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2022 DIGILAW 1486 (ALL)

Naresh Aggarwala v. State Of U. P. , Through The Secretary Department Of Home Gov.

2022-09-15

MANISH MATHUR

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Manish Tiwari, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Kartikeya Saran and Mr. Aushim Luthra, learned counsel for applicant, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of State as well as Mr. Arun Adlakha learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. Sushmita Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing for informant and perused the record. 2. This second bail application has been filed with regard to Case Crime No.1450 of 2019, under Sections 420, 409, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 120-B IPC, registered at Police Station Phase-III, District Gautam Budh Nagar. First bail application was rejected vide order dated 12.07.2021 by his Lordship Hon'ble Justice Ram Krishna Gautam who has since demitted office and therefore this bail application has been listed before this Court as per roster. 3. As per contents of FIR, the applicant was introduced to the informant in the year 2016 and allured and induced the informant to investment money in a Share Broking Company by the name of Sumpoorna Portfolio Ltd. in which the applicant's son Nitish Aggarwala was a Director. It is stated that in a deep rooted conspiracy, the accused person in connivance with one another fabricated signatures of the informant and created false consent form whereby deceitment of huge amount of money of the informant and his Company amounting to Rs.4.35 crores of his company and 7.39 crores of M/s QA Infotech Pvt. Ltd. was made thereby causing a wrongful loss to the informant. It is also stated that subsequently the accused persons issued post dated cheques in favour of informant but at the same time filed a complaint before the National Stock Exchange against neutral arbiter in respect of adjustment of some outstanding. 4. It is a relevant factor that the first bail application was rejected by means of order dated 12.07.2021 indicating the fact that the applicant had made a false statement before Hon'ble the Supreme Court regarding date of filing of bail application. The application thereafter was rejected on merits against which the applicant filed Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.5449 of 2021 which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 02.08.2021. 5. Learned counsel appearing for applicant submits that subsequent to rejection of the first bail application, the informant himself had filed application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. for further investigation which has been allowed vide order dated 30.08.2022. 5. Learned counsel appearing for applicant submits that subsequent to rejection of the first bail application, the informant himself had filed application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. for further investigation which has been allowed vide order dated 30.08.2022. It is submitted that the applicant is of advanced age and is under incarceration since 15.11.2020 with the main accused yet to be arrested. It has also been submitted that the Share Broking Company M/s Sumpoorna Portfolio Ltd. has not been made a party which is against settled law. It has also been submitted that a pure financial transaction of civil nature is being sought to be given a criminal colour. It has further been submitted that subsequent to the rejection of first bail application, the informant has entered into a compromise with co-accused. It has also been submitted that till date no charges have been framed against the applicant. As such, learned counsel for applicant submits that the applicant is under prolonged incarceration with trial not yet having commenced. It is submitted that prolonged incarceration can be a ground to be considered at the time of consideration of second bail application and would constitute a fresh ground particularly in the light of informant's application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. having been allowed. 6. Learned AGA as well as learned counsel for informant have opposed the bail application with the submission that no substantive fresh ground has been indicated by the applicant for consideration of second bail application. It is submitted that the fact scenario subsequent to the rejection of first bail application remains the same. It has also been submitted that three co-accused including the main accused Nitish Aggarwala son of applicant are as yet absconding despite multiple non-bailable warrants having been issued. It is also submitted that there is sufficient material on record to demonstrate undue influence having been brought upon on first investigation officer. Much emphasis has been laid to the fact that the applicant had filed Special Leave Petition against the order dated 12.07.2021 rejecting the first bail application and the said special leave petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 02.08.2021 alongwith another Special Leave Petition No.5532 of 2021 filed for quashing of the proceedings. Much emphasis has been laid to the fact that the applicant had filed Special Leave Petition against the order dated 12.07.2021 rejecting the first bail application and the said special leave petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 02.08.2021 alongwith another Special Leave Petition No.5532 of 2021 filed for quashing of the proceedings. As such, it is submitted that looking to the gravity and serious financial nature of offences committed by the applicant and co-accused and particularly the aspect of non-cooperation in investigation by the co-accused, no case for grant of second bail is made out. 7. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and upon perusal of material available on record, it is evident that the first bail application has been rejected on merits indicating the fact that the applicant had made an incorrect statement before Hon'ble the Supreme Court with regard to date of filing of bail application. Learned counsel for applicant has submitted that no incorrect statement was made before the Supreme Court. However this aspect of the matter particularly with regard to recording of fact at the time of rejection of first bail order cannot be adverted to at the time of consideration of second bail application particularly since in the considered opinion of this Court, it could amount to review of the earlier order, which is beyond the scope and jurisdiction of this Court while evaluating the second bail application. 