ORDER 1. The case of the petitioner is that he is the owner of lands bearing Khasra No.1032/2 measuring 1.312 hectare and Khasra No.1021/1 measuring 0.0310 hectare situated in Devendranagar, District Panna. That he is a farmer. His ancestors have been enjoying easementary rights over Khasra No.1031/2 and Khasra No.1021/1 for more than 50 years. That the respondent No.5 installed a board on Khasra No.1022 and Khasra No.1023/1 stating that the land is disputed and has physically stopped the petitioner to access his agricultural land bearing Khasra No.1032/2 and Khasra No.1021/1. Thereafter, he filed an application under section 131 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short "the Code of 1959") seeking right of entry into the land in order to reach his agricultural land. By the impugned order, the same was rejected. Hence, this writ petition. 2. Learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner's counsel submits that the order passed by the Tahsildar is erroneous. That all that the petitioner wants is a right to approach his land. That section 131 clearly provides for grant of an interim relief to the petitioner. That the petitioner is entitled for such an order. The order passed by the trial court is therefore erroneous. 3. The same is disputed by the Deputy Advocate General appearing for respondents No.1 to 4. He supports the case of the Tehsildar who has dismissed the application under section 131 of the Code of 1959 on the grounds that there is a decree of the civil court and also there is an interim order passed in W.P No. 14851 of 2015, which is a Public Interest Litigation. 4. Heard learned counsels. 5. The right to be exercised by the Tehsildar under section 131 of the Code of 1959 is as contemplated under the said section itself. Therefore, in case of any enquiry, an interim order could also be granted for a period not exceeding 90 days. However, admittedly a Suit No.10-A of 1999 in the court of First Civil Judge Class-II Panna, District Panna was decreed with regard to title and possession by order dated 28.9.2001. Therefore, the plaintiffs therein were declared to be the owner and in possession of the land in question. The very same land is the land through which the petitioner seeks to enter or seeks easementary rights to reach his land. Therefore, the plaintiffs therein were declared to be the owner and in possession of the land in question. The very same land is the land through which the petitioner seeks to enter or seeks easementary rights to reach his land. The Teshildar having considered the same, came to the view that in the existence of a decree of a civil Court, he has no powers to entertain the same. The second ground urged is that there was an interim order granted in the Public Interest Litigation with regard to maintenance of status quo. 6. We are of the considered view that the reasoning assigned by the Tehsildar appears to be just and appropriate. Irrespective of the plea of the petitioner, the admitted fact is that there is a decree passed by a civil Court with regard to title and possession. The claim of the writ petitioner herein is a claim based on easementary rights. A right of easement is necessarily alien to the right of title. The title of defendant being accepted, the plaintiff could always seek a right of easement over the land in question for various reasons therein. However, when a decree for title and possession has been passed, the Tehsildar would not have any power under section 131 of the Code of 1959 to pass an order to the contrary. If any order is to be passed under section 131 of the Code of 1959, the same would amount to violation of the judgment and decree of the trial court, which is impermissible. Therefore, the Tahsildar was justified in rejecting the application. We find no good ground to entertain this writ petition. 7. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. 8. Pending interlocutory application is disposed off. ................ 2023 (1) RN 92 (HIGH COURT) Vivek Rusia, J. Remound Estate Pvt. Ltd. through Director v. Mohammad Saleem Ghori & others Miscellaneous Petition No. 5944 of 2022 (Indore); against the order dated 16.11.2022 passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Dhar; Decided on 7.12.2022 Rohinton T. Thanevala for petitioner; Bharat I. Mehta with Jitendra Mehta for respondent No. 1; Shantanu Chourasia, Panel Lawyer for respondent No. 12/State. fofufnZ"V vuqr¨"k vfèkfu;e] 1963 & èkkjk 14 rFkk 16 & lafonk d¢ fofufnZ"V vuqikyu gsrq lkewfgd okn & pyus ;¨X; g¨uk & ;kph rFkk çR;FkÊx.k Øekad 1 ls 11 d¢ eè; i`Fkd~&i`Fkd~ djkj & çR;sd djkj ls Lora= okn gsrqd xfBr gksrk gS & dfri; fook|d] tSls fd rS;kjh v©j jtkeanh vFkok ;g fd lafonk dk Òax fdlus fd;k gS] ijh{k.k ;¨X; gSa & lkewfgd okn pyus ;¨X; ugha & fopkj.k U;k;ky; us i`Fkd~&i`Fkd~ okn çLrqr djus dk funs'k nsus esa d¨Ã =qfV ugha dhA ¼1999½ 3 ,l lh lh 457] , vkb vkj 1947 ukxŒ 86 rFkk ¼1995½ 2 ,l lh lh 147 fufnZ"VA ¼iSjk 10 ls 12½ Specific Relief Act, 1963 -- Ss. 14 and 16 -- common suit for specific performance of contract -- maintainability -- separate agreements between petitioner and respondents No. 1 to 11 -- each agreement constitutes independent cause of action -- certain issues like readiness and willingness by parties or who have breached contract are liable to examined -- common suit not maintainable -- trial Court has not committed any error by directing to file separate suits. (1999) 3 SCC 457 , AIR 1947 Nag. 86 and (1995) 2 SCC 147 referred to. [Paras 10 to 12] ORDER 1. The petitioner/plaintiff has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being aggrieved by the order dated 16.11.2022, whereby learned IV Additional District Judge, Dhar has directed to file separate suits against the defendants for specific performance of the contract and value them separately. 