JUDGMENT : 1. The Second appeals are filed by the appellants challenging the judgment and decree dated 27.4.2017 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Surat in Regular Civil Appeal No. 20 of 2006, as well as judgment dated 4.9.2005 passed by the learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat in Special Civil Suit No. 67 of 1982, whereby the suit preferred by the original plaintiffs was partly allowed and a preliminary decree under Order 20, Rule 18(1) of Code of Civil Procedure, was ordered to be drawn. 2. There is cross Second Appeal also filed by the defendants of Second Appeal No. 301 of 2017 and Second Appeal No. 302 of 2017 being Second Appeal No.342 of 2017 wherein they have challenged order passed below Exhibit-79 dated 15th December 2016. 3. In all the three appeals parties are common. The settlement agreement entered into between all the concerned parties and the terms and conditions entered into by and between the parties of all the three second appeals. The said content terms are on record of Civil Application No. 3 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 301 of 2017, Civil Application No. 3 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 302 of 2017 and Civil Application No. 1 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 342 of 2017 (wherein translated version dated 28.3.2022 in Gujarati is also on record in addition to the English version) whereby all the four brothers and their legal heirs namely Naranbhai Manibhai Patel, Dineshbhai Manibhai Patel, Muljibhai Manibhai Patel and Ishwarbhai Manibhai Patel have entered into consent terms and they have agreed that the description of subject parcels of land given in paragraph No. 1 (A to E), is now not in dispute in the present proceedings and they all have consented the dispute with regard to said subject properties mentioned in paragraph No. 1(A to E) and prayed that this Court may pass the partial decree on the basis of the consensus arrived at between the parties. The paragraph No. 6, wherein dispute of subject parcels of land is settled, reads as under:- “1. All parties herein have resolved inter-se disputes with respect to S immovable properties and have agreed to distribute them in the manner provided hereunder: (A) For the land bearing survey no 212 of Vill: Puna, Taluka Chorayasi, Surat District (Block no. The paragraph No. 6, wherein dispute of subject parcels of land is settled, reads as under:- “1. All parties herein have resolved inter-se disputes with respect to S immovable properties and have agreed to distribute them in the manner provided hereunder: (A) For the land bearing survey no 212 of Vill: Puna, Taluka Chorayasi, Surat District (Block no. 231), till now, names of Naranbhai Manibhai Patel, Dineshbhai Manibhai Patel, Muljibhai Manibhai Patel and Ishwarbhai Manibhai Patel were shown as owners and occupants in the 7/12 extracts of the said land. Kapilbhai s/o Ishwabhai Manibhai Patel and Muljibhai Manibhai Patel an area admeasuring 1821 Sq.Mtrs from the said land to Nareshbhai Haribhai Bavariya vide sale deed dated 15/07/2019. All parties hereby confirm the sale of the said land in favour of Nareshbhai Haribhai Bavariya vide sale deed dated 27/06/2019. So far as the remaining area of the said land admeasuring Total 1827 Sq.Mtrs is concerned, all parties hereby release all their right, title and interest in the said land in favour of Muljibhai Manibhai Patel. For the purpose of this compromise, the said land shall be treated to have gone to the share of Muljibhai Manibhai Patel, who shall hold exclusive rights to use, occupy, transfer, sell and/or deal with the area admeasuring 1821 square Mtrs of the said land in the manner he deems fit. Except Muljibhai Manibhai Patel, none of the other parties herein shall henceforth claim any rights, title or interest in the area admeasuring 1821 Sq.mtrs and/or with respect to the consideration received against sale. (B) For the land bearing survey no. 283 New Block No. 316 of Village Kosmada, Taluka Kamrej, District Surat (Block no. 318), till now, names of Naranbhai Manibhai Patel, Dineshbhai Manibhai Patel, Muljibhai Manibhai Patel and Kapil Ishwarbhai Patel were shown as owners and occupants in the 7/12 extracts of the said land. All parties herein including Muljibhai Manibhai Patel and Kapilbhai Ishwarbhai Patel hereby acknowledge that it is self acquired property of Naranbhai Manibhai and Dineshbhai Manibhai without prejudice and assuming that all four have 1/4 share each release all their rights, title and interest in the said land in favour of the legal heirs of Naranbhai Manilal Patel and Dineshbhai Manilal Patel, who shall jointly hold undivided share in the said land. For the purpose of this compromise, the said land shall be treated to have come to the share of Naranbhai Manilal Patel and Dineshbhai Manilal Patel. Except the legal heirs of Naranbhai Manilal Patel and Dineshbhai Manilal Patel none of the parties herein shall henceforth claim any right, title or interest in the said land. (C) The House no. 86 of Koliwad Street, C.S. No. 132 of Puna bearing Surat Municipal Tenement no. 64B-19- 3711-0001 shall go to the share of Dineshbhai Manibhai Patel under this compromise. The legal heirs of Dinesbhai Manibhai Patel shall hold exclusive rights of ownership, use and occupation over the said house. Except the legal heirs of Dinesbhai Manibhai Patel, none of the other parties herein shall claim any right, title or interest in the house. (D) The House no. 68 of Koliwad Street, C.S. No. 513 & 567 of Puna bearing Surat Municipal Tenement no. 64B- 19-3521-0-001 shall go to the share of Kapilbhai Ishwarbhai Patel under this compromise and Kapilbhai Ishwarbhai Patel shall hold exclusive rights of ownership, use and occupation over the said house henceforth. Except Kapilbhai Manibhai Patel, none of the other parties herein shall claim any right, title or interest in the house. (E) The House no. 213 of Garas Street, C.S. No. 164 of Puna bearing Surat Municipal Tenement no. 64B-19- 1361-0001 shall go to the share of Naranbhai Manibhai Patel. The legal heirs of Naranthai: Manibhai Patel shall hold exclusive rights of ownership, use and occupation over the said house. Except the legal heirs of Naranbhai Manibhai Patel, none of the other parties herein shall claim any right, title or interest in the house.” 