8. It can also be discerned that the earlier order dated 12.07.2021 has touched upon merits pertaining to the role and conduct of the applicant in the crime alleged. 9. With regard to present second bail application, learned counsel for applicant has led much emphasis on the fact that the applicant is under prolonged incarceration since 15.11.2020 and is of advanced age. Various other submissions have been made including the fact of the Stock Broking Company not being made a party and civil nature of dispute. However, the aforesaid facts not being fresh facts after passing of the order rejecting the first bail application, cannot be said to be fresh grounds for consideration in a second bail application. 10. Purely fresh ground indicated by learned counsel for applicant is with regard to compromise having been effected between informant and co-accused in Criminal Misc. However, the aforesaid facts not being fresh facts after passing of the order rejecting the first bail application, cannot be said to be fresh grounds for consideration in a second bail application. 10. Purely fresh ground indicated by learned counsel for applicant is with regard to compromise having been effected between informant and co-accused in Criminal Misc. Application No.20415 of 2022 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in which the informant is said to have entered into a compromise on 19.04.2022. The other ground taken is that the informant himself has filed an application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. seeking further investigation, which has been allowed on 30.08.2022. It is submitted that the aforesaid factors constitute a fresh ground for consideration of second bail application particularly since till date no charges have been framed and now with allowing the application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., there is no chance of speedy trial which would compromise the applicant's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is settled law that at the time of consideration of second bail application, it is only the fresh and subsequent events which are required to be evaluated without commenting upon the consideration for rejection of first bail application. In the present case, the first bail application has been rejected primarily on the ground that the applicant's son, Nitish Aggarwala was a Director in the company M/s Sumpoorna Portfolio Ltd. and forged the signatures of informant thereby duping the informant of a substantial amount. It is relevant that in the order dated 12.07.2021, this Court has not rejected the application of applicant on the ground of any forgery having been committed by the present applicant whose only role is that to have induced the informant to invest a certain amount with the Stock Broking Company in which his son was a Director. The entire order dated 12.07.2021 indicates forgery allegedly committed by the applicant's son. 11. It is also a relevant fact that in the FIR, it has been stated that the applicant Naresh Aggarwala never signed any paper, documents or any agreement on behalf of M/s Sumpoorna Portfolio Ltd. but only assured that everything would be done in a fair manner. 12. The entire gist of FIR as indicated in the order dated 12.07.2021 pertains to forgeries having been committed by the applicant's son and not by the applicant himself. 12. The entire gist of FIR as indicated in the order dated 12.07.2021 pertains to forgeries having been committed by the applicant's son and not by the applicant himself. Conduct of fleeing from course of justice and non cooperation in investigation is also on the applicant's son Nitish Aggarwala. 13. So far as consideration of fresh grounds at the stage of second bail application is concerned, learned counsel for informant has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) 2007 SCC ONLINE SC 1447 Rajesh Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav versus through Director, (ii) 2004 SCC ONLINE SC 315 Kalayan CHANDRA SARKAR VS RAJESH RANJAN and, (iii) 2001 SCC ONLINE SC 1070 STATE OF MP VS KAJAD. 14. Upon evaluation of the aforesaid judgments, it is apparent that none of them are applicable. In the case of Rajesh Ranjan Yadav @ Pappu Yadav (supra), applicant's bail application was rejected on the ground that the defence had often sought adjournments or had not been present and therefore the defence had been procrastinating in the matter and not permitting defence evidence to proceed to its conclusion. 15. In the present case, it is in fact the informant who has filed an application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. for further investigation which has been allowed on 30.08.2022 whereby naturally the trial will now be delayed. There is no allegation against the applicant of delaying the trial. 16. In the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court rejected the bail application since the High Court had not adverted to complaint of investigating agency as to the threat administered by the bail applicant to witnesses and also to the fact that a number of witnesses had turned hostile after the bail applicant was enlarged on bail. The aforesaid grounds are also absent in the present case since there is no allegation of applicant having administered any threat to any of the witnesses or of any of them having turned hostile. 17. The aforesaid grounds are also absent in the present case since there is no allegation of applicant having administered any threat to any of the witnesses or of any of them having turned hostile. 17. On the contrary in the said case, Hon'ble the Supreme Court itself has followed the earlier judgment in the case Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh reported in (2002)3 SCC 598 while holding that a Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course and that a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of merit need not be undertaken although there is need to indicate reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted. It has further been held that at the time of consideration of second or subsequent bail application, there is onus on the Court to consider the grounds on which earlier bail application had been rejected and it is only after such consideration if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then specific reason should be indicated why the subsequent bail application is being granted in spite of earlier rejection. The relevant paragraph is as follows: "11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting ball should exercise its discretion in a Judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting ball; they are: (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singht and Puran v. Rambilas.) 12. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singht and Puran v. Rambilas.) 12. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent application for bail should be granted. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay)." 18. In the case of KAJAD (supra), the bail application was denied since mandatory requirement of section 37 NDPS Act were not fulfilled. The said judgment also is not applicable in the present facts and circumstances since provisions of Section 37 NDPS Act itself are not applicable. 19. In the recent judgments enunciated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, the liberty granted under Part II of the Constitution of India particularly Article 21 has been given much emphasis. 20. In the case of Union of India versus K. A. Najeeb reported in (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713 Hon'ble the Supreme Court has considered the aspect of liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and elucidates that it could cover within its protected ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and speedy trial. It has been held that ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. It has also been held that once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. The relevant portion of judgment is as follows:- "15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. The relevant portion of judgment is as follows:- "15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 731 , it was held that under trials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the Courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. 17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statue as well as the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.” 21. In P. Chidambaram v. CBI, (2020) 13 SCC 337 , the Hon'ble Supreme court reiterated the following principles for grant of bail: - "21. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of the well-settled principles having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. In P. Chidambaram v. CBI, (2020) 13 SCC 337 , the Hon'ble Supreme court reiterated the following principles for grant of bail: - "21. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of the well-settled principles having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The following factors are to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail: (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; (iii) reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; (iv) character, behaviour and standing of the accused and the circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; (v) larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. 22. In a recent decision in the case of Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 825, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summarized and reiterated the law regarding grant of bail in economic offences, as laid down in its earlier decisions, in the following words:-- "66. What is left for us now to discuss are the economic offences. The question for consideration is whether it should be treated as a class of its own or otherwise. This issue has already been dealt with by this Court in the case of P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791 , after taking note of the earlier decisions governing the field. The gravity of the offence, the object of the Special Act, and the attending circumstances are a few of the factors to be taken note of, along with the period of sentence. After all, an economic offence cannot be classified as such, as it may involve various activities and may differ from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of the court to categorise all the offences into one group and deny bail on that basis. Suffice it to state that law, as laid down in the following judgments, will govern the field:-- Precedents -P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791 : 23. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of the court to categorise all the offences into one group and deny bail on that basis. Suffice it to state that law, as laid down in the following judgments, will govern the field:-- Precedents -P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791 : 23. Thus, from cumulative perusal of the judgments cited on either side including the one rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court, it could be deduced that the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception so as to ensure that the accused has the opportunity of securing fair trial. However, while considering the same the gravity of the offence is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of "grave offence" and in such circumstance while considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the offence is also the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence the accused is alleged to have committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test that would be normally applied. In that regard what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case since there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provide so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle. But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case-to-case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the accused to stand trial. -Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : "39. Coming back to the facts of the present case, both the courts have refused the request for grant of bail on two grounds : the primary ground is that the offence alleged against the accused persons is very serious involving deep-rooted planning in which, huge financial loss is caused to the State exchequer; the secondary ground is that of the possibility of the accused persons tampering with the witnesses. In the present case, the charge is that of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property and forgery for the purpose of cheating using as genuine a forged document. The punishment for the offence is imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. It is, no doubt, true that the nature of the charge may be relevant, but at the same time, the punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted, also bears upon the issue. Therefore, in determining whether to grant bail, both the seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment should be taken into consideration. 