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2022 DIGILAW 1486 (AP)

Mogal Khaja v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2022-12-20

B.V.L.N.CHAKRAVARTHI, C.PRAVEEN KUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT B.V.L.N.CHAKRAVARTHI, J. - This is an appeal filed by Accused 1 and 2 under Sec. 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C., ") challenging the judgment dt.28/7/2015 in Sessions Case No.382 of 2014 delivered by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, where under the Accused No.1 was found guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short herein after referred to as "I.P.C., ") and sentenced to undergo Imprisonment for Life and to pay a fine of Rs.2, 000.00 and accused No.2 was found guilty for the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w 34 of the I.P.C., and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2, 000.00. However, Accused 3 and 4 were found not guilty for the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w 34 of I.P.C., and were acquitted of the said offence. 2. It appears that, the State, represented by the Inspector of Police, Chebrolu Circle did not prefer any appeal questioning the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in acquitting Accused Nos.3 and 4. 3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under : - (i) The deceased-Shaik Bajibee is the mother of Shaik Malik (P.W.1) and wife of Shaik Babusha (P.W.2). Mogal Rizwana (P.W.3) is the daughter of P.W.2. Shaik Khadar Bi (P.W.5) and Shaik Jurabi (P.W.6) are the sisters of the deceased. (ii) The Accused No.1 is the husband of Mogal Rizwana (P.W.3). Accused No.1 and P.W.3 are residents of Suddapallivillage of Guntur District. They were blessed with two children. Accused No.1 was addicted to alcohol and used to beat his wife by suspecting her fidelity. The deceased was running a Belt Shop (extension of a licenced liquor outlet) at their house. Due to harassment of accused No.1, P.W.3 returned to her parents" house and was looking after the Belt Shop. Accused No.1 developed suspicion as P.W.3 was speaking with customers attending the shop. (iii) While so, three days prior to 16/10/2013 P.W.3 visited the house of her parents to celebrate Bakrid festival. On 16/10/2013 at about 7.00 a.m., Accused No.1 went to the house of P.W.2 and deceased. He demanded them to send P.W.3 to his house. The deceased did not heed his words. Then accused No.1 threatened P.W.3, beat her and left the house. On 16/10/2013 at about 7.00 a.m., Accused No.1 went to the house of P.W.2 and deceased. He demanded them to send P.W.3 to his house. The deceased did not heed his words. Then accused No.1 threatened P.W.3, beat her and left the house. On the same day at noon time, the deceased, P.Ws.1 and 2 went to the house of Accused No.1 and quarreled with him for threatening and beating P.W.3. Accused No.1 felt insulted in the public. He thought that the deceased was responsible for all these happenings and decided to do away with her life. (iv) Thereafter, Accused No.1 went to the house of Accused No.4, who is his mother and informed her about the happenings. Accused No.1 is the brother of Accused No.3, sought the help of his mother and brother to do away with the life of the deceased. Accused No.4 informed the happenings to Accused No.2, who is a cousin of Accused No.1. (v) On 16/10/2013 at about 5.00 p.m., Accused 1 to 4, with a common intention to kill the deceased, went to the house of the deceased. Accused No.1 carried a knife (M.O.1) by secreting it in his trouser pocket. They found P.Ws.1 to 3 in front of the house. Accused 1 to 4 picked up a quarrel with the deceased. They attacked P.Ws.1 to 3 with a common intention to kill the deceased. Accused No.2 caught hold of the deceased, while Accused No.1 took out the knife from the trouser pocket and stabbed the deceased below her left breast causing a deep injury. As a result, the deceased died on the spot. It was witnessed by P.Ws.1, 4 and P.W.5 Shaik Khadar Bi. They came to the rescue of the deceased. The accused hurled the knife towards P.W.1 causing an injury and ran away from the scene of offence. (vi) On 16/10/2013 P.W.1 presented Ex.P1 report before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Chebrolu P.S., (P.W.9). Basing on the same, P.W.9 registered a case in Cr.No.108 of 2013 for offences u/s 302 and 324 r/w 34 of IPC against Accused 1 to 4 under Ex.P9 F.I.R., He referred P.W.1 to the Government General Hospital, Guntur for treatment to the injury caused by him. Basing on the same, P.W.9 registered a case in Cr.No.108 of 2013 for offences u/s 302 and 324 r/w 34 of IPC against Accused 1 to 4 under Ex.P9 F.I.R., He referred P.W.1 to the Government General Hospital, Guntur for treatment to the injury caused by him. (vii) Inspector of Police (P.W.11) took up the investigation in the case, visited the scene of offence, observed the same in the presence of mediators, prepared a rough sketch, seized blood-stained earth and controlled earth from the scene of offence. On 17/10/2013 the Inspector of Police (P.W.11) held inquest over the dead body of the deceased at the Government General Hospital, Guntur in the presence of inquest panchayatdars. Ex.P5 is the inquest report. The Inspector of Police (P.W.11) examined the witnesses and recorded their statements and seized M.O.1 knife, M.O.2 Grey colour