JUDGMENT : 1. On 07.04.2020, the following order was passed by this Court:- "Issue notice to the respondents returnable at an early date. The steps for service shall be taken by the learned counsel for the appellant within a week from today. List for admission immediately after service. Till the next date of listing, status quo as exists today with respect to property in question shall be maintained by the parties." 2. From the aforesaid order, it is evident that without admitting the appeal, an interim order was passed in favour of the appellant. Thus, this court proceeded to hear the case for admission. 3. Heard Sri N.K. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the appellant. 4. This appeal relates to the year 2010 which was present in the Registry of this Court on 25.04.2010. 5. This second appeal has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff under section 100 of C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 25.09.2008 passed by IVth Civil Judge (J.D.), Gonda in Regular Suit No.125 of 1991, (Bhaguti Singh Vs. Mata Prasad and others) thereby dismissing the suit for permanent injunction and also against the judgment dated 11.12.2009 passed by IInd Additional District Judge, Gonda in Civil Appeal No.136 of 2008 (Bhagauti Singh Vs. Mata Prasad and others) thereby confirming the judgment of trial court and dismissing the first appeal of plaintiff-appellant. 6. It would be appropriate to indicate here that the suit was filed seeking relief of perpetual/permanent injunction and the relief for declaration was not sought. 7. For the purpose of admission of present second appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both the courts below while passing the judgments under appeal not considered the relevant evidence available on record in the light of pleadings of the parties to the proceedings. He also stated that both the courts below have wrongly considered the report of the Advocate Commissioner. His further submission is that the trial court as well as the appellate court while dismissing the regular suit as well as civil appeal have wrongly placed reliance on the judgments of revenue court passed under section 229 of the U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act ,1950. Thus, the present appeal is liable to be entertained. 8. The factual matrix of the case, in brief, is that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction, registered as Regular Suit No.125 of 1991 before the Civil Judge (J.D.) Gonda. Thus, the present appeal is liable to be entertained. 8. The factual matrix of the case, in brief, is that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction, registered as Regular Suit No.125 of 1991 before the Civil Judge (J.D.) Gonda. Subsequently, after transfer the same was decided by IV Civil Judge (J.D.) Gonda. The case as set up by the plaintiff-appellant in the plaint is based upon the possession over the suit property. As per the averments made in the plaint the property in suit i.e. Abadi Land upon a compromise in a suit filed in the year 1965 by one Madhuban Singh(father of plaintiff) came into possession of one Ganpati Dei and since after death of Ganpati Dei , the plaintiff is in possession of the property in suit. Period of possession over the property in suit has been indicated as 30 years. Further, as per plaint case the defendants tried to interfere in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-appellant, as such he approached the concerned court seeking relief of permanent injunction. After notice, defendants appeared before the court below and filed written statement stating therein that they (defendants) are the owner in possession of the property in suit by virtue of the sale-deed executed by one Udai Raj Singh. From the facts on record, it is evident that this sale-deed was executed by Udai Raj Singh in favour of one Mata Pasad Singh-defendant no.1/respondent no.1 in the instant appeal. As per the written statement, the sale-deed was executed on 26.07.1988. The case of the defendants as appears from the judgment passed in the suit and civil appeal is to the effect that the title of the suit property is with defendant no.1/respondent no.1 and defendant nos. 1 and 2 are in possession of the suit property for the last 40 years as such without seeking relief of declaration in relation to the right over the property the suit for perpetual injunction simplicitor is not maintainable. The facts based upon written statement indicated in the judgment under appeal also shows that in written statment the plea of maintainability of suit for permanent injunction as also limitation was also taken. The facts based upon written statement indicated in the judgment under appeal also shows that in written statment the plea of maintainability of suit for permanent injunction as also limitation was also taken. Before the trial court, it appears from judgment and decree dated 25.09.2008 that seven issues were framed which are as under:- ^^1- D;k okni= ds dFkukuqlkj fookfnr lEifRr nf'kZr okni= dk ekfyd dkfct oknh gS \ 2- D;k fookfnr lEifRRk dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS \ 3- D;k oknh }kjk iznRr U;k;'kqYd de vnk fd;k x;k gS \ 4- D;k nkok dkyckf/kr gS \ 5- D;k ek= fu"ks/kkKk dk okn iks"k.kh; ugha gS tSlk fd izfrokni= dh /kkjk 21 esa dfFkr gS \ 6- D;k dCts ds vHkko esa fu"ks/kkKk dk okn iks"k.kh; ugha gS \ 7-D;k oknh fdlh U;k; izfrdkj dks ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\** 9. The parties to the suit in the trial adduced the evidence. The plaintiff-appellant appeared before the trial court as P.W.