40. The grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the court. The grant or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. But at the same time, right to bail is not to be denied merely because of the sentiments of the community against the accused. The primary purposes of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the accused of imprisonment, to relieve the State of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to keep the accused constructively in the custody of the court, whether before or after conviction, to assure that he will submit to the jurisdiction of the court and be in attendance thereon whenever his presence is required. Xxxxxxxxx 46. We are conscious of the fact that the accused are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. Xxxxxxxxx 46. We are conscious of the fact that the accused are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. We are also conscious of the fact that the offences alleged, if proved, may jeopardise the economy of the country. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the investigating agency has already completed investigation and the charge-sheet is already filed before the Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi. Therefore, their presence in the custody may not be necessary for further investigation. We are of the view that the appellants are entitled to the grant of bail pending trial on stringent conditions in order to ally the apprehension expressed by CBI." (emphasis supplied) 23. The Supreme Court in the case of Paras Ram Vishnoi vs. The Director, Central Bureau of Investigation passed in Criminal Appeal No. 693 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) 3610 of 2020) has observed as under : "On consideration of the matter, we are of the view that pending the trial we cannot keep a person in custody for an indefinite period of time and taking into consideration the period of custody and that the other accused are yet to lead defence evidence while the appellant has already stated he does not propose to lead any evidence, we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the trial court." 24. Upon consideration of relevant aspects of the matter and the various judgments on the scope of bail with regard to its consideration at a time when the earlier bail application has been rejected, it can be discerned that the second bail application can be granted in case of any fresh ground being made out or upon evaluation of circumstances whereby the previous bail applications have been rejected. 25. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgments in the present case, it is quite evident that even while rejecting the first bail application, this Court has taken notice of the fact that the entire gist of allegation is on main accused Nitish Aggarwala, the son of present applicant. The only role attributed to the present applicant is of having induced the informant to invest a certain amount of money with the Share Broking Firm Sumpoorna Portfolio Ltd. FIR itself states that the applicant has not signed any document or agreement with the informant. The only role attributed to the present applicant is of having induced the informant to invest a certain amount of money with the Share Broking Firm Sumpoorna Portfolio Ltd. FIR itself states that the applicant has not signed any document or agreement with the informant. There is no allegation against him of having forged any documents or of having issued cheques which were subsequently dishonoured. In fact the first bail application has been rejected on other grounds of gravity of offence and conduct of co-accused during investigation. 26. Although there is seriousness and gravity in the allegations made in the first information report but prima facie and subject to evidence, the entire gist of allegations against the applicant is only of having induced the informant to invest in the Stock Broking Firm. There is no allegation of forgery having been committed by the applicant nor of having issue any cheques which were dishonoured. 27. It is also evident from record that the applicant is under incarceration since 15.11.2020. He is of advanced age and with allowing of application under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. by the Court concerned vide order dated 30.08.2022, there is no scope of early conclusion of trial. It is also relevant that the said application for further investigation has been filed by informant and not by the applicant and therefore it cannot be said that it has been any act on his part to delay conclusion of trial. There also is no allegation of applicant attempting to tamper with evidence or to influence witnesses. 28. It is also quite evident from the judgments referred to hereinabove that prolonged incarceration of an accused without chances of earlier conclusion of trial are clearly in violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 29. Considering the aforesaid facts, the applicant is found entitled to bail although in view of seriousness of charges and the fact of co-accused being absconding, it would be necessary to impose stringent condition for bail which are as follows:- The applicant is directed to be released on bail subject to the satisfaction of the trial Court, in addition to the following conditions : (i) The applicant shall surrender his passport, if any, to the Court and shall not leave India without permission of the Court. (ii) The applicant shall inform his latest place of residence and contact number immediately after being released and/or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from time to time to the prosecution as well as Court, in writing. (iii) The applicant shall not influence the prosecution witnesses or tamper with the evidence. (iv) The applicant shall regularly attend the trial and shall not seek any adjournment on whatsoever count. (v) The applicant in any case shall not meet or establish contact with the witnesses till recording of evidence is over. (vi) If there are two consecutive defaults in appearing before the trial Court or breach of any of the above conditions, the prosecution will be at liberty to apply for cancellation of applicant's bail."