sari, M.O.3 Grey colour blouse and M.O.4 Blue colour inner petty coat during investigation. (viii) On 29/10/2013 at about 4.00 p.m., on receipt of information, he proceeded to Vejendla cross-road and arrested Accused No.1 in the presence of P.W.8 and others under the cover of mediators report. Basing on the disclosure statement made by A1, he seized M.O.1-knife in the presence of P.W.8 and others under the cover of Ex.P6 mediators report. He arrested accused Nos.3 and 4 on 10/11/2013 at about 2.00 p.m., in the Bus stop at Narakoduru in the presence of witnesses. He arrested Accused No.2 on 6/1/2014 at Vegendla crossroad in the presence of witnesses. The Inspector of Police forwarded all the material objects (M.Os.1 to 4) to R.F.S.L., Guntur for chemical analysis. (ix) The doctor (P.W.13) who treated P.W.1 issued Ex.P14 wound certificate. The doctor (P.W.10) who conducted postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased issued Ex.P10 post-mortem report opining that the cause of the death was due to a stab injury to the heart. (x) The Inspector of Police, after completing the investigation, laid the police report (charge sheet) against Accused 1 to 4 for offences punishable u/s 302 and 324 r/w 34 IPC. 4. The learned Magistrate has complied the provisions of Sec. 207 of Cr.P.C., and as the case is exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Guntur Sessions Division under Sec. 209 Cr.P.C., 5. 4. The learned Magistrate has complied the provisions of Sec. 207 of Cr.P.C., and as the case is exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Guntur Sessions Division under Sec. 209 Cr.P.C., 5. The learned Sessions Judge, Guntur charged Accused 1 to 4 for the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w 34 IPC and charged Accused No.1 for the offence punishable u/s 324 IPC. The charges were read over and explained to the Accused 1 to 4 in the regional language, for which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 12. During their examination Exs.P1 to P14 and M.Os.1 to 4 were marked. On behalf of the defence, Exs.D1 to D9 were marked. 7. On closure of the prosecution evidence, the learned Sessions Judge examined the accused 1 to 4 under Sec. 313 Cr.P.C., regarding the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The accused denied the same as false. Summary of findings of Sessions Judge:- 8. The learned Sessions Judge, upon considering the evidence on record, found that accused No.1 is guilty of the offence punishable u/s 302 of IPC and accused No.2 for the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w 34 IPC and convicted them u/s 235 (2) of the Cr.P.C., and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2, 000.00 each. The learned Sessions Judge upon considering the material on record, found that accused 3 and 4 are not guilty of the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w 34 of IPC and acquitted them u/s 235 (1) of the Cr.P.C., He further found accused No.1 as not guilty for the offence punishable u/s 324 of IPC and acquitted him u/s 235 (1) of the Cr.P.C., Submissions of counsel for appellants: - 9. Sri Posani Venkateswarlu learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that the case of the prosecution as alleged in Ex.P1 F.I.R., and Ex.P5 inquest report about the manner in which the incident had occurred on 16/10/2013 is different from the version deposed by P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 in their evidence before the Court. He further contended that as per Exs.P1 and P5, A1 attacked the deceased soon after arriving at the scene of offence, and no role was assigned to accused No.2. He further contended that as per Exs.P1 and P5, A1 attacked the deceased soon after arriving at the scene of offence, and no role was assigned to accused No.2. P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 in their deposition before the Court deposed that accused 1 to 4 came to the scene of offence, altercated with P.W.2 and the deceased for not sending P.W.3 i.e., wife of the A1 along with him. A1 tried to stab P.W.2 and he escaped from the attack and when P.W.1 tried to rescue P.W.2, A1 stabbed him on the left shoulder causing an injury. Thereafter A1 attacked the deceased and stabbed her while A2 was holding her hands. All the witnesses in their statements recorded by police deposed as in Exs.D1, D2 and D6 to D9 stated that P.W.1 sustained an injury on the right shoulder. Therefore, there are material contradictions in the way the incident occurred. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that, admittedly, P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 are related to each other. The prosecution did not choose to examine any independent witness though the houses of several independent persons are in and around the scene of offence. In view of the material contradictions about the way the incident occurred, non-examination of the independent witnesses raises a doubt on the credibility of the testimony of P.Ws.1 to 6. In that view of the matter, the appellants are entitled to a benefit of doubt. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the prosecution failed to prove the recovery of M.O.1 knife beyond all reasonable doubt. The mediator (P.W.8) did not support the case of the prosecution. Therefore, it is fatal to the case of the prosecution about recovery of M.O.1 knife. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the evidence of the doctor (P.W.10) establishes that there is no possibility to cause the injury sustained by the deceased with M.O1. Further, it is the case of the prosecution that M.O.1 was recovered, buried in the earth, behind a palm tree at Suddapalli tank. The R.F.S.L., report shows that M.O.1 knife has blood stains. It is improbable to believe that blood stains are still found on M.O.1 knife though buried under the earth after the alleged incident, recovered on 29/10/2013 i.e., after 10 days. The R.F.S.L., report shows that M.O.1 knife has blood stains. It is improbable to believe that blood stains are still found on M.O.1 knife though buried under the earth after the alleged incident, recovered on 29/10/2013 i.e., after 10 days. These circumstances raise a reasonable doubt that M.O.1 was planted to rope the appellants with the case. The medical evidence shows that M.O.1 is having a sharp edge on one side and blunt edge on other side, and therefore, it is not at all possible to cause a spindle shape injury. 13. He further submitted that the version of the prosecution, as could be seen from F.I.R., and inquest report, is that A1 was having a grudge against the deceased as she was not allowing P.W.3 i.e., wife of A1 to go to the house of A1 and he also did not like the deceased as she was selling liquor at her house. But P.W.1 deposed that A1 was harassing P.W.3 and consuming alcohol. Therefore, the facts relating to motive were also having material contradictions. In the light of the said circumstances the case of the prosecution is doubtful, and the appellants are entitled to a benefit of doubt. 14. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the appellants relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mayappa Dhondanna Padeade v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 669. and contended that the facts and circumstances of the case show that there is every possibility of roping the accused in the case with the crime. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that for the sake of arguments even if it is admitted that A1 stabbed the deceased, as per the evidence of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6, A1 stabbed the deceased only once, therefore, the single injury would not cause the death. Further as per their evidence there was an altercation between both the sides about sending the wife of A1. All those circumstances show that A1 has no intention at all to cause the death of the deceased. At best it is only a case of homicide not amounting to murder as the accused did not pre-meditate to kill the deceased. Therefore, convicting the accused for the offence punishable u/s 302 of the IPC is not correct. 16. All those circumstances show that A1 has no intention at all to cause the death of the deceased. At best it is only a case of homicide not amounting to murder as the accused did not pre-meditate to kill the deceased. Therefore, convicting the accused for the offence punishable u/s 302 of the IPC is not correct. 16. In support of his arguments the learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 Supreme Court Cases 382. Submissions of learned Additional Public Prosecutor: - 17. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that the evidence on record establishes that P.W.1 was injured during the incident. Therefore, P.W.1 is an injured-eye witness. His evidence was corroborated by P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 on all material facts about the way the incident occurred and, also about the overt acts of A1 and A2. It is a settled law that every fact need not be mentioned meticulously in the F.I.R., The testimony of the eyewitnesses before the Court is consistent on all material facts about the way the incident occurred. All the witnesses categorically and consistently deposed about the role of A1 and A2. In fact, the accused in the cross-examination of P.W.1 admitted about the presence of A1 at the time of the incident. The witnesses categorically deposed that A1 stabbed the deceased while A2 was holding her hands. Their evidence further establishes that A1 stabbed the deceased just below the heart causing severe hemorrhage; it is also corroborated by the evidence of the doctor. Therefore, accused No.1 knowing fully well that stabbing just below the heart will cause death, stabbed her below the heart. He came to the scene of offence armed with a knife concealing it in his pocket. All these circumstances establish that the intention of A1 is only to cause the death of the deceased, as A1 bore grudge against the deceased since the deceased was not allowing P.W.3 to go to the house of A1. The evidence on record establishes that A2 facilitated A1 to stab the deceased by holding the hands of the deceased and there by restraining her movements and preventing her from escaping the blow given by A1 on the heart. 18. The evidence on record establishes that A2 facilitated A1 to stab the deceased by holding the hands of the deceased and there by restraining her movements and preventing her from escaping the blow given by A1 on the heart. 18. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that though P.W.8 did not support the case of the prosecution fully, his evidence to some extent supports the case of the prosecution about A1 showing the place of M.O.1 knife buried under the earth, therefore, it can be taken into consideration. The evidence of P.W.8 is corroborated by the investigating officer. It is settled law that when a witness turns hostile, the entire evidence need not be discarded, and the part of evidence which supports the prosecution case can be relied on when it is corroborated by other material. 19. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the core of the prosecution case found in Ex.P1 report and Ex.P5 inquest report is that A1 bore grudge against the deceased and P.W.2, as he suspected that they are not sending P.W.3, who is his wife, to his house. Therefore, on 16/10/2013 i.e., on the date of Bakrid festival, A1 accompanied by A2 to A4 went to the house of P.W.2 and the deceased. It is true P.Ws.3 to 6 may be relatives of the deceased and P.W.2 but they are the neighbours also. Therefore, their presence is very natural at the time of the incident. The evidence of the investigation officer in the crossexamination as elicited by accused shows that he could not examine other neighbours residing near the scene of offence, since they did not cooperate with him. In that view of the matter, the evidence of P.Ws.4 to 6 cannot be discarded on the ground that they are interested witnesses. They would not rope A1 falsely against the interests of P.W3 who is his wife. The evidence of P.W.1 being an injured witness can also be relied on safely. The case found in Exs.P1 and P5 was deposed before the Court by P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6. Therefore, there are no material contradictions about the way the incident occurred, and motive was also established. The evidence of P.W.1 being an injured witness can also be relied on safely. The case found in Exs.P1 and P5 was deposed before the Court by P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6. Therefore, there are no material contradictions about the way the incident occurred, and motive was also established. Therefore, there are mere minor discrepancies which may have occurred due to lapse of time, the evidence of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 cannot be brushed aside, to give a benefit of doubt to accused 1 and 2. 20. He further contended that the medical evidence established that the deceased died due to severe hemorrhage as the injury was caused to the heart. P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 identified M.O.1 as the weapon used by A1 for stabbing the deceased. The medical evidence further established that M.O.1 would cause the injury suffered by the deceased. Further RFSL report Ex.P13 shows that M.O.1 knife was also having stains of human blood. The mediators report prepared at the time of recovery of M.O.1 shows that the knife contains some blood stains and same was fortified by RFSL report. Merely it was buried in the earth, it cannot be said that no blood stains would be found on it after some time. In the case on hand time gap is 10 only days. Therefore, all the facts and circumstances beyond all reason establish that A1 with an intention to do away with the deceased came to the scene of offence armed with a knife, and stabbed the deceased on a vital part i.e., just below the heart causing injury to the heart. Thereby the deceased died due to shock and severe hemorrhage. A2 facilitated A1 by catching hold of the hands of the deceased and allowed A1 to stab the deceased restricting her movements from escaping the blow. As such the findings of the trial Court that the accused are guilty of the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w 34 of the IPC does not warrant any interference. 21. The learned Public Prosecutor in support of his arguments relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot Vs. State of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347 about the value of injured witness and that minor discrepancies if any will not affect the case of the prosecution. 22. 21. The learned Public Prosecutor in support of his arguments relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot Vs. State of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347 about the value of injured witness and that minor discrepancies if any will not affect the case of the prosecution. 22. He also relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in M.Nageswara Reddy Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others with The State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Kasireddy Ramakrishna Reddy, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 251. and about the value of an injured-eye witness. 23. In the light of the above rival contentions of both parties, the point for consideration in the case on hand is: "Whether the prosecution proved its case against the appellants/accused 1 and 2 beyond all reasonable doubt?" POINT: - 24. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, we have perused the judgment of the trial Court and other material placed on record. 25. The prosecution has examined 12 witnesses and marked 14 documents as exhibits during trial. The eyewitnesses examined by the prosecution are the son of the deceased (P.W.1), who was injured and presented Ex.P1 report to the police on 16/10/2013 immediately after the incident. P.W.2 is the husband of the deceased. P.W.3 is the wife of A1 and daughter of P.W.2 and the deceased. P.W.4 is the sister-in-law of the deceased. P.Ws.5 and 6 are younger sisters of the deceased. 