4. So far as the aforesaid properties mentioned in paragraph No. 1 (A to E) are concerned, the dispute of the said properties is now settled. 5. The remaining properties for which settlement is not arrived at between the parties are described in paragraph No.6, which read as under. “The settlement has not taken place for following properties. (1) Survey No. 350 of Village Puna, Surat District (2) Survey No. 351 of Village Puna, Surat District. (3) Survey No. 352 of Village Puna, Surat District. (4) Survey No. 282/1 of Village Kosmada, Surat District. (5) Survey No. 203 of Village Puna, Surat District. (6) Survey No. 204 of Village Puna, Surat District. (7) Survey No. 216 of Village Puna, Surat District.” 6. (3) Survey No. 352 of Village Puna, Surat District. (4) Survey No. 282/1 of Village Kosmada, Surat District. (5) Survey No. 203 of Village Puna, Surat District. (6) Survey No. 204 of Village Puna, Surat District. (7) Survey No. 216 of Village Puna, Surat District.” 6. Considering the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, more particularly Order 23 Rule 3 read with Order 12 Rule 6, partial decree is required to be drawn. 7. The properties described in paragraph No. 1 (A to E) of the consent terms are settled inter se outside the Court. Hence, present proceedings i.e. Second Appeal Nos. 301, 302 and 342 of 2017 are disposed of qua properties enumerated in paragraph No. 1 (A to E) of the consent terms and for the remaining properties which are described in paragraph No. 6 the proceedings be continued. 8. Learned Counsels for both the sides have relied upon following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court. 8.1 In the decision of this Court in case of Kanji Hirajibhai Gondalia vs. Jivaraj Dharamshi reported in 1975 (16) GLR 469 this Court observed as under:- “2. Now the question is whether the order of the Court on the preliminary issue amounts to a decree, Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code defines what a decree is. According to the said definition a decree is a formal expresion of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. Now the learned trial Judge has held that the notice of eviction was defective and the plaintiff was not entitled to a relief for recovery of possession of the suit premises because of the defective notice. The learned Judge has held that the suit for eviction was not competent and maintainable. He further directed that the suit should proceed only with respect to the claim for monetary relief. Now so far the relief for possession is concerned there is a substantive decision or determination. The decision of the learned trial Judge on the point is clearly a final adjudication between the parties in respect of the suit for possession. The order of the learned trial Judge conclusively determines the rights of the parties on the question of eviction. Now so far the relief for possession is concerned there is a substantive decision or determination. The decision of the learned trial Judge on the point is clearly a final adjudication between the parties in respect of the suit for possession. The order of the learned trial Judge conclusively determines the rights of the parties on the question of eviction. The determination for the relief of possession is final and conclusive so far as the trial Court is concerned. The question whether the adjudication is a decree or not has to be determined with reference to the definition of decree given in Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. The trial Court has undoubtedly adjudicated on the substantive rights of the parties with regard to the controversy for recovery of possession of the suit premises. The order of the trial Judge is clearly indicative of the fact that he has finally determined the issue relating to possession and there is formal expression of the said adjudication, It is true that the learned trial Judge has taken the view that only finding on the issue has been given by him and he has passed only a formal order and, therefore, no decree need be drawn as there had been no final disposal of the suit. There is obvious difference between a simple finding and a finding which terminates the suit. To determine the exact nature and extent of a finding reference to the definition of decree given in S. 