JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Anurag Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Pratyush Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 13.07.2016 passed by the Chief Conservator of Forest, Southern Region, U.P., Allahabad, by which the representation of the petitioner dated 23.04.2016 has been rejected. The petitioner has further prayed for a direction to the opposite party nos. 1 to 5 to provide seniority to the petitioner from February 1994. 3. It would be apt to refer the brief facts of the case for adjudication of the case in hand. Initially, the petitioner was engaged on daily wage basis on the post of Driver in the Forest Department. He approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No.307(S/S) of 1994 claiming his regularization. The interim order was passed in the writ petition on 21.01.1994, by means of which it was provided that the opposite parties shall consider the matter of regularization of the petitioner and the petitioner shall be paid salary in the regular scale of pay as admissible to the driver until further orders. In pursuance thereof, a Selection Committee was constituted and in pursuance of the report of the Selection Committee, the petitioner was appointed on the post of driver by means of the order dated 25.01.1995 in the pay scale of 950-1500 and he was paid the regular salary by the Divisional Director, Social Forestry Division Pratapgarh. The said order was passed subject to final outcome of the pending writ petition. The services of the petitioner were confirmed vide order dated 06.02.2009. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed for want of prosecution on 18.01.2013. 4. The petitioner again approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No.7632(S/S) of 2009 for payment of regular salary w.e.f February 1994 to 25.01.1995 in compliance of the interim order dated 29.01.1994 passed in Writ Petition No.307(S/S) of 1994. In the said writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner after arguing at some length restricted his prayer for a direction to the extent that for redressal of his grievance, the petitioner may be permitted to make a fresh representation to the opposite party no.5 therein and he may be directed to consider and decide the same within some stipulated period. Accordingly, the writ petition was disposed of by means of the order dated 19.11.2019, without entering into the merits of the case, with liberty to the petitioner to make a fresh representation to the opposite party no.5 and the opposite party no.5 was directed to consider and decide the representation, in case the petitioner moves representation within 10 days, by a reasoned and speaking order as per law. In pursuance thereof, representation was decided and the petitioner was paid remaining salary w.e.f. 01.02.1994 to 25.01.1995. 5. The petitioner preferred a representation on 10.01.2014 for correction of his seniority and claiming seniority from 01.02.1994 on the ground that the petitioner has been given regular pay scale since February 1994 in compliance of order passed by this Court on 29.01.1994 in Writ Petition No.307(S/S) of 1994 and the regular appointment has been given to the petitioner on 25.01.1995, therefore he is entitled for seniority w.e.f. 01.02.1994. The petitioner again preferred a representation on 17.11.2015. However, though some recommendations were made but the petitioner was not given the seniority and the tentative seniority list was issued on 22.03.2016, in which the petitioner was placed at serial No.19 on the basis of the date of appointment i.e. 25.01.1995. The objections were called from the employees. The petitioner also filed objection. Thereafter he again approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No.7976(S/S) of 2016, which was disposed of by means of order dated 13.04.2016. The order dated 13.04.2016 is extracted here-in-below: "Heard learned counsel for the parties. Let the petitioner implead the Chief Conservation Officers, Forest Division, U.P. Allahabad as opposite party in the writ petition during the course of the day. Let the newly impleaded opposite party no. 6 consider and take a decision on the recommendation of the opposite party no. 5 in accordance with rules, if there is no other legal impediment. If in the process of considering the same it is found that the seniority of other persons would be affected then the benefit of seniority placement as claimed shall not be given to the petitioner unless an opportunity to submit objection is provided to the affected persons and then objections are considered as per law. The officer shall also verify the relevant facts as regards the validity of the petitioner's appointment/ regularization and the result of Writ Petition No. 307(SS) of 1994. The officer shall also verify the relevant facts as regards the validity of the petitioner's appointment/ regularization and the result of Writ Petition No. 307(SS) of 1994. All pleas are open for being considered by him. This exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is submitted. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is disposed of. There shall be no orders as costs." 6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order passed by this Court on 13.04.2016, the case of the petitioner has been considered and the representation, filed in pursuance to the aforesaid order, on 23.04.2016 has been rejected by means of the impugned order dated 13.07.2016, contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition, providing therein that the petitioner shall remain at serial No.19 of the Zonal Seniority List. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition assailing the said order. 7. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was treated as a regular employee in compliance of the order dated 21.09.1994 passed in Writ Petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994 and paid salary in regular Pay-Scale w.e.f. 01.02.1994 but the petitioner has not been given seniority from that date, whereas the petitioner was appointed on regular basis on the basis of said interim order on 25.01.1995, therefore he is entitled for seniority from February 1994. Thus the impugned order is not sustainable and liable to be quashed. 8. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, while opposing the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the salary in regular pay-scale was paid to the petitioner only in compliance of the interim order passed by this Court as he was working on daily wage basis, however he was appointed on regular basis on 25.01.1995, therefore he is entitled for seniority only from that date. He further submitted that the said writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution, therefore the claim made in the said writ petition was not adjudicated, therefore the petitioner is not entitled for any benefit of the interim order except the salary which has already been paid. He further submitted that the petitioner was appointed on 25.01.1995 and he is entitled for all service benefits including seniority and has been given from the said date. He further submitted that the petitioner was appointed on 25.01.1995 and he is entitled for all service benefits including seniority and has been given from the said date. The impugned order has rightly been passed in accordance with law. The writ petition is mis-conceived and liable to be dismissed. 9. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 10. The issue involved in this case is as to whether the petitioner is entitled for seniority w.e.f. 25.01.1995, the date of appointment of the petitioner or from February 1994, from when the petitioner has been paid salary in regular pay scale in compliance of interim order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994, while the petitioner was working on daily wage basis. 11. The petitioner was initially appointed, on the post of driver in the Forest Department, on daily wage basis. It appears that the petitioner was not being regularized, therefore he approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No.307(S/S) of 1994. An interim order was passed in the said writ petition on 29.01.1994 and the opposite parties were directed to consider the matter of regularization of the petitioner. Further direction was issued that the petitioner shall be paid salary in the regular scale of pay as admissible to the driver until further orders. In pursuance thereof, a Selection Committee was constituted and the petitioner was considered by the Selection Committee for appointment and on the basis of the report of the Selection Committee, the petitioner was appointed on the post of driver under the Drivers Service Rules by means of the order dated 25.01.1995 and paid salary in the regular scale of pay. The writ Petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994 was dismissed for non-prosecution on 18.01.2013. Therefore the issue as to whether the petitioner was regularly appointed or not and he is entitled for regularization from a date prior to 25.01.1995 or not, has not been adjudicated by this Court, whereas the petitioner has been appointed after due selection by means of the order dated 25.01.1995. 12. The petitioner approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No.7632 (S/S) of 2009 for a direction to the opposite parties to pay regular pay scale w.e.f. February 1994 to 25.01.1995, in compliance of the interim order dated 21.01.1994 passed in Writ Petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994. 12. The petitioner approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No.7632 (S/S) of 2009 for a direction to the opposite parties to pay regular pay scale w.e.f. February 1994 to 25.01.1995, in compliance of the interim order dated 21.01.1994 passed in Writ Petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 19.11.2009 on a request made by learned counsel for the petitioner, without entering into the merits of the case, with liberty to the petitioner to move fresh representation and direction was issued to consider and dispose of the representation of the petitioner. Therefore the order passed by this Court in the said writ petition was only to the extent of payment of salary w.e.f. February 1994 to 25.01.1995 in the regular pay scale of driver in compliance of interim order dated 21.01.1994. The respondents, in compliance of the aforesaid order dated 19.11.2009, passed the order dated 27.05.2010 and paid the difference of salary in the regular pay scale paid between February 1994 to 25.01.1995 in compliance of the order dated 21.01.1994, which was received by the petitioner. 