-1 and other witnesses of the plaintiff-appellant, namely, Indrabali and Vindeshwari appeared as (P.W.-2) and (P.W.-3) respectively. From the side of the defendants, Mata Prasad Singh appeared before the trial court as (D.W.-1) and other witnesses, namely, Ram Bahadur Singh and Daya Ram appeared as (D.W.-2) and ( D.W.-3) respectively. To establish the plaint case the plaintiff-appellant filed copy of the judgment dated 22.10.1965 passed in the Case No. 124 under Section 229B of Z.A.& L.R. Act 1950, copy of compromise and copy of suit through Fehrist ( list of documents) Ga 1/159.In support of the claim, defendants produced original sale-deed executed by Udai Raj Singh in favour of Mata Prasad dated 26.07.1988, a copy of chik report under section 435 and 324 IPC, copy of chik report and copy of Family Register as paper no.Ga1/141,GA1/142,Ga1/143and GA1/144 through Fehrisht Ga1/140 respectively before the trial court. Further, transpires that the report of Advocate Commissioner was also obtained by the trial court i.e. Paper nos.Ga2/50 and Ga2/51 which was made subject to the evidence of parties. The trial court after considering the pleadings and evidence available on record including the report of Advocate Commissioner, decided the issue no.1 against the plaintiff-appellant . Further, transpires that the report of Advocate Commissioner was also obtained by the trial court i.e. Paper nos.Ga2/50 and Ga2/51 which was made subject to the evidence of parties. The trial court after considering the pleadings and evidence available on record including the report of Advocate Commissioner, decided the issue no.1 against the plaintiff-appellant . The relevant portion reads as under:- ^^bl izdkj mijksDr fo'ys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij U;k;ky; ds erkuqlkj oknh ;g lkfcr djus esa vlQy jgk gS fd og fookfnr lEifRr nf'kZr okni= dk ekfyd o dkfct dCts ds vk/kkj ij gSA rn~uqlkj ;g okn fcUnq oknh ds fo:) udkjkRed :i ls fu.khZr fd;k tkrk gSA** 10. The trial court, as appears from the judgement dated 25.09.2008, considered the boundaries of property in suit mentioned in plaint and sale deed, as also the statement of P.W.-1 Bhaguti Singh, P.W.-2 Indrabali. The relevant portion related to above quoted finding on issue no.1 reads as under :- ^^ftjg esa ih-MCyw- 1 HkxkSrh flag us dgk gS fd xuifr us esjs i{k esa dksbZ cSukek ugha fd;kA 1955&56 esa vkoknh dk le>kSrk gqvk FkkA lrr dCts ds laca/k esa oknh dh rjQ ls dksbZ lk{; izLrqr ugha fd;k x;kA ;g Hkh dgk gS fd esjs }kjk mn;jkt ds cSukes ds fo#) dksbZ ealw[kh dk nkok Hkh nkf[ky ugha fd;k x;k gSA fookfnr tehu esjs vkoklh; edku ls pkj gkFk dh nwjh ij gSA ih-MCyw-2 bUnzcyh us vius ftjg esa dgk gS fd og nwljs xkao dk xokg gSA mls blds lkjs rF;ksa dh tkudkjh ugha gSA bldk ;g dguk gS fd xuifr dks ejs djhc 30&35 lky gks x;k gSA ih-MCyw- 2 bUnzcyh ;g dgrk gS fd fookfnr lEifRr dh yEckbZ&pkSM+kbZ 30x 30 gSA izfroknh ds dFkukuqlkj ;g fcYdqy xyr gS A ih-MCyw- 2 dgrk gS fd oknh dk edku fookfnr LFky ls dkQh nwjh ij gS tcfd izfroknh ds dFkukuqlkj oknh viuh ftjg esa ;g dgrk gS fd mDRk fookfnr tehu esjs edku ls pkj gkFk dh nwjh ij gSA vr% ih-MCyw- 1 o ih-MCyw- 2 dk c;ku mDr fookfnr dh nwjh ds laca/k esa ijLij fojks/kkHkklh gSA ih-MCyw- 3 foUns'ojh izlkn us viuh ftjg ds nkSjku ;g dgk gS og Hkh nwljs xkao dk xokg gSA bldks lkjs RkF;ksa dh tkudkjh ugha gSA ;g dgrk gS fd fookfnr tehu dh yEckbZ&pkSM+kbZ 200 fQV gSA** 11. From the above portion of judgement dated 15.09.2008 of trial court it is evident that the plaintiff-appellant in the trial failed to prove his possession and ownership over the property in suit as also his case set up in the plaint. 12. After holding that the pliantiff-appellant has failed to prove his possession over the property in suit. The trial court dismissed the suit on 25.09.2008 and being aggrieved the plaintiff-appellant filed the first appeal. 