JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Abhishek Singh, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Birendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent no. 1 to 5 and Mr. Sudhir Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.6. 2. The petitioner, who is a fair price shop licensee, has approached this Court challenging the order dated 03.10.2019 passed by respondent no.3, whereby her appeal is rejected, and order dated 31.01.2017 passed by respondent no.4 by which license of her fair price shop was cancelled. 3. Learned counsel for respondent no.6 claims that respondent no.6 was granted license after the license of petitioner was cancelled. He submits that he has a right to oppose the present writ petition as now he is holding a license for the area concerned. He further submits that petitioner could not have been granted the license as she is not competent to hold license and, thus, raised a preliminary objection. 4. Opposing the same, learned counsel for petitioner submits that respondent no.6 was granted permission only as an alternative arrangement, till the dispute with regard to license of the petitioner is decided. Reference is made to the letter dated 02.06.2016 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tehsil Mahsi whereby permission was granted to respondent No.6. Perusal of the said letter shows that the permission to respondent No.6 was granted in reference to Government Order dated 26.11.2016 in the public interest as an alternative arrangement which would be subject to decision of the appeal and in case the appellate authority decides the matter in favour of the petitioner, no claim of respondent No.6 would be accepted. 5. A bare perusal of the letter dated 02.06.2016 clearly demonstrates that respondent No.6 was granted permission to distribute the ration in the area concerned only as an alternative arrangement to petitioner whose license was in dispute at that time. The said letter itself clarifies that in case the claim of petitioner is accepted, the new allottee, respondent No.6, would not have any claim whatsoever. Therefore, from the reading of the said letter itself it is clear that respondent No.6 was granted permission to distribute ration only till the matter with regard to petitioner is decided. Learned counsel for respondent No.6 has referred to following judgments in support of his case:- (i) Writ Petition No.24684 (M/S) of 2021; ‘Smt. Gudiya Devi Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Learned counsel for respondent No.6 has referred to following judgments in support of his case:- (i) Writ Petition No.24684 (M/S) of 2021; ‘Smt. Gudiya Devi Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Principal Secretary Food and Civil Supplies Lko. & Ors, dated 27.10.2021; (ii) Civil Appeal No.9363-9364 of 2014 Sumitra Devi Vs. State of U.P.; dated 08.10.2014 6. In the judgment passed in case of Sumitra Devi (supra), it is noted that, appellant in the case was a subsequent allottee as he was granted license on 20.02.2008. From the said judgment it is not clear as to whether the said license was a temporary license or an absolute. From the reading of the judgment it appears that the license was an absolute license granted in favour of the subsequent allottee and the license was not subject to the decision of the earlier allottee. Therefore, the facts of the said case, being different from the facts of the present case, are of no help to respondent No.6. Further, the Supreme Court was moved by the fact that subsequent allottee has filed an application for impleadment and without deciding the said impleadment application the High Court had finally decided the writ petition. In the said background the matter was remanded back. The Supreme Court while remanding the matter also stated “we make it clear that on merits of the case, we have expressed no opinion.” Thus, the facts of the said case are of no help to respondent No.6. 7. So far as the judgment passed in case of Smt. Gudiya Devi (supra) is concerned, the same is absolutely silent with regard to rights of subsequent allottee. The said issue was not even raised before the Court. Since, no law is settled in case of Smt. Gudiya Devi (supra), the same is no help to respondent No.6. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court passed in case of Poonam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. Reported in (2016) 2 SCC 779 . Paragraphs 49 to 53 are relevant for our purposes which read as follow:- “49. In the instant case, Shop No. 2 had become vacant. The appellant was allotted the shop, may be in the handicapped quota but such allotment is the resultant factor of the said shop falling vacant. Reported in (2016) 2 SCC 779 . Paragraphs 49 to 53 are relevant for our purposes which read as follow:- “49. In the instant case, Shop No. 2 had become vacant. The appellant was allotted the shop, may be in the handicapped quota but such allotment is the resultant factor of the said shop falling vacant. The original allottee, that is, the respondent, assailed his cancellation and ultimately succeeded in appeal. We are not concerned with the fact that the appellant herein was allowed to put her stand in the appeal. She was neither a necessary nor a proper party. The appellate authority permitted her to participate but that neither changes the situation nor does it confer any legal status on her. She would have continued to hold the shop had the original allottee lost the appeal. She cannot assail the said order in a writ petition because she is not a necessary party. It is the State or its functionaries who could have challenged the same in appeal. They have maintained sphinx like silence in that regard. Be that as it may, that would not confer any locus on the subsequent allottee to challenge the order passed in favour of the former allottee. She is a third party to the lis in this context. 