2. The petitioner, a company duly registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 agreed to purchase agricultural land of various survey numbers on 14.3.2005 with its respective owners (i.e. respondents No.1 to 11). According to the petitioner/plaintiff, all the land mentioned in para – 5.2 of the writ petition is on a single map and the petitioner is interested to purchase the entire area of all the land as one chunk to start its industry. Respondents No.1 to 11, were also interested in selling the land jointly to the petitioner. The deal was finalized through middleman Saleem Ghori. The petitioner agreed to purchase the land @ Rs.3,18,000/- per hectare, accordingly paid Rs.1,03,00,000/- by various cheques and cash amount of Rs.75,00,000/- to Ghori Family. 3. Accordingly, respondents No.1 to 11 did not perform their part as per the terms of the contract. The deal was finalized through middleman Saleem Ghori. The petitioner agreed to purchase the land @ Rs.3,18,000/- per hectare, accordingly paid Rs.1,03,00,000/- by various cheques and cash amount of Rs.75,00,000/- to Ghori Family. 3. Accordingly, respondents No.1 to 11 did not perform their part as per the terms of the contract. The petitioner / Company had filed a civil suit for the decree of specific performance against respondents No.1 to 11 by joining them as defendants in the said suit. Respondents No.1 to 5 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973 seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds of limitation, misjoinder of the cause of action and misjoinder of parties etc. Vide order dated 16.11.2022, the learned IV Additional District Judge has held that each agreement constitutes an independent cause of action, hence, directed to file ten separate suits for each owner of the respective land. Hence, the present miscellaneous petition is before this Court. 4. Shri Thanevala, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner with an interest to purchase a big area of land entered into an agreement to sell with the land owners i.e. respondents No.1 to 11 jointly in order to establish a dairy form. Even if one or two of the owner refuse the sale of the land, then the petitioner may not agree to purchase the other land as well. By way of alternate relief, the petitioner / Company is seeking a refund of the amount. It is further submitted that possession of the land is with the petitioner. The cause of action and relief against all the respondents are identical, therefore, in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings, one suit has been filed against the defendants which are permissible under Order I Rule 3 of the CPC. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of Iswar Bhai C. Patel Alias Bachu Bhai Patel v. Harihar Behera & Another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 457 , in which the apex Court has held that the purpose of Order I Rule 3 of the CPC is to avoid the multiplicity of the suit. This rule to some extent deals with the joinder of the cause of action in as much as the plaintiff frames his suit, he impleads persons against whom he claims the cause of action. It has further been held that joinder of the cause of action has been provided for in Order II Rule 3 of the CPC. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon a judgment delivered by the Nagpur High Court in the case of Parashramsao & Others v. Hiralal S/o Adku Patil reported in AIR 1947 Nag 86, in which the Nagpur High Court has held that Order II Rule 6 of the CPC does not contemplate that plaintiff should be asked to file a separate suit. 5. Shri Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submits that by consolidating all the defendants and causes of action in one suit, the plaintiff has paid the maximum amount of the court fee to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/- otherwise on the basis of valuation of the property in the agreement, each and every suit is liable to be valued and charged with ad valorem court fee. It is further submitted that on the basis of the valuation of the property and suit, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court is also liable to be decided, therefore, if the petitioner is permitted to file a joint suit, then all the issue cannot be considered by the trial Court. Appreciation and conclusion 6. For ready reference, Order I Rule 3 of CPC is reproduced below:- “3. Who may be joined as defendants.