13. From the judgment of appellate court dated 11.12.2009, it transpires that upon due consideration the appellate court framed the following points of determination:- ^^1-vihykFkhZ@oknh fookfnr lEifRr ftls okn i= ds vUr esa uD'kk utjh esa v{kj v] c] l] n o jax yky ls nf'kZr fd;k x;k gS] dk ekfyd dkfct gS \ 2-vuqrks"k ftls vihykFkhZ@oknh ikus ;ksX; gS\** 14. The point of determination no.1 is to effect that whether the plaintiff-appellant is the owner in possession of the suit property indicated in the map at the foot of the plaint as A,B,C and D. It further transpires from the judgment under appeal that upon due consideration, the first appellant court recorded a finding against the plaintiff-appellant to the effect that he has failed to prove his rights, title and possession over the property in dispute. The relevant observation is reads as under:- ^^19- fookfnr lEifRr ds lEcU/k esa vihykFkhZ@oknh }kjk xuirnsbZ dh e`R;q ds i'pkr o mldk dksbZ fof/kd mRrjkf/kdkjh thfor u gksus ij ,d gh ifjokj ds vihykFkhZ@oknh o izfroknh la[;k&1 ekrkizlkn flag ds firk HkXxw flag ds e/; /kkjk&229ch ;w0ih0 tsM0,0 ,.M ,y0vkj0 ,sDV esa dsoy laf/ki= izLrqr djus ls ;g rF; lkfcr ugha gksrk gS fd fookfnr lEifRr ds lEcU/k esa mHk;i{k ds e/; 1965 esa ;k mlds iwoZ dksbZ le>kSrk gqvk ,oa fookfnr lEifRr vihykFkhZ@oknh ds ekfydkuk gd esa vk;hA 20- mijksDr leLr rF;ksa ,oa lk{; dk lw{e foospuk djus ds i'pkr eSa bl fuf'pr er dk gwa fd vihykFkhZ@oknh fookfnr lEifRr ij viuk LoRo o v/;klu lkfcr djus esa vlQy jgk gSA fof/k dk ;g lqO;oLFkkfir fl)kUr gS fd [kqys tehu ds lEcU/k esa dCtk ;k v/;klu mlh dk ekuk tk;sxk ftlds LoRo esa og Hkwfe gksA fookfnr Hkwfe [kqyh Hkwfe gSA vihykFkhZ@oknh dk fookfnr Hkwfe ij LoRo o dCtk lkfcr ugha gksrk gSA vr% fopkj.kh; fcUnq la[;k&1 rn~uqlkj fuLrkfjr fd;k tkrk gSA** 15. In this case, there are concurrent findings on facts by both the courts below. In this case, there are concurrent findings on facts by both the courts below. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments has laid down the law that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by two courts below should not be interfered by the High Court in Second Appeal, unless and until the findings are perverse. 16. In Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki & Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 546 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "The Privy Council, in Luchman v. Puna [(1889) 16 Calcutta 753 (P.C.)], observed that a second appeal can lie only on one or the other grounds specified in the present section. The Privy Council, in another case Pratap Chunder v. Mohandranath [(1890) ILR 17 Calcutta 291 (P.C.)], the limitation as to the power of the court imposed by sections 100 and 101 in a second appeal ought to be attended to, and an appellant ought not to be allowed to question the finding of the first appellate court upon a matter of fact. In Durga Chowdharani v. Jawahar Singh (1891) 18 Cal 23 (PC), the Privy Council held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. The clear declaration of law was made in the said judgment as early as in 1891. This judgment was followed in the case of Ramratan Shukul v. Mussumat Nandu (1892) 19 Cal 249 (252) (PC) and many others. The Court observed : "It has now been conclusively settled that the third court...cannot entertain an appeal upon question as to the soundness of findings of fact by the second court, if there is evidence to be considered, the decision of the second court, however unsatisfactory it might be if examined, must stand final." In the case of Ram Gopal v. Shakshaton [(1893) ILR 20 Calcutta 93 (P.C.)], the Court emphasized that a court of second appeal is not competent to entertain questions as to the soundness of a finding of facts by the courts below. The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad v. Baij Nath [(1893) ILR 15 Allahabad 367]. The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad v. Baij Nath [(1893) ILR 15 Allahabad 367]. The Court observed that a judge to whom a memorandum of second appeal is presented for admission is entitled to consider whether any of the grounds specified in this section exist and apply to the case, and if they do not, to reject the appeal summarily. Similarly, before amendment in 1976, this Court also had an occasion to examine the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and Others [ AIR 1959 SC 57 ], the High Court of Madras set aside the findings of the District Judge, Guntur, while deciding the second appeal. This Court observed that notwithstanding the clear and authoritative pronouncement of the Privy Council on the limits and the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under section 100, Civil Procedure Code, "some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of Second Appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set aside the judgment of the High Court which had no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. In M. Ramappa v. M. Bojjappa [(1963) SCR 673], the Andhra Pradesh High Court interfered with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court which, in turn, had itself reversed the Trial Court's finding on the same question of fact. In