50. The decisions which we have referred to hereinbefore directly pertain to the concept of necessary party. The case of Kailash Chand Mahajan [State of H.P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 351 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 874 : (1992) 21 ATC 528] makes it absolutely clear. We have explained the authority in J.S. Yadav [J.S. Yadav v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 570 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 140] and opined that it has to rest on its own facts keeping in view the declaratory relief made therein, and further what has been stated therein cannot be regarded as a binding precedent for the proposition that in a case of removal or dismissal or termination, a subsequently appointed employee is a necessary party. The said principle shall apply on all fours to a fair price shop owner whose licence is cancelled. We may hasten to add, this concept will stand in contradistinction to a case where the land after having vested under any statute in the State has been distributed and possession handed over to different landless persons. The said principle shall apply on all fours to a fair price shop owner whose licence is cancelled. We may hasten to add, this concept will stand in contradistinction to a case where the land after having vested under any statute in the State has been distributed and possession handed over to different landless persons. It is because of such allotment and delivery of possession in their favour, that is required under the statute, rights are created in favour of such allottees and, therefore, they are necessary parties as has been held in Ram Swarup v. S.N. Maira [Ram Swarup v. S.N. Maira, (1999) 1 SCC 738 ]. The subtle distinction has to be understood. It does not relate to a post or position which one holds in a fortuitous circumstance. It has nothing to do with a vacancy. The land of which possession is given and the landless persons who have received the pattas and have remained in possession, they have a right to retain their possession. It will be an anarchical situation, if they are not impleaded as parties, whereas in a case which relates to a post or position or a vacancy, if he or she who holds the post because of the vacancy having arisen is allowed to be treated as a necessary party or allowed to assail the order, whereby the earlier post holder or allottee succeeds, it will only usher in the reverse situation — an anarchy in law. 51. In this context, reference to the judgment in [Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 ] would be fruitful. The two-Judge Bench was dealing with the concept of dominus litis which relates to the plaintiff. The Court analysed the provision contained in Order 1 Rule 10 and various sub-rules. The subject-matter in the case pertained to a dispute between the petitioner and Respondent 1 which centred on the demolition and unauthorised construction by the competent authority under the Bombay Municipal Act. Respondent 2 was the lessee in possession of the service station. The Municipal Corporation had not issued any notice to the said respondent. It was contended before the Court that Respondent 2 was instrumental in the initiation of the proceeding by the Municipal Corporation against him. The Court addressed to the issue whether the said respondent is a necessary or proper party. The Municipal Corporation had not issued any notice to the said respondent. It was contended before the Court that Respondent 2 was instrumental in the initiation of the proceeding by the Municipal Corporation against him. The Court addressed to the issue whether the said respondent is a necessary or proper party. In the said case, the appellant had instituted a case against the third respondent for declaration that she was the lawfully married wife of the third respondent who had entered context and admitted the claim. An application for impleadment was sought by Respondents 1 and 2 on the ground that they were respectively the wife and son of the third respondent and they were interested in denying the appellant's status as wife and the children as the legitimate children of the third respondent. The trial court had allowed the application and the said order was confirmed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. 52. This Court referred to the authority in [Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 ] and came to hold that there is a clear distinction between suits relating to property and those suits in which the subject-matter of litigation is a declaration as regards status or legal character. The Court observed that in the former category, the rule of personal interest is distinguished from the commercial interest which is required to be shown before a person may be added as a party and accordingly held: (Ramesh Hirachand case [Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 ] , SCC p. 531, para 14) “14. … The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer i.e. he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his legal rights.” And again: (SCC p. 531, para 14) “14. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer i.e. he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his legal rights.” And again: (SCC p. 531, para 14) “14. … It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in [Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., (1956) 1 QB 357 : (1956) 2 WLR 372 : (1954) 1 All ER 273] , wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. in [Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie SA v. Bank of England, (1950) 2 All ER 605 at p. 611], that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject-matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has stated: (Amon case [Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., (1956) 1 QB 357 : (1956) 2 WLR 372 : (1954) 1 All ER 273], QB p. 371) ‘… the test is “May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights?”’” Eventually, the Court unsettled the order passed by the trial court as well as by the High Court. 