13. The seniority of the petitioner was fixed at serial No.19 in the seniority list of Southern Zone, U.P., Allahabad. Though some recommendations were made for giving seniority to the petitioner w.e.f. February 1994 but no decision was taken, therefore the petitioner approached this Court by means of Writ petition No.7976(S/S) of 2016 (Vanshraj Sharma versus State of U.P. and others). The said writ petition was disposed of by means of order dated 13.04.2016, which has been reproduced above in paragraph 5 with direction to the newly impleaded opposite party no.6 i.e. Chief Conservation Officer, Forest Division, U.P. Allahabad to consider and take decision on the recommendation of the opposite party no.5 therein, in accordance with the Rules, if there is no other legal impediment. It was also provided that if in the process of considering the same, it is found that the seniority of other persons would be affected, then the benefit of seniority and placement as claimed shall not be given to the petitioner unless an opportunity to submit objection is provided to the affected persons and then objections are considered as per law. It was also specifically provided in the order dated 13.04.2016 passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition that the officer shall also verify the relevant facts as regards the validity of the petitioner's appointment/reguarlization and the result of writ petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994. Therefore it is apparent that the case of the petitioner for seniority w.e.f. February 1994 was to be considered in the light of the result of the writ petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994, which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 18.01.2013. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred a representation on 23.04.2016. 14. The representation of the petitioner has been considered by the respondent No.4 and rejected by means of the order dated 13.07.2016, impugned in this writ petition. The respondent no.4 has recorded that the Writ Petition No.307(S/S) of 1994 was dismissed for non-prosecution on 18.01.2013. 15. Admittedly, the petitioner has been appointed on regular basis by means of the order dated 25.01.1995, therefore merely on the ground that an interim order was passed by this Court on 01.02.1994 in the writ petition filed by the petitioner for payment of salary in the regular pay scale does not entitle him seniority from the date, the same was paid by the respondents under the interim order passed by this Court. The writ petition was dismissed for non-prosecution, therefore as to whether the petitioner has been appointed regularly or not or as to whether he is entitled for regularization prior to 25.01.1995 has not been adjudicated upon by this Court, therefore once the writ petition was dismissed, any interim order passed therein would have no effect except for the direction issued by the order because there cannot be two orders governing the field at a time and the interim order merges into final order. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed and others versus State of Kerala and another; (2000) 6 SCC 359 , while considering the doctrine of merger has held that there cannot be more than one operative orders governing the same subject matter at a given point of time. 17. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed and others versus State of Kerala and another; (2000) 6 SCC 359 , while considering the doctrine of merger has held that there cannot be more than one operative orders governing the same subject matter at a given point of time. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a recent judgment and order dated 25.03.2022 passed in Civil Appeal No. 2417 of 2022; State of U.P. and others versus Prem Chopra, has held that once the proceedings, wherein a stay was granted, are dismissed, any interim order granted earlier in the said proceedings merges with the final order, therefore the interim order comes to an end with the dismissal of the proceedings. The relevant paragraph 24 is extracted here-in-below:- "24. From the above discussion, it is clear that imposition of a stay on the operation of an order means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order. However, it does not mean that the stayed order is wiped out from the existence, unless it is quashed. Once the proceedings, wherein a stay was 7 granted, are dismissed, any interim order granted earlier merges with the final order. In other words, the interim order comes to an end with the dismissal of the proceedings. In such a situation, it is the duty of the Court to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim order of the court, unless the order granting interim stay or final order dismissing the proceedings specifies otherwise. On the dismissal of the proceedings or vacation of the interim order, the beneficiary of the interim order shall have to pay interest on the amount withheld or not paid by virtue of the interim order." 18. Thus the petitioner is not entitled for any benefit on account of the interim order except the salary as directed, which has been paid to the petitioner. 19. The definition of substantive appointment given under the Rules of 1991 is, "substantive appointment" means an appointment, not being an ad hoc appointment, on a post in the cadre of the service, made after selection in accordance with the service rules relating to that service. 