recover the amount to adjust the said loan amount. The writ petitioner has participated in the bid and also been declared as successful. The writ petitioner at the time of participation has deposited 25% of the total assessed value of the mortgaged property as required under the provision of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 as also reflected in the auction notice. The petitioner thereafter has not deposited the subsequent 25% of the amount as required to be deposited under the provision of sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002. The petitioner thereafter has not deposited the subsequent 25% of the amount as required to be deposited under the provision of sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002. The petitioner, thereafter, represented the respondent-Bank that the amount may be refunded in his favour on the ground that as yet the bank is not in a position to handover the physical possession. 3. It is the contention of the petitioner that the physical possession of the property has been directed to be given in favour of the Bank and to that effect, an order has been passed by the District Magistrate as required to be passed under Section 14 of the Act, 2002. According to the petitioner, this is the reason that the remaining amount as required to be deposited under the provision of sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 has not been deposited. 4. The petitioner has come to this Court on the earlier occasion by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 2304 of 2013 wherein this Court has disposed of the writ petition by granting liberty to make representation for consideration of the claim. The petitioner, in pursuance of the aforesaid liberty, represented before the respondent-Bank for refund of the amount so deposited but the same has been denied to be refunded by taking a decision vide letter dated 17.10.2013. The petitioner being aggrieved with the said decision has filed the instant writ petition. 5. The matter has been heard on 14.12.2022 and on that date, an order was passed making some queries to be answered by the respondent-Bank. The part of the said order reads as under: “… This Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, has put pin-pointed queries upon the learned counsel for the respondents-Bank, as under: (I).Whether the physical possession of the mortgaged property has been taken by this bank, as required under Section 14 of the Act, 2002 ? (II).If such application is filed before the District Magistrate, as required under Section 14 of the Act, 2002, then what order has been passed, the same be brought on record? (II).And, if no application has been filed before the District Magistrate, as required under Section 14 of the Act, 2002, the respondents-Bank is directed to explain as to why no such application has been filed? (II).And, if no application has been filed before the District Magistrate, as required under Section 14 of the Act, 2002, the respondents-Bank is directed to explain as to why no such application has been filed? (IV).The respondents-Bank is directed to apprise this Court that as on date the mortgaged property is in whose possession? (V).The respondents-Bank is also directed to apprise this Court about the status of the loan account as to whether it has been adjusted or not? …” 6. The respondent-Bank in the light of the aforesaid order, has filed an affidavit. The said affidavit reflects that although there is an order passed by the District Magistrate for handing over the physical possession by virtue of the order passed on 12.02.2010 but it is the specific stand of the respondent-Bank that the physical possession could not be taken by the respondent-Bank. It has been stated that though the symbolic possession has been taken by the respondent-Bank but actual physical possession is with the mortgager. With respect to query no.5, i.e., about the status of the loan account, the statement has been made that the total bank dues outstanding in the said NPA account is amounting to Rs.10,68,964/-. 7. Mr. R.R. Nath, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has submitted that the aforesaid amount which is sought to be refunded in favour of the petitioner is concerned, the same cannot be refunded for the reason assigned in the impugned decision wherein it has been stated that it is the statutory requirement of the petitioner being the auction purchaser to deposit 25% of the amount after the sale is being confirmed as required under the provision of sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002. 8. It has been contended that since the petitioner has not deposited rest of the 25% of the amount, therefore, the statutory mandate authorizes the bank to forfeit the said amount and that is the reason by making reference of the provision of Rules, 2002, the claim of the petitioner has been rejected for refund of the amount. 9. Mr. 8. It has been contended that since the petitioner has not deposited rest of the 25% of the amount, therefore, the statutory mandate authorizes the bank to forfeit the said amount and that is the reason by making reference of the provision of Rules, 2002, the claim of the petitioner has been rejected for refund of the amount. 9. Mr. Pandey Neeraj Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner in response to such submission, has submitted that the reason for not depositing the said amount is that since the physical possession of the mortgaged property has not been taken as being admitted in the affidavit itself, as such, the bank cannot be allowed to take that ground for not refunding the amount reason being that if the petitioner would have deposited the said amount then also, the physical possession of the mortgaged property could not have been handed over in favour of the petitioner, therefore, the reason which has been assigned in the impugned decision for not refunding the amount, cannot be said to be justified one. 10. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the impugned decision of the respondent-Bank. 11. This Court, before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order and scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in issuing direction in favour of the petitioner or in faovur of the Bank, is of the view that the very object of the Act, 2002 is required to be referred herein. 