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2022 DIGILAW 1505 (RAJ)

Maya Verma v. Union Of India

2022-05-10

ANOOP KUMAR DHAND, PANKAJ BHANDARI

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. Instant petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 08.03.2022 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench-Jaipur (for short 'the Tribunal'). 2. The petitioner submitted Original Application before the Tribunal with the following prayer:- "(i) the respondents may be directed to treat the regular service of the applicant from her date of initial appointment i.e 16.06.1981 or from the date of first D.P.C. i.e 27.08.1982 or from the date of second D.P.C held in the year 1985 and counting qualifying service for the purpose of granting A.C.P and M.A.C.P. and further for the purpose of all consequential benefits including pension and gratuity. (ii) The respondents may be directed to re-fix the pay of the applicant in the pay scale given to the other Lab. Technicians working in the other central Government departments including C.G.H.S as recommended by 5th and 6th pay commission report and accepted by the Central Government. All consequential benefits including arrear of pay and allowances may also be allowed to the applicant. (iii) Grant such other and further reliefs which are expedient in favour of the applicant. (iv) Cost of the OA may be awarded in favour of the humble applicant." 3. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the Tribunal rejected the Original Application by observing thus:- "After going through the pleadings and hearing the arguments of the learned counsels of both the parties, it is clear that the claim of the applicant, for change in the date of her entitlement of ACP and MACP, is based on the premise that the date of her appointment is not in the year 1989, but in 1981, when she was initially engaged as outsider Laboratory Technician (or when the Selection Committee/DPC cleared her for regular appointment in the year 1982 or in 1987). These claims, which are being raised almost 3 decades after the appointment (as these relate to the date of appointment), almost one and a half decade after the grant of first ACP, and almost a decade after the grant of MACP, are prima-facie barred by period of limitation. The claims, therefore, deserve to be rejected on that account alone. These claims, which are being raised almost 3 decades after the appointment (as these relate to the date of appointment), almost one and a half decade after the grant of first ACP, and almost a decade after the grant of MACP, are prima-facie barred by period of limitation. The claims, therefore, deserve to be rejected on that account alone. However, we are going into the merits of the claim, on account of the applicant claiming it to be causing a continuing loss, and also in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation in case a contrary view is taken by a higher court. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the very fact that she is asking for three dates, with reference to which to consider her eligibility for grant of ACP/MACP benefit (years 1981, 1982 or 1985) shows how vague her prayer for relief is. It is difficult to disagree with this argument. By seeking relief from 3 different dates, it is clear that the applicant is not sure about her own claim and is using this OA as a kind of fishing exercise to get whatever she can get in this regard. Since the counting of the period of ACP/MACP always starts with the date of appointment, there could still be some scope for arguing to get the relief from the date of alleged initial appointment. However, there can be no justification for claiming it from the date of the decision of a Selection Committee/DPC to recommend a person's appointment. Again, if, for the sake of arguments, it was to be considered that it was not a Selection Committee but a Departmental promotion Committee, the selection of the applicant would be considered a promotion, and it would, for the very same reason, be a benefit to be counted for not granting the time bound promotion benefit like ACP (which is given only when a person gets no promotion during a period). The only reason to give some credence to the applicant's claim is the mention, in Annexure A./4, about treating another person, Mrs. Kusum Geoerge, who is said to have been recommended for selection by a DPC held in the year 1985, a junior to the applicant in rank. However, in the absence of any other, more direct and substantive evidence to prove that both the applicant and Mrs. Kusum Geoerge, who is said to have been recommended for selection by a DPC held in the year 1985, a junior to the applicant in rank. However, in the absence of any other, more direct and substantive evidence to prove that both the applicant and Mrs. Kusum George were regular appointees before their selection and appointment in the year 1989, we cannot positively conclude that they were regular appointees before that date. The respondents have categorically denied it. The applicant has not only given no further evidence (other than what is mentioned above), but has also apparently acquiesced to the fact of her appointment in the year 1989, by taking no action to challenge that date, or the subsequent grant of ACP/MACP on the basis of that date. Thus, the claims of the applicant, which are prima-facie time-barred for being raised after such a long period after the initial dates when these should have been raised, also do not have any prima-facie merit. The OA, is thus found to be time-barred and also bereft of any merit. It is, therefore, dismissed with no orders with respect to costs." 4. We have heard the counsel for the petitioner and it is not in dispute that the petitioner is seeking direction to treat regular services of the petitioner from the date of initial appointment that is 16.06.1981 or from the date of first DPC that 27.08.1982 or from the date of second DPC held in the year 1987 and counting her qualifying service for the purpose of grant of A.C.P and M.A.C.P, further direction has been sought for granting consequential benefits including the pension and gratuity. 5. In Board of Secondary Education of Assam v. Mohd. Sarifuz Zaman, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 408 , the Apex Court has observed as follows: "12. Delay defeats discretion and loss of limitation destroys the remedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit of discretionary power being denied on principles of equity. Loss of limitation resulting into depriving of the remedy, is a principle based on public policy and utility and not equity alone." 6. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ], the Apex Court held thus: "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ], the Apex Court held thus: "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction." 7. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T. T. Murali Babu 2014 (4) SCC 108 , the Apex Court held as follows: "Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not." 8. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. R.K.Zalpuri reported in 2015 (15) SCC 602 , the Apex Court, at paragraph 27, held as follows: "27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim Deo gratias thanks to God." 9. It appears that the petitioner was well-aware for her right since 1981 but she kept mum for three decades and after attaining the age of superannuation, she woke up and raised the claim after an inordinate delay of more than 30 years. The petitioner is not clear about the date from which she is seeking the benefits. 10. There is no illegality in order passed by the Tribunal. 11. The petition is hereby dismissed in limine.