26. Core of the prosecution case as per Ex.P1 First Information Report is that the marriage of P.W.3 and accused No.1 was solemnized 08 years prior to the date of incident and they were blessed with two children. For the last 10 days prior to the date of incident, P.W.3 was not feeling well, and she informed her parents, who are also residing in the same village about her ill-health. She came to the house of her parents about three days prior to the date of incident. P.W.1 also came to the village on 13/10/2013 on account of Bakrid festival. On 16/10/2013 at about 5.00 p.m., A1 along with A2 to A4 came to the house of the deceased and P.W.2 and started an altercation with them in front of the house on the road. P.W.1 also came to the village on 13/10/2013 on account of Bakrid festival. On 16/10/2013 at about 5.00 p.m., A1 along with A2 to A4 came to the house of the deceased and P.W.2 and started an altercation with them in front of the house on the road. On seeing the same P.W.1, the sisters, and relatives of the deceased, who are also the neighbours gathered there. Then A1 stabbed the deceased just below the heart saying that P.W.3 would come to his house if the deceased died. The deceased sustained a bleeding injury and then all the persons present there came to the rescue of the deceased. On seeing the same A1 and other accused ran away. The deceased died at the spot even before shifting her to the hospital. Thereafter, P.W.1 came to the police station and presented Ex.P1 report. A similar narration was also found in Ex.P5 inquest report. 27. P.Ws.1 and 2, who are the son and husband of the deceased respectively, in their evidence deposed the events that occurred on 16/10/2013 at about 5.00 p.m., in front of the house of the deceased. In their evidence they deposed that A1 tried to stab P.W.2 and then P.W.1 went to his rescue and sustained an injury on the left shoulder. Then A1 attacked the deceased and stabbed her just below the heart. Based on this, as stated supra, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that there are material contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and the story narrated in Exs.P1 and P5. 28. We scrutinized Exs.P1 and P5 and the testimony of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6. We found that one fact is common and consistent right from the stage of Ex.P1 FIR and to the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 6 with regard to A1 to A4 coming to the house of P.W.2 and the deceased, and A1 altercating with P.W.2 and the deceased on the road in front of their house. On seeing the same P.Ws.4 to 6 and others gathered at the scene of offence. Then A1 stabbed the deceased with M.O.1 knife below the heart and as a result the deceased died on spot immediately. So, the fact that accused No.1 stabbed the deceased with a knife just below the heart, and that she died on the spot is established from the evidence of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6. Then A1 stabbed the deceased with M.O.1 knife below the heart and as a result the deceased died on spot immediately. So, the fact that accused No.1 stabbed the deceased with a knife just below the heart, and that she died on the spot is established from the evidence of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6. It is corroborated by the contents of Ex.P1 first information report. 29. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 that A1 made an attempt to stab P.W.2 and P.W.1 went to his rescue and sustained an injury, which is not found in EX.P1, would not discredit their testimony about the overt act of the accused No.1 i.e., stabbing of deceased by A1 and holding of the hands by A2. It is not the case of the defence that this is a material contradiction i.e. to say that it was not found in their statements recorded under Sec. 161 Cr.P.C. 30. The evidence of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 before the Court is consistent and establishes that A2 held the hands of the deceased while A1 stabbed the deceased. In EX.P1 there is no specific mention about the overt act of the accused No.2. In Ex.P1 and Ex.P5 the presence of A2 to A4 was mentioned. In the evidence they categorically deposed about the overt acts of A2 at the time of incident. 31. As rightly contended by the learned Public Prosecutor, first information report need not contain all the details meticulously. As per the evidence of the investigation officer, he examined P.Ws.1 to 5 immediately after the incident i.e., on 16/10/2013 itself, by visiting the scene of offence, when he prepared the scene observation report and a rough sketch. Therefore, there is no scope for deliberations among them. The defence could not point out any material contradiction from the testimony of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6. Hence, the contention of the defence that there is scope for roping the accused A1 and A2 with false case, in their evidence before the Court will not carry any weight. 32. Having gone through the depositions of the witnesses i.e., P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6, who is the injured, and eyewitnesses respectively, we are of the opinion that there are no material contradictions in their testimony about the overt acts of accused 1 and 2. 33. 