—All persons may be joined in one suit as defendants where— (a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist against such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and (b) if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise. 3A. Power to order separate trials where joinder of defendants may embarrass or delay trial.—Where it appears to the Court that any joinder of defendants may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient in the interests of justice.” 7. 3A. Power to order separate trials where joinder of defendants may embarrass or delay trial.—Where it appears to the Court that any joinder of defendants may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient in the interests of justice.” 7. The aforesaid provision of law provides that who may be joined as a defendant according to which all persons may be jointed in one suit where the right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction is alleged to exist against such persons or if separate suits were brought against such person, the common question of law or fact would arise in order to avoid multiplicity of the suit. In order to join any person as a defendant, it is required to be examined where the person is necessary party without whom no order can be made effectively or a proper party in whose absence an effective order can be passed by the Court. 8. Order I Rule 3A of the CPC gives power to the Court to order separate trials, where the joinder of the defendant may embarrass or delay the trial. In this provision where it appears to the Court that any joinder of defendants may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient in the interests of justice. This provision was inserted in the CPC by Act of 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977 i.e. prior to the judgment passed by the Nagpur Bench in the year 1946. 9. In the present case, the trial Court has observed that there are various issues which are required to be decided between the parties like limitation, court fee, valuation etc., therefore, in the interest of justice, separate suits are liable to be filed. 10. Even otherwise, it is the suit for specific performance of the contract, in which certain issues like continuous readiness and willingness by the parties or who have breached the contract are liable to be examined. There cannot be an omnibus allegation or generalized way of conduct between the seller and purchaser in different agreements to sale. 10. Even otherwise, it is the suit for specific performance of the contract, in which certain issues like continuous readiness and willingness by the parties or who have breached the contract are liable to be examined. There cannot be an omnibus allegation or generalized way of conduct between the seller and purchaser in different agreements to sale. The plaintiff entered into a separate agreement to sale with each landowners i.e. respondents No.1 to 11 in respect of the land, therefore, especially in the suit for specific performance of a contract, there cannot be a joinder of cause of action as well as the parties when every agreement to sale or its non-performance constitutes a separate cause of action. 11. In the case of Ishwar Bhai C. Patel (supra), the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of money against defendants No.1 and 2, where defendant No.2 gave money to the plaintiff from the account of defendant No.1, therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit against both the defendants to recover the money. The trial Court has decreed the suit only against defendant No.2 and not against defendant No.1. In the said facts and circumstances of the case, the apex Court has examined the provisions of Order I Rule 3 and Order II Rule 3 of the CPC. In this case, in respect of the agreement between the plaintiff and respondent No.1, defendants No.2 to 11 are neither necessary or the proper parties. The apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra Alias Gadasa Guru reported in (1995) 2 SCC 147 has specifically held that Order I Rule 3 is not applicable to the suit for specific performance because admittedly, the respondent was not a party to the contract. The apex Court has held that under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC, the Court may have the power to strike out the name of parties improperly joined or add the parties on an application, but the condition precedent is that Court must be satisfied that presence of parties would not be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the question involved in the suit. 12. In my considered opinion, the learned trial Court has not committed any error of law by directing the petitioner to file separate suits against respondents No.1 to 11. 12. In my considered opinion, the learned trial Court has not committed any error of law by directing the petitioner to file separate suits against respondents No.1 to 11. In view of the above, the Miscellaneous Petition stands dismissed. The order passed by this Court shall be complied with within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order.