12. The position of law is well known that even though there was an Act for recovery of the debt in the name and style of The Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and financial Institutions Act, 1993 [now The Recovery of Debts (and Bankruptcy) Act, 1993] but even in course of its existence the necessity has been thought for enactment of the act for making speedy recovery of the public money and that is the reason the SARFAESI Act, 2002 has come in order to get rid of the judicial rigour and the time which is to be consumed in the judicial processes as is the requirement of the Act, 1993. Under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 the Bank has been conferred with the power to take all steps for the purpose of making recovery of the public money in case the account falls under the category of NPA. It is the Bank which has been conferred with the power as under Section 13(2) that before taking recourse of the symbolic possession of the mortgaged property an option is to be given to the borrower by giving some time to repay the amount as provided under Section 13(2) of the Act, 2002. The objection if filed then the same is to be dealt with in view of the provision of Section 13(3) of the Act, 2002 and in a situation when the objection was filed by the borrower if has not been found to be satisfactory then the right has been reserved with the Bank to take symbolic possession by taking recourse of the provision laid down under Section 13(4) of the Act, 2002. 13. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 contains the Enforcement Rules, 2002 which provides certain procedures to be followed before putting the mortgaged property in auction casting liability/duty upon the Bank as also upon the auction purchaser who intends to purchase the property. 14. The Rules has been formulated for giving a notice in public giving therein details of the property by making publication in the newspaper and the terms and conditions for participation in the bid. Here, in the instant case, the notice for sale has been issued as has been appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition wherein the details of the property to be auctioned has been mentioned at column no.5 wherein in the last column it has been mentioned that 25% of the amount is to be deposited as an auction amount to the tune of Rs.4,38,540.10. 15. There is no dispute that the aforesaid auction amount as referred in the sale notice has been deposited by the petitioner but the dispute arose from the stage from where the rest of the 25% of the amount which was to be deposited after the confirmation of sale notice has not been deposited by the petitioner. 16. 15. There is no dispute that the aforesaid auction amount as referred in the sale notice has been deposited by the petitioner but the dispute arose from the stage from where the rest of the 25% of the amount which was to be deposited after the confirmation of sale notice has not been deposited by the petitioner. 16. The petitioner has taken the ground that rest of the 25% of the amount, after the confirmation of sale notice, has not been deposited since the petitioner came to know from survey of the mortgaged property that the physical possession has yet not been given in favour of the Bank and apprehending that even if the amount will be deposited then also there is no likelihood of handing over physical possession of the property in question in favour of the petitioner as also the allegation has been levelled that the property details which finds mention in the sale notice is quite different to that of the physical property which has been found by the petitioner on physical verification. 17. It is not in dispute herein as has been stated by the respondent-Bank in the affidavit that after symbolic possession having been taken in view of the provision of Section 13(4), appropriate application was filed before the District Magistrate by exercising the power conferred to him under Section 14 of the Act, 2002, whereby and whereunder, the District Magistrate of the concerned districts is to hand over the physical possession of the property in favour of the Bank. The aforesaid order has already been passed on 19.02.2010 as has been appended as Annexure-11 to the writ petition. 18. The sole grievance of the petitioner is that the amount is required to be refunded because the physical possession of the aforesaid property is not in favour of the Bank. 19. Before dealing with this issue, the position of law is required to be dealt with that what is to be done by the parties if certain requirement is there in the statutory mandate. The position of law is well settled that a thing is to be done in accordance with the statute. 19. Before dealing with this issue, the position of law is required to be dealt with that what is to be done by the parties if certain requirement is there in the statutory mandate. The position of law is well settled that a thing is to be done in accordance with the statute. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors., reported in AIR (1964) SC 358, wherein it has been held at paragraph 8 as under: “....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” Reference has also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein it has been held at paragraphs 31 & 32 as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” Reference to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court also needs to be made in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 27 as under: “..... it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself....” Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., reported in (2005) 1 SCC 368 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad & Ors. (in Civil Appeal No.5138-40/2007), reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 14 as under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that: (SCC p. 378, para 26) 26.... When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that: (SCC p. 378, para 26) 26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” Thus, it is, evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has propounded the law that if a thing is to be done as required to be done under the statutory mandate, the same is to be done strictly in accordance with the same, meaning thereby, there cannot be any deviation from the statutory mandate. 20. This Court, considering the aforesaid position of law and coming to the given facts of the case has found therefrom that there is specific provision as under Rule 9 to be followed by the parties. Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 reads as under: “9. Time of sale, issues of sale certificate and delivery of possession, etc.