32. Having gone through the depositions of the witnesses i.e., P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6, who is the injured, and eyewitnesses respectively, we are of the opinion that there are no material contradictions in their testimony about the overt acts of accused 1 and 2. 33. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the prosecution did not examine any independent witness to speak about the alleged incident. The investigation officer in the cross-examination by the accused categorically deposed that he tried to examine some of the neighbours to the incident, but they did not cooperate with him. The material on record discloses that though P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 are relatives of the deceased, they are also the neighbours in the place where offence occurred. 34. It is pertinent to note down that their statements were recorded by the investigation officer soon after the incident i.e., on 16/10/2013. In that view of the matter, we do not find any reason to discard their evidence on the ground that they are interested witnesses. The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 who are the son and husband of the deceased corroborated the evidence of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 in all material aspects about the overt acts of accused 1 and 2. Further, the material on record established that in the said incident P.W.1 sustained an injury on his left shoulder and he was also sent to the Government General Hospital, Guntur on the same day by P.W.9 on receipt of Ex.P1 report. It is pertinent to mention that in EX.P1 it is mentioned that P.W.1 sustained an injury. 35. The prosecution has examined the Casualty Medical Officer of Government General Hospital, Guntur (P.W.12). His evidence shows that as per Ex.P14 wound certificate issued by Dr.D.V.Pratap Reddy, P.W.1 sustained an abrasion on his left ear and another abrasion on left arm and age of injuries is about 06 hours prior to the date of his examination on 16/10/2013. It appears that as per the statements recorded by the police u/s 161 of Cr.P.C., vide Exs.D1, D2 and D6 to D9 injury was on the right shoulder. The fact is that P.W.1 sustained injury on his left shoulder during the incident. It appears that as per the statements recorded by the police u/s 161 of Cr.P.C., vide Exs.D1, D2 and D6 to D9 injury was on the right shoulder. The fact is that P.W.1 sustained injury on his left shoulder during the incident. Therefore, we do not find any grounds to disbelieve P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 evidence about the way the incident had occurred and the overt acts of the accused 1 and 2. 36. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, on the date of incident, Accused No.1 came to the house of the parents of P.W.3 and requested the deceased to send P.W.3 to his house, but she refused. Then, when A1 tried to pull P.W.3, and she was following him, then deceased who was on the steps of the house tried to stop P.W.3, and she fell on a spear (ballem"-used to peel dry coconut) fixed near the steps, sustained an injury and died. 37. In the cross-examination of P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6, the defence tried to support this theory, but none of the witnesses admitted to this theory. Nothing elicited to show that a spear was fixed in front of the house of the deceased to probable their plea. In that view of the matter, nothing is there to say that the deceased sustained an injury as fell on the spear. The facts and circumstances in the case establish only one view i.e., the deceased sustained an injury below the heart as accused No.1 stabbed her while A2 was holding her hands. 38. The other contention of the defence is that P.W.8 did not support the arrest of A1 and recovery of M.O.1. P.W.8 in his evidence did not support the case of prosecution about the place of arrest of A1, but he deposed that A1 went near a palm tree and produced the M.O.1 knife. 39. The law on the evidence of hostile witness is no longer res-integra. The evidence of a hostile witness cannot be rejected in total. The evidence of hostile witness can be accepted to the extent, which is found dependable, trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence on the record. 40. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 . The law on the evidence of hostile witness is no longer res-integra. The evidence of a hostile witness cannot be rejected in total. The evidence of hostile witness can be accepted to the extent, which is found dependable, trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence on the record. 40. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 . the Supreme Court held as under: "Where the Court gives permission to the prosecutor to crossexamine his own witness, thus characterizing him as a hostile witness, that fact does not completely efface his evidence. The evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence." 41. In Khujji v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1991 SCC (Crl.) 916. the Supreme Court held as follows: "The evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such a witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof." 42. In the case on hand, the evidence of Inspector of Police corroborated with the evidence of P.W.8 regarding recovery of M.O.1 knife. Further, P.Ws.1, P.W2 and P.W4 to 6 categorically deposed that M.O.1 knife was used by A1 to stab the deceased. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the evidence of P.W.8 can be relied on to believe the case of the prosecution regarding the recovery of M.O.1 knife basing on the statement made by accused No.1. 43. P.W.3, who is the daughter of the deceased and P.W.2, did not support the case of the prosecution. She deposed in favour of A1 supporting the theory of defence. The accused in the cross-examination of P.W.3 elicited that A1 and P.W.3 are living together after the death of the deceased. It establishes that she supported the case of the accused for reasons best known to her. Therefore, it is clear why she turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. Hence, her evidence would not help the case of the accused to support their line of defence. 44. It establishes that she supported the case of the accused for reasons best known to her. Therefore, it is clear why she turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. Hence, her evidence would not help the case of the accused to support their line of defence. 44. When coming to the evidence of the doctor (P.W.10), who conducted the post-mortem examination found the following ante-mortem injuries:- "A stab wound of 5 x 3 cm., x heart deep, present over front and middle part of the chest on left side, 3 cm as below the left nipple, 6 cms., lateral to the sternum, oblique in direction, spindle shaped, red in colour. On cut Sec., 5th rib was cut corresponding to the stab injury, penetrating wound present to the right ventricle of the heart and about 1500 ml., of blood present in left thoracic cavity." 45. The doctor is of the opinion that the deceased died due to a stab injury to the heart. The contention of the counsel for the appellants is that, M.O.1 is having a sharp edge on one side and other side is a blunt edge and therefore, it not possible to cause spindle shaped injury. It was not admitted by the doctor. The relevant evidence of the doctor is as under:- "A stab wound of 5 x 3 cm., x heart deep, present over front and middle part of the chest on left side..." 46. His evidence shows that the length and width of the injury sustained by the deceased is possible with the M.O.1 knife. In that view of the matter, we do not find any reasons to discard the evidence of doctor, corroborated by the evidence of the injured witness, and eye-witnesses in the case which is explicit. 47. The other contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that, even if it is presumed that A1 stabbed the deceased, he gave only one blow, it was not a pre-meditated act, and he has no intention to cause the death of the deceased. He submitted that the act of the appellants 1 and 2 will come under culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and another, (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 382.. held as under:- "11. He submitted that the act of the appellants 1 and 2 will come under culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and another, (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 382.. held as under:- "11. The principal question that falls to be considered in this appeal is, whether the offence disclosed by the facts and circumstances established by the prosecution against the respondent, is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. 12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not viceversa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not amounting to. murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined in Sec. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the 1st part of Sec. 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree.' This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second Part of Sec. 304. 13. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has vexed the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these Sec. s, allow themselves to be drawn into minutae abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the key words used in the various clauses of Ss. 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the key words used in the various clauses of Ss. 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. Sec. 299 Sec. 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done-- Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done-- INTENTION , (a) With the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) With the intention of causing death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 14. Clause (b) of Sec. 299 corresponds with cls. (2) and (3) of Sec. 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under cl. (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that' such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of el. (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of cl. (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Sec. 300. 15. (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of cl. (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Sec. 300. 15. Clause (b) of Sec. 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under cl. (2) of Sec. 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient 'in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. 16. In clause (3) of Sec. 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding el. (b) of Sec. 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if over- looked, may result 'in miscarriage of justice. The difference between cl. (b) of Sec. 299 and cl. (3) of Sec. 