M. Ramappa v. M. Bojjappa [(1963) SCR 673], the Andhra Pradesh High Court interfered with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court which, in turn, had itself reversed the Trial Court's finding on the same question of fact. While setting aside the decree of the second Appellate Court, this Court observed : "It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact, but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid." It may be pertinent to mention that as early as in 1890 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and they added a note of warning that no Court in India has power to add, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.? The findings reached by the First Appellate Court cannot be interfered with, in second appeal, as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. As Lord Hastings observed that "The facility of appeal is founded on a most laudable principle of securing, by double and treble checks, the proper decision of all suits, but the utopian idea, in its attempt to prevent individual injury from a wrong decision, has been productive of general injustice by withholding redress, and general inconvenience, by perpetuating litigation". 17. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. “34. 17. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication — what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ‘103.Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.—In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal— (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.’ The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with.” 18. In Krishnan v. Backiam, (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at para 11 that: “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect.” 19. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram, (2010) 15 SCC 530 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 113, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: “10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court [Salik Ram Boloram Mehar v. Guruvachan Kaur, 2000 SCC OnLine MP 340] was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent.” 20. In the case of Shivah Balram Haibatti Vs. Avinash Maruthi Pawar (2018)11 SCC 652 the Apex Court has held as under:- "...... These findings being concurrent findings of fact were binding on the High Court and, therefore, the second appeal should have been dismissed in limine as involving no substantial question of law." 21. In another case of Narendra and others Vs. Avinash Maruthi Pawar (2018)11 SCC 652 the Apex Court has held as under:- "...... These findings being concurrent findings of fact were binding on the High Court and, therefore, the second appeal should have been dismissed in limine as involving no substantial question of law." 21. In another case of Narendra and others Vs. Ajabrao S/o Narayan Katare (dead) through legal representatives, (2018) 11 SCC 564 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- "...interference in second appeal with finding of fact is permissible where such finding is found to be wholly perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such finding or where that finding is found to be against any settled principle of law or pleadings or evidence. Such errors constitute a question of law permitting interference in Second Appeal." 22. In one more case Dalip Singh Vs. Bhupinder Kaur, (2018) 3 SCC 677 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that if there is no perversity in concurrent findings of fact, interference by the High Court in Second Appeal is not permissible. 23. In Randhir Kaur v.Prithvi Pal Singh (2019) 17 SCC 71 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 372, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: “15. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments would show that the jurisdiction in second appeal is not to interfere with the findings of fact on the ground that findings are erroneous, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. The findings of fact will also include the findings on the basis of documentary evidence. The jurisdiction to interfere in the second appeal is only where there is an error in law or procedure and not merely an error on a question of fact. 16. In view of the above, we find that the High Court could not interfere with the findings of fact recorded after appreciation of evidence merely because the High Court thought that another view would be a better view. The learned first appellate court has considered the absence of clause in the first power of attorney to purchase land on behalf of the plaintiff; the fact that the plaintiff has not appeared as witness.” 24. The learned first appellate court has considered the absence of clause in the first power of attorney to purchase land on behalf of the plaintiff; the fact that the plaintiff has not appeared as witness.” 