19. The definition of substantive appointment given under the Rules of 1991 is, "substantive appointment" means an appointment, not being an ad hoc appointment, on a post in the cadre of the service, made after selection in accordance with the service rules relating to that service. Therefore the seniority can be reckoned only from the date of substantive appointment and the period of service, on the basis of appointment made dehors the Rules, cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority. In the present case, initially the petitioner was appointed on daily wage basis, which is made only in exigencies of service. 20. It is also noticed by this Court that while considering the case of the petitioner in compliance of order passed by this Court, an explanation was also called from Sri Inder Prasad, who is at serial No.18 of the seniority list. He, in his objection, has stated that he was appointed on regular basis on 28.02.1994 and the petitioner is junior to him. Therefore the petitioner, who was appointed on regular basis on 25.01.1995 cannot be given seniority over and above him. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sanjay K. Sinha-II and others versus State of Bihar and others; (2004) 10 SCC 734 , has held that it is settled law that appointments made contrary to the rules are merely fortuitous and do not confer benefit of seniority on the appointees over and above the regular/substantive appointees to the service. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Rashi Mani Mishra and others versus State of U.P. and others; 2021 SCC Online SC 509, considering the Rules of 1991 has held that as per Seniority Rules 1991, applicable in the present case, seniority is to be counted from the date of “substantive appointment” and “substantive appointment” means, an appointment, not being an ad hoc appointment. 23. Relying on the aforesaid judgment, recently the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Malook Singh and others versus State of Punjab and others; Civil Appeal No.6026-6028 of 2021, by means of the judgment and order dated 28.09.2021, has held that seniority which has to be counted from “substantive appointment” would not include ad hoc service. Relevant paragraph 20 of the judgment is extracted here-in-below:- "20. Relevant paragraph 20 of the judgment is extracted here-in-below:- "20. The law on the issue of whether the period of ad hoc service can be counted for the purpose of determining seniority has been settled by this Court in multiple cases. In Direct Recruits (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed: “13. When the cases were taken up for hearing before us, it was faintly suggested that the principle laid down in Patwardhan case [ (1977) 3 SCC 399 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 391: (1977) 3 SCR 775 ] was unsound and fit to be overruled, but no attempt was made to substantiate the plea. We were taken through the judgment by the learned counsel for the parties more than once and we are in complete agreement with the ratio decidendi, that the period of continuous officiation by a government servant, after his appointment by following the rules applicable for substantive appointments, has to be taken into account for determining his seniority; and seniority cannot be determined on the sole test of confirmation, for, as was pointed out, confirmation is one of the inglorious uncertainties of government service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the availability of substantive vacancies. The principle for deciding inter se seniority has to conform to the principles of equality spelt out by Articles 14 and 16. If an CA 6026-28/2021 appointment is made by way of stop-gap arrangement, without considering the claims of all the eligible available persons and without following the rules of appointment, the experience on such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular appointee, because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. To equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would violate the equality clause. But if the appointment is made after considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance with the rules made for regular substantive appointments, there is no reason to exclude the officiating service for purpose of seniority. Same will be the position if the initial appointment itself is made in accordance with the rules applicable to substantive appointments as in the present case. To hold otherwise will be discriminatory and arbitrary….. 47. Same will be the position if the initial appointment itself is made in accordance with the rules applicable to substantive appointments as in the present case. To hold otherwise will be discriminatory and arbitrary….. 47. To sum up, we hold that (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to a rule, his seniority has to counted from the date of appointment and not according to date of his confirmation. The corollary to the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account considering the seniority.” (emphasis supplied) The decision in Direct Recruits (supra) stands for the principle that ad hoc service cannot be counted for determining the seniority if the initial appointment has been made as a stop gap arrangement and not according to rules. The reliance placed by the Single Judge in the judgement dated 6 December 1991 on Direct Recruits (supra) to hold that the ad hoc service should be counted for conferring the benefit of seniority in the present case is clearly misplaced. This principle laid down in Direct Recruits (supra) was subsequently followed by this Court in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India. Recently