JUDGMENT G.S.PATEL, J. - The Appeal is directed against an interim order dtd. 26/11/2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Notice of Motion No.1189 of 2014. In that Notice of Motion the Plaintif sought an injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants from parting with possession and also sought the appointment of a Court Receiver to take physical possession of the suit premises, a bhel puri or chana kurmura vending shop. 2. After hearing both sides and considering the material on record, the learned Single Judge appointed the Court Receiver, directed the Receiver to take physical possession of the shop in question and then directed the Receiver to appoint the Plaintif as the Receiver's agent without security. The Receiver was to fx royalty which was to be deposited in Court and then invested. 3. Mr Railkar appears for the Appellants, original Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. He is not aggrieved by a previous order of injunction earlier granted by this Court. In any case, that injunction has been confrmed by Division Bench of this Court in Appeal on 9/12/2019. What aggrieves the Appellants is the order appointing the Court Receiver with an order to take possession from them and to put the Plaintif in possession. 4. For completeness, we note that on 1/8/2017 the Court had appointed a Court Receiver. This order was recalled at the instance of the 1st and 2nd Defendants since they said it was passed in their absence. The Plaintif's original Notice of Motion came to be restored to fle. 5. The parties are in dispute about Shop No.5, Ground Floor, Bajrang Kripa, N.M. Joshi Marg, Parel, Mumbai. The Plaintif says that her father Deep Narayan was a tenant of this shop. He conducted a chana-kurmura or bhel-puri business there. He did well for himself, and brought his younger brothers Mangruram and Baburam to Mumbai from Uttar Pradesh to help him in this business. Deep Narayan allowed his younger brothers to help in running the business. The Plaintif says that, at that time, Deep Narayan, Mangruram and Baburam each ran the business on a oneyear rotation until about 2012. Mr Railkar says that this narrative by the Plaintif may not be entirely accurate because of other documents. We will leave this aspect of the matter open for the present. 6. The Plaintif is Deep Narayan's daughter. Defendant No. 1 is Mangruram's son. Mr Railkar says that this narrative by the Plaintif may not be entirely accurate because of other documents. We will leave this aspect of the matter open for the present. 6. The Plaintif is Deep Narayan's daughter. Defendant No. 1 is Mangruram's son. Defendant No. 2 is the 1st Defendant's son. The Plaintif says that the 1st Defendant was, under this purported arrangement, to conduct the business in the shop for until the year ending 31/7/2012. He was then to make over the shop to Defendant No.3 (since deceased), Baburam, the other brother. The Plaintif claims that Mangruram's son and grandson refused to hand over the business and the shop to Baburam. They locked it up and did not even give possession to Baburam's sons, Defendants Nos. 4 and 5. 7. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 brought suit against the Plaintif in the City Civil Court and fled a Notice of Motion seeking a restraint from being dispossessed. That Notice of Motion was dismissed by the City Civil Court on 21/12/2012. 8. The Plaintif herself says that the possession of Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was permissive. She claims that these two Defendants have no right to occupy the premises. 9. Baburam's branch has supported the case of the Plaintif against Defendants Nos.1 and 2. 10. Defendants Nos.1 and 2 contested the Plaintif's Interim Application on the ground that all three brothers were co-tenants of the suit shop despite the fact that the rent received was only in the name of the eldest brother Deep Narayan. They relied on a joint declaration allegedly executed by Deep Narayan acknowledging the rights of the other brothers. They also claim that by an Afdavit dtd. 22/2/1990, Deep Narayan transferred his rights in the suit shop to Mangruram (the 1st and 2nd Defendants' father), and that upon Deep Narayan's death, his widow Anta Devi (the Plaintif's mother) executed a declaration relinquishing her right, title and interest in the shop in favour of the 1st Defendant, Mangruram's son. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 thus set up two claims. The frst was an acquisition of title and the second was that they continued in undisturbed possession and continued to run the business. The defence before the learned Single Judge was that the Plaintif was colluding with Baburam's branch to illegally dispossess Mangruram's son and grandson. Hence the City Civil Court suit. 11. The frst was an acquisition of title and the second was that they continued in undisturbed possession and continued to run the business. The defence before the learned Single Judge was that the Plaintif was colluding with Baburam's branch to illegally dispossess Mangruram's son and grandson. Hence the City Civil Court suit. 11. That litigation came up in appeal before a learned Single Judge of this Court who passed an order on 14/8/2013. For completeness of record, we note that the City Civil Court order on the 1st and 2nd Defendants' Notice of Motion was set aside in part and suit itself fled by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was disposed of with a protection to those Defendants until the Plaintif took legal steps to regain possession. 12. Mr Railkar says that his Special Leave Petition against that order is still pending. So noted. 13. Before the learned Single Judge, Mr Sanglikar for the Plaintif relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Ors v Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) Through LRs, (2012)5 SCC 370 . to say that if the possession of the 1st and 2nd Defendants was permissive, they were liable to be summarily removed. 