— [(1) No sale of immovable property under these rules, in first instance shall take place before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) of rule 8 or notice of sale has been served to the borrower. Provided further that if sale of immovable property by any one of the methods specified by sub-rule (5) of rule 8 fails and sale is required to be conducted again, the authorised officer shall serve, affix and publish notice of sale of not less than fifteen days to the borrower, for any subsequent sale.] (2) The sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has offered the highest sale price in his bid or tender or quotation or offer to the authorised officer and shall be subject to confirmation by the secured creditor: Provided that no sale under this rule shall be confirmed, if the amount offered by sale price is less than the reserve price, specified under sub-rule (5) of [rule 8]: Provided further that if the authorised officer fails to obtain a price higher than the reserve price, he may, with the consent of the borrower and the secured creditor effect the sale at such price. [(3) On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately, i.e., on the same day or not later than next working day, as the case may be, pay a deposit of twenty-five per cent. of the amount of the sale price, to the authorised officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be sold again.] (4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the authorised officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period [as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months]. (5) In default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4), the deposit shall be forfeited and the property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit [to the secured creditor] all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold. (6) On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment have been complied with, the authorised officer exercising the power of sale shall issue a certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of the purchaser in the form given in Appendix V to these rules. (6) On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment have been complied with, the authorised officer exercising the power of sale shall issue a certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of the purchaser in the form given in Appendix V to these rules. (7) Where the immovable property sold is subject to any encumbrances, the authorised officer may, if he thinks fit, allow the purchaser to deposit with him the money required to discharge the encumbrances and any interest due thereon together with such additional amount that may be sufficient to meet the contingencies or further cost, expenses and interest as may be determined by him. [Provided that if after meeting the cost of removing encumbrances and contingencies there is any surplus available out of the money deposited by the purchaser such surplus shall be paid to the purchaser within fifteen days from the date of finalisation of the sale.] (8) On such deposit of money for discharge of the encumbrances, the authorised officer [shall] issue or cause the purchaser to issue notices to the persons interested in or entitled to the money deposited with him and take steps to make the payment accordingly. (9) The authorised officer shall deliver the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7) above. (10) The certificate of sale issued under sub-rule (6) shall specifically mention that whether the purchaser has purchased the immovable secured asset free from any encumbrances known to the secured creditor or not.” It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid provision of law particularly from going through the provision as contained under sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the aforesaid Rules that on every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately pay a deposit of 25% of the amount of the sale price, to the authorised officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be sold again. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 further provides that the balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the authorised officer on or before the 15th day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months. Sub-rule (5) of the Rule 9 provides that in default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4), the deposit shall be forfeited and the property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold. It is, thus, evident that the consequence has been provided under the statutory mandate in case of default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4) that the deposit shall be forfeited. It also requires to refer that the provision of sub-rule (3) also cast duty upon the Bank to go for re-sale. The purpose is to secure the public money and to be deposited in the exchequer of the secured creditor and to achieve the very object and aim of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. As has been referred hereinabove that if the statute is being enacted, the parties who are to be governed under the statute is necessarily to follow it and there cannot be any defiance or deviation thereof. 21. This Court, on this pretext, is now proceeding to examine as to whether fault has been committed on the part of the purchaser or Bank. This Court, first is going to consider the fact that as to whether the claim which is being made by the petitioner said to be entitled in view of the statutory mandate. As has been mandated under the statue under sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 that in case of default, the amount so deposited to be forfeited. 22. Admittedly, it is the case of the petitioner that remaining amount to be deposited under sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 has not been deposited, reason taken for not depositing is that the property which has been shown to be sold out is actually not the same property and further the physical possession till date has not been taken by the Bank. 23. 23. The aforesaid fact, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to have any relaxation in the statutory mandate but the question is that when certain duty has been casted upon the Bank under the statutory mandate and the very purpose of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is to notify the purchaser in order to get the defaulted amount to be secured and if that be the conduct of the Bank and if the allegation levelled is correct, then certainly this Court is of the view that the very object and aim of the Act, 2002 will not be achieved. 24. This Court, therefore, is of the view that so far as the allegation leveled by the petitioner against the respondent-Bank to the effect that there was no likelihood of handing over the possession of the premises since Bank was having no physical possession of the premises in question in different to that of as notified in auction sale notice. The same depends upon the factual determination, therefore, this Court is restraining itself in exercising extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine these factual aspect, keeping the fact into consideration that the forum is available. 