a two judge Bench of this Court in Rashi Mani Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, of which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part, observed that the services rendered by ad hoc employees prior to their regularization cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority while interpreting the Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad Hoc Appointment Rules. This Court noted that under the applicable Rules, “substantive appointment” does not include ad hoc appointment and thus seniority which has to be counted from “substantive appointment” would not include ad hoc service. This Court also clarified that the judgement in Direct Recruits (supra) cannot be relied upon to confer the benefit of seniority based on ad hoc service since it clearly states that ad hoc appointments made as stop gap arrangements do not render the ad hoc service eligible for determining seniority. This Court speaking through Justice MR Shah made the following observations: “36. This Court speaking through Justice MR Shah made the following observations: “36. The sum and substance of the above discussion would be that on a fair reading of the 1979 Rules, extended from time to time; initial appointment orders in the year 1985 and the subsequent order of regularization in the year 1989 of the ad hoc appointees and on a fair reading of the relevant Service Rules, namely Service Rules, 1993 and the Seniority Rules, 1991, our conclusion would be that the services rendered by the ad hoc appointees prior to their regularization as per the 1979 Rules shall not be counted for the purpose of seniority, vis-à-vis, the direct recruits who were appointed prior to 1989 and they are not entitled to seniority from the date of their initial appointment in the year 1985. The resultant effect would be that the subsequent re-determination of the seniority in the year 2016 cannot be sustained which was considering the services rendered by ad hoc appointees prior to 1989, i.e., from the date of their initial appointment in 1985. This cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and the seniority list of 2001 counting the services rendered by ad hoc appointees from the date of their regularization in the year 1989 is to be restored. 37. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. (supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the ad hoc appointees is concerned, it is required to be noted that even in the said decision also, it is observed and held that where initial appointment was made only ad hoc as a stop gap arrangement and not according to the rules, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. In the case before this Court, the appointments were made to a post according to rule but as ad hoc and subsequently they were confirmed and to that this Court observed and held that where appointments made in accordance with the rules, seniority is to be counted from the date of such appointment and not from the date of confirmation. In the present case, it is not the case of confirmation of the service of ad hoc appointees in the year 1989. In the present case, it is not the case of confirmation of the service of ad hoc appointees in the year 1989. In the year 1989, their services are regularized after following due procedure as required under the 1979 Rules and after their names were recommended by the Selection Committee constituted under the 1979 Rules. As observed hereinabove, the appointments in the year 1989 after their names were recommended by the Selection Committee constituted as per the 1979 Rules can be said to be the “substantive appointments”. Therefore, even on CA 6026-28/2021 facts also, the decision in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. (supra) shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the decision of this Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. (supra) was considered by this Court in the case of Santosh Kumar (supra) when this Court interpreted the very 1979 Rules.” The notification dated 3 May 1977 stated that the ad hoc appointments were made in administrative interest in anticipation of regular appointments and on account of delay that takes place in making regular appointment through the concerned agencies. In this regard, the vacancies were notified to the Employment Exchange or advertisements were issued, as the case maybe, by appointing authorities. The appointments were not made on the recommendation of the Punjab Subordinate Service Selection Board. However, subsequently a policy decision was made to regularize the ad hoc appointees since their ouster after a considerable period of service would have entailed hardship. Thus, the initial appointment was supposed to be a stop gap arrangement, besides being not in accordance with the rules, and the ad hoc service cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority." 24. In view of above, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is entitled for seniority only from the date of his substantive appointment on 25.01.1995, which has been made after considering his case by the Selection Committee in accordance with law. Therefore this Court is of the view that there is no illegality or error in the impugned order challenged in the present writ petition. The writ petition has been filed on mis-conceived grounds and it lacks merit. 25. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.