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code is essential. Merely because the trial Court heads his finding as an order is not determinative of its nature nor his conclusion to that effect is conclusive. The question whether an order passed by a Court amounts to a decree or not has to be determined with reference to the definition of decree given in Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and the test to be applied is whether there is a formal expression of adjudication, which as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to any of the matters in controversy in the suit. In the aforesaid view of mine I am supported by the decisions of the Madras High Court in V. Adinarayan Chetti v. Kopparam Narasinha Chetti, ILR 54 Madras 337 and Kasi v. Rm. In the aforesaid view of mine I am supported by the decisions of the Madras High Court in V. Adinarayan Chetti v. Kopparam Narasinha Chetti, ILR 54 Madras 337 and Kasi v. Rm. A. R. M. V. Ramanathan Chettiar (1947) 2, Madras LJ 523. Whether an order passed by a- Court is a decree or not cannot depend on the drawing up of a decree by the Court as formal drawing up of a decree is the duty of the Court; vide Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, AIR 1961 SC 832 and Parashuram Rajaram Tiwari v. Hirabai Rajaram Tiwari, AIR 1957 Bom 59 . If a Court does not draw up a decree it cannot be said that the order of the Court by which rights of the parties are finally adjudicated upon is not a decree. There can be more than one final decree in a suit where two or more causes of action are joined together. There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code which prevents the Court from passing two final decrees, if the circumstances of the case so require, vide Fatmabai W/o Rasim v. Abubaker Tarmahmed, AIR 1946 Sind 58. The present suit is a composite suit being a suit for possession and a suit for arrears of rent-; and the issue between the parties with regard to possession of the suit premises is finally decided by the trial Court. Thus there is final adjudication on the issue of possession and this determination amounts to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. The impugned order of the learned trial Judge refusing to draw up a decree, therefore, is erroneous and the same is set aside. Thus there is final adjudication on the issue of possession and this determination amounts to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. The impugned order of the learned trial Judge refusing to draw up a decree, therefore, is erroneous and the same is set aside. It is directed that the trial Court should draw up a decree in pursuance of the judgment and decision passed by it with respect to the claim for possession of the suit premises.” 8.2 In the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Bai Chanchal and others vs. Syed Jalaluddin and others reported in 1970 (3) SCC 124 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “The third point raised by learned counsel was that, since there was one single suit based on the lease of 1895 for ejectment of persons in possession, there could be only one single decree in that suit and the Court was incompetent to pass two separate decrees on 8th July, 1946 and 28th January, 1949. Counsel, in this connection, relied on the provisions of rules 1 and 12 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure which relate to the pronouncement of judgment and the Court passing a decree in a suit. These rules have really no relevance. On the other hand, rule 3 of Order XXIII, C.P.C., clearly envisages a decree being passed in respect of part of the subject-matter of the suit on a compromise, and rule 6 of Order XII, C.P.C., permits the passing of a judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions. Thus, it is clear that, in the same suit, there can be more than one decree passed at different stages. In the present case, the first decree of 8th July, 1946, was based on a compromise between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, while the second decree dated 28th January, 1949 decided the rights of the remaining defendants. The two decrees were separate and independent and neither of them could be treated as a nullity”. 8.3 In the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Katikara Chintamani Dora and others vs. Guntreddi Annamanaidu and others reported in (1974) 1 SCC 567 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “59. The two decrees were separate and independent and neither of them could be treated as a nullity”. 8.3 In the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Katikara Chintamani Dora and others vs. Guntreddi Annamanaidu and others reported in (1974) 1 SCC 567 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “59. Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement, but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree, in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement was lawful-and, as we shall presently discuss, it was so-the decree to the extent it was a consent decree, was not appealable, because of the express bar in s. 96,(3) of the Code.” 9. Therefore, in view of the above referred decisions and the submissions made on behalf of the concerned parties, the Civil Application No. 3 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 301 of 2017, Civil Application No. 3 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 302 of 2017 and Civil Application No. 1 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 342 of 2017 are disposed of in terms of consensus arrived at between the parties for the subject properties enumerated in paragraph No. 1(A to E). 10. The learned Trial Court is directed to draw partial decree accordingly in view of the terms and conditions arrived at between the parties for the subject properties enumerated in paragraph No. 1(A to E). 11. So far as remaining 7 properties of the consent terms, which are enumerated in paragraph No. 6 are concerned, all these three appeals are alive. 12. It is noted that this consensus arrived at by and between the parties is without prejudice to the rights of the each of the parties and it is not come in the way of either of the parties. 13. Accordingly Civil Application No. 3 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 301 of 2017, Civil Application No. 3 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 302 of 2017 and Civil Application No. 1 of 2022 in Second Appeal No. 342 of 2017 stand disposed of.