53. We have referred to the said decision in Ramesh Hirachand case [Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 ] in extenso as there is emphasis on curtailment of legal right. The question to be posed is whether there is curtailment or extinction of a legal right of the appellant. The writ petitioner before the High Court was trying to establish her right in an independent manner, that is, she has an independent legal right. It is extremely difficult to hold that she has an independent legal right. It was the first allottee who could have continued in law, if his licence would not have been cancelled. He was entitled in law to prosecute his cause of action and restore his legal right. Restoration of the legal right is pivotal and the prime mover. The eclipse being over, he has to come back to the same position. It was the first allottee who could have continued in law, if his licence would not have been cancelled. He was entitled in law to prosecute his cause of action and restore his legal right. Restoration of the legal right is pivotal and the prime mover. The eclipse being over, he has to come back to the same position. His right gets revived and that revival of the right cannot be dented by the third party” 9. The legal position, thus, is settled by the Supreme Court. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, respondent No.6 has the right to hold shop only in case the license of the petitioner is cancelled. Otherwise, she has no right with the dispute between the petitioner and the State. In the present case, a conditional license was given to the respondent No.6 which does not create any independent right in favour of respondent No.6 and, therefore, respondent No.6 cannot oppose the present writ petition. Mere participation of respondent no.6 at the appeal stage will also not confer any such legal right. Even otherwise, the issue being raised by the respondent No. 6, that, whether petitioner is entitled to hold a license or not, is not an issue in the present proceedings. In the present writ petition, petitioner has challenged the order of cancellation of her license which is passed on certain grounds. Respondent No.6 cannot enlarge the scope of the proceedings by adding an entirely fresh issue to the dispute that license granted to the petitioner is bad, which would cause a review of the license given to the petitioner. Therefore, even on merits, the issue being raised by respondent No.6 cannot be looked into by this Court and is rejected. 10. Coming back to the merits of the case with regard to cancellation of license of the petitioner, a fair price shop license was granted to the petitioner on 05.05.2011. After an inquiry a charge-sheet was given to the petitioner on 20.03.2013 and on 25.03.2013 license of petitioner was cancelled by an ex-parte order. Petitioner submitted her reply with the recall application and by an order dated 02.04.2013, Sub Divisional Magistrate recalled his earlier order dated 25.03.2013. After an inquiry a charge-sheet was given to the petitioner on 20.03.2013 and on 25.03.2013 license of petitioner was cancelled by an ex-parte order. Petitioner submitted her reply with the recall application and by an order dated 02.04.2013, Sub Divisional Magistrate recalled his earlier order dated 25.03.2013. The Gram Pradhan of the village filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Devi Patan against the order of recall whereupon the Commissioner partly allowed the said appeal setting aside both the order dated 02.04.2013 as well as 25.03.2013 and remanded the matter to respondent No.4 with a direction to pass fresh order on merits. On 05.06.2014 a fresh charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner calling for an explanation to which a reply was submitted by the petitioner. On 27.06.2014, petitioner’s license was suspended and a detailed explanation was called for. Petitioner submitted her detailed reply along with evidences and affidavit in support of her case. By an order dated 28.09.2014 the Sub Divisional Magistrate closed the proceedings with the fine of Rs.1000/-upon the petitioner and a warning. On 10.07.2015, the Sub Divisional Magistrate again issued a show cause notice to the petitioner. On 28.08.2015 the license of petitioner was again suspended. Petitioner again submitted her explanation before respondent No.4 with regard to the charges. Respondent No.4 asked for original records such as distribution/receipt register of last three months as well as distribution certificate issued by the nominated distribution officer. All records were placed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate. Against the suspension order, petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner. The appeal of petitioner was rejected on 27.02.2016 with a direction to Sub Divisional Magistrate to decide the matter on merits within a period of one month. By order dated 11.04.2016 the Sub Divisional Magistrate passed a final order canceling the license of the petitioner. Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner which was partly allowed by judgment and order dated 20.10.2016 and the matter was again remanded back to the Sub Divisional Magistrate. On 31.01.2017, the Sub Divisional Magistrate again passed an order canceling the license of the petitioner. Petitioner preferred an appeal which was also rejected by an order dated 03.10.2019 and, hence, the present writ petition is before this Court challenging both the orders dated 31.01.2017 and 03.10.2019. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the proceeding held against the petitioner is not in accordance with law. Petitioner preferred an appeal which was also rejected by an order dated 03.10.2019 and, hence, the present writ petition is before this Court challenging both the orders dated 31.01.2017 and 03.10.2019. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the proceeding held against the petitioner is not in accordance with law. The same is decided only on the basis of oral statements of some persons. In the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate the reply of the petitioner is nowhere considered. There is no discussion in the entire order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate as to why and how he believed the oral statements of the villagers and has held the documents to the contrary, to be false. The Sub Divisional Magistrate was also wrongly influenced because a complaint against the petitioner was lodged under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. There is no adverse order ever passed by any competent court against the petitioner and mere pendency of the case should not have influenced the authority concerned. He further submits that even the appellate court has failed to consider the case of petitioner and has rejected the appeal only by looking upon the statements of villagers, without considering the reply of the petitioner. Petitioner has strongly relied upon the Government Order dated 22.04.2004 and states that the same provides comprehensive guidelines with regard to the procedure of inquiry and the same is not followed while conducting the inquiry. 12. On the other hand learned Standing Counsel submits that orders passed by the authorities concerned are detailed and exhaustive and the concurrent finding of facts should not be interfered by this Court. 13. When the documentary evidence is available, oral statement cannot be relied. The law in this regard is well settled by this court in Writ Petition No. 1063 (M/S) of 2020 Putti Lal V. State Of U.P. Thru Prin.Secy. Food & Supplies Lucknow & Ors. by judgment dated 06.09.2021. Paragraph 8 and 9 of the said judgment reads as below: "8. It goes without saying that once there is documentary evidence to prove certain facts, it is incumbent upon the authority concerned to take the same into consideration. The oral evidence against such documentary evidence should not be accepted, unless circumstances for the said purpose are duly explained. The said aspect of law is reiterated in the aforesaid Government Order dated 16.10.2014. The oral evidence against such documentary evidence should not be accepted, unless circumstances for the said purpose are duly explained. The said aspect of law is reiterated in the aforesaid Government Order dated 16.10.2014. A perusal of the impugned orders clearly shows that this aspect of the matter is totally ignored while passing the impugned orders. Both the courts have proceeded only on the basis of oral statements given by the complainants. The authority concerned never asked the complainants to produce their ration cards. The petitioner had submitted his Registers, which have been ignored on frivolous reasons. 9. The authority concerned should be more particular in cases where they are disbelieving the record submitted by the shop owner, to verify the correct facts from the record of the complainants." 14. A bare perusal of the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate shows that he has wrongly relied upon the statements made by the villagers in the inquiry. On the basis of oral statements of some persons, he has held that stock registers are incorrect. The same cannot be held to be a proper procedure. Once, the oral statements against a documentary evidence is being relied upon by the authority concerned, it must specifically state the circumstance and the reason as to why the authority is proceeding to disbelieve the documentary evidence. In the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, there is nothing to indicate as to why he is relying upon the oral statements and disbelieving the records. Even otherwise, in the entire judgment, there is no reference of the documents and reply submitted by the petitioner. Thus, the manner in which the order dated 31.01.2017 is passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate is contrary to settled principles of law and cannot stand. The appellate court while referring to the submissions of the counsel for parties, without even considering the case of petitioner, has again relied upon the oral statements. The appellate court has also not given any reason as to why the appellate court has relied upon the oral statements against the documentary evidence. It merely states that there is no reason to interfere with the order of Sub Divisional Magistrate as there is a difference between the statement given by the villagers and the submissions and record submitted by the petitioner which is not believed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. It merely states that there is no reason to interfere with the order of Sub Divisional Magistrate as there is a difference between the statement given by the villagers and the submissions and record submitted by the petitioner which is not believed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. The same cannot be said to be a finding of facts in accordance with law. There is no consideration of the case of petitioner, again in the appellate order. 15. Thus, both the impugned orders dated 31.01.2017 and 03.10.2019 cannot stand and are set aside. 16. Writ petition is allowed.