24. In the judgment reported in Avtar Singh v. Bimla Devi (2021) 13 SCC 816 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 827 again the scope of the jurisdiction which is available to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the matter of the second appeal, has explained as follows : “19. It is thus evident, therefore, that mere findings of fact cannot be interfered with in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction given the three limbs of jurisdiction available under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act. Findings of fact which are unreasonable, or which are rendered by overlooking the record, therefore, per se do not appear to fall within the scope of second appellate review by the High Court. In these circumstances, the High Court's findings — which are based entirely on the reappreciation of the record — and consequent interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, cannot be upheld.” 25. In S.R. Tewari v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 602 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 893], after referring the earlier decisions starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131, the Hon'ble Apex Court held at para 30: “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/ inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131] , [Kuldeep Singh v.Commr. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131] , [Kuldeep Singh v.Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v.State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] and [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179].)” 26. Thus, from the above, it is crystal clear that the High Court in exercise of power under Section 100 CPC should not interfere in the findings of fact recorded by the first Appellate Court which is final Court of fact or concurrent findings of fact unless the same are based on no evidence or perverse. 27. It would not be out of plea to point out here the settled principle that if the dispute of title/ownership is in issue then in that event the suit for permanent injunction without seeking relief of declaration regarding title/ownership would not be maintainable. 28. In regard to aforesaid, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji (Deceased) Through L.R.s v. Maniben Jagmalbhai (Deceased) Through L.R.S and Others reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 258. Relevant paras of which on reproduction are as under:- "37. Even otherwise on merits also, the Courts below have erred in passing the decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from disturbing the alleged possession of the plaintiff. Assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff is found to be in possession, in that case also, once the plaintiff has lost so far as the relief of declaration and title is concerned and the defendant No. 1 is held to be the true and absolute owner of the property in question, pursuant to the execution of the sale deed dated 17.06.1975 in his favour, the true owner cannot be restrained by way of an injunction against him. In a given case, the plaintiff may succeed in getting the injunction even by filing a simple suit for permanent injunction in a case where there is a cloud on the title. In a given case, the plaintiff may succeed in getting the injunction even by filing a simple suit for permanent injunction in a case where there is a cloud on the title. However, once the dispute with respect to title is settled and it is held against the plaintiff, in that case, the suit by the plaintiff for permanent injunction shall not be maintainable against the true owner. In such a situation, it will not be open for the plaintiff to contend that though he/she has lost the case so far as the title dispute is concerned, the defendant -the true owner still be restrained from disturbing his/her possession and his/her possession be protected. In the present case, as observed hereinabove and it is not in dispute that the suit filed by the plaintiff for cancellation of the registered sale deed and declaration has been dismissed and the registered sale deed in favour of the defendant No. 1 has been believed and thereby defendant No. 1 is held to be the true and absolute owner of the suit land in question. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court in so far as refusing to grant the relief for cancellation of the registered sale deed and declaration has attained finality. Despite the fact that the plaintiff has lost so far as the title is concerned, still the Courts below have granted relief of permanent injunction against the defendant No. 1 the absolute owner of the land in question, which is unsustainable, both, on law as well as on facts. An injunction cannot be issued against a true owner or title holder and in favour of a trespasser or a person in unlawful possession. 38. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Jharkhand State Housing Board v. Didar Singh, (2019) 17 SCC 692 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held by this Court that though a bare suit for injunction in the absence of declaration relief would be maintainable and in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff, it is not necessary that in all those cases, the plaintiff has to seek the relief. In the said decision, it is observed and held by this Court that though a bare suit for injunction in the absence of declaration relief would be maintainable and in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff, it is not necessary that in all those cases, the plaintiff has to seek the relief. It is further observed and held that, however, when the defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction. 39. In the present case, once the defendant No. 1 was held to be the true and absolute owner pursuant to the registered sale deed executed in his favour and the plaintiff was unsuccessful so far as the declaratory relief is concerned, thereafter, it cannot be said that there was a cloud over the title of the plaintiff and/or even the defendant. Therefore, the only relief which survived before the trial court was the consideration of relief of permanent injunction and having been unsuccessful in getting the relief of cancellation of the registered sale deed and the declaration thereof, the relief of permanent injunction could not have been granted by the trial court as well as by the first Appellate Court. This aspect of the case has been lost sight of by the High Court in the second appeal. 40. In the case of A. Subramanian v. R. Pannerselvam, (2021) 3 SCC 675 , it is observed by this Court that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction and/or protect his possession against the rightful owner, more particularly, when he fails to get the declaratory relief and the dispute with respect to the title comes to an end. 41. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction and/or protect his possession against the rightful owner, more particularly, when he fails to get the declaratory relief and the dispute with respect to the title comes to an end. 41. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar (supra) by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff in support of his submission that in a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's possession, the only thing the plaintiff will have to establish is that as on the date of the suit, he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant has tried to interfere or disturb his possession is concerned, what is observed by this Court in paragraph 15 is the “lawful possession” of the plaintiff. In the present case the plaintiff, who has failed to get any declaratory relief and the defendant No. 1 is held to be a true and absolute owner on the basis of the registered sale deed on payment of full sale consideration thereafter the plaintiff's possession cannot be said to be “lawful possession”. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any permanent injunction against the true owner in the instant case. 42. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has not properly appreciated the distinction between a substantive relief and a consequential relief. The High Court has observed that in the instant case the relief of permanent injunction can be said to be a substantive relief, which is clearly an erroneous view. It is to be noted that the main reliefs sought by the plaintiff in the suit were cancellation of the sale deed and declaration and the prayer of permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from disturbing her possession can be said to be a consequential relief. Therefore, the title to the property was the basis of the relief of possession. If that be so, in the present case, the relief for permanent injunction can be said to be a consequential relief and not a substantive relief as observed and held by the High Court. Therefore, the title to the property was the basis of the relief of possession. If that be so, in the present case, the relief for permanent injunction can be said to be a consequential relief and not a substantive relief as observed and held by the High Court. Therefore, once the plaintiff has failed to get any substantive relief of cancellation of the sale deed and failed to get any declaratory relief, and as observed hereinabove, relief of injunction can be said to be a consequential relief. Therefore, the prayer for permanent injunction must fail. In the instant case as the plaintiff cannot be said to be in lawful possession of the suit land, i.e., the possession of the plaintiff is “not legal or authorised by the law”, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any permanent injunction. 