ORDER : 1. This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 14.10.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 12595 of 2020. 2. On noticing that prayers sought for in Special Civil Application No. 12595 of 2020 before the learned Single Judge was for setting aside the order dated 17.03.2017 which was revised on 20.03.2017 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar in Criminal Revision Application No. 75 of 2016 (Annexure-A) and said orders having been assailed before the learned Single Judge was by filing a petition by categorizing it as one falling under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we posed a pointed question to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as to how this petition can be construed as one filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and would it not fall under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, Shri Deepak Sanchela, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend, this Court having entertained the appeal by issuing notice may not insist for hearing regarding maintainability as it is deemed that this Court had entertained the appeal on merits and has prayed for appeal being taken up for being heard on merits only instead of raising the issue of maintainability. 3. In the aforesaid background, we have perused the case papers and find that the order which came to be impugned before the learned Single Judge was an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Criminal Revision Applicant No. 75 of 2016 dated 17.03.2017, which was revised on 20.03.2017. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act does not provide an appeal against the judgment or order passed by a learned Single Judge in a petition filed under Article 227 and intra-court appeal would lie only if the judgment or order is passed in a petition filed under Article 226. However, where a petition is filed both under Articles 226 and 227, it will have to be considered whether the issues raised in the petition which arise for adjudication for the first time before the High Court, so as to construe it as a jurisdiction having been exercised by the learned Single Judge in original jurisdiction. However, where a petition is filed both under Articles 226 and 227, it will have to be considered whether the issues raised in the petition which arise for adjudication for the first time before the High Court, so as to construe it as a jurisdiction having been exercised by the learned Single Judge in original jurisdiction. If the challenge in the petition is with respect to the point already adjudicated by the Subordinate Court or Tribunal, then it will have to be held that supervisory jurisdiction vested under Article 227 of the Constitution of India having been exercised by the learned Single Judge and not the original jurisdiction. The relief prayed for and granted by the Court is also a factor that would indicate as to how the petition filed is to be construed or understood. In a case where it can be said that the petition would fall both under Articles 226 and 227, then it would be proper to consider the petition as one filed under Article 226 and in those cases, an appeal would lie under Section 15 of the Letters Patent Act. 4. The proceedings under Article 226 is an original proceeding or the learned Single Judge would exercise the powers under the original jurisdiction and when it concerns Civil rights, it is in original civil proceedings. The proceedings under Article 227 is not and would not be an original proceeding. An intra-court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a learned Single Judge when the power of superintendence is exercised by examining the order of the Subordinate Court. 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Nandini J. Shah, (2018) 15 SCC 356 , has held that appellate officer while exercising the power under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or a Judicial Officer designated by the District Judge, possessing essential qualification). Further, the order passed by the District Judge under the Public Premises Act is in the capacity of an appellate Court and it would partake the order of the Subordinate Court, then challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226 thereof. Further, the order passed by the District Judge under the Public Premises Act is in the capacity of an appellate Court and it would partake the order of the Subordinate Court, then challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226 thereof. In such circumstances, the appeal against order of the learned Single Judge would not be maintainable. It has been further held by the Hon’ble Apex Court thus: “57. Even though the respondents have invited our attention to other decisions of High Courts and also of Supreme Court which have analysed the provisions of other legislations, it is unnecessary to dilate on those decisions as we intend to apply the principles underlying the decisions of three-Judge Bench of this Court in Thakur Das (supra), Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra) and Mukri Gopalan (supra), in particular, to conclude that the Appellate Officer referred to in Section 9 of the 1971 Act, is not a persona designata but acts as a civil court. 58. In other words, the Appellate Officer while exercising power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification designated by the District Judge). Being part of the district judiciary, the judge acts as a Court and the order passed by him will be an order of the Subordinate Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction. 59. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the respondents had resorted to remedy of writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of our conclusion that the order passed by the District Judge (in this case, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court at Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the Subordinate Court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. In view of our conclusion that the order passed by the District Judge (in this case, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court at Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the Subordinate Court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. Moreover, on a close scrutiny of the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court dated 14.08.2012 we have no hesitation in taking the view that the true nature and substance of the order of the learned Single Judge was to exercise power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and there is no indication of Court having exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as such. Indeed, the learned Single Judge has opened the judgment by fairly noting the fact that the writ petition filed by the respondents was under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. However, keeping in mind the exposition of this Court in the case of Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) wherein it has been explicated that in determining whether an order of learned Single Judge is in exercise of powers under Article 226 or 227 the vital factor is the nature of jurisdiction invoked by a party and the true nature and character of the order passed and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge. In paragraph 40 of the reported decision, the Court adverting to its earlier decision observed thus: (SCC pp. 557-558) “40. xxx xxx xxx Whether the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction Under Article 226 or Under Article 227 or both, would depend upon various aspects. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. It was reiterated that it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. It was reiterated that it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The two-Judge Bench further clarified that the Division Bench would also be required to scrutinise whether the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on that foundation. The delineation with regard to necessary party not being relevant in the present case, the said aspect need not be adverted to.” Again in paragraphs 41 and 42, which may be useful for answering the matter in issue, the Court observed thus: “41. We have referred to these decisions only to highlight that it is beyond any shadow of doubt that the order of civil court can only be challenged Under Article 227 of the Constitution and from such challenge, no intra-court appeal would lie and in other cases, it will depend upon the other factors as have been enumerated therein. 42. At this stage, it is extremely necessary to cull out the conclusions which are deducible from the aforesaid pronouncements. They are: 42.1 An appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench of the High Court if it is so permitted within the ambit and sweep of the Letters Patent. 42.2 The power conferred on the High Court by the Letters Patent can be abolished or curtailed by the competent legislature by bringing appropriate legislation. 42.3 A writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge Under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article and, hence, no intra-court appeal is entertainable. 42.4 The tenability of intra-court appeal will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis as to how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same.” (Emphasis supplied) 60. 42.4 The tenability of intra-court appeal will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis as to how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same.” (Emphasis supplied) 60. In the case of Radhey Shyam decided by a three- Judge Bench, this Court after analyzing all the earlier decisions on the point, restated the legal position that in cases where judicial order violated the fundamental right, the challenge thereto would lie by way of an appeal or revision or under Article 227, and not by way of writ under Article 226 and Article 32. The dictum in paragraphs 25, 27 and 29 of this decision is instructive. The same read thus: (SCC pp. 447-449) “25. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision Under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for the High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence Under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence Under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression “inferior court” is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 26. xxx xxx xxx 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226. The expression “inferior court” is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 26. xxx xxx xxx 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 28. xxx xxx xxx 29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows: 29.1 Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29.2 Jurisdiction Under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction Under Article 226. 29.3 Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.” (Emphasis supplied) 61. Similar view has been expressed in Jogendrasinghji (supra). In this decision, it has been held that the order passed by the Civil Court is amenable to scrutiny only in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and no intra court appeal is maintainable from the decision of a Single Judge. In paragraph 30 of the reported decision, the Court observed thus: (SCC p.26) “30. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is graphically clear that maintainability of a letters patent appeal would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the type of directions issued regard being had to the jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context. Barring the civil court, from which order as held by the three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra) that a writ petition can lie only Under Article 227 of the Constitution, orders from tribunals cannot always be regarded for all purposes to be Under Article 227 of the Constitution. Whether the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction Under Article 226 or Under Article 227 or both, needless to emphasise, would depend upon various aspects that have been emphasised in the aforestated authorities of this Court. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. We reiterate it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The Division Bench would also be required to scrutinize whether the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on that foundation. Be it stated, one of the conclusions recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment pertains to demand and payment of court fees. We do not intend to comment on the same as that would depend upon the rules framed by the High Court.” In the concluding part of the reported judgment in Para 44, the Court observed thus: (Jogendrasinhji case, SCC p.34) “44. We have stated in the beginning that three issues arise despite the High Court framing number of issues and answering it at various levels. It is to be borne in mind how the jurisdiction under the letters patent appeal is to be exercised cannot exhaustively be stated. It will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straight-jacket formula for the same. Needless to say, the High Court while exercising jurisdiction Under Article 227 of the Constitution has to be guided by the parameters laid down by this Court and some of the judgments that have been referred to in Radhey Shyam.” 