14. In opposition Mr Railkar submitted before the learned Single Judge that Defendants Nos.1 and 2 were in possession. There was no indication by the Plaintif that the shop was in any imminent danger of waste or destruction warranting immediate relief. The possession of the 1st and 2nd Defendants could not be said to be not juridical i.e. such as the law did not recognize. Even on the Plaintif's own showing, the 1st and 2nd Defendant entered into possession in a permissive manner - whether from the plaintif or her predecessor in title. Mr Railkar cited several decisions regarding the appointment of a receiver. Before us he relies on the decision of Madras High Court in T Krishnaswamy Chetty v C Thangavelu Chetty & Ors.,AIR 11955 Madras 430. The decision in T Krishnaswamy Chetty enunciates fve principles regarding receivership. The fourth of these reads thus: (4) An order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the efect of depriving a defendant of a 'de facto' possession since that might cause irreparable wrong. The decision in T Krishnaswamy Chetty enunciates fve principles regarding receivership. The fourth of these reads thus: (4) An order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the efect of depriving a defendant of a 'de facto' possession since that might cause irreparable wrong. If the dispute is as to title only, the Court very reluctantly disturbs possession by receiver, but if the property is exposed to danger and loss and the person in possession has obtained it through, fraud or force the Court will interpose by receiver for the security of the property. It would be diferent where the property is shown to be 'in medio', that is to say, in the enjoyment of no one, as the Court can hardly do wrong in taking possession : it will then be the common interest of all the parties that the Court should prevent a scramble as no one seems to be in actual lawful enjoyment of the property and no harm can be done to anyone by taking it and preserving it for the beneft of the legitimate who may prove successful. Therefore, even if there is no allegation of waste and mismanagement the fact that the property is more or less 'in medio' is sufcient to vest a Court with jurisdiction to appoint a receiver." 15. The question is not whether the Court has the power to appoint a Receiver with a direction to take possession, but when such a power should be exercised. We are in respectful agreement with the view of the Madras High Court that the order of appointment of the Receiver at interim stage is not to be made for the asking. Where it has the efect of ejecting a defendant from actual and physical possession which is of some standing, such an order should be made only in the most extreme cases. The question is how one must balance the view of the Madras High Court in T Krishnaswamy Chetty and the Supreme Court decision in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes. The distinction perhaps is this. In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes, the Supreme Court had before it a matter coming up from the Panaji Seat of the Bombay High Court in a matter that arose under Portuguese law and inventory proceedings. The distinction perhaps is this. In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes, the Supreme Court had before it a matter coming up from the Panaji Seat of the Bombay High Court in a matter that arose under Portuguese law and inventory proceedings. In Maharashtra, the position in law as regards a gratuitous licensee - and a 'permissive licensee' is nothing but a gratuitous licensee - the position is now frmly settled by the Supreme Court decision in Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha v. Manhabala Jeram Damodar,(2013) 15 SCC 358..afrming the Full Bench decision of this Court in Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha v Manharbala Jeram Damodar,2007 SCC OnLine Bom 602 : (2007) 5 Mah LJ 341 (FB) : (2007) 5 Bom CR 1. The Supreme Court decision in Kotecha has been applied in Mahadev P Kambekar v Shree Krishna Woolen Mills (P) Ltd., (2020) 14 SCC 505 . This line of authority would suggest that it is not possible to eject a gratuitous licensee without regard to the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 and the exclusive jurisdiction that Act confers. Maria Margarida is, in any case, a decision of 2012, while Prabhudas Kotecha is of 2013 (and specifc to the situation in Mumbai). But this was not urged before the learned single Judge, and we will not, therefore, consider this any further. 16. What is more important for our purposes is that even from the documents that Mr Sanglikar has shown us, there is no doubt that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have been resisting dispossession (on various grounds). What merit those claims may have is for trial in the suit. There can also, in our view, be no doubt that the 1st and 2nd Defendants were in possession of the shop until the date of the suit. 17. Consequently, to order and ejectment of the defendants or dispossessing at the instance of the Court Receiver, the Plaintif would have had to show that there was some imminent danger to the property justifying to removal of the defendants from the premises. 18. In paragraph 18, the learned Single Judge took the view that the 1st and 2nd Defendants had not been able to establish a prima facie case of exclusive or settled possession in respect of the suit shop. It is this fnding regarding possession that we believe is unsustainable. 18. In paragraph 18, the learned Single Judge took the view that the 1st and 2nd Defendants had not been able to establish a prima facie case of exclusive or settled possession in respect of the suit shop. It is this fnding regarding possession that we believe is unsustainable. There were after all, over three possible claimants to possession: the Plaintif, the 1st and 2nd Defendants and Baburam's branch. There was no fourth option. Baburam's branch has no claim to possession. It supported the Plaintif. The Plaintif's claim to possession was based on the assertion that the building in which the shop is situated went into redevelopment by the housing authority, MHADA. There is a document in that regard in favour of the Plaintif's father Deep Narayan and MHADA is said to have delivered possession to the Plaintif. 