43. An injunction is a consequential relief and in a suit for declaration with a consequential relief of injunction, it is not a suit for declaration simpliciter, it is a suit for declaration with a further relief. Whether the further relief claimed has, in a particular case as consequential upon a declaration is adequate must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Where once a suit is held not maintainable, no relief of injunction can be granted. Injunction may be granted even against the true owner of the property, only when the person seeking the relief is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the property and also legally entitled to be in possession, not to disposes him, except in due process of law. 44. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that even if the plaintiff failed to get the declaratory relief and relief for cancellation of registered sale deed and her suit for the said reliefs came to be dismissed and the plaintiff is found to be in possession and therefore, the only remedy available to the defendant No. 1 would be to file a substantive suit to get back the possession is noticed only to be rejected outright. It is the contention on behalf of the plaintiff that once the plaintiff is found to be in possession, her possession cannot be disturbed except in due process of law and the defendant No. 1 though may be the true owner has to file a substantive suit for recovery of possession. It is the contention on behalf of the plaintiff that once the plaintiff is found to be in possession, her possession cannot be disturbed except in due process of law and the defendant No. 1 though may be the true owner has to file a substantive suit for recovery of possession. While considering the aforesaid submission, the decision of this Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 is required to be referred to. What is meant by due process of law has been explained by this court in paragraph 79, which reads as under:— “79. Due process of law means that nobody ought to be condemned unheard. The due process of law means a person in settled possession will not be dispossessed except by due process of law. Due process means an opportunity to the defendant to file pleadings including written statement and documents before the court of law. It does not mean the whole trial. Due process of law is satisfied the moment rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a competent court.” 45. In the said decision, this Court has approved the following findings of the High Court of Delhi in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Hotel Imperial (2006) 88 DRJ 545 :— “28. The expressions ‘due process of law’, ‘due course of law’ and ‘recourse to law’ have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed ‘forcibly’ by the true owner taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the same thing—ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly, ‘due process of law’ or ‘due course of law’, here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner. Now, this ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. Now, this ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the ‘bare minimum’ requirement of ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ of law would stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e. for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the ‘recourse to law’ stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made with regard to the first party's protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law.” 46. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision to the facts of the case on hand and once the rights of the parties are adjudicated and the defendant No. 1 is held to be the true owner on the basis of the registered sale deed and on payment of full sale consideration, it can be said that due process of law has been followed and thereafter the plaintiff is not entitled to any permanent injunction against the true owner." 29. In the instant case the case of defendants/respondents herein was based on the sale-deed dated 26.07.1988 and as such suit of plaintiff-appellant for permanent injunction simplicitor itself was maintainable. 30. Considering the aforesaid including the concurrent findings/ observation against the plaintiff-appellant regarding possession over the property in suit, which are based upon sale-deed and other documents on record as also after taking note of statements of P.W.1 and P.W.2 , cannot be treated as perverse as also taking note of settled principle related to a suit for permanent injunction simplcitor when there exists a cloud over the title/ownership of property in issue, this Court is of the view that the appeal lacks merit and no substantial question of law is involved in the instant appeal. 31. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed at the admission stage.