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in cl. (b) of Sec. 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 17. For cases to fall within cl. (b) of Sec. 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 17. For cases to fall within cl. (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, So long as death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant v. State of Kerala is an apt illustration of this point. 18. In Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, (2) Vivian Bose j. speaking for this Court, explained the meaning' and scope of Clause (3), thus (at p. 1500): "The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Sec. 300, 3rdly'. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;. secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, . that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and, fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender." 19. Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra) even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Sec. 300 clearly brings out this point. 20. Clause (c) of Sec. 299 and cl. (4) of Sec. 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that cl. 20. Clause (c) of Sec. 299 and cl. (4) of Sec. 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that cl. (4) of Sec. 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general--as distinguished from a particular person or persons --- being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder, ' on, the facts of a case, it be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in Sec. 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Sec. 300, Penal Code is reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of murder' contained in Sec. 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the first or the second part of Sec. 304, depending respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of Sec. 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes, within any of the Exceptions enumerated in Sec. 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' punishable under the First Part of Sec. 304, Penal Code. 22. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes, within any of the Exceptions enumerated in Sec. 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' punishable under the First Part of Sec. 304, Penal Code. 22. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so inter-twined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient, to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages." 48. The material on record establishes that accused No.1 came to the scene of offence armed with a knife keeping it in his pocket. This indicates that A1 came to the scene of offence with an intention to do away with the deceased as she was preventing his wife from coming to his house. It is also proved that his intention was to inflict injury to the heart, to cause death. Therefore, he stabbed on the vital part of the body i.e., just below the heart of the deceased and, as a result the deceased died on the spot due to severe haemorrhage on account of penetrating wound to the right ventricle of the heart. 49. In view of the above circumstances, nothing is deduced to say that act of A1 was an accidental or unintentional act, or that some other kind of injury was intended. No evidence is forthcoming to say that A1 committed the act in a sudden fight or in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, or on grave and sudden provocation. Therefore, the act of A1 amounts to culpable homicide as defined in Sec. 299 of the IPC. Hon'ble Apex Court in Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 . held that injury if sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature-- Its determination is purely objective and inferential which has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Illustration (c) appended to Sec. 300 clearly brings out this point and it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Illustration (c) appended to Sec. 300 clearly brings out this point and it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined in Sec. 300 as 'murder. 50. The overt acts proved against A2 is that he held the hands of the deceased to facilitate A1 to stab on her heart. This established that he held the hands of the deceased in furtherance of their common intention to commit murder of the deceased. Hon'ble Apex Court in Hari Om v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1993) 1 Crimes 294 (SC). held that to apply Sec. 34 of the IPC, prior conspiracy or pre-meditation is not required, common intention can be formed suddenly in the course of occurrence. Sec. 34 IPC speaks that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. From the facts and circumstances in the case, common intention has been clearly established. So A2 in the case is equally liable like A1 for offence of murder. 51. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court that accused 1 and 2 are guilty of the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w 34 of IPC holds good. 52. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the finding of the trial Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. 53. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the III Addl. Sessions Judge, Guntur made in S.C.No.382 of 2014, dt.28/7/2015.