19. But this seems to us to rather beg the question. If, according to the Plaintif, she was in possession on the basis of the document at Page 141, or other documents cited before the learned single Judge, then there was no reason for her to seek the removal of Defendants Nos.1 and 2. No case was pleaded in the Suit of forcible dispossession (as for example contemplated under Sec. 6 of the Specifc Relief Act). Indeed the entire application before learned Single Judge was (a) for an injunction against the 1st and 2nd Defendant's from parting with possession or creating any third party rights in respect of the shop; and (b) for a Court Receiver to take possession of the shop, i.e., for removal of the 1st and 2nd Defendants from the shop. This can only mean that the Plaintif was seeking possession from the 1st and 2nd Defendants; or, in other words, that it was the 1st and 2nd Defendants who were in possession. This aspect has not been overlooked by learned single Judge at all. 20. Further, in paragraph 18, the learned single Judge found that the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were permitted to conduct business in the suit shop on gratuitous basis. Such permissive possession does not create any right or interest to the property'. This is clearly an error in the prima facie assessment at an interim stage. The question of right or interest will be decided at the trial. It cannot be decided at this stage. Such permissive possession does not create any right or interest to the property'. This is clearly an error in the prima facie assessment at an interim stage. The question of right or interest will be decided at the trial. It cannot be decided at this stage. What is, however, clear is that the Defendants Nos.1 and 2 were found to be in possession. Therefore, absent a case of waste or destruction, they could not have been removed from possession at this stage and in this manner. Certainly the property had to be protected; and even Mr Railkar has no quarrel with the appointment of the Court Receiver per se. His objection is to what is virtually the ejectment of the 1st and 2nd Defendant's despite this fnding at an interim stage. We believe he is correct. The parties would have to be properly maintained in status quo and the property preserved. That seems to us to be the only order that was possible. 21. Having regard to the principle enunciated by the Madras High Court in T Krishnaswamy Chetty, with which we are in respectful agreement, we do not believe that it was possible for the learned Single Judge to have directed the Court Receiver to take possession from the 1st and 2nd Defendants and to appoint the Plaintif as his agent. We do not believe that this part of the impugned order can be sustained. It is, on facts and law, incorrect and untenable and lies outside the frame of the ratio of the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd v Antox India Pvt Ltd,1990 (Supp) SCC 727. as also Mohd Mehtab Khan v Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan., (2013) 9 SCC 221 . 22. In this appeal, by an order of 9/12/2019, the impugned order was stayed although the injunction against the Appellants was continued. By a later order dtd. 1/12/2021, the Division Bench continued the previous order. The Appellants undertook to deposit Rs.50,000.00 per month on or before the 15th of each month efective from 15/12/2021 with the Court Receiver until the Appeal was fnally disposed of. In default, the Court Receiver was to take physical possession. Mr Railkar informs us that royalty has been paid although an agency agreement has not been executed. The Appellants undertook to deposit Rs.50,000.00 per month on or before the 15th of each month efective from 15/12/2021 with the Court Receiver until the Appeal was fnally disposed of. In default, the Court Receiver was to take physical possession. Mr Railkar informs us that royalty has been paid although an agency agreement has not been executed. The non-execution of the agency agreement might be an oversight on the part of Court Receiver, possibly due to the absence of a specifc direction in the order of the Court. 23. In this view of the matter, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned order is substituted by the following order: (a) The Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay will continue as a Receiver in respect of the suit shop; (b) The possession of Defendants Nos.1 and 2 of the suit shop which has continued until today is not to be disturbed; (c) The Court Receiver will ensure that the Court Receiver's board is placed on the shop. (d) Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are under no circumstances to remove that sign board. (e) Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 will execute an agency agreement with the Court Receiver within one week from today. (f ) Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 will continue to pay royalty at the rate of Rs.50,000.00 per month until fnal disposal of the suit. (g) Liberty to the Plaintif to make an application for either enhancement of the royalty or for withdrawal of the amount deposited, or both. Any such application will be decided on its own merits. (h) Should the 1st and 2nd Defendants commit a single default either in payment of royalty or in any other manner breach the terms of this order, the Court Receiver will proceed to take possession, forcibly if necessary, and remove the 1st and 2nd Defendants. In doing so, the Court Receiver may take the assistance of the local police authorities, who will act on production of an authenticated copy of this order and will not insist on a certifed copy. If the Court Receiver resumes possession under this direction, the Court Receiver will put the Plaintif into possession though without payment of security. Any royalty payable by the Plaintif will have to be decided in a separate Interim Application or on a separate Court Receiver's report. If the Court Receiver resumes possession under this direction, the Court Receiver will put the Plaintif into possession though without payment of security. Any royalty payable by the Plaintif will have to be decided in a separate Interim Application or on a separate Court Receiver's report. (i) The existing injunction against 1st and 2nd Defendants from creating any third party rights, alienations or encumbrances on the suit shop will continue until fnal disposal of the suit. 24. Mr. Sanglikar states that his client is willing to pay a higher royalty for the appointment of agent of the receiver in respect of the shop. We leave it open to the Plaintif to fle an appropriate Interim Application in this regard before a learned Single Judge. That application will be decided on its merits. This order is not to be construed as concluding that issue fnally. 25. The Appeal is disposed of in these terms. No order as to costs.