62. In Para 45.2 of the same judgment, the Court authoritatively concluded that an order passed by a Civil Court is amenable to scrutiny of the High Court only in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is different from Article 226 of the Constitution and as per the pronouncement in Radhey Shyam (supra), no writ can be issued against the order passed by the Civil Court and, therefore, no letters patent appeal would be maintainable.” 6. Keeping the aforesaid authoritative principles of law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in mind when we turn our attention to the facts on hand, it would emerge therefrom that appellant municipality passed a resolution fixing the tax structure and bifurcation was made in respect of the properties and invited objections to the resolution dated 08.11.1982 and after receipt of the same it was forwarded to the appropriate Government and same having been approved by the Government under Section 102 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, same was published and a notification came to be issued by the Government under Section 104 vesting the power with the municipality for increasing or reducing the levy of tax. 7. On account of development of the town of Palitana due to pilgrimage undertaken by the general public several Dharamshalas have come up, as a result of which the consumption of water has also increased and to provide facilities to the pilgrims, said Dharamshalas are also said to be providing amenities including sanitation facility and as such, during the year 2003-04, the municipality resolved to increase the tax and after following the prescribed procedure and inviting objections to the assessment list as required under Section 108 of the Municipalities Act, 1963, an opportunity of hearing having been extended to the aggrieved persons. A general board resolution came to be passed on 25.06.2008 whereby four yearly periodic assessment came to be cancelled and the said resolution was reviewed under Section 258 by the Collector and said resolution came to be suspended. 8. In the meanwhile, Prakash Bhuvan Jain Dharamshala run by Sanghavi Sardarmal Trust challenged the new tax assessment along with the bill of 2003-2004 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Palitana, in Appeal No. 50 of 2004 under Section 138(3) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, as well as Section 374(3) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Said appeal came to be rejected by judgment dated 18.02.2016 and aggrieved by the same, the trust preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 75 of 2016 before the Additional Sessions Judge, who by order dated 17.03.2017 allowed the Criminal Revision Application on the ground that the municipality though had followed the prescribed procedure yet the person who had undertaken the exercise had no power to undertake such an exercise. It is this order which came to be passed by the learned Sessions Judge which was assailed before the learned Single Judge. The Judicial Officer who is presiding over the Sessions Court at Bhavnagar is exercising the power of the District Court and as such the orders so passed would become amenable for being questioned only under Article 227 of the Constitution before the learned Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. It is no doubt true that in the instant case the petitioner through the learned advocate by clever drafting has styled the petition as one filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are of the considered view that mere mentioning of the provision of Article 226 and without there being any fundamental and foundational facts raised in the Special Civil Application, which may suggest or indicate that original jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge is invoked and in such circumstances, it cannot be held that merely because the petition is styled under Article 226, it should be construed or held that learned Single Judge has exercised the original jurisdiction. It is an undisputed fact that in Special Civil Application No. 12595 of 2020, the only prayer that has been sought for is to quash the orders dated 17.03.2017 and 20.03.2017 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Criminal Revision Application No. 75 of 2016, allowing the revision petition and setting aside the order of the J.M.F.C. Court passed in Valuation Appeal No. 50 of 2004. Essentially the order which was challenged before the learned Single Judge was and is an order passed by the trial Court which came to be set aside by the learned Single Judge in exercise of powers vested under supervisory jurisdiction. The order of the Trial Court which was under scrutiny before the learned Single Judge which came up for consideration was scrutinized in exercise of the power of superintendence as indicated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. The order of the Trial Court which was under scrutiny before the learned Single Judge which came up for consideration was scrutinized in exercise of the power of superintendence as indicated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. In that view of the matter, a Special Civil Application which questions the order of the Civil Court/Sessions Court before the High Court will have to be necessarily construed as one challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and order passed thereon by the learned Single Judge would be construed as one passed in exercise of power of supervisory jurisdiction vested under Article 227. Against such orders intra-court appeal would not be maintainable in the teeth of judgment of the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India referred to supra, whereunder it has been held that an order of Subordinate Court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Same would indicate that emphasis is on the expression “order of Subordinate Court.” In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that present appeal which is filed against the order of the learned Single Judge before whom the order of the Sessions Court came to be challenged was scrutinized, examined, adjudicated and answered by the learned Single Judge in exercise of the power of supervisory jurisdiction and not in exercise of original jurisdiction. 11. For these myriad reasons, we are of the considered view that present Letters Patent Appeal would not be maintainable and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we dismiss the appeal as not maintainable. Notice stands discharged. Consequently, connected application/s, if any, stands consigned to records.