25. It is relevant to note herein that the matter would have been different if there would have been no alternative forum available to the purchaser but Section 17 is available as has been inserted by Act 44 of 2016 w.e.f. 01.09.2016 whereby and whereunder any person can file application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, as such, it would not be proper for this Court to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 26. This Court is fully conscious of the position of law that there is no restriction in exercising the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but it is self-imposed restriction upon the High Court to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction particularly in a case where the adjudication will be on the basis of the determination of the factual aspect then in that circumstances, it will not be proper for this Court to exercise such jurisdiction. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Orissa Agro Industries Corporation and Ors. vs. Bharati Industries and Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 725 . Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Orissa Agro Industries Corporation and Ors. vs. Bharati Industries and Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 725 . Paragraphs-8-11 of the said judgment read as under: “8. In a catena of cases this Court has held that where the dispute revolves round questions of fact, the matter ought not to be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. [See State Bank of India v. State Bank of India Canteen Employees' Union [ (1998) 5 SCC 74 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1270] and Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das [ (1999) 7 SCC 298 ] .] 9. In the instant case the High Court has itself observed that disputed questions of fact were involved and yet went on to give directions as if it was adjudicating the money claim in a suit. The course is clearly impermissible. (See G.M., Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Satrughan Nishad [ (2003) 8 SCC 639 ] and Rourkela Shramik Sangh v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [ (2003) 4 SCC 317 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 456] ) 10. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises [ (2003) 7 SCC 410 ] it was observed by this Court that the question whether the writ petition was maintainable in a claim arising out of a breach of contract should be answered first by the High Court as it would go to the root of the matter. The writ petitioner had displayed ingenuity in its search for invalidating circumstances; but a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations. (See Har Shankar v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr. [ (1975) 1 SCC 737 : AIR 1975 SC 1121 ] and Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. [ (1981) 3 SCC 238 : AIR 1981 SC 1368 ] ) 11. In Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar [ (1977) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1977 SC 1496 ] the types of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State or its agents can be set up were enumerated. Ltd. [ (1981) 3 SCC 238 : AIR 1981 SC 1368 ] ) 11. In Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar [ (1977) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1977 SC 1496 ] the types of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State or its agents can be set up were enumerated. The third category, indicated is where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract and in exercise of executive power of the State. The present case is covered by the said category. No writ order can be issued under Article 226 to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract; pure and simple. It is more so when factual disputes are involved.” 27. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid view, is not inclined to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so far as the claim of the petitioner is concerned. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed to that effect. 28. The petitioner is at liberty to approach before the appropriate forum to ventilate her grievance, if so wishes. 29. Now coming to the duty to be exercised by the Bank. As has been observed by this Court hereinabove that if a statute has been formulated governing the field, the parties are duty bound to follow the same and if a party is not following the same, the same will lead to anarchical situation and more particularly it is the accountability of the Bank being the public sector unit and dealing with the public money to follow the statute mandatorily. 30. This Court is now proceeding to examine the conduct of the Bank for the reason that it is the specific case of the Bank that as yet the physical possession of the property is not with the Bank as has been stated at paragraph-7 of the affidavit. Further, it has been stated at paragraph-8 that at present the total bank dues outstanding in the said NPA account is amounting to Rs.10,68,964/-. 31. Admittedly, as stated, the loan amount is still under the NPA category leading to loss to the Bank. The aforesaid loss is at whose fault that is to be dealt with. Further, it has been stated at paragraph-8 that at present the total bank dues outstanding in the said NPA account is amounting to Rs.10,68,964/-. 31. Admittedly, as stated, the loan amount is still under the NPA category leading to loss to the Bank. The aforesaid loss is at whose fault that is to be dealt with. Admittedly, herein, Bank has made opposition with respect to the claim of the petitioner since the amount which was to be deposited under the provision of sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 has not been deposited. 32. This Court has posed a pin pointed question upon the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank that when there is a law to be followed then why the Bank has not followed the Rule which mandates that in case if the amount has not been deposited and the purchaser has been found to be in default, the property shall be sold again as has been referred under sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 coupled with the provision made under sub-rule (5) thereof. The amount to the tune of Rs.10,68,964/- is still lying as outstanding against the loan account. 33. This Court, therefore, wants some answer from the higher authority at least of the rank of General Manager of the concerned Bank that what action is being taken against the erring officials after conducting an enquiry by casting liability so that said instance may not be repeated in future and the very object and aim of the Act, 2002 be achieved in strict sense. 34. In view thereof, let this matter be listed on 03.03.2023 so far as the direction as aforesaid pertaining to the Bank is concerned.